Created: 10/31/1968

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Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses




Ai indie n'cd ovarleof

31 October 8


PogC> 33

The following infel'igonco organizations participated in the prfparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency one) the Intelligence orgoniioiions of lheof Slate one! Defense, and lhe NSA.


Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director. Central Intelligence

Mr. Thomoi L. Hughes, the Director of InreHigenee and Research, Departmenl ol Slate

ll. Gen. Joseph f. Carroll, the Director, Detent* Intelligence Agency U. Gen. MarshoH S. Carter, the Director, Notional Securily Agency Dr. Charles H. Rtlehardl. (or theeneral Monoger, Atomic Energy Com* minion


Mr. William O. Ciegar, for the Assistant Director, federal Bureau ol Investigation, the sub ted being outside ef hit jurisc-elion.


,nMnm In formal ion affecting thefllrn'HSloles

||| imr. the irons-

Toi'i'or. of which In ony monner io onMon is prohibited.








A. Forces Through. t

Air Surveillance and Control 7


Surface-tc-Air 8

U. Capabilities Through 9

Against the Medium* and High-Altitude Threat 9

Against the Low-Altitude10

Against the Standoff11

Against an Electronic Counterrncasurfl12

C Capabilities Through12

D. Forces Through


and Capabilitieshe MoscowIS

and Capabilities Through


Possible Modification of theystem17

Other Possible Developments 18

ABM Deployment19



Table I: Soviel Interceptor and Fighter Aircraft Estimatedand

Table II: Soviet Surf ace-to-Air Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics

and Performance 28

: Soviet Anu'ballisiic- Missile System Estimated Characteristics






To estimate thc strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces throughnd general trends in these forces'


the postwar period the USSR has devoted ato strategic defense. This effort can be attributed primarilysize and diversity of US strategic attack forces, although forthe Soviets must consider the threat posed by thirdChina.

believe that the competition for resources in thelikely to intensify, not only between civilian and militaryalso wilhin the military establishment. These pressuresa restraining influence on the strategic defense effort, butto reduce it below present levels. The trend for thewill depend heavily upon Soviet decisions concerning(ABM) deployment and thc related question of strategic

Soviets haveormidable system of airin depth, which would be very effective againstlow-supersonic aircraft attempting to penetrate at mediumaltitudes. Thc system is less effective against higher performance

'Tint eitlmate considers only those Soviet strategic defensive lorces located in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The Soviet antisubmarine wirfaic effort, with ils implicit ions lot Pctaru. wdl be discuued In use forthcoming NIESovietEast European Ceneral Purpose Forces."




aircraft and standoff weapons; it has virtually do capability agaiast low-altitude penetration beloweet exceptew, limited areas. The Soviets recognize these shortcomings and are deploying new interceptors, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs J, and radars in an effort to overcome them.

present, the major effort is directedounter theby high-performance aircraft and standoff weapons.of theong-range SAM system is the largest singleweapon program now underway. This system represents aimprovement over older systems in terms of range,firepower. It is being deployedarrier defense aroundUSSR and for point defense of selected targets. Wcthat there arc someomplexes, and that nearly halfwc believe thatomplexes will bc operationalThe Soviets have also been testing an airborne warningsystem (AWACS) that will probably enter service soon.deployed in coastal areas and used with long-rangecould greatly extend thc area in which incomingbe engaged.

Soviets arc also attempting to strengthen their airlow-altitude attack, but their efforts of the past year havein minor improvements rather than in any fundamentalto the problem. They have deployed all-weatherimproved capabilities for low-altitude attack, and they willintroduce more advanced SAMs and interceptors betterlow-altitude defense. Thc primary limitation on low-altiludehowever, is surveillance and control. Deployment ofhas improved tracking capabilities in limited areaseet and even below, but we expect little advancecontinuous tracking capability at low altitudesperiod of this estimate.

Moscow ABM systemnder deploymenlhas probably achieved some operational capability. Itshas apparently been cut back substantially from tlicplanned level; thc elements still under construction willoperational Wc believe that the Soviets plan additional


deployment of an improved ABM system at Moscow. ABMcontinues, but we cannot determine whether it involves an improved version of the Moscow systemubstantiallysecond-generation ABM system, although we consider tbe latter more likely. We still do not believe that there is anyof ABM defenses outside the Moscow area. We believe that theong-range SAM system is unlikely toresent ABM capability, although the state of available evidence does not permit us to exclude this possibility, and we consider it unlikely that it will be modified for an ABM role.*

C. Deployment of ABM defenses beyond Moscow will probably await the availabilityecond-generation system. Ifystem is now under development, it could reach an initial operationalineriod; like the Moscow system, it will probably be designed for long range, exoatmospheric intercept. Tlie extent of future deployment will depend heavily upon economic as well as technical considerations. Deploymentational defense systemcale sufficient to cope with thc full US missile threat docs not appear toeasible course of action for the USSR within the period of this estimate. We believe that the Soviets will deciderogram that would provide some defense for the mosttarget areas in the USSR. Some part of this defense would probably be deployed against Communist China and other third country threats.

II. We have no evidenceoviet antisatellite weapons program

nor of Soviet development of hardware specifically for this purpose. It would be technically possible, however, for the Soviets now toimited antisatellite capability. With existing radais and missiles armed with nuclear warheads, they could almost certainly destroy or neutralize current US satellites up to. during an early phase of their mission. With terminal homing in themissile, they may even be able to neutralize satellitesonnuclear warhead. Soviet technical capabilities arc such that they

'ForMi) Genhmui. u. Auhixh Qurl al Sttf, InleDftbor,

USAF. and" Joseph A. MrChrwiun. OV Aiintant Chief of StitTrepartment ul the Atroy. on Ihf minion und eirmuilillrs al UieTallinn) lyitem, ir* their footnote on page IT.





could develop and deploy during the nextean any of several types of antisatellite systems if they chose to do so. We believe, however, that the Soviets would realize that any use of antisatellite systems in peacetime would expose their own satellites to attack, and consider it unlikely that thoy would do so except in retaliation.



L Soviet strategic defense forces liavc gone through several stages ofsince World War IL Through theho Soviets attempted to counter the large US strategic bomber force in being with Urge numbers of air surveillance radan and interceptor aircraft, reinforced at Moscow with Urge numbers of surface-to-air missiless the US force obtained higher perform si nee intercontinental bombers, thc Soviets in thes developed and deployednterceptors and extended SAM defenses throughout the country. When the US, In the face of tills extensive defease, began practicing low-altitude penetration tactics, the SovieU began in theeploying the Firebar interceptor and theoth possessing better capabilities for low-altitude Interccpl than earlier systems. The US deploymenta standoffwith air-to-surface missilesas followed by Soviet development and the current deployment of the Fiddler interceptor and theystem, which have greater ranges than earlier systems.

In their efforts toefense in being against an immediate threat, the Soviets have generallyystem quite early in the development cycle, using available technology, rather than wait for the development of more advanced but unproven techniques. These systems have then generally been modified and improved during the period of deployment. In some cases, however, deployment has been canceled early in the program either because the system provedineffective oretter one was in the offing. When an improved system has been deployed, older ones arc not rapidly retired or replaced. The Soviets lend to have extensiveeployed in depth, usually withredundancy. This redundancy may give the defensesreater capability than analysis of each weapon system alone would indicate On the other hand, some elements of tbc defenses are always somewhat out of date, and do not represent the moil effective Soviet counter to new US systems or concepts of operation.

Soviet military pUnnert piobably see tlie US Strategic threat in the1 as consisting of three major forces: bombers and ASMs. ballistic missilesiK] submarine Uunched ballistic missilesliey are aware lhat thc threat will become more sophisticated and formidable with



lhe incorporation ofaires aft, ASMs, aerodynamic andpeoetration aids, and mulliple independently-targeted reentry vehicleshe weightS attack could be increased by tbe strategic forces of Britain and France; the Soviets probably view lhe British forces as simplyto tbe Polaris threat, but French mtermcdiatc-range ballistic missile (IRBM) deployment will posethreatew quarter.

The Soviets probably believe that the massive air defense forces they have built and are building will provide an effective counter to the medium and hlgh-altftude bomber threat, although tbey realize the problem of low-altitude defense ii not yet satisfactorily solved. The most critical requirement of Soviet strategic defense, and the one most difficult to meet despite moreecade of effort, however, is defense against ballistic missiles. Tbc nature and extent of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment is almost certainly one of tho major questions of Soviet military policy.

For the period of this estimate, the US and il* allies will continue to pose the principal strategic threat, to the USSR, but Soviet military planners must also be concerned with the emerging strategic capabilitiesostile China, Tbe substantial mflitary buildup along the Chinese border over tbc past few years has consisted primarily of theater forces. The strengthening of air defenses has been modest In comparison, aodeliberate pace that in the Soviet viewmatches Chinese offensive capabilities. The Soviets almost certainly believe lliat their peat superiority in offensive strategic weapons wiD enable them lo cope with any threat that might materialize in thc foreseeable future, and they hopeoUtical change in China lhat would remove this possibility. For the longer term, however, Moscow must consider lhe problem of ABM defensesew threat from the south.

Soviet decisions as to how best lo meet thc strategic threat of tbeill be affected not only by the Soviel view of the threat and the pace ofdevelopment, but also by lhe constraints of economics. Thc present Soviet leadership liaseneral disposition to accommodate militaryand mibtary expenditures have continued to rise. Moreover, within the miliury establishment strategic defense has longavored position. We estimate that ibe Soviet strategic defense effort is larger, both in absolute terms andhare of live total military budget, lhan lhat of thc US. Developments of the past year, however, have strengthened the demands' of competingboth civilian and military. Tin: Soviet leaders have shown rising concern over ihe adverse effects of military spending upon economic growth; we believe that thisajor consideration in tbeir decision lg discuss strategic arms control witb. Now lbc Occh crisis has raised new requirements; for theater forces in Europe which, logclhcr with the continuing buildup on lheborder, will piobablyignificant increase in Soviet theater forces.



Thus. wrt believe lhat convpctilton is tixely to intensify, not only between civilian and military programs, but alto within the military establishment

pressures mayestraining influence on theeffort, but are urshkely lo reduce it For the near term, at least,for strategic defease will probably be maintained at their presentwhile military expenditureshole continue to rise. The trendlonger term will depend heavily upon Soviet decisions concerning ABMthe most cosily single military program on thothe related question of strategic arms control. If the Soviets embarksizable new program of ABM deployment within the next few years,for strategic defense will increase and by lhe1 areexceed those for strategic attackubstantial margin,


Soviet itratcgic air defense forces are subordinate to the PVO Sltany (Anti-air Defense of thene of tlse major Soviet commands. They areof three major elements, which carry out air surveillance, interceptor, and SAM operations. These forces are deployed throughout the USSRierarchy of geographical divisions and subdivisions linked by multiple communications channels. Wc believe that the major divisions ateir defense districtshich are probably subdivided into someir defense zoneslthough most of the latter arc probably further divided into sectors for air surveillance purposes', integrated control over all three functional elements of the air defense forces is almosi certainly exercised primarily at lhe ADZ IcvcL

Inlo the forcei directly assigned lo it, the PVO Strany abo exercises Operational control over air defense elements of the general purpose forces at such times at tlinse elements arc required for defense of tlien Eastern Europe, air defense of Ihe Soviel forces rests with the local air defense commander; air defense of Ihe Warsaw Part countriesational responsibility. Both, however, cooperate with ihc PVO Strany in Ihe USSR and in effectestward extension of Soviet air defense. At preseni. however, lhe Soviets probably have considerable doubt about the reliability of Czech forces Wiih Soviet assistance. Mongolia has established an air defense syslrm which is probably alto closely coordinated with the PVO. We believe tbat the cooperation between thc air surveillance systems of the USSR and Communist China has ceased.

The command, control, and communications network of PVO Stranyighof redundancy, fieri bility. and reliability We lielieve that theohm! ic air surveillance icpoiting systemomeears ago

' fi' sir d'fenie eapabilil ies of Soviet genera! purpoi' loan arc discussed In llieI4-CS, "Soviel and Kail European General hirpote Purees."



been extended further throughout the USSR, to tbe Croup* of Soviet Forces, andumber of other Warsaw Pact countries. We now estimate that more than two-thuds of the ADZs now employ this system In varying degree, and believe that, it will be extended to all ADZs. Surface-to-air missile units are almost certainly Included in this system. Despite these improvements, however, there are Indications that the Soviet air defense system remains vulnerable to saturation.

A. Forces ihrough

Air Surveillance and Conlrol Systems

Thc Soviets continue to Improve tbeir extensive and overlapping aircapability.adar sites In the USSRadars arc distributed along the boundaries of the country, along barrier defenses wilhin the country, and around major defended areas. Coverage is particularly dense west of the Urals. The Soviet rites arc supplemented byitesadars in thc Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe. AD the sites have several air surveillance radars; practically all have radars which could provide information to ground-controlled intercept (CCI) controllers. Thc density of coverage increases the likelihood of detection, and frequencyamong the sets provides some defense against electronic rounterrneasuresuring tbe past year tbc deployment of new radars, especially for low-altitude coverage, continued. We expect the numbers of radars and radar sites to remain relatively stable Innear term, as old equipment ii retired at about lite same rate as new is Installed.

During the past year tbc Soviets have been testing an airborne warning and conlrol syslem (AWACS) that will extend their coverage for early warning (EW) and interceptor control.ystem uses an airborne platform for long-range radar surveillance and for the data-processing and communications equipment required for control of interceptors; lhe Soviet system employs lheodifiedleat. It will probably be operational soonew aircraft. The system could be considerably expanded with the conversion of additional Cleats;leats have been produced, ll is abo possible that olher transport aircraft will be modified for this role.


present, there arc probablynterceptors in FighterAiress than lad year. In addition, thecall uponighters ot Soviet Tactical Aviation and upon thein tbe Easi European Air Forces. Nearly all ofightersas interiepiorS;f them are in regiments which have aair defense mission.


Someercent of the Soviet interceptor force in MPVO. is still made up of subsonic or low-supersonic models introduced7 or earlier, which have little capability0 feet Most of these older models are day fighters and arc armed with guns or rockets, limiting them to attack rangesalf-mile or less. Someercent of the force is composed ofll-weatherintroduced, which are armed with air-to-air missiles (AAMs) having rangesautical milesut capable of tail attack only. The remainingercent of the force is made up of new aircraft which are capable of head-on or multidirectional attack; we estimate that they have AAMs with rangesmproved air intercept (AI) radars, and data link control systems.

estimate that models currently being deployed will continue to enterforces over the next few years, and that older models will be phasedIndicated below. These older models may be retained as reserve aircraft


S MiD-ISOS Modob



Newer Models


FktdJer* .


* models are in current production. Surfaec-'o-Air Missiles

area defense capabilities of the IAPVO arc supplemented bydeployment of thchich makes up the great bulk oldefenses. Deployment of theas essentially complete byc estimate that there arc nowperational sites of 6in the USSR, and that there areites which arc probablyto provide alternate or supplementary positions during periods ofMost ol the operational silcv arc occupied by PVOrc probably manned by thc air defense troops ol theWc believe that Soviet ground forces havebattalions in garrison in thc USSR and someeployed in Eastern

Europe. The air defenses of lhe East European countries includeites. Since its initial deployment, ibeas undergone several model changes, which have progressively increased its maximum effective range fromo aboul_ improved its maximum and minimum intercept altitude eapabililies. and givenetter trading aod electronic count er-countermeasuie (ECCM) capabibties. These improvements have continued during the past year, and are reflected in our estimates of capabilities below.

Theystem, deployed moreecade agoouble ring around Moscow. Is still operational. Under normal covditlons, the Soviets apparently keep onlyercent ofauncherstate of readiness; In times of crisis, however, this level of readiness is piobablyIncreased. Tbe Soviets have made improvements In thb system which probably giveapability approaching that of the SA-2.

Wc estimate tliat (here arc now about HOites In the USSR, of which aboutercent arc permanently occupied. In addition, thcas been deployed widely with llie Soviel forces for defense of airfields in Eastern Europe Deployment of tlieay continue for another year or so. Further analysis of thescluding radar limubitions, has led us to estimate better low-altitude capabibties for tbe system.

Deployment of tbeong-range SAM system has continued. We beheve that there are now someomplexes, and that nearly half areThe rest will probably be operational byypical complexitesaunchers each. As presently configured ihey are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack. Wc believe lhat the system is being deployedarrier defense around Ihe European USSR and for point defense oftargets.

B. Capabilities Through

A'juinil Ihe Medium' and High-Altitude Threat

air defensesormidable capability under all weatheragainst subsonic and low-supersonic (less thanircraftto penelrale at medium and high altitudes to principal target areas.Soviet capabilities against higher performance targets are beinglhci of new interceptors and SAMs. Under optimumrange at which the Soviet ground-based EW system can detect andbmited only by tbe radar horlroci. and ei. oul fromDetection and tracking at medium or high altitudes is virtuallyat. The detection range of (be ground-based EWpiogressively reduced against aircraft penetrating at lower altitudes,ol lineof-sighl limitations.


new AWACS ilfcrmfl will probably ope/alem. from the coastlines of tba USSR. Area and frequency of icaich will bo limited by the number and performance of aircraft available. This system will greatly extend the range at which approaching aircraft can be detected in patrolled areas and wiU permit tbe full combat radius of tbe Fiddler and Firebar to be exploited in intercepts under control of the AWACS. Extensive deployment of this system would improve the Soviet radar and fighter control coverage by denyingarge extent undetected low-altitude penetrations over sea

The Soviet interceptor force has good capabibties against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft at altitudes0 feet. Its capabilities would be degraded at night or in advene weather conditioni. by attacks at lower altitudes, by standoff attacks, and by attacks using decoys and ECM. Against maneuvering supersonic targets flying at speeds of over Mach IS and at altitudes0 feet, thc Soviet manned intercept capability is marginal, but is being unproved with the deployment of Fiddler and Flagon A.

Soviet SAM systems provide good medium- and high-altitude defense against subsonic and low-supersonic aircraft and ASMs under all weatherHowever (hendshort-range systems. Nuclear warheads are probably available at somendites; use of such warheads would greatly increase the kill piobabihty of these systems. Tbeowever,onsiderable improvement over older systems in terms of range, velocity, and firepower. We estimate that It is capable of engaging aircraft aod ASMs traveling at speeds up to aboutnd at altitudes ofeet. Its maximum effective range against aircraft is probably on the ordernd againit ASMs on the order ofjn.

Aodinif Iht low-Afrifudo Threof

Soviets are well aware of tbc low-altitude penetration threat todefenses, and have introduced during the pait year severalan attempt to overcome the shortcomings of their defenses. Tlsethe Soviet air defenses to intercept aircraft or ASMs flying at lowwith the altitude, and at very low altitudes are limited by thcol radars and by lhe difficulty ol maintaining trackargetclulici. In addition. Soviet low-altitude capability depends on theand alertness of personnel, weather, terrain, and other factors. Sovietover the past year have resulted in minor improvements rather Hun insolution to the problem.

uring the past year the Soviets have continued their efforts to improvelection and surveillance capabilities. They have continued to deploy radars on towers winch improvesverage ol turgcts at very low altitudes; these radars have thc capability to detect moving targets againsi


ground clutter. In area* where deployment ii sufficiently dense, we believe that these Instillationsracking capability somewhateet; in the Leningrad area, it may bc as toweet As they axe added to other selected radar sites throughout the USSR, capabilities will improve in those particular areas; future deplcn/rnent will probably be limited to likely avenues of approach.

Generally, in areas of dense radar coverage (Eastern Europe, the western USSR, and tlie approaches to major miliiary-industrial centers) the airnetwork il capable ofontinuous track oa aircraft flying down toeet. Id areas of less dense coverage, Soviet radari are unlikely to be able lo accomplish continuous trackingeet

Improvements in the AI radars employed by the new generation of fighters probably provide some capability lo distinguish moving targets against ground clutter.nterceptors in IAPVO probably now have an intercept capabilily in all weather conditions downeet over favorable terrain (and somewhat lower overn clear daylight the older model inter -ceplors, still operational in large numbers, would also be used for low altitude area intercept under visual conditions against slower aircraft. Although we believe the Soviets are workingook-down capability for their liilerceptors, we do not expect an operational capability before

levation ofissile guidance radars has given someapability down toeet. In addition, new information and analysis of thelectronics has led us to believe that thean, under favorable or cu instances, effectively intercept aircraft flying as loweetange ofun. We have no technical evidence rwveerning the low altitude capabibties of Ibeut wc think it is unlikely that it is being deployed to counter the low-altitude threat.

ho Standoff threat

lie key lactic inuccessful ASM attack is to destroy (lie carrier aircraft before they can launch llseir missiles. Once tlic attackers have bunched their missiles, the ASMs themselves must be engaged. The Soviets are deploying forces with greatly improved capabilities for both of Ihese eventualities. The deployment of Fiddler inter ceplors with increased range and attack capa together with AWACS aircraft, will rilcnd ihc areas in which ASM carrier aircraft can be engaged several hundicd miles farther from critical target areas. Similarly, tliearrier defenses will cause the atlackcrs to face an increasing volume ol defensive fire as they approach lhcir objectives; theange ofiih nuclear nr homing warheads, will greatly increase the probability of intercept ol supcisunie aiicraft at medium and high altitudes. Slwuld lhe ASM carriers successfully launch their missiles, thcould probably intercept incoming ASMs at medium and high altitudes atof aboul.

developments pennit the Soviets touch bettera standoff threat directed at targets in the European USSR from thenorthwest. They arc apparently more vulnerabletandoff attacksouth, but are improving their capabilities. Fiddler deployment anddefense of military industrial complexes will improve defenses in theeastern USSR.

Against an Electronic Coon/er measure environment

use of ECM appreciably degrades tbe performance of airSovietsreal deal in aa ECM environment. The Fiddler usestype of radar circuitry than that employed by previous Sovietpiobably cannot be jammed by most Western Al jammers. Thisbe refitted to Af radars carried by other new Interceptors.believe that thc new interceptors now being deployed are equippedmissiles and with data links for CCI. which improve their capability in

an ECM envaonmcnt. All Soviet SAM systems are designed to operateoise jamming environment; theost widely deployed in tbc USSR and Eastern Europe (but not in Vietnam) can probably degrade angle deception

jamming and select moving targets in an ECM environment. Considering Soviet

emphasis upon overcoming ECM, wc would expect theo have features

enhancing its ability to operate in the presence of ECM.

C. Capabilities Through

planners almost certainly expect the diverse aerodynamic thicaland NATO foices to continue well Into; they probably see thisthreat as ranging from low-altitude subsonic speeds up totond the ASM threat at both high and low altitude, with addedprobably consider that the deployment of the Fiddler-Moss team,and theill deal reasonably well with tbe medium- andposed by boih aiirraft and ASMi. but (bey are still concerned aboutior adequate air defenseseet. We believe thatexert major efforts inn an lo moot litis requirement.

limitation on an adequate low-altitude capability is Ihe Sovietdose CCI control, which would require many closely spaced groundwhen elevated. Although the Sovieii are trying this approach, it fosolution only foi relatively small areas Wc eipect the furtherof radars and techniques specifically designed to handlein specific nrcis, but we foresee little Soviet success intracking capability at low altitude for large arras or for (hea whole

W An improvement tn low altitude uitertrpl capability eould be achieved with look-down radar that canoving target againit ground clutter New iritejecplors prolwblyimited moving target indicator capability,


but do true look-down capability. We believe that the Soviets axeadaj with an overland look-down capability, and an AAM with an ability to pickarget while shooting down toward the ground. Such systems probably would not be deployed1 or so. The first interceptorthese capabilities would most likely be the Foxbat, which willbecome operational in IAPVO.

ln order to utilize interceptors most efficiently against low-altitude targets, the Soviets would need an AWACSadar capable of detecting targets against ground clutter. Although we do not know the state .oi development ofystem in live USSR, tbe Soviets could deploy an operational system in the, and we believe they have an incentive to do so. Tbe Soviets may also develop and deploy about the same time an advanced all-weatherruise interceptor with the range of the Fiddlerook-down, shoot-down capability.

Improvements in thc low-altitude capabilities of current SAM systems have probably approached the limits of these systems. To further improve low-altitude SAM capabilities, the Soviets would probably have toew system with technology specifically tailored to this purpose and deploy it widely. They mayystem designed puiely for low-altitude defense, utilizing the technology ol the new tactical SAM, CainfuL They could do this in the, but it would probably only bo useful in defense of limited areas; its short range would make deployment for continuous effective defense extremely expensive. Thccould alsoore advanced SAM system that might eventually replace both thendnd complement theuch an advanced system might incorporate advanced techniques such as pliased-array radars, and infrared or coherent radar homing; but it could probably not be deployed before the.

continued introduction of higher performance irUerceptorj andwith the rapid data transmission requirements of low-altitudeimpose increasing burdens on Soviet air defense communications andbebeve tbe Soviets will extend tlic semiautomatic data system to allthe direction of CCI contiollcis and SAM units We would expectattempts to impiovr the capacity, flexibility, and security of airand control communications. As lhe newer fighters continue tointerceptor force, we believeontrol systemegree ol "hands oil" computerized eontiol will lie deployed onA and later interceptors.ystem would permit theseOperateontrolled environment, allowing close roordinalion ofSAM operations

orces Through

the capability of new air defense radars will increase, thclow-altitude coverage will continue to require much overlapping and lhe

number of radar rites vritl probably remain substantially at tbe present level.

Ai dcw radars witb greater reliability and frequency diversification arehowever, the need for redundancy at each site will decline. Older radars will probably be phased out faster than newer ones are introduced, and the number of radars will grid usecline over tbe next decade.

Soviets have in the past kept large numbers of the older modelus service longer than wc expected. However, now that neware being deployed In increasing numbers, the need for extremely large

, -numbers of aircraft for strategic defense will diminish. Tho overall capabibty of the force will probably improve during tbe neat decade even though thereecline in the number of aircralt. We estimate that the numbers ofIn IAPVO will decline to about ihiee-fourths of the present levelnd to between one-half and two-thirds of the present level

believe the Soviets will continue to deploy theo as todefenses on the likely approaches to the industrial heartland ofUSSR,ocal defense of key targets and selected majorthe USSR. Based on this deployment concept, wcomplexes will be operationalf the Soviets shoulddeploy more complexes to defend additional selected targets in thethe country, anotheromplexes might be operationaleSovicls will keep thcystem for low-altitude defense of limitedthc period of this estimate, it may be supplementedewsystem in defense of some target arras during the. Ifshouldew more capable low-allitude system in the lateofndould probably decline.


Moscow ABM systemnder deploymentachieved some operational capability, llie deployment ofand Triad radars has evidently been cut back substantially Irom the

level originally planned by the Soviets. elated to the ABM

problem is continuing.

still do not beheve that Ihcre is any ABM deployment outsidearea. We continue to estimate that iheTallinn) system wasand deployedong-range SAM. We consider it unlikely lhat itpresent ABM capability, although tbe stale of available evidence doesus lo exclude this possibility *

*UWOlack ft Ihanus. ihrCW ol Sua*.aad Maf. Cen 1 A. McChrulua.ofor Ifirftgeac*.

Department of the Anny. on lhc mission and capability ol ll*Wr footnote on




A. Forces ond Capabilitieshe Moscow System

warning, identification, and initial tracking for tbe Moscowprobably to bc provided by large phased-array dual Hen House radarson the Kola Peninsula and at Skrunda ia Latvia. Theand orientation of these radars indicate that they are intendedcover ICBMs launched from the US against targets in the westerncoverage of the Polaris threat from the north and northwest Is also obtained.

"en Houseetection

missiles launched from tho US toward most targets in theSR. There are some indications, however, thatigh degree of accuracy could not be achieved for large numbers of targetsMoreover, tbe Hen House radars would probably be highlyto blackoutuclear environment. These characteristics, together with thc fact that these radars are soft and vulnerable, indicate that their primary function is to detectallistic missile attack.

believe that long-range acquisition, early target tracking, andare to be provided by another large phased-array radar, the Dogabout. southwest of Moscow. Q

3 It willbe used to control the assignment of targets to the launch complexes.

Dog House will provide radar coverage in two oppositenorthwest face is oriented toward the US ICBM threat; the southeastoriented toward the Indian Ocean. The northwest face may beand thc southeast face probably will be by


other major components of the Moscow system include thetracking and missile guidance radars (called Triads) and the Caloshmissile. Each launch complex includes two Triads andthese complexes are located atites about. frombelieve thatriadsalosh launchers were planned forsyslem. Wc now estimate lhat deployment of lhe presentomplexesotalriads andaunchers.probably have reached operational status, and the remainingpiobably be opcraliona)

c believe lhal live large Triad radarthe final target tracker and that the tsvo small Triad radars track and control thc interceptor missiles. The large radar receives its acquisition information from the Dog Houscf*

I, it may also

bo able to icceive inch information fiom thc Hen House radars.or more Calosh interceptors could be launched almost immediately after acquisition, and intercept could occuraximum effective slant range of.

The large Triad radarignificantly limiting element of thc Moscow system, particularly in sectors not covered by the Dog House or the Hen House. It can probably track only one, or atery few targetsime. Thus the system could cope withmall number of targetsime. The large Triad probablyimited capability to search for and acquire targets in its assigned sector. Butarget was acquired the Triad's searchwould be lost as longarget was being tracked.

We continue to believe that the Moscow system is designedong range, exoatmosphcric Interceptigh-yield nuclear warhead.


analysis of the Moscow system indicates that, as presentlywillimited defense of the Moscow area, but that it has someweaknesses. It appears to bc extremely limited in its ability to handlethreats as long chaff clouds and certain other penetrationlimitations on the Triad radar and on the numbers of launcherstliat it li highly susceptible to saturation and exhaustion. Its capabilitywith pieeursor bursts is probably not high, and none of the systemappear to be hardened to withstand Ihe effects of nuclearthe Moscow system is primarily an anti-ICflM system; it providesradar coverage ofart of the multidirectional Polaris threat.large radars will piobably he deployed to improve this coverage.

orces and Capabilities Throughyifcm Developmenl

ABM development is probably building upon Sovietlhc Moscow system ami its technology- Wc cannot, however, makecslimate as to llie syxlem or systems under development. It mayloward an upgrading of the Moscow system by improvements locomponents. Sueh Improvements could bc incorporated in thc existing


raciutia around Moscow1f lhe unproved version of Ihe system is deployed in additional sites at Moscow, it could reach IOC ineriod It is abo possible that the Soviets areecond-generaUon ABM system that wouldubstantia] improvement over the Moscow svsteos;ystem probably could reach IOC ineriod

e doubt that both an improved verrioa of the Moscow systemecood-geoeratioo system are being developed concurrently. Apart from the difficulty of such an undertaking, the present level of activity does notevclopment effort of this magnitude. Our evidence provides oo good basis for choosing between these alternatives, but conridering Ihe probable timing of these programs and Soviet rcrruirernenls, we think that developmentubstantially better, second-generation system is lhe likelier possibility.

Possible Modification of Ihoystem*

e consider it unlikely that the Soviels will modify thcystem for an ABM role. Considering the great technical problems associated with ballistic missile defense and the number of attack options open to theystem designed specifically against ballistic missiles would provide greater effectiveness Ihan one converted from an air defense role. Moreover, modification of the

leaf, Cen. Jack E. Thomas. Ok, AuuUM CW al Suf. tMeUigenor. USAF. and Mil On. Joseph A. McCbristian. thel Slal forf lhe Army, brfcoe thalL

J Because ef ecMtoumg uanrtamuM in our uJidentandlng ef theughtt their view that th* raunoo andol therHcm ihould be surrunanwd a, ioflW

if raghly probable the ryilem wai developed lo provide an atrr-nnbericgainst mediura and li.ghaula-surface rrunflca andlaunched ballisticots, bothpresently observed lyslem coiuKinenu and available evidence on ASM tesUng.

aie about even thil Die lyilem altodesigned lo enableABM intercept. In which mode theould be dependent upontracking sensors fflEN IIOOSE/DOC HOUSE type radars or semeentiiliied command and eontiol system, and thc use efd.ble neither mi, denies the existence orthese elements.

e.osslWr, but unlikely, lhat Ihrould performinle.eepls ofaeept perhaps jgrm.rbrSSR rlV'i wK as TITAN.

la On. Thomas' .Mw an eitnule thU sum.U-.

aBM* ereJeace liam lhe Ug* ind growing So-sel mvetfment toime when muVi .albrrpow rhe largest number ot taegeti

rSonel matrgir detent* is items

top srxrccr

ystem lo give it an ABM role would tend lo degrade iti performance in ao air defense role. Finally, such modification would probably be very costly and would involve very difficult technical problems, some of whicli arc discussed below. If lhc Soviets should modify lheystem for an ABM role, we believe It unlikely that ihey would design topecific weakness, closely following tankage)articular system.

is possible lhat tbeystem could beimited capabilitydefense by modUfyuig it to perform an exoatmospheric, posnt-ln-spaoaThis would require provision of off-site acquisition and trackingceotralired command and controlystem for excatmospliericthe missile,uitable nuclear warhead. An effective command andsystem would be the most difficult to achieve. Furthermore, tho onlythat could now provide the necessary dala are the two northernand the Moscow Dogystem which relied onewfor all target tracking would be highly susceptible to saturation by aatiack, and could be completely negated by ibe loss of those sensors.these radars haveimited discrimination capability against exo-

atmospberic penetration aids, and do not provide mulliarimuth coverage againsi the SLBM threat. And finally, wc believe that only about two-thirds of the

omplexes are so deployed lhat they could utilize Urget data from these


of theystem toelf defense or terminalwould be even more difficult, f*

^The principal limiting faclor is tho current engagement radar. It does not appear lhal upgrading the capabilities of thisexample, by providingighABM system. Deploymentotally new engagement radar, possibly of the mulllfaccd phascd-array type, would be necessary to provide an effective self and terminal defenseuhiiiiinuUs ballistic missile threat la addition. If the syslem Lsiscrimmalr among incoming objects, radars utilLiing atmosphere sortinguch higher peifoiinancc, high-acceleration missile would be requited.

Olher Possibfo Dovolopmen's

e have no specific evidence that thc Sovicls arehort-range intercept system that ulilixes atmospheric sorting lor discrimination. Character is-


lies of the large Triad radarsapability to track RVs at high elevation angles, which would be required for terminal intercept. We have not, however, detected any test programigh-acceleration missile that is required for short range, endoatmospheric intercept. Nevertheless. US programs foraids and advanced warheads may lead the Soviets to developystem. Considering development time, it piobably could not reach IOC before the. We would probably leam of and detect such development and deptoyment at least two years before IOC.

Soviets have been investigating over-the-horizon detectionpossibly for missile EW.J


believe that their level of technology it luch that they may be able to detect ballistic missile bunches out toe have no evidence now of an operational OHD system for detection of missile bunches, and we cannot tell when or even if the Soviets couldufBciently reliable system to warrant deployment. The Soviets may now also be developing space-borne systems (such as infrared launch detection sensors) which could bc used in support of their strategic defense forces.

ABM Deploymenl

ABM deployment is probably the subject ol continuing andwithin the Soviet military and politicalecision hasbeen made to halt any extension of the current Moscow system.are undoubtedly those who advocate primary reliance on strategicand oppose further extension of ballistic missile defenses as well aswish to extend such defenses as soon as an improved system isif there were no possibility of strategic arms control any decisionquestions would probably be held in abeyance pending technicalof the problems involved: nevertheless rhey almost certainly remainIf an agreement on strategic arms control is concluded, anyABM deployment would depend upon its terms, but io its absence,will almost certainly extend their ABM defenses beyond thethough the timing and cslml of such deployment remains

GO. Wc behevc that the logical first step in any future ABM deployment would be to augment the defenses or Moscow. As we have noted above, new deploymenl at Moscow could involve clllscr .in unproved version of thc Moscow ARM system will, an IOC int periodubstantially bctlcr.


second-generation rptaching IOC ineriod We consider (hc latter possibility more hkely. Whichever of these systems is involved,the additional deployment at Moscow will probably bring the number of launchers at least to tho level originally planned.

doubt that the Soviets would consider even an improved vers ionMoscow system suitable for widespread deployment. Deployment ofbeyond Moscow will probably await tbe availability ofIhe first of these defenses could become operaUonal Ln tlieifystem Is now under development. Like the Moscowwill probably be designed for long range eaoarmmpheric intercept. Wothat the Soviets will eventually see tbe need to supplement these long- systemshort range terminal intercept system for point defense of key targets. Deployment ofystem could begin in the. but

would probably enter service later.

extent of ABM deployment beyond Moscow will depend heavilyas well as technical considerations. Deploymentcale sufficient to cope with the full US missile threat doeseasible course of action for the USSR over the nextears.improvements in US forces, however, have almost certainly addedexisting pressures to provide defenses for key target areas. Thcto proceed with ABM deployment has probatly also strengthenedWe beheve that thc result is likely toompromise, andSovieis will deciderogram that would provide some defensemost important target areas in tho USSR. Some part of this defensebe deployed againit Communist China and other third country threats.

easure of Soviet capabibties and willingness to commit resources, wc have systematically examined major weapon programs of lhe past, We nndeployment programecond-gcneralion, long-range ABM system that would be roughly comparable with th* largest and most vigorous of these past piograms would provide an ABM force ofaunchers. We estimate that procurementorce toward thc high side of this spread svould costillion rubles (approximately S3 billion)eriod of eight years, this estimate excludes theosts which would beExcept for the prolonged (Il-year)rocurement program, which went through several phases of equipment modification and cost marginally

theof Mi) On.l* MM Chid ofcOmMun. Ox AxataMStaff Im iMel^.e.

l Iho Army, oai Ox nuiooa and tafubJiUei of th* SA-Ssystem, arcfootnote on

c believe that il would be tho largest single advanced weapon program lo dale.'"


, ihe SovieU have been building an elaborate space surveillance system based upon Hen House radars. When all of these tadars are operational, they will provide the Soviets with the capabibty for rapidly detecting anddetermining tbe orbits of virtually all low-altilude satellites crossing over tbe USSR. They probably will be capable of detection and tracking out to.ear earth orbiting satelliteetection range would be limited by radar horizon to. Tbc syslem is not deployed so as to achieve first orbit detection of all new objects, but most high inclination satellites will be coveredist pass, and the network appears designed for rapid detection If. as appears likely, the individual radars arc netted so lhat tracking data can be merged, (be Hen House-Dog House network will be able to provide extremely accurate prediction of satelUte position after several tracking passes.

c have no evidenceoviet antisatellite weapons program nor of Soviet development of hardware specifically for this purpose. It would be technically possible, however, for the Soviets now toimited antisatellite capabibty. Using existing radarsurrently operational space launcher or ballbtic missile armeduclear warhead, the Soviets could almost cer-

Mi. Thomas L. Hughei. the Director of Intelligence and Research. LVyaitmcnl ofthis paragraph aa illntntive of costs rather than ai an minute of

ABM deployment. While economic factors doubUesa -JI Sruie la Soviel tSecmoas oa arvab of ABM deployment,ot enough data to judge whatunrtaOoni oo oVpIoy-meat might result from economar raoUainO. For the moment at least, UchootogKa] laUVr than economic fartorl probably aie limiting Soviet ABM deployment.

. Cen. Joseph K. Cur oil, lhe DBeetor. IMensegency,en, Joseph A. McChnilian. the Assistant Chief of StaH Im Inirlligence, Department of the Army. Ilexr Adm. rrederick J. Harlfinger. II, lhe Aublanl Chief of Naval Operalionl (loielligenca).of the Navy, aoden- Jack K Thomas, the Aiustant Chief ofntelli.

USAF. emacw lhat budgetary ami eeonomieinaWoce Sovtot de-

imaM eoMrrahBgjHMI llowvcr. uWy bebcx lhataDtsiK mimicpiogiam wdl beno higher ptmnty lhanpeiiGi past weaponot reinalitrnt with the Uaditunal emphasis pla<il on deli-nsc by Sovwl leadcis. They believe that the merit of thcystem deployment,ample, was determined primarily by an evaluation ol effectiveness andnot cost. Similarly, tlie Soviet decision con-inning the extent st deploymentl.'i-i- poiuIc delei v; lystem wdl be made primars!)

hi weighing effccfnrwris and need as well irsoufera

aao of Use second-geca-ial-on. haog langr ABM lineal lot tin lateshould letogntaa the mm of UW force may <angeery small number ol laumlirri largely fomwd around widespeead syilem Willi considerably rtKiie launchers than llie SOO-VOO tilled in


taioly destroy or neutralize current US satellites up tojn.early phase of theirafter the Erst few orbits but before thethe first day. With terminal homing in thc interceptor missile, they mayable to neutralize such satellitesonnuclear warhead; we haveof the existence of terminal homingonnuclear warheadfor suchcould possibly use tbe existing Calosh ABM system with awarhead utibxing pellets or rods against satellites up to ofm.

The Soviet ability to interfere with satellites in highly elliptical orbits or at synchronouss much rnore Limited. The Soviets can probably acquire and track such satellites by using their deep space tracking facilities. It is possible that the Soviets could neutralize or destroy such satellitesuclear weapon, but such action wouldostly and complex space operation. We beheve, therefore, that if the Soviets seek to interfere with satelbtes operating in highly elliptical orbits or at synchronous altitudes during the period of this estimate, they will use some other means.

Soviet technical capabilities are such lhat they could develop and deploy during the nextears any of several types of antisatcIJite systems If they chose to do so. They could develop andround-based missile system similar to the current Moscow system; in fact, any further deploymentong-range ABM system could be adapted for use in an antisatellite role. They might explore techniques (such as electronic interference) for the nondestructive neutralization of satelbtes. These techniques might utilize mechanisms on tbc ground, in missiles, or inanned coorbiting satellite inspector could be developed as an outgrowtharge ncar-canh manned space station in the early or. Although the costs ofystem would bo high, the operaUonal advantages.nspection, electronic intrusion,ight outweigh the cost consideration.

e believe, however, that the Soviets would realize that any use of anti-satellite systems in peacetime would risk opening their own military support systems to retaliation* They probably would attempt lo relaliatc againsi our satellites, if they believed that we were interfering with theirs. It is also possible lhat they would attempt to neutralize US mditary support sysiems if they thought lhat war with thc US was imminent. But Ihey would probably judge that such action would be regarded by the US asore general attack, and we doubt that ihey would undertake such an cHurl prim io tlie Initiation of hostilities

uller discussion of this subject, seeilelihood of lnrcifaen. with USateday IMfl. MJ. SOURCE.



be Sovieti view their civil defense program as an integral part of their strategic defense effort. This program is controlled by the Council of Ministers through the Chief of Civil Defense.Soviet marshal, whoorps of specially trained dvil defense staff officers for the day-today operation and coordination of the program. Staff officers are assigned to all leveb of the Soviet Government. All or most of these staff officers are military personnel; operational civil defense units are manned largely hy civilians. The civil defense effort is mainly one of training civil defense personnel and thc population on evacuation, disaster control, and shelter construction techniques; this is done in closewith interna! defense organizations and various civilian agencies. This training becomes more widespread and more highly publics red each year. It emphasizes planned urban evacuation nf nonessential personnel in advance of the outbreak of hostilities, and thus appear* to assume several days warning. The Soviets are probably providing shelters for key personnel but the leadership apparently continues to reject on economic grounds the feasibilityationwide shelter program for the population

mprovements in civil defense preparedness arc being advocated by high levels of the party, government, and Ihe military. There is little evidence, however, that basic concepts are being modified because of tbe accelerated pace of advanced weapons dcvclopenenf. nor does it appear that substantiallyresources are being made available. Measures taken to dale appear to be directed loward greater pressures on local administrators and civil defense staffs to force Ihem to act on their own icsjkn nihilities for planning shelter spaces, securing stocks of emergency supplies and equipment, and for mgitnizing and equipping operational units. Civil defense slill encounters some apathy in the USSH and probably will continue to loie in tbe competition for funds among various Soviet economic and military programs. Nevertheless, tlse unusualendorsement ol civil defense efforts by Breihnev atd Party Congress indicates that civil defense will have MM high-level support in pursuit of the goals it hastrained cilircnry, tested evacuationarge mobile rescue force, and secure control and communications.


TOP sccrct- -

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a 3ggs 3

Sals asgsss s

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vr Slant Miiiii-ium Intercept Altitude Maaimum Intercept Altitude

Moscow SrsTOt (ABM-1)


m ^



Missile on1

Additional Missiles ois-Slle per Launcher 1


MMimum Velocity

Marimum Warheadlbs



Full system capabilityV launched from thc US. ThUystem range basedriad/Galosh combination.



Tot the views ol Maj. Cen. Jack E. Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Sulf. Intelligence, USAF. and of Maj. Ceo. Joseph A. McChrUb'an. the Assislant Chief of SUIT for Intelligence, Detriment of lhe Aimy. on Ihe mission and capabilities of theystem, sec iheu footnote on In an ABM role, ihey believe theould have the following capabilities-


Maximum Interceptinimum Intercept Altitude Maiimum Intercept Altitude


Missiles on

Add.tlonal Missilo on-Site per

Laonther Reload Time

Manmum Velocity (fpr)

Marimiim Warhead Weight (IbsJ '






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