MILITARY COSTS OF THE WARSAW PACT INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Created: 9/19/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

LBJ

Mandatory Review

CRAN DUM

JMI1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEof intelligence

8

Military Costs of the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia

The direct incremental military costs to the Soviet Union of the partial mobilization of Warsaw Pact forces for the invasion of Czechoslovakia is estimated to be on the orderillion rubles, the equivalent0 million (seeirtually all of these costs nay have been borne by the USSR; if not, the combined burden of the East European Communist countries wasillionillion. In some respects, this operation was comparabloarge-scale Warsaw Pact military exercise because of the lack ofand geographic proximity of the forces.0 million estimate represents an increment ofercent to the total costs currently estimated for Soviet general purpose forces

The total number of men directly involved in the operation is estimated to besee Moreere associated with theivisions of tho ground forces involved in the operation, at leastf which actually occupied Czechoslovakia. 0 personnel were assigned to the force ofactical fighter and fighter bombers andedium transports involved in airlift and resupply efforts.

The expenditure estimate reflects onlycosts to the Soviet Union over and above what it would have cost to maintain theso forces under normal circumstances. The major costs were for the ground force units and air support, which together amounted to two-thirds of the total. The mobilization of some0 reserves amounted to about one-fourth of the cost.

An attempt was made to assess all of the direct cost implications. It has not been possible to quantify the dislocation and other indirectcosts of the operation. The indiroct impact

siouf i

on the Soviet economy of the partial mobilization and occupation of Czechoslovakia was insignificant, however. The additional POL and other materials required undoubtedly were drawn from military stockpiles and can be readily replaced. Theof trucks from civilian use, notably from agriculture, in the western part of the USSR apparently were not numerous enough to disrupt the harvest or other essential civilian activity. The removal0 reserves from their civilian occupations also could have had little overall adverse effect on the economy. Even though most of these reservists probably possessed special education and skills, their numberery small fraction of the total number of such persons in the non-agricultural labor force of aboutillioi

Table 1

Estimated Direct Incremental Military Costi of Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia

5 Rubles 6 US S

Reserve

Ground force unite

Naval

Airlift/resupply and

tactical

^ Including costs of operating division* involved in invasion and loss of equipment.

Table 2

Warsaw pact Manpower Involved in Invasion of Czechoslovakia a/

a. Ho estimate of the naval forcea on alertesult of the- invasion was included, because of the indirect nature of their

Assumptions Made Concerning the Soviet Invasion

of Czechoslovakia

The following assumptions were made;

The only costs included are those over and above what the Soviets would have incurred had they not invaded Czechoslovakia, including abnormal equipment losses.

The incremental costs associated with the operation and maintenance of Hungarian and Polish units were probably borne by the Soviets. If the costs of the Hungarian and Polish units were borne by their governments, the combined burdenillionillion. No costs were included to cover the token East German forces.

Generally, costs applyix-month occupation and include the cost of moving men and equipment to and within East Europe and back to their home base, Naval costs aro includedleet-wide alert and two months of continued readiness on station.

The invasion involvedivisions, including four Polish divisions and one Hungarian division. All were at full peacetime strength (men and equipment), At leastivisions entered Czechoslovakia. Transportation costs are included forivisions that moved within or into East Europe during the operation (four divisions were mobilized, but remained in the USSR). The mobilization0 reservists,

The invasion also involved deployingighters and fighter bombers to Czechoslovakia and utilizing oneockedium transports in airlift and resupply efforts.

Twenty thousand vehicles were requisitioned from the civilian economy for use by the invasion forces. Only the operating costs for these vehicles were included, as it was assumed that the vehicles would be returned to the civilian sector as soon

as possible, but without reimbursement.

Original document.

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