CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF GROUND PARAMILITA

Created: 11/1/1968

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CLANDESTINE SERVICES

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THE EVOLUTION OF GROUND

PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES

AT THE STAFF LEVEL

DO NOT DESTROY

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approves for release pate:

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Controlled by . SO Division Date prepared t 8

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of thy paper continued to behich has been

described previously. Ont was re-

67/

placed by the first of sevoral NSC actions referred to as2 series.

2 reaffirmed the responsibility ofDCI for ensuring that covert operations were consistent. policies, and that direct action such as support to resistance, OW, sabotage and countersabotageas included in the overall definition oi' covert operations. The DCI was made responsible forwith the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) and other departments and agencies as appropriate.

Ground PM Accomplishments, August4 It was rather bitterly ironic, at least to PM Staff personnel, that this period at the outset saw PMachieve its highest announced status and recognitionrincipal staff function, then decline to its lowest depth of acceptanceajor Agency responsibility anderies of failures, compromises and disappointments. It istrue thatertain extent these unhappy results were the productack of professional expertise in the planning, implomontation and security

The Soviet Union unci Eastern Europe Soviet Russia: The operational difficulties in establishing long-range I'M assets in the USSR were practically insurmountable, particularly in view of Uie "ore prossiiifc requirementsntelligence collection. The practicality and advisability of rccruiLing and training PM assets, to be held externally until required for operational employment, was taken under adviseraont. It was recognized that such an undertaking would present very large administrative and security problems.

Czechoslovakia and Poland: ew months after the disastrous DDJ exposure in Germany, PM projects which had successfully infiltrated trained agents into Czechoslovakia and Poland were badly

compromised byenetrations oi the sponsoring political groups. umber of valued agents wereup and executed. tho projects wero considered as compromised beyond salvage.

bulgaria: m project for the introduction of trained agents into bulgaria was also compromised,

with resultant loss; ol agents.

eastny: m project, based in berlin, for tho infiltration of trained pm agents into east germany was initiated and appeared to give some promise

of fruitful results.

the near east

iran: by2 it became apparentim wasunger of indirect tnkeovor by the soviets. the government of iranian premier mossadeq, sorely besot by economic problems, was falling increasingly under the influence of extreme nationalists and tudeh (iranian communist) party. tha shah did not seem to have the will to act.

at tho suggestion of/

Original document.

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