C MUTUAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IB8
SUBJECT: US INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO tiONTTCIi
CEHTAIN LIHTPATIOKS ON SOVTET STKATECIC WEAl'ONS PitOGRAMS
THE lltOQLHM
To estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor by untiunnl means limitations on certain Soviet otroteglc capabilities over the next five years or oo.
MOTE
The Intelligence Ccuarasiilty has been asked to review SUEitled as above, dated lUnd to ui-Jete tuut estimate because of the recent Soviet proposal regarding the dlecucKjon of certain nrws control measures. In thltwc give pi Imorj consideration lo the nbllity of lotelllgencc to
nonllor tho deployment. Of certain otroicfcie weapon nyuterau, but w0 also consider thc likelihood of our detecting certain qualitative Improvements to various weapon systems.
CONCLUSIONS
A- In the continued oboencearge-scale Soviet prpRron of deception and concealment, wc believe thot we would olcoat cer-taluly detect any extensive new deployment In strategic forces, although the Soviets could probably effect small-scale lncrcaocu without our knowledge. Tbe timing of detection ond identification would vary with the nature and size of the program. Vc probably wouldand-mobile offensive uyctera, for example, but
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^jit would be difficult to determine tbe magnitude oi"orce-
B. We would almost certainly detect any large-scalerogram, but we could nut always expect to assess accuratelyax objectl'oeo or even thc precise nature of the system being tented. Our cnpabllitleoly better in the coce Of
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offcnsive ttiuD of defensive weapons. Wc believe, for cxuraple, that, ve could detect ond Identify Soviet tcGt-ing of multiple Independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MUTVg) for intercontinental ballistic missiles. We could probably also detect test activity oSGOciated with antic nlssllc (ADM) system,^
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C. Our capabilities for detecting qualitative improvements in thc deployed forces ore better in the cooe of defensive veopooG ttioD offensive onec- Tourface-to-olr missile (SAM) system for an ABM role vould require such extensive changes tbat come would almost certainly be detected tuid identified^
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We see no prospect of deteialnlng whether MlBVs (if developed) or other clfjnlficent lmprovescntueen Incorporated In deployed offeuGlve olssilen.
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D. Soviet cieployccpt of deception and concealmentarge-scale would, of course, degrade our capabilities. While we still believe that substantial new deployment would almost certainly be detected, detection would come later in thc prograov-
B. Factors affecting InteUigence collection win vary over the period of this estimate, but inteUigence is not expected to be able to guarantee that tbe Soviets have not violated ooe or more provisions of an agreement.
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DISCUSSION
I. US HCWTOHIrffi CAPABILITIES
1. The basic problems for intelligence, oo iteapons llmltatlorj agreement, ore toto Interpret it correctly, and to catiofy USof the validity of those interpretations in time fortake appropriate action. No Ginglc aourcc-of informationexclusively relied upon for these purpooee, although theof overhead photography and signal Intelligencemake them essential eourceo. RegardIcgg ofintelligence cannot be expected to guarantee thathave oot violated one or more proviciooo of ongeneral, our confidence Inviolations
will lncreaoc ln proportion to the extent of deployment or testing involved.
?. He bovc generally been succcaoful ln Identifying new programs during thc tcot phaae, ond, except for defensiveest dato hot been nn lupoi'tnnt aource of Information on
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characteristics. It should bo remembered, however, tuut new strategic weapon uyotcmu wiU have been in research and development for several years before they arc detected In tbe test phase. Our collection capabilities arc lower with respect to production;^
J In rcgord toweigh degree of confidence lb our cotluiotcfi of current order-of-battle for Soviet strategic forces; the physical aagnltude of most ol these programs nnd of their supporting cle-ocntH hup made them rcudlly Identifiable
3- Over tbe period of this estimate, wc believe that our capabilities to collect ondnformation Soviet strategic programs win continue to
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At tbc dodc tlcc, qualitative improvementc Id oone Soviet weapon 6ynloowi will probably be nsore dIfflcult for uc to nonltor. During thc period of tbla ectlmntc, we believe thot tbc SovieU could probably effect oioor increases ln various elements of their strategic forces without our knowledge, but thot anynew deployment In any of these elements almost certainly would be detectedn some cosca early In the program, in others not until Inter.
>f. In tbc following dlacuoalon, we will attempt to indicate the degree of confidence which wc have In our ability to detect further deployment or Improvements to certain specific Soviet strategic weapon systems under ooct normal circumstances- We reserveater section our consideration or Soviet capabilities to evade detection through deception, cooceminent, or Interference.
II. oTIuVTECIC WFAPOSS DEPLOYMQiT
A. Fixed Strategic Defensive Systems
5- US Intelligence hoc been able to detect tbe deployment Of tbc two latest Soviet strategic defensive missile syctcmn, the
Moscow aotlballlovic mlacilccLcra and tlieTallinnell before thoae oyctemi, reached Initial operational capability (IOC) yctemsbe readily Identified, and ve believe Hint virtuallytCG hove been located anddditional deployment would be detected oL on early Wc recognized thc Moscow eye teasossible ABM3 ond mode thiG estimate finae believe tbat thlc system vill reach IOC later this year. ttlC Tallinn cycled vao identifiedhree years beforeOn the basic of this experience, ve believe that ve could delect thc Initial deploymentcv fixed strategic defensive
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6. We cannot, however, guarantee that ve could male confident and detailed noalyiien of the capabilitiesew defensive missile systcm against balliatic missiles
l/On tbe overage,omplexes have been detectcdQ
Jaboutears have been
required to bring tbcra to op'-iational status.
Strategic Defensive Syatetas
0. AEH systems do not lend themselves rcodlly toeans for ovoldlng detection- For example, to fulfill thclr functions, launchers should be in or Dear firing position at all tlatea. Present ABM systems require conspicuous supportparticularly large, fixed, phased-array radars for the acquisition of target data. To be effective, en ABM system would have toarge number of launcher* with associated guidance radars. While the use of mobile launchers vould make it morefor us to determine tlie full magnitude of deployment, ve believe that ve would detect andmobile" system,
Strategic Offensive Systems
9. Weigh degree of confidence io our ability to detect rixed otroteglc offensive mir.slle sltea. It is highly unlikely that ony intercontinental ballisticaunch ccaplexea remain undetected, and wc believe wc have accounted for all the launch sites In thc ocdlua-range bolllslic missile/ interoedlote-ronge ballistic missile (MBBM/hIBM) force. Virtually
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all operational sites lo the present ICBM forcedetected^ ^prior to becoming operational- f
Assuming
thc Soviets continue to follow current construction ond deployment practices. It is ^lElily unlikelytrategic missile site would reach operational statu6 before being detected.
10. If the Soviets were to begin deployment of onfixed strategic offensive aiiBGlle system requiring aconfigurotion, wC would expect to see the prototypeone of the test ranges
Test Tiring activity vould almost certainly confirm tbe existence
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Large fiinglc sllos arc built inP0 monlbiJ toroup tostatus;roup ofmall silo'; the timel0 aonthr.. It is ponnlblc that any single silo within either type of group could bc ready for firing short of thcoe timcn if ibe group launch control facility were operational.^
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ornc- IOW and reveal U. general characteristic... U* believewould also detect tent firings ofBW IBlx'. or
nowledge of the prototype launcher oodwould assisto identifying "eld deployment ofmissile
U. Tlie Soviets probably could retrofit new or Improved ICBM* Into old alloe without our knowledge. Test activity on tbe missile ranges would almost certainly alert us to the developmentew missile, f"
lth cooslderable modification, the Soviets could Install XCTJm ln KRHl/lIuX alios; we still would not necessarily be able to confirm thc fact or extentetrofit progr*
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D- Lond-Hoblle Strategic Offensive Syr.teas
oolie system at one Involving atluUl, erector, ond launcher walcb eon nove aboutnnd utilize unprepared but presurveyed firingto us. rtlUiough the Soviets ore tentingwhich lend themselves to mobile deployment, weno auch weapons have achieved
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facilities, train conflguratlou ond theprobablyaols for ettinuitlng tbc generalo roll-mobile force- It would be more difficult to make auch
on estimateoad-mobile system. It would be extremelyto establish on accurate order-of -battleobile weapons aince their positions could be changed fiequcntly and they could be kept under cover.P
Joo thc other band, the poor condition or many Soviet highways would limitwhere rood-moblle launchcm could operate, ornl nill-moblle launchers would
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have to be deployed on tlie Soviet rnllxood network. This wouldefined though extremely large area for surveillance.
1^. Considering oil these factors, we recognize that the existenceoviet road or rail-mobile missile system might not become known to us in the early stage of deployment. Hc would, however, probably identify the
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Missile-Launching Novo! Vessels
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Historically, nuclear missile submarines have spent about two years of an approximate three year construction cycle on the ways; diesel missile submarines have apent aboutonths ofonth construction cycle on tbe ways. He probably would be able.to identify uniteew claar. prior to delivery to tbeuring? month fitting-out period after launch).
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^Jue believe our current mlGGilc Guboarloe order-of-battle le highly accurate. Once ncv units hsvc Joined the fleet
they ecldoai escape detection for very
Jodest buildup in missile submarine strength could, therefore, eccape detectionore extensive buildup almost certainly uould be detectedignificant number.of units had Joined the fleet.
17. The Soviets could Increase the number of launch tubec by modifying existing submarines; wc believe that we could detect such modificatJons during thc retrofit period. Our oblllty to
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distinguishev cruisesubmarine and ballistic missile units li
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10. Some Soviet surface ahlps arc equipped vjtf.cruUo oicrilcsange*ln excessautical There ls no evidence that the SovieU have Installed ballistic missiles on any surface obiP( hl)Wevcr( nor aof any Interest inrogram. Launching equipment for existing Soviet ballistic ox cruise missile systems could probablyurfaceonths. In addition to navelarge merchant ship or navol auxiliary vould be suited for such an installation-^
rofiron toumber of chipswould, of course, increase the probabilityextensive
deployment of vessels of this sort into the Atlantic or Pacific would certainly arouse our suspicion and could lead to detection.
in. ayAhnvmvE TKraovmofTS to stratum weapon syjtjw;
19. In this section we discuss thc degree of certainty with wliich we think wc con detect and define thc poraoeters of Soviet erforts to expand their strategic capabilities.by lnproving various offensive ond defensive weapon nysteoo.
A. Antiballistic Hlsalle Systems
80- We believe we can identify iaprovements ln deployed ABM
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. Tba IIbc It night take to identify andoviet effort loAM oystea to give It on AB4 role will depend on the rxtont af thei cat ion. To optimize tbe fcyetca for en
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AB$ role would require such extensive chunges Uiat come would almost, certainly be detected and probably would be identified^
Jevelopment wouldmong other thingc, acquisition inpvita from otberew fire control eyetejo awl radar,ew
^Jour capabilities to distinguish between various types Of defensive systems will probably continue to Increase over the aext few years, but we cannot estimate thc extent to which this would advance tbe possible tin* or Identificationoviet effort toAM system to give It aa ABM role.
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D. Strategic Off endive Micelle Systems
believe tbat any significant improvements toInvolve full system flight testing lo ICBM raogC- Wecei-ttilnly detect Soviet efforts to improveaccuracy of their ICBMs/"
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the Soviets were to develop multiplereentry vehicles (MIBVs) for ICBMs, we believe thattesting could bc detected]^
We probably could distinguish testingIRV system from tbo testing of multiple reentry vehicles (KUVs) or various typeG of penetration olds. We believe tbat ve vould also detect Soviet development of MIRVs for MRBMs and IBBMs^
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The chances of our detection of the development of MXRVs for eubmarioe-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) href
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Tbc testing or strategic weapons such as depressed tre-Jcctory XCBMs (DICBMtXe fractional orbit bombaroaeot systemnd ret rood ICTHoould probably be detected. Baaed on our experience vith the Soviet testing of theowever, ve believe that the identification of the particular nystem being developed might be extremely difficult. Based on this cameve believe that multiple orbit testingultiple orbit bombardment system (HOBS) vould be identifiable. In tbe unlikely event that the Soviets limited MOBS tectlng to fractional orbits, however, our ability to identify vould be diminished. We believe that developmenteliable and accurate HOBS vould require a
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Confirming deployment of new or improved missiles into existing sites might bc possible if extensive oxxJlflcotion of the launchers were required during retrofit, but it would be difficult to distinguish between retrofit and other typos of mlr.slle site work. U' tbo modification required enlarging the nlie of the launch sllos, we would probably detect and identify tlie program
] Determining the extent of retrofit of such improvements oc MIRVs, fractional orbit, depressed trajectory.
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retroed ballistic, ond MOBS into existingGitcs "ould be vlrtuaUy inpossiblc.
sulienorinc-launclied missiles, uc would expectevidence Of their naval associating
Our capabilities to detect improvements to existing missile systems vary; we could expect to detect improvements ln range capability, for example, but probably not ln oiGGlle accuracy- Alterations to submurineo to incorporate new or Improved missiles may not bc detected.
C- Radically Hew Weapon Systems
ls conceivable that technological advance willgcsbc radically new strategic weapon system which Ig notbefore the end of the period of this estimate. could undcrtoke the development ofystemknowledge, and the noveltyadically acv weaponhamper recognition^
^juc cannot now predict at what stage It woulu be recognizedew system or thc degree of success we would have in estimating its characteristics.
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IV. SOVIET CAPAIHUTIES FOR CONCFAlHHfT AND DECEPTION
26. The conclusion of no arm* coutrol agreement wouldsignify thot lhc Soviets bod decided to accept, at leastime, tbeut ions Imposed by such ao ogr cement. If thc Soviets ahould employ concealment or deception to violate thc agreement, we believe that their aim would be to alter thebalance. Any caviller stakes would hardly Justify the rlokc.
29- In planning to develop or deploy strategic weapon; in violation of on arms control agreenent, moreover, the Soviets would hove to count on successfully concealing thc programoint where they coiild achieve tbe desired Improvement in their strategic position. They vould have to weigh thc possiblecosts, ond risksajor clandestine weapons program ogalnst the alternatives of compliance with thc agreement or of open abrogation and unconstrained weapons developacot. If they decided to abrogate, they would almost certainly moke secret prcpnrationsesumption of anas competition In advance of the announcement.
38. In addition to deception or concealment, tlie Soviets could otte.cpt direct interference with US rccoiroalai-ancewhlclientlal for monitoring a" arms control The Soviets almost certainlyuclear killagainst reconnaissance satellites and. mayonnuclear capability. In addition, there are several meanG whereby the Soviets could interfere with tho effective operation of such outcllitcs. Wc have elsewhere estimated that the Soviets were unlikely to use such copabllltie6 both because of the possibility of reaction against their space activities and out of concern for the general political problems which such an nctioD might produce. Tbe orms llmltotlou agreement situation would add another consideration against interference vltb American reconnaissance satellites since thc Soviets would almost certainly anticipate that the US wouldthat thc Interference was to prevent detectionlolotloc-
V. PitOHLEKS OFIOLATION
39- It is the nature or the intelligence proccoe that much of the evidence upon which Intelligence Judgeeota arc based ls fragmentary, ambiguous, and often
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Intelligence findings ore frequently based on complex systems of analysis in which human Judgments ploy an Important rolc-
W. Our judpmcntoiven subject arc baaed on more than the total body of information collected; they ere effected by such foctora os our evoluotion of tbc various sources which have contributed, our knowledge of US scientific, engineering, and testing programs, and our understanding of Soviet behavior patterns. The problem of demonstrating vlolatiooc of en asms limitation agreenent, is,ery real and serious one because it requires not only satisfying responsible US authorities but may also call for uratng them with documentetlon sufficient toose.F
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Original document.
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