8
MEITORANDUM
SUBJECT: The US Assessment of North Vietnamese Military Strength in Laos.
It has never been possible to follow with either precision or confidence the ebb and flow of North Vietnamese troops in Laos. There are two broad reasons for this unhappy state of affairs, one having to do with the nature of Northactivity in Laos and the peculiar characteristic of the war that is being waged there, and the other having to do with limitations under which ourgathering effort in Laos operates. The two factors are obviously related.
There are0 Northcombat troops in Laos, whose efforts are more or less directed against the Vientiane government. Spread-outough line that runsiles from the Chinese border in the north to the Cambodian border in the south, the North Vietnamese furnish both the backbone and the muscle for the Communist movement in Laos. The number of North Vietnamese troops in Laos fluctuates with the seasons. In tho so-called dry season, roughly between November and Hay, the Communists take the military offensive and troops are moved in from North Vietnam toattacks. When the rains come and overland travel becomes perilous and resupply of advanced units difficult and unreliable, the enemy moves to
a defensive posture. Some of the North Vietnamese troops return to their home bases.
lassic case this past year,of theth Division moved outChau innd then played ain the Nam Bac campaign in January. Theyup some of our other guerrilla outpostssame area and returned to North Vietnam before
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4. Our ability to keep an accurate count of the Vietnamese movement is not vory good. For one thing, we have no evidence that Hanoiystematic (croup numbering system for unitsinto Laos as they do for the troops on their way to South Vietnam. Thereumber of logical reasons for this, including the difference in the numbers Involved and the fact that the units going to Laos deploy as organicof which have had previous experience inthan as groups of green recruits, as in the case often in Vietnam.
mostly from interrogation of
prisoners and defectors, that the majority of the NVA units in Laos are old-timers. Am the capability of governmentthe tribalincreased over the past four or fivo years, Hanoi has been forced to keep increasingof its troops in Laosore or less permanent basis. This is particularly true in the panhandlo area, where Hanoi's interests are paramount and where tho distance separating government bases from the vital infiltration corridor is not very great.
substantial increase in Northpermanently assigned to Laos operationsmore than one yearakes the job ofa major Communist push more difficult. is that we believe the enemy can takeit wants incuttingthebringing in great numberstroops or large stocks of supplies. Againespecially true in the sensitive panhandlewell-developed road and trail net thereVietnamese to move troops about quickly and, in
a pinch, to move-up reinforcements.
situationood deal differentnorth where the distances and theInvolved in moving troops through mountainous
terrain would make it more difficult for the enemy toajor surprise against Luang Prabang, Long Tiong or even Na Khang. The substantial numbers of friendly guerrilla-intelligence gathering assets we deploy in these areas also make enemy surprise more difficult.
8. We are somewhat more apprehensive about the Plalne des Jarres (PDJ) area because the enemya sizeable force in close proximity tolines and is sorvodell developed supplyoute 7. Our roadwatch teams giveretty fair count of what is moving on the road, but the fact remains tint wo are not able toood account of what the trucks are carrying. Ourindicates, however, that the Communistshave substantial stockpiles in tho PDJ area and can move against the friendly neutralists there with
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little warning.
thore is no reason forfact remains that we have had some tip-offJust about every major Communist attack inLaos in recent years. Last year, for example,the alarm in Namonth beforefell. We knew the North Vietnamese werePhou Pha Thi well before they took it, andestimated that the North Vietnamese did not
have enough assets in the immediate aroa to take Na Khang.
record is not nearly so good in Countless rumors of impending enemygenerally unreliable testimony of prisonersCommunist intentions (the Northalways laying it on pretty thick withand thepart to keep morale upto scare the dlckons out of the governmentwords filtersnd the heavy movementinfiltration corridor most of which isLaos, enables the enemy to keep frompunches. Our estimate that the Communistsouth Laos is essentiallyinfiltrationallowed us to call a
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few of tbe shots before theylatoattack against Thateng, for example, was almost certainly In responseovernment clearing We are not confident, howevor, that we couldajor change in Communist strategy in the south. We have the intelligence assets, for example, toommunist buildup in the Thakhekas wo have in theit would be extremely difficult to predict an upcoming thrust against that Mekong town.
lthough tbe basic Intelligencethe south strikes us as almost insolublecurrent realities there, some steps haveto increase our intelligence capabilities.
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Our beat guess, however, is that Hanoi win not-pull the plug on us in Laos at least until such time as thoy have played out their game in South Vietnam. We don't know anybody who feels particularlywith this estimate of Hanoi's intentions, however, least of all our very capable people in Laos who are watching the enemy closely and often at close quarters.
SECRET/SENSITIVE LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
ANNEX
CIA ACTIVITIES TO MONITOR ENEMY INFILTRATION INTO LAOS
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anticipation of the possibility that the Communistshonor2 Geneva Accords, CIA developed aethnic Lao Roadwatch teams to report on Northincursions into northern Laos. This effort was initiallyand unsophisticated but as North Vietnamese militarythe program was expanded and its reporting techniques This information is now disseminated as acquired socan be exploited immediately and tactically by USAF orforces. At present, CIA roadwatch teams provideon all major enemy infiltration routes into Laos.ndn northwest Laos from China;entral Laos from North Vietnam; Routes5nLaos from North Vietnam; Routes5n southfrom North Vietnam; andn south Laos fromattachedor current CIA roadwatch team locations inand Map II for team locations in south Laos.)
oadwatch teams are deployedany given time in order to report on the level of enemyor through Laos to South Vietnam. In the latter instanceare deployed along,s well as several key rivers. The teamsin enemy-controlled areas adjacent to thesereport the volume, type, direction, time and othertraffic moving past their observation points. Order ofis also collected through contact with local villagers.team consists ofoightly armed men who carry,to necessary field equipment,
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The teams operating in north Laos have had more success in accurately monitoring the level of infiltration and the subsequent destination of enemy forces and materiel coming into Laos than have those in south Laos. This is due primarily to the difference in terrain between the north and the south. In the north the rugged mountainous terrain restricts the enemy to well defined roads and trails, thus making his movement easier to monitor. In the south the flatter terrain and heavy jungle or rain forests provide the enemy considerable cover and flexibility of movement making his whereabouts more difficult to detect. Nevertheless, with the aid of other intelligence sourcesgent nets, informants, prisoner and defector debriefings, overhead photography.
IA believes it is
able to provide reliable estimates on enemy plans and capabilities in Laos. Prom this all-source reporting the Agency has been able to provide early warning on enemy buildups and subsequent attacks at Nam Bac, Phou Pha Thi, Na Khang, Saravane, Attopeu and more recently the Chinese road construction in Laos. This effort producesositive intelligence reports per month which are disseminated immediately to field commanders In Vietnam, Thailand and Hawaii as well as the intelligence community in.
Original document.
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