APPROVED FOR RlllASt DnTE: JUL ?DB?
SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM
the problem
In (his estimate we consider two possible outcomes of tlio wai:k>Iitical settlement which, for one reason or another, would pcimil the communist to take control of the government in South Vietnam, not immediately butear or two; the second, acceptance by Hanoiolution that falls well short of its objectives while preserving important elements of its political-military apparatus in the South.
the estimate
I. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
L Whatever the outcome in Viotnam, there are several constant factors in Southern! Asia which will serve to condition developments there. Stability in the region ii Jeopardized by the internal weaknesses of states still seeking the right mixture of traditional practices and modern institution*ong period of colonial rule. In mosthe central government has little,to mobilize national resources; and in several countries, border provinces arc remote and neglected, and there is widespread alienation among ethnic and religious minorities. Other broad soti.il problems and poorly functioningadd further io the burdens of the frequently inefficient civilian and military leadership. While these conditions oiler opportunities for communist subversion, they are partially offsetrowing sense of nationalism, traditional fear of China, and distrust of communism at sin antinationulist and pro-Chinese movement.
bviously, there ore significant differences in the inherent stability of the nations of the region and in the strength uf internal factors resistant toThe military regimes uf Burma and Indonesia, for esamplr. have still notirm popular consensus in support of their policies and programs,t dear that tfa>pohtical institutions are viable, in both countries, however, theof nationalism is strong enough to hold the basic political framework together. In Malaysia and Singapore, un the other hand, the ethnic loyalties uf the Malay and Chinese communities conflict with their national feelings, but representative government and (he electoral
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U, andissupport (at ihe nation.il loader-ship based on its commitment to economic Isrttermcnt.
Tliailand and Cambodiaiddle position. Tlie. Thai regime still searches foe mto cniuie and legitimatev'<-inwhile in Cambodia. Silianouk's highly peisoittuzcd rule has forestalled any real test of political iaelitutions. But lioth regime* are reasonably acceptable to theof the peoplo und neither appear* to have domestic poliiicnl opposition wllli sufficient strength or cohesion to threaten its position In both countries, too, politicaleinforced by widespread respect for the? royal family. Thoughuddhist monarchy, it lacks the homogeneity ofand the sense of history whichirm basis for Tluii andnationhood. In any event. Laospecialundamentally, tho Souvanna regime depends for Us survival on the external forces which created and sustain it.
Economicutilization of resources, capitallow exportalso conspicuous among the problems ofAsia, hut tho Impact of such deficiencies on political stability should not be overstated. In general, the region's predominantly agricultural economysufficient food to adequitelv feed the population despite continuing high birth rates. In this situation, sophisticated economic analyses often have little application to the life of the mass ol the uli/ens, much less to their political attitudes. It is apparent, however, that ihe reasonably well-managed and rapidly
growing economies of Thailand. Malaysia, and Singapore have enhanced
political stability of their governments, while economic stagnation contributes to the uncertainty of prospects for the regimes in Burma. Indonesia,ategory apart is the Philippine*airly good growth rate lend* to mask ever-widening disparities helweon rich and poor.
The leaderi of Southeast Asia are further distracted by the rivalries and frictions which frequently characterize their relations with one another. Prince Sihanouk views Cambodian history astruggle to forestallextinction at the hands of more aggressive Thai anrl Vietnamese.esult, Cambodia'sthose of Thailand and South Vietnam asoften diverted by border incidents, propaganda wars, and diplomatic recriminations The burgeoning dispute between Malaysia and tbe Philippines over tlie osvncnhlp of Sabah threatens lo disrupt efforts to achieve greater regional cooperation. Thailand's longstanding doubts aliout the loyalty of its ethnic Malay peoples causes Bangkok to deny full cooperation to Kuala Lumpur in joint efforts to ileal with security problems along their common border. For their part, tbe Malaysians remain suspicious of Indonesian ambitions in Borneo despite Sukarno's departure from the scene. And Singapore is persistentlyof absorption by its Malay and Indoncslnn neighbors.
Communis* Sciboerrion. More than any other part of the world, theof Southeast Asia have beenn their quest for stability by communist subversion. Each of them, eicrpt Singapore, bas had to contend
ommunist in Munition on some scale, imrl communist bonds arc still active in most countries. So far, however, the communists have gained complete control of only the northern half of Vietnam and adjacent portions of Laos. Moreovcr. although Malaysia. Vietnam. Laos, and Cambodia have, at one time or another, required the assistance uf foreign combat troops to meet thethreat, theThailand. Indonesia, ami theneeded only the inputateriel, technical aid and. in some cases, advisory personnel
Communist parties in Southeast Asia have fared poorly, not becauseand Socialism are unpopular, but because the communists acted inanner as to alienate nationalist sentiment in the various countries.. just as newly tixlependrnt. nationaltst and socialist oriented regimes we appearing in the region, Moscow and Pekingeneral line of armod liberation for Southeast Asia. Thishe communist parties an anti-nationalist image which alienated most students, intellectuals, and workers.ajor exception, of course, was in Vietnam where the communists managed toredominant position in the nationalist movement ifter World Warfter tho failure of these premature insurrections, communists in sometried to operate at the legal nnd parliamentary level under the slogan of peaceful coexistence. But popular support, except in Indonesia, could not be developed, and most of the parties liad no alternative but to continue with the efiort to develop peasant-based insurrections. In several cases, this has meant operating in remote areas populated by relatively primitive minority peoples.
Communist prospects in Southeast Asia reflect theseuch lesshreat today in Malaysia. Singapore.ami tbe Philippines thanears ago. The once formidable Malayan Communist Party force Is down to lossC0 men and is holed up just north of the Thni-Malaysian border.r so guerrillas from Sarawak roam the highland jungles south of the Sarawak frontier. Both groups arc comprised mainly of ethnicrcsukv.ls of Malaysia, but neither maintains nny substantial foothold on Malaysian soil. Tho Huk movement In the Philippines consists of an armed nucleus ofen and appears to have degeneratedomrnunbt guerrilla movement into moreilipinongaged in murder and extortionivelihood. In central and easternew hundred Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) activists have taken to the hills in hopes of developing the soil of guerrilla force the party so obviously larked during the crucial weeks of5 The PKI effort has been severely set back by recent government operations against its bases; many top communist leaders have been killed. Despite thb setback and the party debacle. the communist movement in Indonesin remains tlto most potentially significant subversive force in Southeast Asia aside from thecommunists.
While Communist insurgency has declined in the insular and peninsular slates of Southeast Asia, activity furtherBurma, Thailand, and Cum-
been stepped up in recent years, partly because of the war inand partly because of the stimulus of Peking and Hanoi. Fundamentally, the present significance of the communist parties in these countries lies in their role as instruments of external forces rather than in their own internal appeal or strength.
In Burma, the long-simmering insurgency ofr so Peking-oriented White Flags (Communist Parly of Burma/White Flag) wasewabout two years ago when theyull-blown Maoist line. This was followed shortlyrisis in Sino-Bunnese relations generated by Peking's Cultural Revolution. Although the Chinese have since moderated their overt hostility toward the Ne Win regime, they persist in an effort to weaken it; they supply guns and training in adjacent Yunnan Province to the relatively few members of dissident ethnic groups willing to cooperate with White Flag elements in attacks against government units in northeastern Burma. Whatever the communist strategy in Burma. Peking and the White Flags probably have little hope of implementing it without substantial cooperation from the Kachin, Shan, Karen, and other ethnic insurgent forces. In the past, the lack of common objectives and cohesion among these rebel groups lias been theiris the Rangoon government, and there are few signs that this defect will soon be remedied. Moreover, most ethnic insurgent leaders appear to be anti-Chinese and to oppose communismhreat to their ancient modes of living.
The decision to commence active insurgency in Thailand in5 was probably made by Peking in concert with Hanoi; the former has always dominated tho Thai communist movement. While preparation for guerrilla war in Thailand began at least as earlylans were accelerated5 probably to assist Hanoi by generating concern in US official circlesossible communist "second front" in Southeast Asia and by stimulatinghailand over further extending its military commitments to the US. So far, the communist insurgents have made little headway, hut their actions have alerted the regime to its vulnerabilities in remote sectors of the country and led it to institute various remedies in the fields of security, administration, anddevelopment. In the Northeast, across the Mekong fromr so insurgents are on the defensive, despite occasional forays. In the densejungles of the North, several hundred tribesmen, with grievances against the government, have been armed and trained by communists and are harassing government foiccs and outposts near tlie Lao border. On the other hand, the communists are not likely to exert any significant influence away from remote tribal districts so long as their appeal is geared mainly to hill-tribe grievances. Efforts to penetrate the ethnic Thai in the North have not progressed far but do pose some threat for the future. Communist terrorismuch smaller scaleontinuing problem in other regions of the country.
Over the past year or two, guerrilla activity has revived in Cambodia anderious Internal problem for the Sihanouk regime. Its origins and
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nature are vague, but activity is centered in two areas. In the remote north-eastem part o( the country, where the Vietnamese communists operate in sup-port of the war effort in Vietnam, some dissident tribesmen have apparently accepted arms from Hanoi to oppose the increasing government presence in the region. Of greater potential vigriiacancc arc tbe disruptive activities of the ethnic Cambodian insurgents, styled "Khmer Rouge" by Sihanouk, who operato sporadically in small armed bands throughout western Cambodia. There have been incidents elsewhere, however, and the Khmer Rouge api>ear to have links to subversive elements in Phnom Penh itself.
n Laos, of course, tbe communistsajor threat. They control about half the countryhird of its people, and the indigenousPathetan internationally recognized claimhare in the national government. The backbone of the insurgency is, however, provided by regular North Vleftiamcso forces.
n sum. the nations of Southeast Asia exhibit serious social, political, and economic weaknesses Rutre generally buttressedense of nationalismetermination to preserve their independence. They have had considerable experience in dealing with communist subversion, and they have learned over the centuries to survive in the shadowowerful China. None of the countries in the region, with the possible exception ofs so weak that communist movements are hkrly to increase their strength greatly over the next several years without major and direct foreign assistance.
VS Hole. How the US views its role nnd commitment in thehow tliis is perceived by both communist and noncommunist elements,to be crucial factors in the Southeast Asian political equation.no realistic prospect that over the next several years another power orsystem will appear to relieve the US of the security function itundertaking in the area. In fact, the expected withdrawal of UKMalaysia and Singapore will inevitably pose new problems for the USregard.
ETTLEMENT FAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS'
discussing an outcome favorable to the communists, we rule outassumptions as the military collapse of Allied forces in Southprecipitate and unilateral withdrawal of these forces,egotiationpolitical concessions so sweeping as to be tantamount to grantingachievement of its aims in the South. The contingency herea political settlement of the war which, for one reason or another,the communists to take control of the government in South Vietnam.
rarJJm. for tU Annt-Dt Okf ot Suit for.f the Army, and Maj On,or tin- Ami.Lint Cliicf of Staff. InlerJigrnic, USAF. .IkHont from llio ni|pimcnl in llili wellon. For ihrlrhou footnote to poragrni'li M,
Insofar as the rest of Southeast Asia Is concerned, an important variable would be the time required for the communist takeover, If itrears, llie repercussions ebewhere would tend to be muted or even lost among otherduring (he period. For purposes of this estimate, therefore, weuch shorter period, say no moreear or two. during the course of which tbe Southeast Asians would come to tbe conclusion that the settlement accepted by the USommunist success virtually inevitable.
CommunlMettlement in Vietnam favorable to thewouldsycltological lift to leftist elements everywhere in Southeast Asia, but it would not necessarily lead them to rely more heavily on armed violence than at present. Some local parlies are already doing all they can In the field of 'peoples'thers would require considerable- time and outside assistancerge-sc.de campaign of violence could be initiated. And the decision to attempt this course would depend not only On the local party and its view of the opportunities but also on the policies of itsNorth Vietnam, or the USSB as the case might be. Only in Laos, and perhaps in Cambodia, isapability in being to increase the level of armed pressure and violence quickly and dgnifkarwly.
Hanoi's first reaction to Itsouth Vietnam might be an early move lo unleash the armed forces it controls in Laos and to provide large-scale assistanceambodian resistance movement. Then' is, after all, no doubt that Hanoi's objectives are to establish its control over Laos and attain pre-
doininent inituenco In Cambodia. Bui we believe (he Vietnamese
would be somewhat mote cautious. They might fear lhat llsere was some risk
ew US military response and. more important at this stage, ibis level
of military action would probably seem unnecessary to the North Vietnamese.
they would expect the regimes in both countries to be amenable to Hanoi's
influence without further resort lo svar. Moreover. Hanoi would be preoccupied.
ime at least, with the formidable task of consolidating communist rule
in South Vietnam.
Initially, therefore, Hanoi would probably apply pressures in Laos, hoping in this way toew coalition government dominated by the Pathet Lao. (Hanoi might indeed have embarked on this course In advance of tho Vietnamese settlement if It were convinced during the negotiations that the US was in the processajor reduction in its commitments In Southeastf pressure tactics failed in Laos, the North Vietnamese might undertake new military action to strengthen the communist bargaining position or lo effect an outright military takeover of the country In Cambodia. Hanoi would probably move moresettling initiallyovernment reasonably responsive to its influence. If Sihanouk proved uncooperative, Hanoi would apply additional pressures,assistance to procommunist elements in Cambodia.
Hanoi sees bothand Cambodia as falling primarily within its sphere of influence and. in Ihe afiermathuccessful settlement, would resist efforts
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ontrolling voice in either country.in Southeast Asia, Hanoi is not likely toredominant role in the communist effort. Activities in Ijtos and Cambodia would have first call on its capabilities In Thailand, the North Vietnamese are currently providingto the guerrilla forces though they recognize that the Chineseajor interest and may beetter position, over the longer term, to influence the communirt mosement there. Hanoi willeluctant to leave the Geld entirely to the Chinese, however, nnd will do what it enn to maintain anrole In the communist insurgency in Thailand. With regard to Burma.and Singapore, on the other hand, the North Vietnamese will probably be more intent on cultivating friendly relations in the postwar years.
s for Peking, it is difficult to estimate the extent and nature of itsIn Southeast Asia after Vietnam, especially because of tbe uncertainties nigendcred by China's domestic situation. Recurrent Internal crises, for example, could limit Chinas ability toonsistent policy line toward the region. On the other hand, if internal order is maintained, China's aspirations for great-power dominance in the region would lead to increased efforts to limit orUS influence, particularly in those states close to China's borders. Hut this svill be true no matter what the outcome In Vietnam. In any event, China would almost certainly claim some credit for any communist success in Vietnam and exploit it at the diplomatic and political level throughout Southeast Asia as part of the continuing effort to advance its nationalommunist success in Vietnam would encourage Peking to support subversive movements, hut the scale of its effort* would be influenced by the degree to which local conditions provided promising opportunities. Current Chinese strategy does not appear to call for overt aggression and we do nothange in this strategy.
li' impact of communist success In Vietnam on relations between Peking and Hanoi could have substantial implications for Southeast Asia, particularly over the longer term. It is possible, for example, that the two countries would draw closer together and undertake joint political, propaganda, and subversive efforts in the area. It seems more likely, however, that Hanoi would wish to take the opportunity to establish quite clearly its independence of tho Chinese, relaying on con tinned Soviet and available Free World sources for the material and technical assistance essential to Ut postwar reconstruction. Followingourse svould require that Ilnnni soft-pedal support for subversive activities outside IrKlochina at least. It would also increase the chances that the age-old Vietnamese distrust of China would combine with current conflicts of interests to produce serious strains in Hanoi.Peking relations.
he Soviet Union is not likely toajor supporter of communist Subversion In Southeast Asia after Vietnam. The Soviets will be disposed to defer to Hanoi's wishes on Laos and Cambodia and will probably attempt to increase their own influence in the outlawed Indonesian communist movement. In general, however, the end of the war and of its self-imposed obligation tu support Hanoi, would lead the USSR toore important political position
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In thein Thailand. Malaysia. Indonesia, and theby developing further its diplomatic, econcmic, and cultural lies. The Soviets would oppose increased Chinese influence everywhere in the region.
Reactions of the Southeast Asian Countries Most of Southeast Asia would welcome on end to the svar in Vietnam,ettlement favorable to thewouldrisis in Laos and severe anxiety in Cambodia and Thailand. Throughout the area, tbe settlement would have an adverseimpact that would damage US prestige and credibility. In view of the extent of US commitmenls to South Vietnam and the depth of US involvement in the war, serious doubts would be felt about the validity of US power and cornnurmcnls. and there would be renewed concern over <omtmmist intentions and the longer run prospects of surviving in the shadow of Chinese power.
The greatest danger in this situation would not be that subversivein Southeast Asia would immediately take heart and make rapid progress in undermining tho stability of noncommunist governments. As indicated above, local communist organizations gem-rally lack the capability and tbe appeal for any such rapid growth. Rather, the main danger would lie the development of an atmosphere of defeatism arid resignation in noncommunivt countries in the area, with individual gosrmments Vising tbeir hope of withstanding tbe political and psychological pressures of Hanoi and Peking. Th ere couldeneral move to placate the communist powers by cutting military and political ties with the US. This process could begin before the communist takeover had beenparticularly if Hanoi moved quickly and surccssfuHy to upset the balance in Laos.
We cannot say that it would not work out this way in the end, for much would depend on continuing US actions. While some Southeast Asian leaders would probably entertain increased doubts about the will of the US toecurity role in (he area, we do not believe that they would be panicked into precipitate changes in policy or posture. They would probably suspend any definitive policy decision at least unlil there had been time and opportunity to study indications of future communist conduct and intent and, more critically, thnse of the US.
Concern over the communist threat in the aftermath of Hanoi's success would also be conditkinod by the circumstances of the time. Some countries may be psychologically preparedettlement which appears to be favorable to the communists. Moreos-er. if the settlement came in the next year or so, Ihe atmosphere in Southeast Asia would be quite different from that which existed, At lhat time, there was the spectacle of unbroken Viet Congagainst South Vietnamese forces, rapid Chinese advances in the field of modern weapons, and an Increasingly powerful Sukamo/PKI coalition taking charge in Indonesia and bullying the newly-organised and fragile Malaysian federation. In the intervening years, hosvever. Southeast Asians have seen China bogged down in confusion and disorder, Sukarno ousted and the PKI suffer
bloody suppression, and tlx- Vietnameseayfearful price during long yean of war.
A communist success in South Vietnam would have its sharpest and most immediate Impact in Imoh. The reati/adon that North Vietnam and tho Pathet Lao could quickly overrun government-held territory if they chose to do so, would generate sentiment among civilian politicians in Vientiane for reaching an ac-conwnodation with Ilanoi. Souvanna and other Lao politicians would be willing toeturn to2 Genevaoalition government withparticipation,ore truly neutral foreign policy. They would be reluctant, however, to agree to concessions that appeared to threaten acommunist takeover. The top Lao military figures would oppose any major concessions to the communists. Much would depend on how far anil how quickly Hanoi pressed its advantage. Witlx.ut increased US involvement, Laos could not long withstand tbe military and psychological pressures which Hanoi would in due course almost certainly apply.
Cambwlia would also feel directly exposedesultommunist success in South Vietnam, especially if North Vietnamese Army units remained In Cambodia. Khmer Rouge and other insurgent elements might be emboldened to intensiiy their efforts, but they are not likely to develop quicklyajor threat to Sihanouks regime without considerable support from Hanoi Sihanouk would probably try to suppress the insurgents, meanwhile taking steps toCambodia to the new situationndochina area. Internally, for example, he would probably decide to bring procommunists into the government, though he wouldredominant role for them. Intcmntionally, he would seek the good offices of Moscow' and Peking to help secure Cambodian indc-perrdVnee. and might even proposeew Geneva Conference to this end Sihanouk would do these tilings in hope of avoiding the completetakeover that he has long feared. If all such measures failed. Sihanouk would probably how out rather than subject his countryietnam-type conflict origurehead status for himselfommunist-controlledow leadership tliat could carry on effective resistance to Hanoi would be unlikely to emerge.
In Thailand, the will of the present mling group to maintain itself in power, to assert national independence, and to resist internal subversion would probably remain strong despite communist success in Vietnam. The present Thai lenders would have limited options because of their longstanding aitd unequivocalto military alliance with the US. an alliance which they have regarded as indispensable in the faceontinuing armed threat from China. We do not believe that these leaders would view alignment with Hanoi or Peking as acceptable alternatives to continued reliance on tho US.
In these circumstancos, Thai counlerinKurgency forces would persist in their efforts against the communist guerrillas, and communist prospects for recruiting large numbers of local Thai for their farces would remain poor. But Thai capa
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bilities could lie severely (axed if Hanoi were lo emerge from tho Vietnamese struggle prepared toore aggressive and direct role in support of the Thai insurgents; for example, by sending trained Vietnamese guerrilla cadres and more sophisticated hand weapons into northeasternrospect which isource of great concern in Bangkok. Tlie Thai leaders would besensitive to signs that Hanoi was moving towardcomplete takeover in Laos, in view of the strategic importance they attach to ituffer against direct communist pressure. Indeed, we could expect that the Thai would press the US to take measures to prevent communist control of (lie Mekong Valley.
Capt. Fmnk M. Murphy, for the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsiutmcnt Of the Navy, believes that the probable political impact upon ThaOaml of the assumed setuement would be more severe than slated. He would have the last sentence read, 'Under the changing circu instances, the US-Thailand relationship probably would change, with Ihe Thais beginning to move toward pragmatic adjustment to the new political realities after the Communist take over."'
Even if Hanoi does not adopt (bis more aggressive posture toward Thailand, neutralist and leftist elements on the Bangkok political scene would become more vocal. But their influence would probably not grow sufficiently to sway theunless US support and US responses to Thai requests had made itthat the US was withdrawing from its commitments to Thailand. The Thai would, in any case, consider whether their relationship with the US ought to be changed in some way. Any revaluation would proceed carefully and would closely reflect Thai judgments of US statements and actions following ain Vietnam. Undor tbe changing circumstances, the Thai might decide that tlie evolution of US policy left them no choice but toosture of strict neutrality.3
Peking is Ihe chief concern of Burma which is currently being harassed by the Chinese-supported White Flags. Ne Win will be sensitive to the possibility of any increase in such support in the wake of the Vietnamese War, but it is doubtful thai communist Success in Vietnam would lead him to alter significantly Burma's domestic or foreign policies. Malaysia and Singapore are apprehensive of any substantial increase of interest by Peking in their ethnic Chinese leftists and guerrilla remnants. These groups have usually been responsiveeking's direction and, in ihe event of communist success in Vietnam, might receivecovert support from legal leftist fronts which continually agitate in these countries for accommodation with ihe communist powers. Such activity could serve lo heighten existing tensions between the Chinese and Malay communities in both countries.
Indonesia would feel less vulnerable than the otters because of itsfrom China and ihe small proportion of ethnic Chinese in the country. It is most unlikely that the present leadership in Djakarta would falter in itsto cope with Indonesia's internal communist problems; indeed, thewould attach considerable importance lo Ihe continuation of US economic aid to sustain this determination. The psychological impact on the Philippines
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would be somewhat greater titan tn Indooesio, if only because tbe Filipinos have been for so long wholly dependent on the US for their defense. While
Filipino leftists and anti-US factions would derive new confidence and vigor from the US failure in Vietnam, the problem of communist subversion in the Philip-pines would probably not increase to any important extent. In any case, it would remain far lesshreat to Philippine stability than the chroruc pcJibcal corraption and economic malaise of tlie country.
he US Posture. Overongerreat deal would depend on the role the US decided to play in the region, and on lis success in convincing leaders there of its will and capacity to continue backing them. Initially, the Southeast Asian states wouldendency for the US to withdraw generally from fn-volvcnsent with the security of the entire region, particularlyettlement was reached inrecipitate manner as toudden and Isasic change in US policy. This initial concern would probably be least in Burma which chooses not to rely on external support for Its security ami is unlikely to change in this regard. The self-reliant Indonesians would be somewhat less concerned than the Filipinosood deal less concerned than Malaysia and Singapore. The two Utter have been accustomed to British protection and are disturbed by the prospect of its complete withdraw.il.
Iksc initial reappraisals of US capabilities and Intentions would beto continuing review. We believe that governments with any sort of security arrangements with liveI-*os, Thailand, and thewish to retain them, at least until further evidence was available on the course of US policy in the region. AH would urgently seek concrete reassurance* of one sort or another and, if these were forthcoming, they would over time tend to dilute the impact of tlie. loss of Suuth Vietnam. For the Thai, one of tlie lessons of Vietnam could be that US support Is not likely to lie cfTccrivo without greater efforts of their own. They would, therefore, move to bolster their forces, inctoding ocqutntion of all possible material aid from the US.
For the oilier nations of Southeast Asia, US actions in support ofsvould be an important measure of its intentions throughout the region; few woukl expect <my mujor US militaty effort in behalf of the more exposed Lao. No matter how the US performed in Thailand, however, there would Inevitably he an increased search lor alternatives to heavy reliance on US military power. Tlierc svould, for example, be increasing interesttrong enintcrinrurgency role for regional associations, though all member nations would realise that defense against external aggression could not be the province of such groupings. And there might be snmc interest in having the Russiansreater role in Southeast Asia as an additional counterweight to Peking. Even the Thai, con-cofTi-nl with their efforts to obtain new US security guarantees, would doubtless explore such foreign policy alternatives. Neutralist sentiment in Burma would lend to Income even firmer, and neutralist slices would become louder, though hardly decisive, in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.
One factor of great importance would bo the appraisal made by US leaders and public opinion of the meaning of the Vietnam experience for the
Mure course of USraumatic popular reaction in the US. revealed perhaps by rectimina (ions over Vietnam and bitter debate over future use of US power in Southeast Asia would greatly intensify the impact of the loss of South Vietnam. Omversely, if American opinion soeiiicd in the main toleady and sober line, echoes in Soutlicast Asia would he similarly moderated. In effect, US domestic interpretationsetback in Vietnam and the impras-ifcsns others consequently formed as to the hkcly course of US policy in the region might ultimately prove as important as the event itself.*
ETTLEMENT UNFAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS
n discussing an outcome unfavorable to the communists, we arc not in-eluding in our consideration any Outright surrender on their part or theabandonment of their campaign to take over South Vietnam. We arc assunving the acceptance by Hanoi of an outcome that falls well short of its objectives but which preserves some Important elements of its political-military apparatus in the South. This situation might come aboutesult of aor it might become gradually apparent as the communists scaled down their attacks, disengaged their forces, and otherwiseillingness lothe shooting war. In either case, an increasingly confident regime, allied with the US. would retain power In Saigon.
he principal initial reaction of the Southeast Asians to such an outcome in Vietnam wouldense of reliefelief that additional time had
l>oen won to bolster further their own political and economic stability.
would conclude, however, thai the future of the Saigon government had
Cm.ranklin, for the Aarbtart Chief of Staff for InteO^iwe.the Army, anden. Jamnue M. Itidpott. for the Auutnnt Chief of Staff,dbsent from Section II. Tbey believe lhat this section seriouslyommunut micccm ia South Vietnam, and give, iiiadenuntc consideration wcircumstance. The postulated artilemrni Useable to the <omn.un.it. wouldUS prestige and credibility. Ami. in slew ofs-ndtnne of vastommunUt taltevser La South Vtonm. the nossosmminitt eovermaent,S eeasasstsssess. le use- deW.efenws* irsrc^ghcsrt
Southeo* Asm would be encouraged and would press harder tn emulate the drmonstnired success of -pecrJes'oth Ladbodia would come under some form of domination fairly sooni even the Thai probably would clttftf* their teUtiomhip with the US.
Whatever the reaction of tlie noncunununlst fiOvemir*nU of Mainland SoutheMt Asia over the short term,onger terra, reR(mtlrw of US assurances, they would probably Mr* some mean* of scs.nimod.lkin to rnrnsunist pressures Somehe mm almost certainly would vine aetcrnocditfc. as aa acceptableo the prospect of ihiiIhmiI mttary aetata in conjunction with theonlylutkn fawnUe fx. tbe Cflmrmurists.
The Army and Air Force members oho believe that elsewhere in Southeast Am lenders would be greatly Influenced by the outcome and would, al (he time ol the tottknient, viaw US supi>ort In tlie urea as uncertain. In the US acceptance id aa unfavorable sell lenient in Vietnam, ihcy would see US withdrawalsngstnndmg and deep commitment. On that hasts. Southeast Asian leader, would maVe thoae polky deessions then considered neccasar-to neuronal survival
assured, that the Vietnamese communists had been pmnanently stopped, or that Hanoi had abandoned its ambitions in Laos and Cambodia. Not would an
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outcome unfavorable lo the communists remove Southeast Asian doubtsthe willingness cJ the American Government nnd people to engageubstantial scale in any new military .'inflict in the region.
US prestige would increase, however, and Its allies in Southeast Asia would reaffirm their links to the US. Everywhere in the region, the morale of communist forces would sag while that of lhe iioncommunists would improve. But the impact on the actual power relationships in each country would not be significant, except In Laos where the political position of tlse Souvanna gov-eminent would be greatly strengthened, and in Cambodia where the will of the regime to oppose domestic communists would be reinforced.
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence would be felt inside the com rnurtist countries and within the various communist movements. The successes of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions have no doubt been highly influential in the continued commitment of other communists in Southeast Asia to the concept of "peoples'efeat in Vietnam, even if rationalizedemporary setback, would bring the doctrines of Mao and IIo Chi Minh into question. "Revisionism" might begin to gain some adherents, and there would probably be some splits and degeneration in the various insurgencies. There rrughteriod in which communist forces would place greater emphasis on working within the system through popular fronts and association with other leftwing movements. Inase, Peking and perhaps Hanoi would lose some influence.
Because of the importance of Southeast Asia to China. It is conceivable that Hanoi's acceptance of an unfavorable outcome in Vietnam might provoke recriminations in Peking and resulteadership crisis. We think, however, thateaction is unlikely. For Peking at least, there alreadyationale for the defeat of the Viet Cong, namely that because of improper tactics they were unable to persistrotracted war. Chinese policy might become more threatening, but il is more likely that the failure of the communist campaign In Vietnam would notajor effect on Chinese policy elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
As for Hanoi, we believe that it would remain unreconciled to the division of Vietnam and to the presence of US power in Indochina. The Vietnamesewould try to preserve what assets they could in the form of cadres and organization in South Vietnam. They might well, however, refrain from instituting further violence while they rebuilt their potential andor the diminution of US power and interest in Vietnam.
A communist failure in South Vietnam might further strain Hanoi'swith Peking. There might he mutual recriminations and Hanoi, in its weakened position, might be more than ever concerned to retain Soviet support and avoid overdependenee on China Nonetheless, normal prudence, if nothing else, would suggest that Hanoi would attempt to maintain good relations with Peking. Both Hanoi and Peking, of course, would want to prevent any further strengthening of the noneommunist position in laos, and Hanoi would try to hold the ureas of Laos bordering on North Vietnam.
Original document.
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