'J
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Communist Military Assistance Programs in Less Developed Areas
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
SubmittedIN FULL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELUGENCE
Concurred in by lhe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Ai indicated8
Authenticated:
SECRETARY,
Tpe 'oUsiwiog in; etf gence organizations pat'kipaied i" lhe ptecaraf'.rtn ef this eiff.Toto:
The Cvnvol InreHigencehu itVdi'geaei, efgcriuHuiM iAiMfiriiaii and Dcfrntc.he NSA.
Concurring.-
dit. Rufo*K>ontrol Hvlligence
Mr.heor of itte&swce'.toorth,f Stoio
Vieo Adm. Vernon L. Lowrince, tor ihoeierae Intelligence Agency. Morclioll S- Carter, lhe Director,Secoriry Agency
Abstaining!
Dr. Charles H. Reichordi. for the Assistant General Manager. Atomic Energy Cor-tnlwiop ond Mr. Williamgor. fo- the AssiHonr Director. Federal Bjrcasi Ol hivesligatson, lhe Ssib|ocS beingheir jurisdiction.
wilease through ET theIEW PROGRAM oJ tbtf Central Agaocy.
COMMUNIST MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN LESS DEVELOPED AREAS
CONCLUSIONS
he Soviet Union, China, and several Easthave, among them, extended7 billion in arms aidnon-Communist countries in Asia and Africa. The Sovietsaboutercent of this total; the Chinese lessercent
Soviets'clearly consider rriilitary aidaluableof policy. It Is used to build positions of influence at thethe West, sometimes to undercut the Chinese, and to improvefor access by Soviet forces, when desired, to ports,other facilities.
pursuing these objectives, the Soviets havesuccess and failure. Partlyonsequence of militaryWestern influence has been eroded in many countries,has won significant positions of influence in severalnotably the Middle East. Military aid has not, however,Moscow with strong or dependable control oyer clientimproved the fortunes of local Communist parties.
and instability in the Third World during thewill probably provide the USSR with additionaldispense military aid. Since thc Soviets have come to regardin arms as one of the more effective instruments of theirthey arc likely to continue to take up such opportunities.however, that in the next several years these will beimportant enough to result in aid extensions at the high.
DISCUSSION
I. THE PATTERN OF COMMUNIST MILITARY AID PROGRAMS
tbc pastears or so the USSR, Communist China, andstates ol Eastern Europe have extended7 billion inaid toon-Communist countries of Asia andheof this, aboulercent, has been provided by tlte Soviet Union.tlie recipients aru former clients or .colonics of the Western nations.they are ruled by authoritarian regimes whoso stability dependsnational military forces, and tbey face major problems related toand political stability. Noner-ehno'ogical andbase adequate Io develop and supply its armed forces with tbemodem weapons they think they need.
A. The Soviet Role ond Aims
USSRelative newcomer to international arms trade;had dominated the field before the Sovietsrogram ofUnder Stalin, the USSR's postwar policy gave priority todomestic economy and to consolidating the Soviet position inMoreover, Stalin's policy of supporting local Communistthe Free World apparently excluded the possibility of dealing withhowever anttcokmialist. FcJkwving Stalin's death, however, tberadically altered its approach toward these perinealits policy of tending support only to ideological clients, andmilitary and economic aid programs io non-Communist countries.was probably facilitatedumber of factors; the generalthe USSR's postwar economic recovery effort; the availabilityonsequence of military manpower reductions and changes Induring thc; and the notable lack of success offorces in many developing areas.
he new Soviet approach found its first expression5 when the USSR, initially using Czechoslovakia as an intermediary, began arms shipments to Egypt. Over the years, the USSR has extended someillion In military aid to countries of tbe Third World. About half has gone to two countries, the UAR and Indonesia. Five others. Iraq, India, Syria, Afghanistan, and Algeria have received aboutercent of tha total, with the remainder going in small chunksumber of states, primarily in Africa. Tho Soviets have usually offered libera* terms; flexible repayment arrangements, discount prices for the most part, and outright grantsew cases.
This estiroate deals with Communist military assistance to the countries of thc Third World. It does not discuss Soviet snd other aid prop-ami to Communist satesorth Vic (rum. Cuba). See Tabic at Annex for quantities supplied to various recipient*.
St^T
A. Soviet miliary assistance Is an important element of Soviet policy designed to increase Soviet (and decrease US) influence. It is often usedeans to gain entree into states which might otherwise be less susceptible to Soviet approaches. It sometimes help* to align "progressive" forces with Soviety. aod, occasionally, to maintain regimes in power favorable to the USSR Moscow has in recent years also used its military aid program to pursue the additional objective of attempting to prevent tlie Chinese from cat ending their influence. In pursuit of such goals, the Soviets have not, as far as we know, tutnedingle prospective client seeking their assistance, and have repeatedly shown that ihey can move rapidly to exploit new opportunities. They have, however, displayed some selectivity in selling icons and in deter-roining thc kinds and quantities of arms thoy will sell. In most cases, the clients themselves originally preferred other Sources of supply, turning to thc Soviets only after failfng to get what they wanted elsewhere. And gradually, (cars associated with taking arms from the Communist slates have greatly diminished throughout the Third World.
Thc fact lhat Soviet arms oilers have been made in svidely dispersed areas suggests that military aid policy is not designed toigid plan, but to respondpportunities, wherever tliey nrise, to estabtbb influence andThe opportunities which drew ihe Soviets Into this activity in theere in thc Middle East and thus could be viewed in the light of traditional Russian strategic interests. At the lime, the Soviets evidently thought that they had reason to be concerned about lhe poliucal-military position the US wasoo the USSR's southern penphcry. and their moves in that region were surely thought ofounter to the US presence.
The USSR's use of military aid as one of the major tools of its diplomacy probably reflects its recognition lhal in most developing countries the military is either the actual or potential locus of power, lhe military establishment of the recipient country is the direct beneficiary of this aid and stands to gain most from it, and the Soviets have generally sought to encourage contact and rapport with military leaders. Thb has been facilitated by the presence of Sovietadvisers, by the training of the recipient counlry's military personnel in the USSR, and by periodic exchange visits of high level military delegations.*
The Soviets have not used their aid programs to bargain for formal base rights. Generally, they'appear to consider tudi arrangements as politicallyThey have acquired, however, the use of fuel storage facilities at Port Said and naval repair facilities at Alexandria to suppori their Mediterranean fleet operations. And recently, they also appear to have acquired managerialof the Al-Kabbari ship construction and repair facility at Alexandria which fs to build vessels for Soviet account. There Is evidence, moreover, that they have staged combined air and naval intelligence operations using Egyptian facilities.
'Since (he start of meat prognua, theJiUry penocoel from the developing countnet in theeorstt yrmn. the nwbrr of Soviet mutiny *dvuory pcrto-neJ rervtos; to the recipient reontnee0 lanuiry.
Similar limited arrangement might be made elsewhere,eacetimebin it is unlikely that present Soviet war plans contcmplato extensive reliance on foreign facilities. To the extent that they have military interestsecipient country, the Soviets' aims appear lo be: to prevent military cooperation with the West; to seek the use of thc recipientroxy for various initiatives against Westernnd to improve opportunities for access by Soviethen desired, to ports, airfields, and other facilities.
he Role of the East European Countries
The miliiary aid programs of* Communist countries of Eastern Europe have been modest 3nd are likely to remain so for some time to come. Of8 million in arms aid extended to the developing countries to date, nearly three-quarters was provided during the, when East European countries were acting as intermediaries for the USSR. Since then. East European arms commitments have been considerably reduced, averaging0 million annually. Even so, there is evidence that various East European countries have occasionally complained about having to participate in the Soviet military assistance program.
The major East European suppliers have been Czechoslovakia and Poland: the other Communist regimes have provided only token aid. The primaryhave been Moscow's major clients, the Arab countries and Indonesia, andesser extent, India and Afglianistan. Unlike the Soviets, the East European regimes, especially Czechoslovakia, havo in recent years been interested In arms sales primarily for commercial reasons. Consequently, their credit terms have been more stringent than those offered by the USSR; tbey have insisted on shorter repayment periods, payment in hard currency, and have given nofrom list prices.
C. The Minor Chinese Role
he Chinese have extendedillion in arms aid to the developing countries, probably much of it in thc form of outright grants. This represents lessercent of the military aid granted by all Communist states to Third World countries. Though thc objectives of the Chinese aid program arebuild positions of influence at tho expense of both the West and the USSR- -tho means available to the Chinese are limited, and' dieir targets of opportunity have become fewer. Over the past decade, the Chinese havesirabla amounts of arms toon-Communist countries:ambodia. Indonesia, Pakistan, and Tanzania. In addition, the Chinese have extended token assistance, primarily small arms, ammunition, and training, to several African countries and to dissident poUtical groups iu Africa and Asia.
The Chinese have to date achieved little of substance with their military aid programs. Their temporary success in Indonesia was almost entirely the result of Sukarno's excellent political rapport with the Peking leadership; since
SEgFlET
Sukarno's downfall, thu Chinese have lost not only their arms investment hut whatever influence they once had. Pakistan, which has received almost hull of China's military aid, haa recentlyillingness to incur Chinese displeasure by seeking Soviet aid. Failures and partial setback, are not likely lo dissuade the Chinese irom continuing with their military aid program, though stillodest scale.
II. THE IMPACT OF MILITARY AID
reviewing the record to date, the SovieU probably regardone ol uneven achievement. ure, Western influence hasin many countries, the Soviets have gained significant positions ofin importantthe Middlethey were notpresent; and in some instances, thc Soviels can count on the supportclients, particularly with respect to some issues which evoke For instance, the USSR's intervention in Czechoslovakia wosdenounced hy only two Soviet arms recipients, Tanzania andgovernments, more dependent on Soviet arms, stood silent ordisapproval ofoviet move in very muted terms. On the othermilitary aid relationship has not provided the Soviets with strong orcontrol over clients, and thc fortunes of local Communists have rarelyasresult of an increased Soviet presence. Moreover,esult ofwarhey learnedpecial relationship withrecipients can lead to risks of unwanted militaiy. even
direct confrontation with tlie US; diplomatic and prestige lossesesult of the defeat ol their clients and tho destruction of Soviet-supplied equipment; and the cost of replacing lost equipment andamaged relationship.
How much durable leverage the Soviets have gained in any particular area is. of course, difficult to measure. Still more difficult toow much of any such gain can be attributed to arms shipments and how much to larger political considerations. Indonesia under Sukarno, for example,ajor recipient of Soviet arms and maintained good relations with tho Soviets, but nonetheless went on to pursue foreign policies much more in line with Peking than Moscow. The Arabs have been more cooperative with the USSR onissues, but they too before7 periodically criticized Moscow for Us foreign policies and for meddling in their affairs. India has many limes deferred to the Soviets, but primarily because it counts on Soviet support against China. In general, the Soviets have been careful not to abuse the leverage afforded them ihrough anus aid, and only very occasionally have they tried to use it to exact political concessions,
The Soviet military aid program has generated closer trade and economic relations with most of the recipients. Aid provisions frequently have called for repayment in commodities rather than hard currency, and this in turn has resulted in some trade reorientation from traditional markets to tbe USSR The Impact of Soviel arms aid on the economies of most aid recipients, however, has been
FT
comparatively modest, partly because uf the terms associated with the aid and partly because of the limited payments thus far made. Roughly two-thirds of the credits extended by Moscow remain unpaid, and the Soviets probably eipect in thc end to write off much of this. In the meantime, they can perhaps win some additional political return by generous debt rescbedubng. ln any event, the existing indebtedness has not inhibited thc USSR or its clients from entering additional aims agreements.
Thc Sovieis may expect that by cultivating members of the recipientmilitary establishment they can in time have major influence on Ihe political orientation of tbc recipient, itsnd perhaps even the choice of aregime. Any such expectations, however, arc supported by few tangible successes. In (act, the Soviets have met with outright failures in several important instances. In Ghana, some of the military were fairly cooperative with Moscowime, but eventually turned out both the Soviets and Nkrumah. Inthc military was never very responsive to thc Soviets despiie Its almost total dependence on them for arms. And in the UAR, the USSR continues to provide armsilitary establishment for whose political orientation, as well as professional quality, il appears to have no very high regard.
Tho Soviets probably never thought of military aid as an instniment which by itself could effect the revolutionary transformation they would like to see in Third World countries. Their experience of the last decade must confirm that an arms supply relationship gives no decisive influence over poUtical developments within recipient countries. Tbe Internal politics of some recipients have been highly volatile. If anything, the Soviets are nowadays more cautious about using military aiday of becoming directly Involved in internal affairs, with all the obligations and risks flowing from such attempts. If military aid buys Influence, and, in particular, leverageecipient's foreign policy, the Soviets will think they haveood bargain.
III. PROSPECTS
Soviets almost certainly intend to continue their military aidwhich they must consider to haveseful tool of policy,costs ara relatively insignificant in terms of the USSR's resources.of Soviet arms shipments to tho developing countries lasl year wasone percent of the USSR's defensebe Soviets still appear toto provide military aid wherever there is an opportunity lo advanceor to establish their influence in new areas. Tbey have recentlyfurnish arms to South Yemen. Pakistan, and the Sudan, and have madeJordan and Ethiopia. The uncertainties of domestic and regional politicswill probably provide the Soviets with additional opportunities overseveral yean. In Latin America, an area so far denied the Soviets, theyexpected to make limited arms offers, though the prospect of findingseems rather remote.
SEfRET
SfJRET
Soviet* will, we belie*e, place growing emphasis on certainof their miliiary aid program. Over the years, they have devoted aof their arms efiort to the counlries along tbe USSR's southernFrom Ihe Soviel viewpoint, entry into some of those countries is madeattractiveew are members of Western alliances. Iran nowarms, Pakistan may soon. The extension of arms offers to Pakistan,periodically been in conllict with two other Soviet recipients. Afghanistansuggests that Moscow is willing to risk antagonizing other clients, and
even to some extent involvement in regional disputes, if tbe political gains of son this instance lhe reduction of US ond Chinese influence In an area near thc USSR) appear especially promising.
By developing air and port arrangements with some recipients of their military aid, the Soviels have succeeded in providing support for their military presence in thc Mediterranean and Red Sea areas- Such arrangementsignificant potential for further development and use. Ethiopia. labya, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, which have cooperated vrith tbe US and refused to except Soviet military aid or collaboration, have shown increasing concern over these developments and the pressures which they create.
A larger proportion of Ihe military items which the Soviets furnish over thc nexl several years will probably be relatively sophisticated equipment. Tbe assortment of advanced conventional weaponsndighters,edium-range bombers, guided missile patrol boats, and surface-to-air missiles) available to some existing clients will probably be made available to other recipients. Aboul two-thirds of the weapons delivered by the Soviets to date arc in standard use in the armed forces of tlie communist countries; more than half are being currently manufactured in the USSR. By contrast,ho SovieU generally supplied arms that were outdated by their standard.
Clearly, the costs of the Soviet arms program have increased In recent years, and may mount if the Soviets satisfy demands for more sophisticated sveapons. We think it unlikely, however, that the USSR will be dispensing aid on the record scale of the. The process of replacing the obsolescent equipment of existing clientsradual one. Moreover, the states that seem to be the most likely new clients of the USSR over the nexl year or two arc small for the most part, and have limited needs for arms. Regional conflictajor Soviet client could, of course, result in appreciable increases in supply activity, as dad thc Arab-Israeli war last year.
The instability and conflict which arc likely to characterize the Third World during the years ahead will provide the Soviets with additional opportun-ilies. Thc reluctance of most Western Powers to provide arms, coupled with the competitive desire of many of lhe developing nations to obtain them, add upavorable arms market for lhe Soviets. Not all the various conflict situations svill be exploitable by the USSR. Some, however, svill be. Thus, we believe that the Soviets will continue to provide military assistanceairly large number of noncommunist countries.
ajor change in lhc Soviet approach to East-West relations and the adoption ol regional aims control agreements affecting lhe Third World would, of course, allcr this judgment. Neither appears to lie in sight. For some time. Soviet policy is likely to be based on thc premise lhal thc Third Worldheater of competition between Soviet and Western uuluence. and thai arms supply is one of the important instruments for waging that struggle. There may behe Middle East, where thc Soviets might think it prudent to seek lacit understanding to limit thc intensity of competitive arming. But it seems unlikely that they will wish lo join formally wiih the US in an effort to limit tlie quantities of arms acquired by less developed countries
SEsfRET
ANNEX
COMMUNIST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. BY
Recipient
Algeria
Cambodia
Conga (Bnuuville) .
Cvpni*
'..
Guinea
India
Indonesia ..
Iran
Iraq
Mall
Morocco
Pakistan
Somalia
South Yemen
Sudan
Syrta
Tanzania
Uganda
United Arab Republic Ye
TOTAL
f}
28
US t
tt
Eastern Europe
21
10
SO
SB
In addition,he USSR made cash sales ol military equipment to1ndhe East European countries have made cash sales tondia (J69igeria (S2he UARnd Yemen (S3 million).
EI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
ai disseminoied by Ihe Cenirol imelLgcnce Agency. Thiilor Ihe information o'd wr of Ihe recipient ond of poio' jnder hisiici onio-mowAdd'ionoi essential dmeotnorion etay ba os'horiied byofTkioii within lhcir respective deportmend.
of Intelligence ond Reieorch. for rhe Depoiirrenl o' Stole
Defense Intelligence Agency, for ihe Office of lhe Secretory of
Defense and ihe organiialion of (he Joinl Chiefs of Ston c Assistanl Chief of StoH lor Intelligence, Department of lhe Army, lor lhe Doportmoni of ihe Army
Chief of Naval Operation!or lhe Oeportmenl of Use
Nary
hief ofetoUigence.or she DepcimeM of lhe Air
force
ol Inteitgersce, AfC. for rhe Atomic Ene'gy Comevisiion
Oirector. FM, for Ihe Federal Bureau of Investigation
of NSA, for the National Security Agency
I. Director of Conirol Reference Service. CIA, far any other Deportment or Agency
This document moy be retained, or destroyed by burning ia accordance wiih applicable securily regulations, or returned to the Cemrat Intelligence Agency by orrongemem with the Control Reference Service. ClA.
s doCHPsent is efisseminoted overseas, the overseas recipients esay retain ireriod do) in excess of one year. Aiend ol rha period, ihe document should either be destroyed, returned so ibe forwarding agency, ar per-mission should be requested of lhe forwarding agency ta retain il in accordance wiih
2
liile of this document when used separately from the ten sfsosrld be dos-
DISlRIBUIIONi
While House
National Securily Council
Deportment of Slate
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of IrrvsOVgoiion
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: