approve!
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky's Proposalsew Approach to Peace Talks
SUMMARY; Vice-President Ky feels that the Paris Talks have arrived at an impasse on procedural issues which will not be resolved because the North Vietnamese will be satisfied to drag out the talks on procedural matters in the hope of exploiting the present differences of opinion on the American and South Vietnamese side, therebyedge between. and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) delegations. Theseof opinion include both those expressed by various American political figures on how to end the war in Vietnam, as well as those positions held by Ambassador Bunker in Saigon, senior officials in Washington, mostly consistent with the GVN position, as contrasted to that of Ambassador Harriman in Paris who seems to have his own very personal policy and viewpoints on how to negotiate and resolve thoin South Vietnam. These are presently of considerable cause (or concern to the South Vietnamese government. Ky feels that he has been most reasonable in seeking new ways to break the present impasse in the Paris Talks, but also feels the parties have arrivedritical turning point of the war in Vietnam, and that significant new actions muat be taken by the GVN. Not afraid of an Americana thinks that the time has come for the South Vietnamese to come to grips with the major problem of dealing with the National Liberation Front. Ky believes that the South Vietnamese should give the front "de facto" recognition as the second phasewo-phase plan to solve the Vietnam problem, the first phaseilitary withdrawal of. and North Vietnam forces. In Ky's view, the North Vietnamese withdrawal would afford adequate evidence to move into phase two of dealing with the NLF. Ky believes that his proposal differs little if any from his understanding of the Kissingerranslation of which he read for the first time onecember. Ky has proposed his plan to President Thieu who has approved it, and now plans to return to Saigon aboutecember to "sell" the plan to the militant elements in South Vietnam. Although he feels it will be difficult to accomplish, he thinks he if "the one man who can do it" and certainly must make every possible effort to do so because his very country's survival Is at stake. In
conjunction with and in support of the two-phase plan to end the war, Ky believes that there mustignificant strengthening of thoin Saigon to give it the power to deal with opposition to tho two-pbasc plan. If he is unable to secure the Saigon support he needs In moving forward on the two-phase plan, he may as well not return to Paris since he would not have adequate backing to continue asof the South Vietnamese side of the negotiations.
with his first session in Paris withKy has been apprehensive over Harriman's obviouswith moving ahead, in Ky's opinion too quickly. Inprocedural issues with the North Vietnamese, with the obvioussome major breakthroughettlement of the Vietnamwhich Harriman couldong and distinguished careerservice. Ky, who has been operating under explicitfrom President Thiou on how far to go beyond theapproach to the talks, has in fact exceeded theseobtained Thieu's after-the* fact approvaL in suggestingand speaking priority arrangements, all of which, inwere reasonable ones and all of which have been rejectedNorth Vietnamese. Ky feels that he has acted in good faiththe Communist side ia stalling in the hope of exploiting theof opinion on. /GVN side on how to proceed inin Paris. Ky is still the only man on the GVN side into propose andew approach to break thisconsiders that tbe parties have arrivedignificant andpoint in the war in Vietnam, and will continue to try to dothe South Vietnamese side. (Ky felt that Ambassadorhave taken him forery young and naive person"Harriman stated that, in view of the shorth when he would be replaced, his principalto make some progress on prisoner-of-war exchange, sinceone matter specifically urged on him by President Johnson. strange to Ky that Harriman would think Ky gullible enough tothis when it is obvious he would like to cap his career withsettlementarticularly trying for Ky when theare so totally relevant to the political survival of hishe wants to be careful and as certain as is possible to make all
the right initial moves in Paris, and without being hurried orto make them.)
haswo-phase plan to be negotiatedparticipation to solve tha Vietnamese conflict, and hasThieu's approval for the plan. The first phase would beandithdrawal of the American andmilitary forces from South Vietnam, with the withdrawal
properly supervised by some international group and couplede-establishment of the Demilitarized Zone ath parallel. Onceevidence of this North Vietnamese withdrawal becomes apparent, phase two would begin involving the GVN's de facto recognition of the NLF and permit the latter to participate in the social and political life of South Vietnam, including organizingolitical party, although doubtless not under the banner of Communism, and culminating in the constitutionally-provided elections This second phase would not only give the NLF the opportunity to prove its claim of broadsupport in opposition to the Thieu-Ky "puppet" government, but would be arrived at under democratic conditions between the South Vietnamese prople themselves.
3, Ky "does not know" what kind of policy the incoming Nixon administration will adopt toward the Vietnam solution, but believes that even if it should develop toess flexible and "tougher" one than at present, it would be compatible with what the GVN's own interests now dictate, namelyritical turning point in the war has arrived and that new and far-reaching initiatives must be taken by the South Vietnamese themselves. In this regard, this two-phase proposal is very similar to Ky's understanding of the Kissinger plan (which heranslation of for the first time onecember) to end the war inilitary withdrawal by North Vietnamese and American forces, direct negotiations between the GVN and NLF on the political future of South Vietnam,ejection of an Imposed coalition government. If the withdrawal of American forces should begin soon and in considerable numbers, the GVN must be prepared to go it alone with only materiel support from the Americans in the future, and this would be an additional reason for the GVN to move forward phase two of recognizing the NLF and workingolitical settlement with them. It should be noted that this move by the GVN in'granting de facto recognition to the NLF would be inajor concession on the part of the GVN, andove long opposed by the government leaders, and of course by the many militant elements of South Vietnam. Beyond the move of de facto recognition, Ky has no present plan for the details of how the discussion with the NLF should proceed. Initially they-might be held secretly, bat certainly the detailed aspects should not be announced as part of the two-phase plan, since otherwise they would be construed as "conditions" which both sides would then debate and attack, thereby hindering resolution of the problems.
4. Ky's two phase plan is not proposed with the intent tothe present Paris Talks, or-evade the basic purpose for the fourhvParis. -Instead, it as.an effort to jump over the present impasse over procedures, and get to the basic Issues hopefully much sooner, Ky feels that the Communist side would be hard pressed for any rational answer which would disagree with the two-phase proposal since it meets squarely two of their stated interests, withdrawal of
General [Nguyen uuc
could have the desired favorable impact. Ky has waited patiently for President Thieu to "do it his own way" for about one year now, and feela there is too much drift and not enough decisive moves to galvanize broader elements of South Vietnamese society in support of government actions, particularly important now in view of the difficult days just ahead.
6. At this juncture of the situation in South Vietnam and in the Paris peace talks, Ky feelsritical turning point has been reached and that the GVN mustajor move soon torolonged and fruitless bickering over procedural matters and other minor preliminary discussions. Ky is therefore returning to Saigon about ZZ December for discussions with President Thieu and other GVN leaders, and to push for the adoption and implementation of the two-phase plan to end the war. If Ky is unable to secure backing for this proposal, (although he feels he will be able to do so) he feels that there will be no point in his returning to Paris to continue as supervisor of the South Vietnamese side, because he will have been discredited and will be without the support of thehe is supposed to represent.
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Original document.
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