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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Hanoi-Peking-Moscow Triangular Relationship
48
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Kanoi-Peking-Moscow Triangular Relationship
Summary
Hanoi's decision last spring to open talks with the USubstantial gain for the OSSRharp setback for China in their competition for influence in Hanoi. Soviet satisfaction and Chinese dismay over this turn of events, however, should not obscure the central reality that the North Vietnamese have made their own decisions throughout the war. They have had toazardous course through conflicting counsel and pressures from Moscow and Peking. In this they have shown remarkable political skill, playing the Soviets against the Chinese, compelling both to provide material assistance on Hanoi's terms and toHanoi's right to chart its own course.
The Chinese were playing for high stakes in pressing for an outcome in Vietnam which could be plausibly representedefeat for the US. Peking was not, however, prepared to use threats of force or logistic pressure in an effort to prevent Hanoi from negotiating. The Chinese apparently concluded that such moves would be self-defeating and thus had no real choice except to retreat grudgingly from their hard-nosed opposition to talks.
Hanoi's tendency to lean toward Moscow in the present phase of the contest was evident in itsof the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Note: memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It waa prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research^ the Office of Economic Researah, and the Office of National Estimates.
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North Vietnamese clearly judge that they can expect little support from Peking in their apparent intention to scale down the level of hostilities and probeettlement which they recognize will fall well short of their maximum goals.
As long as US forces remain in South Vietnam and the contestettlement continues, Hanoi cannot afford an open break with China. But the Northapparently intend to workosition of clear independence from both Peking and Moscow, To this end, they probably will seek economic andrelations with non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere and play down theirventures in neighboring countries. These aspirations toarger role in Asian affairs may in turn bring Hanoi into collision with China's long-run ambitions for predominant power in East Asia,
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bizarre incident in mid-October inauthorities were obliged to send troopsfour Soviet visitors who had beenharangued for over seven hours by Chinesepersonnel presents in microcosm Northdilemma in being constantly exposed to theof the Sino-Soviet feud. The long delay inthe beleagured Soviets reflects theVietnamese reluctance to become directlythe feud and suggests that this delicate matterbe carriedigh level for decision. Withindays, Hanoi was filledew roundorth Vietnamese frictions, stimulated
in large part by the Soviet and East European missions, and by speculation concerning progress in the Paris talks. For Hanoi, this episode was only the most recent illustration of the willingness of its two greatallies to disregard North Vietnamese interests in their obsessive prosecution of the great schism.
The recent sharpening in Sino-Soviet enmity is directly related to the issues raised by Hanoi's decision last spring to open talks with the US. and Peking, of course, clearly recognized that this decisionajor turning point in the long Vietnam conflict and that itewdimension that could be decisive in determining the outcome of the war. For the Paris talks posed the supreme test for conflicting Soviet and Chinese counsels to Hanoi in the past fourtest which wouldajor bearing on the complex triangular relationship in the years ahead.
The Russians eagerly endorsed Hanoi'sand have tried to portray the Paris talksindication of their tactical prescriptions. Peking, on the other hand, viewed the North Vietnamese move with dismay, angrily denouncing the US peace "hoax" and exhorting the Vietnamese Communists to continue to fight until "victory is achieved on the battlefield."
Although events since last Apriluperficial impressionubstantial gain for the USSRharp setback for China in their competition
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for influence in Hanoi, this should not obscure the central reality that the Hanoi regime has remained master of its own strategy and decisions throughout the war. Hanoi's repeated affirmations over the past four years of its determination to fight indefinitely until "complete victory" is achieved did not signify an ascendancy of Chinese influence any more than Hanoi's agreement to open talXs with the USacceptance of Soviet advice,
5. All major North Vietnamese decisions appear to have been taken independently on the basis of Hanoi's own evaluation of the prevailing military balance and political situation at each stage of the conflict. There is no evidence, for example, that Soviet and Chinese advice had any significant influence on Hanoi's strategy for coping with the situation created by the unexpected American entry into the war North Vietnamese decisions!-
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and strenuous military efforts would be requiredthe Communists would beosition to enter negotiations on acceptable terms. Neither5 or6 for negotiationseans of forestalling further US escalation of the conflict nor Chinese opposition to talks in any form at any time deflected Hanoi from its determination to steer an independent course and to enter talksime of its own choosing. When the North Vietnamese finally decided last spring that the time was ripe,pril offer of "contacts" with the US
6. There appears to be no correlation betweendecisions over the course of the past four years and the ebb and flow of Chinese versus Soviet relations with Hanoi. The North Vietnamese, of course, have had toazardous course through conflicting Sino-Soviet pressures. But Hanoi has demonstrated remarkable political skill in resisting these pressures, inthe two Communist giants to provide military and economic aid very much on its own terras, and to accept Hanoi's lead in political strategy on such vitalas the timing and terms of negotiations with the US.
orth Vietnamese Relations
The Chinese leaders, or at least the more dogmatic Maoists in Peking, had good reason to be chagrined over Hanoi's decision to begin negotiations. They were playing for very high stakes in pressing for an outcome in Vietnam which could beajor Communist victory. Their peremptory insistence that the Vietnamese Communists couldefeat on the US if they persisted in waging aconflict while shunning all forms of compromise and negotiations was not inspired merelyesire to demonstrate the efficacy of "people's war" againstpower. Peking's constant advocacy ofmilitary struggleogmaticthat the Vietnam warital role in Maoist strategy for dealing with the three fundamental challenges facing China, as Mao Tse-tung defines them: the US, the Soviet Union, and Mao's domestic enemies.
In Mao's conception, Vietnam offered an ideal opportunity toefeat on the us which, in his mind, would leadeneral diminution of American power in East Asia and, specifically,eduction in American political and military commitments toadjacent to China's borders. ommunist victory in Vietnam would be the key to removing the barrier of American influence and power which blocks China's ambitions for predominant power in East Asia. It is conceivable that the Maoists evenumiliating American defeat in Vietnam would set inhain of events that wouldopen the way for settling the Taiwan problem on Peking's terms.
Vietnam played an equally vital role in thedrive to discredit Moscow in the Communist world and to destroy Soviet influence in Asian Communist movements in particular. Peking's political strategy tried tothe fact that the Soviets had no direct stakes in
a Communist victory in South Vietnam and that theirconcern was toangerous escalation of the war. China's scornful rejection of Moscow's repeated appeals for "united action" on behalf of the Vietnamese Communists and its constant allegations of Sovietwith the US were aimed directly at discrediting the Soviet policy of limited cooperation with the US in areas of mutual advantage and at stimulating suspicions of Moscow reliability Ln Hanoi and in other Communist parties.
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10. Finally, Mao appears to haveitter and prolonged war in Vietnamaluable weapon for arousing both anti-US and anti-Soviet emotions in China and for turning the issue of China's policy in reacting to the American intervention in Vietnam against his domestic opponents. Theof US bombing in5 and the subsequent commitment of major US ground forces seems to have aggravated policy differences within the Chinese leadership. Propaganda warnings5 stressing the danger of imminent war with the US were accompanied by suggestions in the Peking press that such figures as Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching and Teng Hsiao-ping were advocating, in varying degrees, atemporary and tactical easing of tensions with the USSRime of potentially grave threat to China's security. peech inor example, Lo Jui-ching cautiously urged the need to "unite thecamp" in the interests of resisting US The Maoists subsequentlyccused Liu Shao-chi of exaggerating the threat of US imperialism5 and of advocating compromise with the Soviet revisionists. These polemical charges undoubtedly were exaggerated, but it is conceivable that Liu, Teng, and othor senior party leaders, under pressure of the US intervention in Vietnam,ourse of at least testing the offer of Khrushchev's successors at this timeodus Vivendi,essation of polemicsesumption of Soviet aid to China.
11. Hanoi's move to open talks with the US and, in particular, recent progress in the talks, clearly undercut the Maoist exploitation of the war at home and abroad. There is no evidence, however, that these changes in the complexion of the Vietnam conflict had any direct, bearing on the apparent ascendancy since July of "moderate" forces in the Chinese leadership. Nor is there any evidence that Peking attempted to dissuade Hanoi from proceeding with negotiations by threatening to curtail its material support. The Chinese apparently were fully aware that the application of such coercive pressure would be self-defeating. ignificantof Chinese material aid would not only impair Hanoi's ability and will to continue fighting andChinese influenceritical juncture, but would expose Chinaost damaging North Vietnamese public rebuke.
The disruption in rail shipments to North Vietnam early last summer was caused primarily by severe Cultural Revolution disorders and flooding in South China. It is doubtful that Peking exercised sufficient control over the chaotic situation in Kwangsi at this time to have prolonged thedeliberately ever, if it had wished todispleasure over Hanoi's course. It would have been theoretically possible for Peking to have insisted on maintaining its engineer units in North Vietnam at full strength after they had completed theirprojects. But three of five Chinese construction units appear to have been withdrawn over the past year, totaling as many0 construction troops. Four Chinese antiaircraft divisions remain in North Vietnam. Two of these have had their tours extended, however, and it is possible that the cessation of US bombing will prompt Hanoi toeduction of this force.
There is no reason to believe that even the most zealous Maoists have ever contemplated somestroke, such as direct military intervention in North Vietnam, to force Hanoi toourse to which Peking is strongly opposed. There would appear to be no parallel between this situation and thethat led to the Soviet occupation of The Soviet leaders had considerable reason to be confident that the Czechs would not fight,when confrontedassive occupation force. But the Chinese could have no such confidence about Hanoi's reaction. On the contrary. Northrecord of resistance to the French, Japanese, and Americans over the past quarterentury must impress even the most ardent hawks in Peking. There is, moreover, serious doubt that Maoist forces at the center commanded sufficient political andauthority at any point in the past year or so to have mobilized an intervention force even if they had been disposed to resortolicy of militaryagainst Hanoi.
In any case, the Chinese have had no real choice but to reconcile themselves, however grudgingly, to the fact of Hanoi's ability and determination to chart its own course in defiance of outside pressure. Peking's belated public acknowledgment of the Paris talks onctober suggests that the Chinese sensedreak in the diplomatic impasse was imminent andactical retreat from their extremeon negotiations was required.
orth Vietnamese Relation?
contrast with Peking's dismay andthe Soviet leaders view Hanoi's presentobvious satisfaction, for their two majorhave been achieved; to avert an expansion
of the war and to strengthen Soviet influence in Hanoirime means of checking the erosion of theposition within the Communist world. Moscow's massive material aid to North Vietnam has been highly effective in blunting Chinese allegations aboutindifference to the fate of the Vietnameseand charges that the Soviets werewith the US in trying to bring about an early end to the war, thus depriving the Vietnameseof victory.
Moscow has seen some advantages
ontinuation of the war, it has generally sought to persuade Hanoi tolexible course, keep-
Premier Kosygin's appaai tor an international conrerence three weeks after the beginning of US air attacks in the North. For the North Vietnamese, this appeal and subsequent Soviet and East European reminders of the advantages of an early negotiated settlement underscored Moscow'sto give unqualified support to Hanoi's pursuit of its maximum objectives in South Vietnam.
17. Despite this legacy of friction, the North Vietnamese have not hesitated to enlist Sovietin the Paris talks and have consulted with Moscow much more closely than in the past. The mostevidence of the importance Hanoi now attaches to Soviet support is its promptendorsement of theof Czechoslovakia./
Sino-Soviet Relations
have been no changes in state andbetween Moscow and Peking in the pastwould have any significant bearing on theirwith respect to Vietnam. The upsurge inin the past several months has beenPeking's frustration over the improvement in SovietVietnamese relations and by Chinese attemptson the generally hostile reaction amongCommunist parties to the occupation of The Chinese have tried to portray the USSR as
an aggressive and unreliable ally and to projectas the protector of weak and exposed Communist regimes. Three days after the intervention inChou En-lai called attention to the dangeroviet move into Rumania and vaguely promised Chinese support to the Rumanians. On the occasion of Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the Chinese reaffirmed their usual noncommittal assurance of the support0 million Chinese people."
Peking's protest against alleged intrusions by Soviet military aircraft and charges that Soviet troops are concentrating along the border appear to be no more than routine political warfare calculated to exploit Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. There are no indications of any change in the Soviet military posture along the frontier since August that might arouse genuine Chinese concern.
During the past four years the Soviets have gradually doubled the strength of their ground forces in the area and now have twenty-four divisions along the Chinese border.
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23. In any case, the Soviet build-up reflects the profound change in the political climate between the two countries. It may have been influenced by China's development of nuclear and missile It certainly has beenSovietthe violence and confusion of the Cultural Revolution, whicheadiness to react forcefully to Chinese adventures, and perhaps even to be ready to intervene should the course ofconflict in China present an opportunity to further Soviet interests.
25. The Chinese, for their part, have made no effort to keep pace with the Soviet military build-up. They have not deployed any major new ground force units to the border area. The present Chinese order-of-battle forces along theMongolian and Sovietare relatlvely weak. i
the ferocious antagonismand Peking, neither appears to have anyin escalating the verbal and political duellevelilitary confrontation. Theno appetite for inviting serious trouble onborder with Chinaime when they arein the hazardous enterprise of tryingthe erosion of their position in EasternChinese leaders, for all their verbalalwaysrudent caution inthe USSR and the US, which reflects theirof China's military inferiority inboth of the super powers. They will be careful
to avoid any premature collisions.
The Communist Troika and Future Attitudes Toward Southeast Asia
advent of the negotiating phase inconflict has broughthapter
of the triangular relationshiplose. But the coming phase of protracted negotiations andfor military advantage in South Vietnam maysome significant changes in the alignments and issues that have prevailed in the past four years.
Hanoi's Position
in the negotiations. North Vietnam's decision to enter negotiations does not mean that it hasits long-term goal of bringing the South under its control or that it is now reconciled to anpartition of the country androlonged US military presence. 8 strategy of "general offensive and general uprising," long envisaged as the final stage of the war, was designed to bringead, with the primary political objective of breaking allied will to continue the war and opening the way for negotiations on terms favorable to the This strategy, of course,lear recognition that Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces could notilitary decision and that the Communists would have to settleompromise in the South well short of their maximum objectives.
The over-all thrust of the next phase in Hanoi's policy probably will be to move the struggle away from the intensive and exceedingly costlyconfrontation of the past three yearsore limited and controlled level of conflict that will preserve Communist military and political assets in the South. It seems highly unlikely that Hanoi sees any serious prospect of final settlement on acceptable terms as long as the UStrong military presence. The prime Communist objective in the negotiations, therefore, almost certainly will be to extract anin principle for the withdrawal of all "foreign forces" from South Vietnam.
As for North Vietnam's intentions beyond the Vietnam arena, it seems unlikely that it will take any actions in either Laos or Cambodia which, in its view, would jeopardize higher priority objectives in South Vietnam. Hanoi will defend its pretensionsphere of influence in these two countries, but itajor increase in military or subversive operations there wouldigh risk oftrong US reaction that would endanger the priority aim of reducing the US military presence in Vietnam.
Beyond the traditional Indochina limits of Hanoi's ambitions, the North Vietnamese are likely toarger role in Southeast Asian affairswith their demonstrated power and achievements. They probably will seek to establish trade and diplomatic
relations with non-Communist governments both inAsia and in the outside world. One of Hanoi's principal motives in moving in this direction would be to emphasize its independence from both Peking and Hanoi already has shown interest in developing post-war economic relations with Japan and Western Europe,
Areas of Potential Sino-Vietnamese Friction
Hanoi's aspirations toarger role in Southeast Asia could well collide with Chinese pretensions in this area. The Chinese over the short term probably will be content to recognize the primacy of Hanoi's interests in Laos and Cambodia, but Thailand mayockpit oforth Vietnamese rivalry. The North Vietnamese will be anxious to settle old scores with the Thai regime, arising from the latter's involvement in Vietnam and may be reluctant to acquiesce indefinitely in China's predominant influence in the Thai Communist Party and the Communist-led Thaimovement."
Hanoi, on the other hand, will have to balance these ambitions with the need to maintain at leastsatisfactory relations with China as long as the USilitary presence in Vietnam and the struggle for South Vietnam remains unresolved. realities will oblige Hanoi to continue to exercise restraint and caution in dealing with China.imited settlement in Vietnam, perhaps no more than an armistice along the lines of4 Geneva agreement, would enable the North Vietnamese to reduce their dependence on China. ettlement would also give freer play to historical Vietnamese fear and hostility toward China,
China and Vietnam
events have forced Peking tofrom its uncompromising opposition toChinese probably will now shift their ground and
try to recoup this setback by becoming the champion of Hanoi's maximum demands in the talks. They can beto urge Hanoi to prolong the talks indefinitely, arguing that time will work to the advantage of the Vietnamese Communists. Their common interest with Hanoi in achieving the withdrawal of US forces willtrong incentive for supporting to the hilt Hanoi'sfor an agreement on this issue.
obsessive rivalry with the USSR,may impel the Chinese to take actions thatmutual interests. Soviet success5 ina strong presence in both North Vietnamharp setback for ChineseAsian and international Communist affairs. Thewill continue probing for ways to disruptwith Hanoi and this can hardly fail tofrictions with the North Vietnamese.
USSR and Vietnam
termination of bombing and theprolonged negotiations will tend in some waysMoscow's freedom of maneuver in itsboth Hanoi and the US. The Soviets,continue to face the dilemma of balancingwith respect to the US and otheragainst the requirements of their positionCommuniat world and the feud with China, f"
| Moscow
undoubtedly fears that the Chinese would be thobeneficiaries of such reduction of American power. Although the Soviets have given formal support to Hanoi1 goals in South Vietnam, the specific termsietnam settlement probablyatter of relativeto Moscow so long as the integrity and security of the Hanoi regime are assured.
37. ractical matter, however, the Soviets have little choice under present circumstances but to support Hanoi's position in the negotiations. Their priority interest in protecting the favorable position they have established in Hanoi5 probably will rule out any roleediator between the two sides. It would obviously be extremely risky for the Soviets to urge concessions on Hanoiime when the Chinese are pressing the North Vietnamese to insist on maximum terms. The Soviets may therefore try to play down their role on issues in the talks by concentrating on providing generous economic and technical assistance for Hanoi's reconstruction efforts. Moscow, however, might urge the Vietnamese to beon some questions if the talks appeared to be in serious trouble.
36, Moscow's unfavorable prospects forits position anong Asian Communist partieswill encourage greater Soviet attention toits diplomatic and economic influence in the rest of Southeast Asia. The Soviets are likely to focus this effort on promoting existing ties with Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, and they may even seek to expand relations with Thailand, depending on Hanoi's attitude toward the Bangkok regime.
Original document.
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