Soorot/Sansitiyp
APPFOVIC FORPElfASE DATE
The Situation in Vietnam: Overview and Outlook
STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATICetaindassnCtenge&lasafy toaoncurrence ot . 2SXn " FPC/HDR by Data
Withdrawal No.
Scorot/SoncitivB
9.
13
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SUBJECT: THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM: OVERVIEW AND OUTLOOK
CONTENTS
I. THE CURRENT SETTING II. THE MILITARY PICTURE III. THE POLITICAL PICTURE IV. PACIFICATION
V. THE VIEW FROM HANOI VI. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS: THE NEAR TERM VII. OUTLOOK
Annex A. The Vietnamese Protagonists Annex 8. Military Porces Annex C. Hanoi's Four Points and the Front's Five Points
SUMMARY
The present time is particularly appropriateeview of the situation in Vietnam since we are at the closehase that began with the Tet offensive last January. With the change in American administrations, the opening of thenegotiations in Paris and the current re-intensification of the fighting after an appreciableew phase is now beginning.
SinceB, military trends have been increasingly favorable for allied forces. Thehave taken staggaring casualties, their combat effectiveness has declined, and their overall strength has been maintained only through huge inputs of North Vietnamese manpower. Hanoi recognizes its military shortcomings and has been seeking formonths to redress them. Many of the units withdrawn from combat last year are now returning after refitting and the level of infiltration has risen sharply since late November. The enomy has already begun to step up the level of his military action and we can expect more activity along the lines we have seen over the last few weeks. This may include at least terrorist and sapper attacks on major urban centers, including Saigon. Such attacks could come at anytime.
Politically, the Communists are engagedajor effort to weaken the GVN and to create the appearance if not the substance, of an ongoingapparatus "governing" as much of South Vietnam as possible. Their aim is to boost the prestige and image of the National Liberation Front and its claims of control over territory and people. These claims are wildly exaggerated. At the moment, the GVN's positiontrong onei the political surface in South Vietnam is reasonably calm, progress is being made toward the elusive goal of stability, and the pace and effectiveness of pacification has increased appreciably in tho past few months. Events of the next few months, however, are certain to test South Vietnam's internal stability, the solidity of recentgains, and particularly the GVN's ability to withstand the war of nerves the Communists patently intend to wage in Paris.
In the negotiations, the Communists haveproved to be tough and skillful bargainers. They obviously want to move into substantive issues, which they hope will prove explosive in Saigon and divisive in relations between the GVN and the United States. We believe, however, that they also view the Paris talkserious effort to exploreegotiated settlement.
We cannot predict the terms the Communists would eventually acceptompromise settlement. Hanoi's minimum position, however, probably will include total American troop withdrawallearly defined period,estructuring of the political order in South Vietnam whichtheoleower base from which they can work to achieve their ultimateof domination.
Over the next few months the Communists will attempt to combine political action and military effortsix that will enable Hanoi to cope with whatever policies are adopted by the new US administration. At the moment the Communists believe the war can be continued at acceptable costs long enough to convince the United Statesompromise political settlement is mandatory.
Over the near term, the critical variable in all major aspects of the Vietnamese struggle--de-cisions in Hanoi, negotiations in Paris, and the course of events in Southbe tho posture and policies of the new American
I. THE CURRENT SETTING
present timearticularlyoneeview of the situation in Vietnamof the balance of military and politicalthe start of substantive negotiations in Paris,
we have witnessed the closeistinct phase in Vietnam that began with the Tet offensive last Looking back, it seems more evident that thisritical watershed not only in tho strictlysense, but also in the broader political what the phase has demonstrated, at least to the North Vietnamese, wasilitary victory was clearly beyond their capabilities and that thedimensions of the struggle would have to assume greater significance in their overall strategy.
had already made some preliminarythe summerhen the Nationalrevised its seven-year-old politicalit to emphasize national goals in anbroaden its appeal to non-Communistat the Tet offensive the first appearanceby the so-called Alliance of National,and Peace Forces, an urban based coalition
of ostensibly non->Coramunists. Finally, in the wake of Tet, and the failure to stimulate anhe Communists began to develop administrative bodies called "Liberation Committees" at the local levels. Thoughaper-shuffling affair, in which old cadre assumed new titles, the overall effort is to lay the groundwork for claiming de facto controlide area of the countryigh percentage of the population.
Paris, the Communists have provedtough bargainers. They have beenand patient. Several points emerge from
*Seeaakground diaouesion of the politiaal foroee etruggling for control in Vietnam.
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the record since last May. Hanoi has been careful to avoid an irrevocable stalemate. On both critical issues, the bombing halt and the seating hassle, the Communists have eventually climbed down from initial positions and have given ground on some key points. In each case, of course. Communist negotiators waited until the last moment to shift their positions, trying to nxtract every possible concession and timing their moves to take advantage of developments in American politics. Finally, there is the intriguing role of tho Soviet Uniono between at crucial junctures. The exact relationship between Hanoi and Moscow is uncertain, but it seems clear that Soviet influence is growing, apparently at the expense of the Chinese.
II. THE MILITARY PICTURE
In the military field, the trends since the low point at Tot have been generally favorable for the allies.* Communist forces of all typesunpracodented casualties0 and the combat effectiveness of enemy units declined. Despite his mounting problems, the enemy has been able to keep his combat forces quantitatively about as strong as thoyear ago, mainly through the input of vast numbers of North Vietnamese troops. During the last half8 the enemyumber of units into sanctuary areas where training has undoubtedly improved and units have probably been restored to something approaching full strength.
By contrast, the overall strength andof allied forces has sharply improved. in US tactics have increased the combatof US units, and Allied intelligence has been more successful in detecting Communist movements since Tet. More firepower and combat punch have been added to the ARVN and South Vietnamese paramilitary forces by upgrading armament, stepping up mobilization, and
atia* strengthe and problems of ARVN and VC/NVA forces ape diocuaeed in move detail in Annex B.
improving training. Nevertheless the ARVN forces are besetumber of weaknesses and basic faults andremain highly dependent on US forces for air, artillery and logistics support. An ARVN capability toignificantly greater responsibility for the ground war against enemy forces at its current strength is unlikely to be attained within the next year or two.
The allies, especially the US forces, have become increasingly effective in maintaining steady pressure on many enemy units and in preventing enemy campaigns from materializingarge scale. Not only have allied forces been generally able to block major new enemy offensives over the past few months, they have done so whileubstantial margin of force to support the extension of securityVN presence in the countryside.
Several developments pointenewed Communist effort toew phase of intensive combat. The Communists probably have completed the refurbishing and refitting of the main force units previously pulled back into sanctuary areas along the Cambodian and Laotian borders and in North Recent intelligence has provided an increasing number of indications that this stand-down is ending and that most of these units are moving or areto move back into their normal operational areas.
Moreover,elative lull in enemy infiltration during the fall, the number of North Vietnamese troops being put into the pipelineharp upturn in December which has continued in We estimate that at0 and0 men are en route to South Vietnam at present. Most of these troops should arrive in South Vietnam during the first quarter
and they could be followed by additional larqe
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III. THE POLITICAL PICTURE
Saigon government weathered the shock
of the Tet offensive and, on balance, emergedfrom the tribulations of early Allat topmostKy, and Prime Minis-torrecognize the need for unity in tho face of common danger, both on the battlefield and in in the Paris meetings. The personal rivalry between Thieu and Ky persists, however, as doos the increasingly sharp rivalry betwoen Ky and Huong. These rivalries naturally tend to underminecohesion. Although Thieu has maneuvered adroitly to strengthen his position against Ky and, on the whole, has become an increasingly effective president during the past year, he still finds it difficult to project the imageolitical leader and has failed to develop an effective political organization to mobilize popular support for the GVN.
the dire prospects of Tet hadeffect, particularly on the urbanas the immediate danger has receded, so too
has the resultant sense of unity. There are grumblings in various quarters by such elements as the militant Buddhists who dislike those in power. At present, however, none of these groups seem likely to offer the government serious trouble. On balance, the political surface in Vietnam is reasonably calm and progress continues toward the elusive goal of
this surface calm,Communist military plans, the course ofmeetings and, above all, the policies ofAmerican administration have produced amood of apprehension. Acutely consciousneed for American assistance in copingCommunist drive for political power, thefor that matter,segments of South Vietnameselong been hypersensitive in their concern
for American constancy and what they think of as the US willingness to stay the course.
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the past year, this generalincorporated the mounting specific feardomestic political considerations mayimpel the US government to give Vietnameseshort shriftuest for settlementat almost any price. In this mosteven when the GVN leadership is operatingadvantage of sophistication transcending that
of its citizenry or with knowledge and reassurances privately conveyed through ambassadorial channels, Saigon's leaders still cannot afford to move too far out in front of Vietnamese opinion on thecharged political issues hero involved. Also, on these central issues, even when Saigon's loaders want to be cooperative, they feel an acute political need to save their own and their"face" by not appearing to cave in under American pressure.
Thieu and his seniorVice President Ky) do notpeace; but rationally or not, they areof being sold out. Their behavior inhas reflected this fear and their behavior
in the weeks ahead will continue to do so. Thieu and Ky's expressed awareness of the need forand their professed endorsement of the desirability of an early honorable settlement are almost certainly sincere, but their private stress is much more an "honorable" than "early." The GVN's leaders recognize the political reality of thedesire for peace within the United States. The GVN's recent initiativeS troop withdrawal announcementeflection of that recognition. But Thieu and his colleagues are also worried about tho Communists' ability to exploit this desire to the detriment of the non-Communist Vietnamese. One specific GVN concern, for example, is that thedesire for peace may lead the US government to an overly optimistic assessment of the NLF'sindependence from Hanoi and hence to pressure on the GVN for concessionsGVNbo politically disastrous in South Vietnam.
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IV. PACIFICATION
uncertainties and apprehensionsgreatlyore positive attitudeGVN's part toward the broad effort to secure
the countryside against the Viet Cong military forces and political organization and to engage the allegiance of the rural population. Thieu recognizesritical element in preparing hisfor the inevitable struggle with the Viet Cong when and if the fighting ends. Concern over how much time is left has stimulated GVN supportuch more vigorous and sustained pacification effort.
assessing the status of thissets of facts need to be constantly borne First,ercent ofpopulation is concentrated in aboutof the country's total land area: lowlands, the cities and the Mekongcounts politically, therefore, is controlnot territory. Secondly, the shadingsfound in Vietnam are not tidy or Saveew extreme cases,no clear zones of GVN or of Communistthe most recent figures from Saigonthat as of the end off South Vietnam's population lived inurban areas or rural hamlets classed as
at least "relatively4 percent of the population lived in contested hamlets,3 percent of the population was controlled outright by the VC.
rather bright picture requiresof cautionary caveats. Though weprogress and "population control"dataHamlet Evaluation Systemmatrix was designed primarily as atool and not as an index of progress
or moasure of "control." HESetter
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gauge than anything else extant, but its data needs to be read in light of the fact that when employed to measurehe system is being used for purposes it was not designed to fulfill. Furthermore, smooth national HES data curvesmask considerable provincial and even greater district leveldramatic progress in some areas cancelling out, in national averages, almost equally dramatic regression in others. In addition, the national percentages cited above reflect the eminently defensible but nonetheless debatable judgement which classes "C" hamlets as "GVN controlled" rather than "contested." Thestatistical breakout for the last quarter8 is not yot available in Washington, but inamlets accounted8 percent of South Vietnam's total population.
In addition to the "positive- task of providing the rural population with security and tangible benefits sufficient to induce it to identify its fortunes with those of the GVN, the pacification program also involves the "negative" task ofand eradicating the Communist politico-military control apparatus known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (or VCI).
The allied attack on the Viet Congwas never properly integrated ororganized until the advent of the Phoenix program early7 and, really, not until Presidentuly-signed the decree that made Phoenix/ Phungruly joint effort fully backed by the Vietnamese. In the past few months, this effort
has picked up momentum and it is already causing
the Communists considerable concern. Despite genuine
signs of early promise, however, broad judgements
on the probable net impact of Phoenix can not now
be made and will have to await the rocord of Phoenix's
performance over the next few months.
our view, the pacification effort as
a whole hasignificant contribution to the prosecution of the war and strengthened the GVN's
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overall political position and prospects. Thethe past few months has been particularly en-
couraging. inimum, the setbacks which occurred in the wake of last year's Tet attacks seem to have been largely overcome.
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Progress over the past four months, however, reflects not only the results of the current intense GVN and allied effort known as the AcceleratedCampaignut also the general standdown in Communist initiated military activity and the pullback of main force units which have provided an optimum climate for pacification efforts. It would be extremely disquieting if significant progress had not been recorded in recont months. The acidof allied abilities to record continued progress and the solidity of gains recently registered-will como when the Communists resume some significant measure of military activity and exert military pres-sure deliberately designed to counter the pacification campaign. This test will almost certainly come within the next few weeks and may, in fact, have already begun.
THE VIEW FROM HANOI
21. It is against this general background that the Communists have had to formulate their strategy for the coming year and to face the new US administration. We are fairly certain that there has been considerable debate in Hanoiorrect strategic line and its proper tactical implementation. The essence of the discussion seems to be whether Hanoi should adopt an "offensive strategy" looking once again for dramatic military results, orore flexible combination of political and military tactics.
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What evidence there is points to the latter course as the one the Communists are now pursuing. There are several factors which may have influenced Hanoi in this direction. First of all, and probably the most importantonviction that Hanoi cannot win the war through large-scale, offensive military
actions. Hanoi knows that continuingtrategy would involve high losses without commensurate gains. The North Vietnamese further believe that the effort necessary to support large-scale fighting resultserious weakening of the ideological struggle in both North and South Vietnam, closely allied to these propositions, is the probable conviction that the US will to persevere in South Vietnam is weakening and can eventually be underminedombination of the threat of indefinite military struggle coupled with pressures and gestures toward compromise and political settlement. In sum, the prevailing view in Hanoi seems to be that the first priority should be directed at getting the US out of Vietnam and, further, that united front tactics, negotiations, and other political means should be used to this end, with military pressures and terrorism playing an ancillary and supporting role.
problem is to decide on theof political and military tactics in orderwhat it regards as favorable trendsthinking about the war and to get the newcommitted to the route of a Hanoi almost certainly calculateslarge measure of military pressure will continue
to be needed, if only to make sure that alliedin conventional battlesoint of significant breakthrough. In other words, Hanoi must demonstrate to the US that the Communists can make the war continue with no clear end in sight.
realizes that it is in noimpose its own termsettlement. positions, as stated in the DRV'sand more recently in the new five points
of the Liberation Front, clearly are for bargaining.*
1
ontains the full texts of these has-Communist statement a.
In private and through various third parties Hanoi has alreadyillingness to discuss lesser demands.
The Communists probably have set outpossible scenarios for the negotiations. They certainly hope that in the process of fighting and negotiating the Saigon government will crumble and be replacedroup of leaders more amenable to the kind of agreements the Communists desire. This is why they are putting such emphasis at the moment on the needpeace cabinet" in Saigon or at least the removal of Thieu, Ky and Huong.
If neither events nor negotiations produce such results, we cannot be certain how far thewill go in scaling down their demands. Hanoi views the Paris talkserious venture, however. Its terms will have to be explored by our negotiators, of course, and they will only emerge clearly in the process of hard bargaining. At the core of the Communist position are two minimum essentials: first, that all American troops must be withdrawn within
a clearly defined period; and second, that the US agreeormula which gives the Communists some guaranteed political statusower baseto provide themlear shot at obtaining control in the South and eventual reunification of the country. This is the "political beachhead" President Thieu believes the Communists hope to retain at the conclusion of the talks. Remembering the periodhe Communists almostwould refuse toettlement which fails to satisfy these minimum aims.
substantive discussionsCommunist negotiators probablyroad sketch of their standardoutlined in the DRV's four points and thepoints. Within this propagandawe believe the Communists are prepared
to be fairly flexible in their tactics. The precise degree and nature of that flexibility will be largely
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determined by how Hanoi sizes up the policies and attitude of the Nixon administration and by Hanoi's assessment of the situation on the ground in South Vietnam,
VI. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS; THE NEAR TERM
In the military field,have to decide whether theirbetter served byaintaining abut steady, pace of fighting in Souththe hope that this may encourage the newto move ahead towardy sharply increasing themilitary action to project an image ofand thus convince American leadersinettlement will not result in
a better deal for the allied side. Most of our evidence suggests the Communists areincreased infiltration, new troop deployments, and stepped up harassingbeosition to make the latter option genuinely viable.
of the mainourse of intensified militarythe current allied Accelerated Pacification Hanoi cannot permit the allies touncontestedrogram which not
only solidifies and extends Saigon's political writ but which alsoasic threat to the Communist organization in the South. Moreover, the military situation in South Vietnam in the past several months has given the appearance of relative Communist passivity in the face of allied initiative. In Hanoi's view, this is the wrong kind of background music for conducting substantive discussions in Paris.
addition, Hanoi would certainlycreate within the American people and theira psychological mood duplicating aspossible that produced by8 Tetattacks, however, would involve considerable
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risks. Failure wouldajor setback and the Communists must realize that prospects for success are doubtful at best. Moreover, they must be quite uncertain about the reaction of the new USeven to an attempted majorone which included attacks on Saiqon
Hanoi will try toit has the capabilities and the will,pressures, to continue the military struggle,
thus convince Washington that the road of nego-
tiations is attractive and feasible. We believe the current high level of infiltration activity is aimed at putting teeth in this argument and to put the Communistsosition to apply greaterpressure. We do not think the Communists will move forward with anything approaching an all-out effort, however, until they have sized up the policies of the new US administration. In the meantime, wo can expect some rise in the overall level and scope of Communist military activity along the lines which
fhave been developing in the past week or two. This may include at least sapper and terrorist attacks on urban centersr including Saigon. There is evidence that such attacks could be tried at any time.
Current Communistpropaganda activities are concentrated onrelations between South Vietnam andStates, denigrating and embarrassinggovernment and its leaders,and rivalry among non-Communistand improving the status of tho NLFbody rightfully entitledhare ofin South Vietnam. The theme Hanoi mostsee doveloped is that all parties to thepeaco except the current Saigonis the primary obstacle to an earlythe Vietnam conflict. In Paris andhas alreadyajorthat the peace so universallycome until Thieu, Ky and Premier Huong are
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removed from their leadership positions in Saigon. In support of this campaign, the Communists are stepping up their political action efforts in Southattempts to fomentand other efforts to create unrest and to weaken the GVN's administrative authority.
they strive to undermine the GVN,also are working on improving theirprospects in South Vietnam. Their maindirected toward enhancing the status ofFront anduturefor it in South Vietnam. At the same time,
the Communists are preparing for the eventualityeasefirehift toward greater stress on political competition. The "Liberationhich they huve been setting up in rural areas during the past year, willrime mechanism for this effort and will probably be used in Paris to support Front claims of territorial control. The numbers of these committees and the extent to which they actually exercise governing functions are wildly exaggerated by the Communists, but such claims are one of the best indications of the bargaining line the Front is likely to take eventually in Paris.
VII. OUTLOOK
ew phase sooms to beVietnam with the opening of the substantivein Paris, the change in Americanand the current intensification of theCommunists seem prepared to employ aof diplomatic, political, andwhich they still hope will achieve But tho criticalleast overbe the posture and policies of the
new American administration and their impact in Paris, Saigon, and Hanoi.
THE VIETNAMESE PROTAGONISTS
Nature of the Struggle. TheVietnam is intruggle forover those Vietnamese who now liveportion of Vietnam lying south of the The primary issue is control overterritory. Armedfrom theof individual terrorists toby line military units oflongey rolo in thethis struggle; but our adversaries havearmed force, of any kind, for thepurpose of seizing and holdingof terrain. Instead, our adversariesemployed armed force, of allolitical abrasive intended to cow
the population into submission, collapse all political structures (from the local to thelevel) they do not control, and erode the appetite for struggle of all who opposo our adversaries' drive for political control. For the Vietnamese involved in this struggle, therefore, the ultimate measure of success or failure will not be relative casualties inflicted, battles won or lost or even territory entarable with impunitypolitical writ runs (for whatever reason) over the population of South Vietnam.
and analysis of the struggle
in Vietnam, and the major issues involved, frequently employ nouns or adjectives with definite geographic connotations. "NorthSouthnorthernsouthernhough descriptively accurate in some contexts, in others, these geographically oriented labels are misleoding or give rise to serious distortion. Such language implicitlyonventional struggle between two traditional nation states whose populations are ethnically similar . the US
andach of which acknowledges the
existence even though both may disputo the location of their common frontier.
Such an implicit image bears almost no valid relationship to the realities of the struggle in Vietnam, primarily because none of tho major Vietnamese participants therein thinks of the struggle or the issues involved in thesewhatever these participants, on both sides, may say for public or international consumption. What you really have isontest between two nation statestruggle for political control being waged in the southern part of Vietnam between, on the one hand, the Vietnamese Communist Party and its adherents, clients andwitting someon the otheruch moregroup whose only real thread of unity is its opposition to Communist rule.
The Vietnamese Communists: It wouldrosi, and erroneous, over simplification to suggest that all those fighting or working for the "Viet Cong" are Communist party members doc-trinally motivated by devotion to Marxism-leninism. Many who fight and work for the VC cause have never heard of Marx or Lenin and are motivated by concerns that have little or nothing to do with Communist doctrine. Nonetheless, the control and direction of all aspects of the insurgency, which began7 and has evolved into the full scale war being waged today, has always been kept firmly andin the hands of the Vietnamese Communist Party, which,as called itself the Dang Lao Dong (Vietnam workers Party) and since
eferred to itself south of the
parallel as the Peoples Revolutionary Party. The control center for all VC activity in South Vietnam--the Central office For South Vietnama Party command echelon subordinate, through Party channels, to the Politburo in Hanoi.
over two decades, the Vietnameseparty hasenchant for and skill in
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using Front organizations, always under tight covert Party control but ostensibly independent groupings incorporating both Communist and non-Communist "Whenever the Party hand in one group became too obvious or well known, it was followed. the Viet Minh was followed by the Lien Viet (during the struggle against the French) which was subsequently replaced, in North Vietnam, by the Fatherland Front. Using the some style and format,0 the Party created the SouthNational Liberation Front (NLF) which has always been kept under tight Party control and whose pretentions to independence have always been taken much more seriously by foreigners than by the Vietnamese, who quickly recognized the NLF's lineal antecedents. Afterhe Party created the "Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces"ossible urban oriented complement to the NLF. imilar vein, the Party is now setting up "liberationhich are the linoal descendants of the "Administrative/Resistance Committees" through which, in the First Indochina War, the Party attempted to exercise political control over territory wrested from the French. Though as many non-Communist as possible areinto these various groups, their control is always tightly (and ruthlessly) kept exclusively in Party hands.
6. The Party thinks ofa single, nationwide organization. (For that matter, the state structure the Party overtlyDemocratic Republic of Victnam--also thinks in similar terms and adamantly denies that its writ lawfully stops ath parallel.) The Party's leadership thinks in national, not regional, terms. Furthermore, many key members of the Party leadership upper echelons are persons of southern origin and/or persons whose party careers and rise to power within the Party are rooted in tho southern struggle and the development of the Party's southern organization. Politburo member Pham Von Dong, Premier of the DRV, was born south ofh parallel (in Quang Ngai Province). Even more significantly, so too was
the present head of the Party apparatus, Politburo member Le Duan. It was Le Ouan who first organized COSVNnd who remained its director until,hen he went to Hanoi to assume the function and, eventually, his present title of Party First Secretary. During theiet Minh War, Le Duan's deputy in COSVN, who helped him build the southern Party organization, was Le Due Tho,olitburo member, head of the Party's Organization Bureau and its chief negotiator in Paris. The present head of COSVN is another Politburo member, Phamative of Vinh Long Province in the Mekong Delta. The "north/south" language Hanoi's leaders sometimes use in propaganda or diplomacy, in short, masks the central fact that the Hanoi leadership really does not think in such language. To the Party leadership, in language it also frequently employs, "Vietnam is one."
7. The way the Communist leadership views the overall struggle has several important It explains why Hanoi believes it has the right to support the struggle in South Vietnam with North Vietnamese troops, who are, by definitition not foreign. Hence, when Hanoi calls for theof all foreign troops from South Vietnam, Hanoi is talking only about US and allied troops, not its own forces. Secondly, the Communist leadership's outlook and command structure, means that any discussions of present reality or potential future developments framed in terms of relationships between "North Vietnam" or "Hanoi" overnment) and the National Liberation Front are apt to be misleading or meaningless.* All of our available evidence indicates that the Front's capacity for action independent of Party control is negligible and likely to remain so. The real point is the central (Politburo) Party leadership's capacity for maintaining control over and discipline within
AThe Saigon leadership's acute appreciation of this point aaaounts in part for ita strong emotional re-sietance to any negotiation arrrangements which treat "Hanoi" and the NLF as two separate entities.
its southern organization. Here there are somefriction, but not at higher command(which controls the NLF) will almostthe disciplined servant of the Hanoiand the six regional Party committees inwill almost certainly remain theof COSVN. Any problems that arise areto develop at provincial, district and
level. Finally, this leadership outlook means that whatever interim political arrangements the Hanoi Politburo may accept during the coming months (as the Politburo accepted the "temporary" division of Vietnam, the Politburo is unlikely ever to abandon its goal of establishing centralized Party political domination over South Vietnam.
Non-Communist Vietnameseon one side of the political strugglewaged in Vietnam youet ofaround and effectively controlled byand definable organizationalVietnamese Communistthe otherpicture is considerably more diffusa. Hereoriented labels "theor "the South Vietnameseoften be misleadingigh proportionkey positions in the Government ofestablishment, civil service. Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky)
are held by northern refugees. In discussing the political goals or preferences of those Vietnamese now living south of the seventeenth parallel, it is also important to recognize that the "politicized" portion of Vietnamesethose who think in concepts we in tha West construe as
tend to be concentrated in urban areas. The
and attitudes of the rural population, by and large, tend to be much more localized, pragmatic and
these caveats, thein the struggle may be said to
comprise all Vietnamese in South Vietnam
to Communist rule (and in Vietnamese eyes,
shrift is usually given to subtle distinctions
between the Communist Party per se and its various front groups such as the NLFollectively, these protagonistspectrum ranging from almost the extreme left over to the extreme right, and encompass people of all regional, religious and other groups politically important in Vietnam. In the aggregate, this spectrum of those opposed to Communist rule comprises the overwhelming majority of politicized Vietnamese living in South Vietnam. Were this not the case, the war would have inevitably endedommunist victory years ago. oot problem, however, lies infact thatajority of the politicized population of South Vietnam may be united in not wanting to come under Communist political domination, it is not yet united on anything else. Opposition to Communist rule does not necessarily, or even generally, equate to positive support for theof Vietnam or its leaders who are directing the main effort toommunist takeover.
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ANNEX B
MILITARY FORCES
I. Enemy Strength and Capabilities Manpower Resources
North Vietnamese are estimateden in the Regular Armedthe end In addition to thoseSouth Vietnam and the border areas, aboutand combat support troops are deployed North Vietnam infiltrated
men into South Vietnam each year6 Infiltration8 was atnd may possibily have been as high.
number of males fit for militarydraft age each year in North. Although large numbers
of infiltrators have been outside this age group, from the point of viewanpower balance, onlyid the requirement for troops exceed the new age group. Wc estimate that North Vietnam alsoivilian manpower pool of athysically fit males ingo group out of5 million people ingo group.
the first halfora serious problem forthe mobilization of manpower. Somanotull cycle of basic ortraining, and reservists who make upof many infiltration groups did notadditional training after being calledintensified scale of warfare during thequartersdded to the problemstwo years of building up theevere strain on the supply of NCOsparticularly able ones with combat These quality problems undoubtedlyin the effectiveness and raganarative
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capacity of some units. The deploymentumber of units into sanctuaries during the last quarter provided opportunities for refitting and training. The units involved have probably been restored to something approaching full strength thoughdeterioration may have proved more difficult to rectify.
Despite these problems and the personnel losses sufferedhe oncmy Regular Forces in South Vietnam and in contiguous border areas of North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are quantitatively about as strong as theyear ago. Tho maintaining of Regular Force strength has been accomplished mainly by Hanoi providing an increasingly largo share of replacements. The enemy has also been able to maintain the strength of his Guerrilla Forces but only at the costignificant diminution in their quality. Thethreat represented by the Guerrilla Forces is limited by the fact that only one-third of them are estimated to be fully armed and adequately trained. Despite some erosionhe Viet Cong have been able toiable political infrastructure. These people are highly organized, well trained, and dedicated cadre that constitute the major target of Allied programs for the political resolution of the war.
We believe that the enemy should be able to maintain his forces at their current strength. His success in doing this, however, will depend on Hanoi's continued willingness to make largeof its own manpower and on Viot Cong ability to recruit in the South.
Beginning in8 thereharp reduction in the number of infiltrators observed entering the infiltration system in North Vietnam. In December, however, infiltration activity picked up sharply, and it is now believed that at0 and0 men are en route to South Vietnam.
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Most of these troops should arrive during the first quarter Their deployment at this time is consistent with the expected increase in enemy military pressure during the current winter season.
The current and future ability of the Viet Cong to recruit in South Vietnam is difficult to judge. There is increasing competition from the South Vietnamese draft but the most important factor will be the extent of Viet Cong military andsuccess during the coming months. It isthat recruitment averagedonth6 andonth At these rates the Viet Cong were able to increase somewhat the number of men in regular units. ombination of recruitment and improssmont the Viet Cong were able to at least double the7 rate during the last two months7 and the first quarter Desertion among enemy forces later cut substantially into the gains ofor sometime recruiting clearly haserious problem to the Viet Cong, and the current monthly recruitment rate almost certainly is well below the average maintained
Tha proportion of ethnic southerners in the enemy forces declined sharply during the last half Above two-thirds of the personnel in the Viet Cong Main Forces are now believed to beethnic North Vietnamese, and8 for the first time some North Vietnamese fillers have been allocated to some Viet Cong Local Force Units.*
ti ca1 Suppor t
is no evidence thatignificant inhibiting factor inplanning. Logistical support to the Communist
The Viet Cong Local Forces are subordinate to Province and District Party Committees and normally operate in their home areas. The Main Forces are subordinate to higher military headquarters.
Forces operating in South Vietnam during the next six months should be adequate to maintain the present or even an expanded force structure at present or higher levels of combat. The logistical system through Laos has been continuously improved throughout the war and the burden in North Vietnam is substantially lessenedesult of theof the bombing. Materiel movement continuesigh rate throughout the system. Tn addition, enemy forces have been able toubstantial share of their non-lethal stores and an unknown share of arms and ammunition directly from Cambodian sources. The most serious logistical problem now being faced by the enemy is the increasing success of Allied spoiling operations in disrupting re-supply operations within South Vietnam and inlarge quantities of supplies in forward positions and thus disrupting planned enemy
ii. The Outlook for arvn
arvn's long-term potential forreater share of the combat burden has been greatly enhanced during the past year. The size of the regular and territorial forces increased aboutercent. The firepower of most units is rapidly being increased as much of their World War II-type weaponry is replaced by modern US Moreover, most arvn units gained extensive combat experience8 as the level ofintensified. Nevertheless, thereumber of constraints and basic faults in the arvn military structure. An arvn capability toajor share of the ground war against enemy forces at their current strengths is unlikely to be attained within the next year or two.
A major limitation to arvn's futurefor attaining an effectiveerious lack of adequate air, artillery* and logistics support. For example, the arvn is
D-4
@
almost completely dependent on US airliftfor deploying and supplying their combat forces during military operations. In addition to these basic deficiencies, the ARVN potential is limitedarge number of fundamental weaknesses. These include training, leadership, pay, and The latter is reflected in part by the serious desertion rate among ARVN's major combat units.
ANNEX C
HANOI'S FOUR POINTS AND THE FRONT'S FIVE POINTS
I. The DRV'a Four Points
The four points were made at tho endong policy address by North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong in Hanoi has described them over since then as the "basis"olitical settlement in Vietnam. They read as follows:
of the basic national
rights of the Vietnamesepeace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. According to the Geneva agreements, the US Government must withdraw from South Vietnam US troops, military personnel, and weapons of all kinds, dismantle. military bases there, and cancel its militarywith South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and ogqression in South Vietnam. to the Geneva agreements, the US Government must stop its acts of war against North Vietnam and completely cease all encroachments on the territory and sovereignty of the DRV.
2. Pending the peaceful reunfication of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still temporarily divided into two zones the military provisions of4 Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The two zones must refrain from entering into any military alliance with foreign countries, and there must be no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnel in their respective territory.
Sensit
The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV without any foreign interference.
The peaceful reunfication of Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference.
II. The Five Points of the National Liberation Front
The Front setague five-pointinhich wasrogram than an analysis of the situation and exhortation to the South Vietnamese people. The Communists touted the five points widely as the definitive Liberation Front positionettlement, but they never really carried much weight. tatement reacting to the full US bombing halt, the Frontevised five-point program which is now considered the basic Front negotiating The new five points read as follows:
Vietnam is resolved tothe materialization of itsnamely independence,neutrality, prosperity,peaceful reunification of
the fatherland.
US imperialists must put antheir war of aggressionwithdraw all their troops
of their satellites and all war means
from South Vietnam, and liquidate
all US military bases in South Vietnam.
internal affairs of the Southpeople must be settled bypeople themselves inwith the political program ofwithout foreignNFLSV advocates the formation ofnational and democraticand holding of freein South Vietnam.
4. The reunification of Vietnam will
be decided by the people in the two zones of Vietnam, step by step, by peaceful means and on the basis of consultations and agreements between the two zones, without foreign.
5. South Vietnam will pursue aof peace and neutrality: alliance in any formcountries, andfriendly relations with allon the five principlescoexistence. Goodwill be set up withof Cambodia on the basisfor its independence,neutrality, andwithin its presentwith Laos on the basis2 Geneva agreements concern-
that country.
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Original document.
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