Tht following intnlUgwcm orgonizafrom participated in ihe preparationJ ?
The Central rrterboeoce Agency ond thooni of tneof Stole ond Defense, ond the NSA.
Co ne uit innjryi
s Dr. ft. J, Smith, (or the Deputy Director. Central.-iCi
; Mr. Ihomai L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence ond ResoOrch, Department
v.- ' Geo. Joseph f. Carroll, 'he O'roco', Dofcnie IntelligenceGen. Marshall S. Conor, tha Director, Notional Security Agency'
Ahi'tiir.ingt
Dr. Oiarlei H. Rcichardf. for the Assistant General Manager, Atomk Energyand Mr. Witliom O: Crogar, for the AssiVont Director, Federal 8ixcoo of Irrvestigotlon, Ihe sublet being outude of their jurisdiction.
This material contains information affecting TWa Nationol Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage lavs,SC,3, Ihe rrafts-mlssion or revelation of which in any mannernauthorliad person Ii prohibited.
CONTENTS
Page
CONCLUSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
II. CONVENTIONAL
II.-SOXC AND "PEOPLES* WAR"
A. Motives and S
H. North Korean (pliabilities for Rear-Area 7
C. -South Korean 8
ID
ANNKX: OPPOSING FORCES IN13
CONFRONTATION IN KOREA
CONCLUSIONS
have reviewed tin- evidence on North Korea'scapabilitiesis South Korea. We conclude (hat, underPyongyang docs not intend to invade Southdo we believe lhal Pyongyang is deliberately trying toRepublic of Korea (HOK) (nnd/or the US)esumptionhostilities. We do lielieve, however, thai North KoreanIl-song is committedtrategy of developing ain the South and that Ins campaign will continue (oof HOK and US force* inilitarized Zonearmed infiltration of rear areas.
our view. North Korea's prospectslisliingin South Korea or developing significant political supportpopulace are quite poor, at least over the next two years orviolence will, however, continue toostlytlie HOK Governmentotential cause of publicthe Pak administration.
pursuing its campaign of violence, Pyongyang seemsliveituation thatontinuing danger ofby HOK forces. Kim Il-song is apparently confident that liethe situation, stopping short of actions certain to provokereaction. If HOK reactions to Northlmost entirely defensive, Pyongyang might besome point to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ andrear-area operations We cannot rule out such efforts,Iter they take place1 would depend on how the Norththe proliablr mu-titm* of the ROK and the US.
hus, the danger over the next year or two is not that war will ariseu'liheralc decision of one side or the other, but that it
might result fromexample, in the process of probing fur wcukikrsscs and testing ROK and US resolve. North Korea may overplay its hand and lead tlie South Koreans to retaliate heavily.
believe that, even in these circumstances. Northwish to avoid full-scale war.risis, decisionsffected, perhaps decisively, by tlieof major allies. In OUT view, given no major change inChinese attitudes, both Moscow and Peking would probablyKorea toull-scale war. Yet despiteanner of thought and action is such that theresponse would In; difficult to predict with confidence. Ain both North and South Korean thinking during anylie the US posture, or what they ix:!icvc it to be. But weNorth Korea would feci that the initiaUon of majorthe South would bring about US military response,US ground forces are stationed in South Korea.
cannot say exactlyietnamese settlementt Kim's current course. It would depend primarily on how hetlie outcome in terms of US willingness tormfurther North Korean provocations. Thus, he couldmoreessive or more cautious. Given his strongto tbc promotion of revolution in the South,is unlikely that he will abandon his objectives, even though hehis tactics.
DISCUSSION
Korea's persistent campaign to undermine ilic security of Soiilh Korea entered its current phase inhen armed harassment of Republic of Korea (HOK) and US forcers in the area of Korea's Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) increased sharply. Inhe North Koreans began to infiltrate small armed reconnaissance teams into rear areas of South Knrca hy sua; and inhe first actshind-thc-lincs sabotage were committed. In late January l'at>S, sci/ure of the Pueblo and Ihe abortive North Koican raid on the presidential mansion in Seoul provided evidence of Pyongyang's willingness to run high mks in carrying out its new policy. During the spring and early summer of ly6S, however, the North Koreans lowered the pitch of their campaign ol violence; DMZ actions were fewer and generally less aggressive than in the corresponding monthshere was no evidence of OinununUI-direeied sabotage; anil there were no kriosvn rear-area guerrilla infiltrationsew agent landings on the paltern of earlier years werehe decline in violence probablyecision to keep tensions underfollowing the Pueblo and Blue House provocations.
This period of relative quiescence ended inhen North Korean incursions in Ihe DMZ area became unusually uumeruus. The DMZ activity, perhaps designedistraction, subsided in early November just after aneavily-armed North Koreans, in several groups, were lauded at points along South Korea's eastern coast near Ulchin, mnreiles below the DMZ. Su far, ROK military and police forces havend captured seven of these infiltrators. KOK losses, Including civilians, totalilled andounded. Immediately alter landing, One group of Communists succeeded invillage propaganda meeting"ype common inAsia. Since then, the various infiltration groups have apparently beenwith survival under winter conditions while attempting to escape northward by way of the sparsely-populated mountain ranges which parallel the coast in this region. Their path has been marked, however, by numerous instances of deliberate terrorism aird an evident determination not to be taken alive. North Korean propaganda has jxirlrayed tliis activity us part of an indigenous revolutionary movement which is rapidly gaining active support among South Korean workers and peasants.
WAR
developments raise serious nutations about North Korea'sis possible, for example, that the various incidentsrelude to theof major hostilities hy the Cor mm mists. The landing of guerrillatin: attendant publicity could be [taillan to claim the existence ofuprising in the South which would then appeal to North Korea
lori ll ii aba) com' iilil- (hat North Korea hopes toajor taliatiun dv 'In- HOK Ccneinittrnt, to that the war which ensued would appear defensive' and1 Ircutm with China and the USSR could he invoked.
There is msullicicnt intelligence to rule out totally such hypotheses, hut wo euntinue to Ixllcw- that the North Korean regime does not now wool another war. This-s in large mrasui.out view of how leaders in Pyongyang would assess their pnmpects of winningspttr the heavy emphasis in recent yean on modern iriiig Its armedn training raseivra and in-(Teasing local mili'ia. and on the protection of key rnihtary and Indus trial instu Hat inns against air attacks, Pyongyang almost certainly would not expect to emsh its opixinents and uverntii Ihe South as il very nearly did iu the summer. The HOK Army has become an etiocllvc forte and is substantially larger than tbe North Korean Army, itcapableuccessful defense of the coimtry aeainst North Korean force* given US logr-liral aral airyongyangcertainly believes thai theKe ot I'S forces in Soiilb Korea, quite aside from US public commitments, would virtually assure US participation in any new wm. And such participation, in Pyongyang's view, would almost certainly mean serious rl,image to the North Itself.
he North Kcavam almost certainly calculate that they could notapid and decisive victory user HOK/USiltoul heavy and continuing outside logtslieal support, ami probably manimwer. from tbe. or both. Indeed, without advance assurance of such support, they would not count on liemg able to sustain offensive uperutions in tlie Southonth or two. Under prcsetil londilious, il is extremely doubtful Ihet Pyongyang would receive any such assuraiox* in advance Irom eilberpower. Since ncttlier Moscow nor Peking eierts control over the North Korean legime, there would be little (hsjsositMHi for cither to offer upm-tndrd rornmitrnerits earning the danger nf direct involvvmmt in war with ibe US. It rs unlikely, too, that Pyougvang'1 leaders now expect to receive advance assurances of unstinted militiiiyt from Moscow or Peking. North Korean Premiersoug has said as much, privately and publicly, in recent years. Indeed, Kim has chosen to build his leputatioulobal (ommunislon the theme that, in view of tie- timidity drtuoosf ratedtbe Russians and Chinese in recent years, orJy small cNorth Korea, North Vietnam, andable effectively lo chalh-ngv and roll hack US power and influeiiee.
or similnr reasons, we think il unlikely that Pyongyang Is bent onthe HOKesumptionajor hustililieB jin hope of activating its defense treaties with the USSR andutcow and PVkuig wouldrtainlv res|iond with maicrvl and perhaps wiih men to North Korean miia-sts furgainst an invading force. On the other hand, we think it unlikely that either of them would provide supportcale necessary for adesigned to overrun the South.
Sin;pposing Force* in
III. KIM ll-SONG AND "PEOPLES' WAR"
A. AAolivet and Imerrtions
Kim Il-song has alwaysilitant viewpoint on uV global Communist struggle against Ibe LIS. After the Korean War, however, he was cautious and abided any diicct challenge lo t'S and ROK fnrcovj propaganda and politieal Mibvminn win hU principal tactics againstuccession ol' ilirtl-ComirrunrSt govcrninctit* In South Korea.owever. Km began to moveore adventurist policy. Wc cannot say with certainty what factors weighed most bcavih in Ihe timing of Ihu decision. Kim may have fch that the North was losinghe unification unsggle to an incrnasmgly stable and prugressis'e South. Il is possible ihat Kim was concerned wilh the growing apathy among his own people and hoped, hyar psychology, lo Bllr them to greater economic efforts, particularly in Ihe realm of heavy Industty. Develop, meuts ui Vietnam probably alsoole. Klin may have liekscvediigttcr level of defense readinessore hemgerent pOfturr would not Only provide aid ami comfort lout nught la-lp deter US military action elsewhere in Fast Asia With tin- OS iHeaoang more heavdy engaged in Vietnam, he may have hit that the risk ol US and HOK retaliationore aggressive campaign against the South had been reduced.
Whatever tlu- original motivation, Kim's growing nimmilmcrrt loin South Korea bas given the North Korean program ofonsentum of its own Tills is not to saya* could not curtail or csrn aliandon his now heavily publieircd campaign if il seemed advisable. Kiln appears to ho fully in command in Pyongyang and, over the past two years, has easily purged high party and government ulficiaU svho opposed his more aggressive policies and promoted those,uiuher of professional soldiers, who supported the sticks ou defense spending aial mibtart/atrnu of the populace.
y. More critical perhaps than Kim's public commilinent in any estimate of the situation i* his own state fll mind Though lie has been North Korea's leader for more thanears, the SA-ycar-uld Kim ii among tlie least known of high Communist personages in tlie world. Hut in his ireriormance of recent years, qualified observers have perceived an extreme and growing egoism, expressedraving tor veil,assertion and the limelight,nsclivity timard wishfulis Is the sort of man who lends lo blush aside or explain away any setbacks and lo persisthosen course offreely msptovuing hislong as he receives persona! gratification from the effort.
HI. What then is Kim Il-*oug's present stialegyis the SuuuV Isirm planixed scheduler Short of all-mil war, how far Is ho prepared lo go?
khiMigh 'be North Korean regime is corntnltted to tbe -tratrgs ofa 'resuliilsunary struggle" in South Korea. It is not in our view lied to any firmnor lo any particular sequence o) moves. Theobabry believe that Ihe development of an effective movementolitical apparatus
St^RET
milluerrilla capability will rerjuiiv many yens. Tin ii theoreticians emphasize dial Ilic- hasisohilionaty ration lu Iho South is still inadequate and ihat considerable timer and eimgy will be mpiircd In develop one; tlie phrase most ofsedwithin ourirn II song, however, has apparentlynot to wait for ohjcclive iiualttlons to develop vptnitaiMOtvst)', but to utilize violence and intimidation in the belief that ihe. will somehow serve toolubonary potential in the South
i" to have decided luariety of tactics, exploiting whatever Im-aks may ooeur. He mayhat one nt hit Inflltiation operations willa pocket of exploitable iliviiiium in tome rural area. In Insew luei-evtiul and Hunt my ant udiotage. auavvusatioii. or terrorist missioti* might cause serious civil nnreit. seven- political btckering, and upset tbe cconomic stability irisotiA gosirnrnrtit i> building its acceptance. He may also calculate that his new tactics, coupled with the continuing Communist effort loovert political aprwatm iuilh. will generate substantial civil unrest there. In auy case, he seek* lo exploit ihe political maneuvering likely lo precede1 South Koreanthat will intensify if Pak .seeks to amend the KOK Constitution in order tohird term as president.
Meanwhile, of course, Ihe luetics of violence may be intended to serve other, less visionary,o cmbunass ;md distract the HOK Government; to undermine the confidence ni the HOK pnpuhiee in its leaders; to impair Ihe presently favorable climate for economic growth anil foreign investment; to encourage Communist agents iu the South: and to gain support for propaganda claims nf serious political unrest there. Pyongyang also hopes lo exacerbate South Korea's relations withS. In addition. Communist operations in the DMZ area provide useful intelligence on HOK aial US dcieitgas, while rear-area activities gain inftmnalkm on HOK tapahllitici and vulnerabilities in the countrywide,
Thus, while Pyongyang'* longer range strategy may be heavily uuruenced liy the degree ofachirvid In lis various operationi, in the short term, lactses of violence are likely to go on whether operation* arc successful or not. lVougysng seem* willing to hvritiutam which involves substantial casualties andontinuing rUngrrabaiory attack. Kim isi lut-nt thai be can control the situation, stopping short of actions certain touu-scaie ROK reaction. He almost certainly expects the US to actestraint ou liar South Koreans. And he probably relies on hi* treaties with Moscow and Peking to deter ihe US
lo. lhus, the danger over the next year or two is not that war will ariseeliberate decision of one side or the other, but thnt it might result fromexample, in the process ol probing for weaknesses and lestlng HOK and US resolve. North Korea may nverplay Its liand and load President Pak to order major retaliation. 'Hie eventsarticularly those of January, demonstrated that fear of reprisal will not m'cessaillv deler Kim and his aides
fromiovociitive policy. Nor have tlie North Koreans been deterred by iheir losses along thend the virtual obliteration of their rear-area infiltration groups during lQfJ?S.
B. North Korean Capabilities for Rear-Area Operations
lti. To carry oot activities in rear areas of the South, Pyongyang has in recent years revamped and greatly expanded its various agent and guerrilla training organizations. The Korean Labor Parly's Liaison Department was oncoprimary agency for intelligencesubversive operations in South Korea.5. however, guerrilla operations were added to lis responsibilities, and its members were involved in some of the armed infiltrations of theinhe Liaison Department continues to handle infiltration of small ageut teams fur recruiting and other polilical tasks, hut perhaps because its armed reconnaissance loams have hud little success, theesponsibility for such operations has been shifted to the North Korean Army's Reconnaissance Bureau (HB).
nterrogation of captured North Korean personoel has revealed details concerning tho organization and recent activities of the KB. Originally, its most active elements were the Foot Reconnaissance Stations which dispatched small ngenl teams for military reconnaissance in tlie DMZ area.hisluis expanded in size and has added harassment, ambush, sabotage, and terrorism to its former role. Each of the tliTee North Korean Aimy Croups along the DMZool Reconnaissance Station. The most active one is attached to the North Korean 2nd Army Croup area along the we-slem end of the DMZ; it may have as manyen.
IS. Tlie largest componenl of the RR ish Reconnaissance Brigade, an elite unit activated1 and trained for airborne infiltration and guerrilla warfare in the event of war. Tire brigadeodest airlift capability provided liv someolt light transports, each of which can drop abouten, Ibe current size of die brigade is difficult lo determine because it continuously funnels luiineeS to units more actively involved in infiltration operations*.
ied Army Unit of the KB was activated int first, it competed with the Parly's Liaison Department in rear-area agent recruitment and similar missions, but soon focused on training lor armed infiltration. Inpparently because of its very limited success in tlie clandestine political field, leaders of this unit were dismissed and the bulk of its personnel and responsibilities were alisorbcd by an offshoot,th Army Unit. This unit carried out the Bhic House operation and also tho recent tenorist activities in the eastern highlands, and is currently the principal arm of the North Korean guerrilla effort.th has been organized Into platoon sized units foriu long-range |Mnietration and guerrilla warfare. Its overall strength may run a* high. Units oflh are reportedly training for attacks on major ltOK and US military installations, including surfaee-to-air missile sites. One report indicates intensive training for an attack on Seoul's Kimpo Airfield.
SEvSjTET
Tlie miiiilier uf North Korean pei^Omiel available for arincd infiltration is expanding rapidly; theit; is an increasing numlier of training bases; and regular military units, particularly the Uccunnaissancc Brigade, are being tapped for experienced personnel. Casualties mi far have been small relative, to theavailable for further operations and, at least in the short term, aretoimiting factor. Iu psychological terms too, personnel losses arc unlikely to liave any .short-term impact on the availability of Infiltrators. Cnm-partmen la ligation of the guerrilla effort and restrictions on the dissemination of information help protest the morale of guerrilla trainees who, in any case, appear toeavily indoctrinated, highly motivated, and select group.
Tlie more important consideration for the North Koreans at this time is the delivery of these men to tho target areas. Ihe physical environment in South Koreaumber ol advantages for guerrilla operations, One of the most important isile-long coastline with its thousands of islands, many utiiuhabited,yriad of fishing boats at most seasons. This makes it almost impossible entirely to prevent infiltration of guerrilla units by sea. North Korea appears to be focusing on this avenue oF approach to the South; unlike Vietnam, there is no easily exploitable overland route to "peoples' war' in the Korean peninsula. North Korea has high-speed craft for this purpose and facilities for producing more; it has given priority to acquiring, chiefly from Japan, high-performance marine engines and sophisticated electronic- gear, par-tieulaily ship radars,
Once landed, however, the North Korean infiltrators have relatively few advantages, They are apparently expected to live off tlie country; wc have seen no evidence of attempts to resupply them from North Korea. Though nigged terrain predominates throughout South Korea, vegetation in these highlands is generally sparse even in the warmer months; In the winter, of nurse,is even mure difficult and snuw and freezing temperatures make evenroblem, as iu the ease of the recent Ulchiu infiltrators. Such factors contributed to the failure of Communist guerrilla movements in South Korea in mil.
Thu Communists have other, more hosie handicaps. They may be able to count on assistance from their established agents in Ihe Soulh and in some cases fromut the overwhelming majority of -South Koreans areto assist them in any way. In the adult population, there is widespread dislike of the Kim Il-song regime based on bitter memories of its brutal conduct in the South during tbe Korean War. In addition, Ihere are broadlaws rigidly enforced; and liberal cash rewards arc given to those who assist the authorities. Whatever the motive, over tbc past two years. South Koreans .seem generally to have informed the autlioritics fullowing contacts with Coin-
' But cuptinol in IIHrators huso revealed lintnny Unit docs not adept rrcnilts wilh rcliit.vft. In .SontitThis hnub-il pH'tr of .uiJunr pojntfv.uV of
limrrivit rather tbati (lolUicill jiirniiiinn, at te*H for liili unit.
muuist infiltrators.smmurusts are trying to meet this problem with terror Utiles, bul (bis mar only further inflameMimed againstn tlie other baud, if South Koreans, particularly those In isolated hamlets, become iiurvrtain of theirability to protect them, tendencies toward passivewith tlie guerrillas could develop. At this time, the prevailing mood is one of strong support for the government in its cOuiitirinfUlration activities, bidecd.esult of their response to North Korean intrusions of the past two
years, tlie South Koreans may be much httlcr equipped pathologically I" meet
the Cfeiununist threat than5 or.
C. South Korean Capabilities
Ihe HOK is certainly lietter prepared militarily lo respond to Pyongyang's new 'tn- Over il-ISornprtlicnsivc coiintc-riiiSltrationeen developed andAt the national level,abtnrl-lrvei coordiiuittiic committee chaired by the Prime Minister. 'Hieuf Ibe Joint Staff (Ministry of National Defense) ucts as Secretary of the eommttlee andpecial Operations Outer for counterinfiltratinnwhich Ibis been set up within Ihe Joint Stulf mechanism. At the provincial Wei. there areith similarly broad representationi'uidance trout Seoul- Militaiy operations inwin try side are coordiiiated by nine lVmincial and sis Special Military Sector Defense Cornmandi
A key element of the now system is the strengllveiiing of DMZ defenses, including the trainingquick-reaction forces, the use of sophisticated surveil-lanev equipment ami explosive devices, the construct Ion of harrier fences,ion program. To improve coastal surveillance and defense. HOK Navy and Coast Police patrols have been increased, offshore air patrols conuneiKcd.tch system, with slicee-basod radars mid manned observation posts, has been vastly expanded. Tlie HOK Army has organizedpecial Conntcrinfil[ration Hatlallons. and tbe National Police haw trainedombat Policeomeland Reserve Force, drawnfrom an aims reserve In cicrssiDiou nxsi. has been establishedorce toarmy and police units in guarding mstallaliotii and itpprclmiidfug rear-arc* infiltrators. Homeland Reserve jiersonnel, however, arc issued arms only when (raining or on duty.
'Hie performance of ROK (and US) security' forces against North Korean prolics in tlie DMZ area8 has la-en good. Fewer Oomoiunhts appear to Lave penetrated beyond (he southern limi of tbe rone than was the case" North Korean casualties have increased constdrarftfah/ in proportion to those of HOK and US forces.uth sides had approximately equal numbers known to lie killed in action in the DMZNorth Korean toS/ROK troops:S, the ceerwrwidiug figures
a tenwtacr ofetween North
i Soiltll
SEQJcET
tiniiii' difficult to evaluate KOK performance in the rear areas.all tlie armed infiltrators7S were ultimately killed orBut operations against tlieiu rcvisi'isd problems and deficiencies.hy tfie Ulchiu episode i* the failure to detect and intercept the iuh'ltraliori craft. Another problem is the high expenditure nl manpower by tbc HOKs relativehe infiltrators; al (he peak of the Ulchins manyegular troops and substantially greater numbers of militia ami police may have been involved. In the "command and control" of this varied force, thereeen uiueh confusion as to lines of jurisdiction, particularly when the net ion involved crossing district, province, or armylan Is under consideration tounified coiiiitiand" of all security foices on the eastern const-
2ti. Another major priiblem, one common to almost all recent coiintcriusnrgcncy strategies in Asia, is tlie inability of the lightly-aniuxl and inexpcricncid Combat Police Companies to copo with North Korean units comprised of selected military personnel armed wilh modem automatic weapons. Police units were supposed to hear the major burden uf any initial ojx-nitlon against armed infiltrators, but nowe plans to place certain particularly vulnerable areas, such as the eastern highlands, under the permanent operational control of the ROK Army. The KOK Government is also thinking of dissolving the Combat Police entirely or,inimum,its operations to the least strategic areas of the country. The performance of die Homeland Reserve, on the other hand, appears lo have pleased Seoul. Ofr more mustered along the eastern coast this fall, however, only about one-half had rifles; the government is moving to secure more and better arms and equipment for the reservists, as svell as pay and rations for them when on duty.
ol "civic action'esponse to North Korean Infiltrations hasin South Korea. Because of the apparent lack of adequate protectionvillages and farmsteads, the government intends to stress theaccess roads and the re Im at ion of selected homes to "defensivenot on any massive scale. "Ihe many uew internal security measurescould cause, resentment among the populace in Ihe affectedso far at least, authorities have been extraordinarily sensitive to local feelings.
IV. THE OUTLOOK
orth Korea will probably continue its campaignluitassmenl in Ihe DMZ area, though the timing, frequency, andits actions will continue to be dilhcidt lo predict. It is already apparentwinter season can no longer be viewedlack period along theNorth Koreans have avoided major sabotage and attacks againstin the DMZ area forear, possibly because ROK andmeasures have been effective, but such attacks may be undertakenIn any event, tlie Communists can maintain tensions along the DM"/cost in lives and materiel, and will probably continue to do so whether
individual operation* uii nicvinnful nr nor. So longincldnits are, they will conliiiuc Io serve inuay o( Kim lUong* basic purposes.
Cuntrilla Ofmatlom. Tlie North Koreans will probably also continue (heir paramilitary und letroiist activities in the Sooth. Iu the short term, they doubtless-liope thai the net ollcct ol* such activities, whatever the casualties, will be sufJi-Hent lo generate scrums political tinrest, cause economic losses, and sharpen differences between the ItUK CovcnimcDt and its I'S ally. For the longer puD. North Korea ssillwelting to evlablnh revolutionary liase areas from which it can cipMfid its political prosclytiziiig and guerrilL warfare capabilities. Tlie recent Ulehin landings were inurther test ot tlie basibdity of doing so. Wc believe thai overt year or two Pyongyang will continue and maytease Its eflurts toialde giierrilla presence in South Korea- lu our view, however, its prospects in this regard are quite pour. It is highlythat the North Kmcaiis can succeed in establishing and maintaining base aims under tbelr control on any significant scale. And oven il isolated bases could he created, the North Koreans vould be highly unlikely to gain any significant degree of local support.
petlally if HOK reactions to its provocations continue to be almost entirely defensive. Pyongyang might lie tempted at some point to go well beyond inetiiVots along the DMZ and occasional guerrilla operations. It might, for example,aid across the line with fairly large forces, carryorniruitdo raidoastal untiuatioti.a for giierrilla attackizable town or iralustiul plan! iu tin- interior. Another cootingcocy. suggested by the8 attempt on Pak'shat the North Koreans may attempt aisother assassin jIumi or some oiIht such dramatic incident, tliougb they have not done so duringlast year, ln view of the highly emotional reaition in Sonlh Korea at (he lime of the Blue House affair, the North Koreans maysuch incidents loo risky for the psychologicnl or propaganda gains. Wc cannot rale nut iiuy such actions in the future, tliuugh whet Iter they lake place would depend primarily on the North Korean judgment as to the probableof the ItOK and (he US.
In (he even( (hat Pyongyang did challenge the ItOK in some such fashion, the ROK may respond. We cannot say precisely what (be tLislipoiiit would be. bul (In- ROK policy of restraint is not harry to be rnaltitained indcSnitely in the face uf cootiiitsisl ptuvoeationv. especially in view of their cumulative effect. ROK troop* have already made several unptiblk-ired forays Into tbe northern side of (lie DMZ in response to particularly obnoxious North Korean activities.
Overall, Iwwcvei. ROKave shown themselves willingistenounselstrninl in the lace of Communist provocations and they have focused on delcusivc measures. Tlie populace bus been similarly re-strained, at least until Ihe recent (crrorivm in the eastern highliiiids. Nor does Seoul appear eager to seize upon some Communist moveretextew Korean War. If and when South Korea does respond, therefore, if Ls likely lhat it would do
soanner roughly pmjsotiionate lo tlie provocation, hoping (hat Pyongyang would accept the rebuke without raising the slakes. Although we believe that Pyongyang would also wish to avoid actions certain toull-scale war, the dangers of miscalculation by citlier side are apparent and substantial.
risis of this sort, decisions ininbe affected, perhaps decisively. by the attitudes of major allies. In the case of Southrout deal would depend on Ihe nature of the dialogue between the I'sli lit >K.he latlei felt il COold rely upon Ihe US. In uur view, given no major change in Soviet or Chinese altitudes liolh Moscow and Peking would probably urge North Korea toull-scale war.
ritical element in North Korean thinking dining any such crisisindeed it has been so throughout the current campaign againsthe US posture, or what Pyongyang behoves it lo he. Kim ll-song. if we are correct in our earlier interpretation ol his stale of mind, could conclude at some point thai the US was constrainedariety of factors from involving itself again iu an Asian "peoples' war" and this could make him increasingly adveuiurous. ItuI Kim is likely to assume that major hostilities against the South wouldirect US military response, particularly while US ground forces are stationed iu South Korea.
e citnuot say exactlyietnamese settlement would alfect Kim's current course It would depend primarily On bow be interpreted the outcome iu Icmts of LS willingness tuirm stand against further North Korean provocations. Thus, he could bccniuc somewhat more aggressive or more cautious. Given his strong public eouunitmeiit to the. promotion of revolution iu the .South, huwever, it is unlikely that he will abandon his objectives, even though ho may modify bis tactics.
uger Term. Even if war docs not come again to Southense and risky .situation is likely to persist there for several years, at least so lung as Kim ll-song's hard-line views hold sway in the North. Under Suchpcrhupit the must critical factor will be the South Korean people, par-ticoliU'ly iheir ability In withstand Communist psychological pressures and to maintain confidence in their leaders. While the postwar reeoid in the South is mixed in this legard, we believe that in recent years the nation and its people haveegree? of viability .sufficient to ittake South Korea an.Mihjeel lor "peoples'*outh Korea has strengths never enjoyed by South Vietnam, and the appeal ol North Korea is substantially less than Hanoi was able to exert in South Vietnam iu the early stages of its effort there.
SF&RET
ANNEX
OPPOSING FORCES IN KOREA
Ground Force*
Korea. Our kiaiw ledge of North Korean Army strength ishugely from Table of Organization ond Equipmentittinkaten. Thisrganized intoT.-ry divisions, eachtrength ofen; aial fiveeachivision equivalent liy virtue uf rt>en. The Noith Korean forcearger proportion of its menunits than do KOK fortes, aial North Korean infantry units have aof automatic svetipous than HOK Army units. Thessaultproduced and In general use, is superior lo any hand weaponuse hy the HOK Army in South Korea. North Koreaargerof field and anliainmil artillery than does South Korea, but ROK andfor ammunition resupply are probably better. HOK and USabout 'WO tanks; tlie- North Koreans may haveanks andassault guns We do not know to what extent, if any. North Koreaneipilpua nt lass hem replaced or augmented hy the Soviets sinceth. exception nf thend some mutfquV tube rocket launchers,weapons ot World War II continue to predominate
- KOK Army hasen, and tlie ROKlaimbeishe army hasnfantry divisions,en, and two armored brigades ofen each.have one division and two provisional brigadm; (one of tlieis in Smithf Ihe totalre In Vietnam. The main weaknesses of Iho HOK Army areol heavy equipment and technical specialists,ack oflogistical operations. In addition, war reserves arc it very austereare two US divisions In Korea, hut both are under strength becauseinaiiningnoicover, their logistic posture In equipment,and combat service tupport is below par.
3 Any eompartvwi ol ground combat power lictween North and South is dimrtiit. On balance, however, we estimate lhal ncllliet side has the ability toustained eampaigii orecisive advantage wllliontund continuing outside logistical support.
SE^ET
Air forces
iVrirlit Korea. The Norlh Korean Air Force has been greatly reinforced by the .Sovietso Car as is known, all of tlie increase, lias been In Mig-2Is (of which an estimated SO were supplied; and such defensive weapons as surface-to-air missilesadars, aud possibly some antiaircraft artillery. In addition, Ihe North Koreans have been emphasizing tlie construction of caves and revetments at major military airfields, and some alternate airfields and landing strips are lieiug prepared. Tin Nmth Koreans now have close tot MiVf-I,,U. ,'r Mi- IV. 'litis force is organized into four lighter divisions, each with three regiments. Tho number ofites, only two inndt theof I'XsS. Is now abouif which about one-hall are Occupied. North Korea'set light bombers* give It an offensive capability unmatched by the HOK Air bony; the original force of S9 may base been diminished somewhat by attrition. 'Hie Ninth Korean Air Force couldtrong defen.se against air attack, it couldurprise attack against South Korea, but it could not long sustain effective operations without outside support.
South Korea. The HOKs haveet fighter aircraft, predominantly h'-SOs, butupersonic fighleis have been introduced in recent years. The 1IOK Air Force has been heavily reinforced since the Pueblo incident by Ihe temporary basing olS Air Force supersonic jet fighters in South Korea. HOK and US Air Forces presently in South Korea could nol long sustain defensive or offensive operations without substantial support and furtherThese forces arc vulnerable to air attacks: airfields lack the revetments, bombproof support bicililies, aud antiaircraft defenses commonly found in the North.
Naval Forces
orth Korea. Ihe North Korean Navy has been greatly strengthened in recent years. Its main offensive capability lies in atitishippiug operations by its 4submarinesuided missilesas" andith associated Styx missiles. Of these, four "Osas" were provided by the USSH iu. The submarines and "Kumars" were delivered duringeriod, 'these units, based on North Korea's eastern coast, giveactical advantage over South Koiean naval forces. North Korea alsoalrol escorts,ubchasers, aboutotor gunboats,otor torpedo boutsShexsbens" provided5 by thend aboutiiii'swei-|M'is; there are alruise missile coastal defense complexes. In keeping svilh its emphasis uti hardening key installations, Pyongyang isextensive underground facilities at ceitain of its patrol boat and submarine bases. The North Koreans have also recently accelerated domestic production of small nav.ilpatrol boats and torpedoare seeking to import suitable marine engines and electronic gear from Japan.
Korea- The HOK Navy itoastal palrol force. Its6 destroyermphibious transportsndatrol, andmphibious ships.
Prospects
changes in North Korea's conventional military capabilities overyear or two are largely dependent upon Soviet policy. The USSRcontinue to provide major defensive weapon systems, but not tliequantities of equipment which would encourage tlie North Koreansoffensive operations against the South. Pyongyang's domesticalready respectable, will continue to increase in scope andhranchlng Into such items as artillery ammunition and lessequipment, jlul its ground forces aTe unlikely to expandwill remain basically dependent on outside aid for the conduct oflarge-scale combat.
'.fiiVJ; if
notice" -
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