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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM 1.
groups for which personnel complements are known,, suggesting chat as many0 troops are involved. This continuing high rate of infiltration from tha North isbecause bad weather beginning in May in the Laotian infiltration corridor normally slows troop movements.
ersonnel, lowering the average strength of this month's infiltration groups to wellorm6 since the first of this ye
5. Tha evidence in support of the theory that
moreove already deployed from the
to be found ml captured docuner.ts, .indirst is thefththinto South Vietnam by January of this year. These units,roops, were not included in the estimate
Tntiitx-ationrobably do not include all the groups wnicn nave moved during the past fouralf months. Although they find it impossible atto figure out how many are being missed while en route, they acknowledge that total deployments may be well in excess of current estimates.
7. This impression is supported by thewho have supplied infiltration group numbers
There is no solid indication that Northdepleting its strategic reserve of trained combatin order to keep up the present high level of Host of the major North Vietnameseassigned to the defense of the homeland show nomoving from the North at this time. Rather itthe current wave of infiltrating personnel isof draftees, reserves, and an unknown number
Evidence is growing that North Vietnam ia drawing heavily on "second echelon" manpower in order to carry on infiltration to the south. Captives taken in recent engagements in South Vietnam contain an increasing proportion of young, ill-trained, poori motivated, and physically unfit troops. It seems likely that persons previously exempt from service for reasons of health now are being taken.
It is possible that Hanoi has decided that all such individuals canontributionear when so much is at stake. Some of them could be used in support of the expanded logistic system required by tho deployment of an unprecedented number of troops. Those who are assignad to combat units may be regarded as cannon fodder in keeping up the kind of military pressure the enemy hopes to maintain during the next few months.