Foreign Diasem/jjp Controlled
8 SC No.8
LBJ LIBRARi Mandatory_ Case'-kiX- -
This document contains classified information aflectinG the national security of tK? Uniled States within thc meaning of the espionage laws. US Code.,. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of-iti contents In any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use Inany .manner prejudicial to thc safety or interest of the United States or for thcany foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
I ill- .
No Foreign Dis>em/No DisHrHlB!d lsl
SC No. 8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Direc-orate of Intelligence8
SUBJECT: Situation in Haiti
rapid collapse of the invasion staged byman group of non-Communist Haitian exiles hasthe underlying strength of the Duvalier regimebolstered the dictator's position. Theremain at large in the Cap-Haitienaboutnow attempting to eludehas been no sign that any of Duvalier's keywavered during the invasion. The calmmanner in which Duvalier reacted suggests he
is confident of his position.
Haitianorganizationbeen active in the Bahamas overfew months attempting to lay the groundwork foron Duvalier. In late March,xiles wereby Bahamian authorities while apparentlyfor an invasion. In earlyoat with somethat appeared to be linkedlan tosank in the Bahamas and its occupants were Although Duvalier probably had somethe Haitian Coalition was plotting an attack on
example he had reports that the exiles were attempting to obtain anapparently had no precise information on the nature and timing of the attack. It appears that the exiles had not adequately trained and equipped themselvesustained, well-organized effort.
This memorandum was produced solely bv CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and aooravnated wtth tke Clandestine Servioee.
In attempting to evaluate exile activity, Duvalier was apparently confusedumber of false reports. Onay, for example, he was informed by the Dominicans that an invasion had already taken place at Cap-Haitien. Onanto Domingo press dispatch carried the same story. None of these roports was true, and I
cruTor.ted thatonipoanding of an original rumor (noted that the reports of landings of merlanc^rms originated from untested sources.
Once the invasion had occurred,forces reacted relatively effectively. there was somein__thearea andandovae . was able toorce of aboutPort-au-Prince and sent thera by truckile trip to Cap-Haitien, Thesethe leadership of the ruthless Lt. Col.seem to have rapidly routed theremained calm throughout thethough the exiles had staged anraid on the National Palace. Elsewhere inthe security forces doubled their alerta number of suspected opponents. there have been no indications ofsupport for the exiles, although theyreceived some support in Cap-Haitien. the exiles mis-assessed the degree ofto Duvalier and failed tc takethat most enemies of the dictatorshipHaiti are effectively cowed. In addition,in the Port-au-Prince area werein the dark about the situation by Duvalier.
There has been no indication of Communist involvement in the Invasion or Communist support for the exiles once they arrived. Although the Haitian Cornmunist movement is small and badlythere appears to have been an increase in Haitian Communist activity, particularly by Conrou-nists in exile, over the past year. Oneof this was the recent arrestommunist Haitian exile in Canada who was on his way back
1 HIM]>mrs [SI
Controlled Dissem No Foreign Dissefa/No Dissem Abroad
No Foreign Dissera/No Dissent Abroad ControlletT^lisjsem
So far, however,
to Haiti from Cuba.
|he was carrying revolve weraive instructions. last suxnrrter
inreturned to Haiti.
their presence inside Haiti has not been confirmed and they do not appear to have carried out any anti-Duvalier activities.
6. Although Duvalier has recently demonstrated some concern that former Dominicanleaderis believed to be inwillommunist invasion of Haiti, there ia no evidence thatlan actually exists. The Communists, both inside and outside Haiti, have been preparing for long-term guerrilla warfare andhave been debating the best tactics fortheir strategy.
7. The invasion attempt is likely to ro-enforce Duvalier's underlying bitterness and antagonismthe United States. His representatives at the UN and in the OAS have implied that the invasion could not have been staged without US complicity. This contrasts with their initial effort to influence the US position by attempting to portrav Cuba as the sourco of the invasion.
ip-naitren together prior to their departure and told them that the invasion was the work of the CIA and part of President Johnson's anti-
Negrocommon Duvalier propaganda theme.
It seems unlikely that either Communist
or non-Communist exiles have the capacity to topple Duvalier in the immediate future. As demonstrated by this week's ill-fated invasion, Duvalier'sare loyal and relatively effective againat small unorganized invasion. Duvalier appears to have neutralized all actual or potential opposition to him within the government. Prospects are thatyear-oldhas recentlyin goodbe Haiti's "Dictator for Life" for some time to come, barring, of course, assassination.
rs ISIOriginal document.