fheU-2's Intended Successor: Project
BeforeecamenlA projecthad estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over (he Soviet Union would be betweenonths and two years. After overflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of tracking and attempting to intercept. this estimateptimistic. Byichard Bissell was so concerned aboutulnerability that he despaired of its ability to avoid destruction for six months, let alone (wo years.
To extendseful operational life, project officials ftrji attempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet radars. Project RAINBOWs efforts to mask the radar image ofot only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more vulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude. Because Soviet radar operators continued to find ands equipped with amiradar systems. lhe__CIA canceled Project RAINBOW in
Long before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richardhis Air egun to look for
a more radical solution to the problem of Soviet radarentirely new aircraft. In the late summerhe two officialsumber of airframe contractorsearch for new ideas. Among the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for aaircraftery-high-lift wing. Because it would not tie made of metal, the wing wouldype of bridge truss on Id upper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve
altitude* o' KO.OOO0 feci bui onlyubsomc speedv just cnou'li to keep it airborne '
The slow-flying Northrop design did rot solve ihe problem of radar detection, and7 the emphasis switched to SupersonicInjKliBfeflhai hod been working on ways to reduceulnerabilityadar, begannvcsiigaie (he possibility of designing an aircraftery smatt radar cross section. ^Jj^.oon discovered thai supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances ofbyrom thi< point on. the CIA's attention locusedon the possibility of building an aircraft thai could fly at both extremely high speeds and high altitudes while incorporating the best ideas in radar-absorbing or radar-deflecting techniques,
THE EVALUATION OF DESIGNSUCCESSOR TO
By the autumn. Bissell andjfigftthad collected so many ideasuccessor tohat Bissell asked DO Dullesstablish an advisory committee to assist in the selection process. Bissell also felt that the supportommittee of prominent scientists and engineers would prove useful when it came time to ask for funding for such an expensive project. Edwin Land became the chairman of the new committee, which included some of iheand engineers who had served on previous advisory bodies for overhead reconnaissance: Edward Puree)I. Allen F. Donovan. H. Guyford Stever. and Kugene P. Kiefer.Air Force's chief scientist, Courtland D. Perkins, wasember. TTie committee first met in7 and held six more meetings between8 and the late summerhe meetings usually took place in Land's Boston office and almost always included the Air Force's Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, Dr. Joseph V. Chary k. and his Navy counterpart. Garrison Nonon. Designers from severalmanufacturers also attended some of the meetings.'
' Donovin ioif rvicw
ouKttwmi mm&
Themii% involved in iltc tejiclt Tor avrcic Lockheed,vj . and
Conviiit. wliicli wasS "Hustler" bomber for ihe Air Force and also working on an even faster model known asS8 "SuperarlyS. Richard Bissell askedfrom both nniit to submit designsigh-speed fecoonaik-sancc aircraft. During the spun- and summeroth firms worked on design concepts without jovcrnntcnt contracts Or funds.
Following extended discussions with Oissell on the subjectupersonic successor to. Lockheed's Kelly Johnson beganan aircraft (hat would cruise atl altitudes0 feet. Onohnson prcscnled his new high-speed concept to Land's advisory committee, which expressed interest in (he approach be was taking. At (he same meeting. Navy representativesonceptigh-altitude reconnaissance vehicle thatthe possibility ofamjet-powered, inflatable, rubber vehicle thai would be lifted to altitudealloon and then be propelledocketpeed where the ramjets could produce ihrusi. Richard Bissell asked Johnson to evaluate this concept, and three weeks later, after receiving more details from NavyKelly Johnson made some quick calculations that showed that the design was impractical because the balloon would have toile in diameterift the vehicle, which in turn woulding surface area greater than one-scvenih of an acre to cany the payload.
Byocklveed hadumber of possible configurations, some based on ramjet engines, others with bothand turbojets. Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts asnd soarryover from (he original nickname of "Angel" given touring its development These nicknames for (he various designs soon became simplytc.
Inhe Land committee met again to review all (he concepts then under consideration andinnow out the few that were most practicable. Among the concepts rejected were the Navy's proposal for an inflatable, ramjet-poweredoeing proposaloot-long hydrogen-powered inflatable aircraft, and i
L.f Hie IjxlWfli^lj-r- u-
o-'d oVs-S"crafi <ihc>ther Kelly Johnsoux thisuillMI subsonic aircraftery-lowradar cross(the CM)ew supersonic design (ihedid not accept altar one. ihe former because of its slow speed and the latterof its dependence on exotic fuels for its ramjet* and itshiph cost- The committee approved the continuation ofamjet poweredparasite" aircraft that would be launched'pecially configured version ofomber. The design wasarasite because it could not take off on its own butarger aircraft to carry it aloft and accelerate it to the speed required to start Ihe ramjet engine. The Convair design was called the FISH.'
Two months later, after reviewing the Convair proposal and yet another Lockheed designigh-speed reconnaissance aircrafthe Land comrnitiee concluded in late8 that i: would indeed be feasible to build an aircraft whose speed and altitude would make radar tracking difficult or impossible. The committee, therefore; recommended that DO Dulles ask President Eisenhower to approve further pursuit of the project and to provide funds forstudies and tests.*
Onllen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed the President on the progressuccessor to. Also present were Land and Purcell from the advisory committee. Presidential Science Adviser James Killian. and Air Force Secretary Donald Quarlcs. DCI Dulles reviewed the results ofissions to date and stated his beliefuccessor loould be used all ovei ihe world and "woulduch greater invulnerability to detection."
Bissell then described the two competing projects by Lockheed and Convair, noting that die chief question at the moment was whethei to use air launch or ground takeoff. The next phase, hewould be detailed engineering, at the end of which it wasthatitcraft be orderedost of0 million.
ouxcart v.
fHfliMy.dup. ;o. p. tloKiiion. "Archwgcl2 Norjn^g- f
Although President Eisciiltowvi'cd the purchase of this type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had teen tested. Promising that more thought would be given to thebefore such an order was placed. Secretary Quarles noted (hat CIA. the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were workingunding plan for the project. The President suggested that the Air Force "could support (he project by transferringt (he close of the meeting. Eisenhower asked the group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss further Stages of the project with him.'
COMPETITION BETWcfcN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIH
With funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available. Richard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convairubmit detailedDuring the first halfoth Lockheed and Convair worked to reduce the radar cross section of (heir designs, withfrom
In pursuing hisd discovered athat he believed could be used to advantage by the newaircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred tois pltcnomcnon involved three elements: the strengthadar return, the altitude of the object being illuminated by Ihc radar, and (he persistence of the radar return on the radar screen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).
Most tracking radars in theand ofoide" in circumference. Any object encountered in this area reflected the radar pulseanner directly propoitional to itslarger the object, (he stronger the returning radar signal. This return appeared on (he cathode-ray tube of the radar screenpot or blip, and die persistence of this blip on the radar screen also depended on the strength of the radar return, with blips from.larger objects remaining on the screen longer. During thenduman radar operator watched the radar screen and kept track oflips that indicated aircraft within (he radar's field of view.
AndVew J. GooopiKcr. "Memorandum or Conference theE.lS. WHC-SS. A'phs DOGU <TS J
lzfT.'
determinedii-jli-JltiiuiIe object moving two to three limes as fastormal aircraft would producemall blip with so little persistence that the rad-ir operator would have great difficulty tracking it. if indeed he could even see it.hai for an aircraft to take advantage of this Blip/Scan Ratio phenomenon it must fly at altitudes0 feci andadar cross section of less thanquare meters, preferably not muchquare meters. However,ircrafl to achievemall radar cross section, its designers would have to make many concessions in its structural design and aerodynamics."
By the summeroth firms had completed theirIn early June. Lockheedesignround-launched aircraft known asI. It wouldpeed ofangeiles, an altitude0 feet,ompletion date ofelly Johnson had refused to reduce theof his design in order toreater antiradar capability, andadar cross section, although not great, was substantially larger than llut of the much smaller parasite aircraft being designed by Convair."
The Convair proposal calledmall, manned,reconnaissance vehicle to be air launched from one of twoconfiguicdSB Super Hustlers. The FISHadical lifting bodyery-small-radar cross section, would fly at0 feet andangeiles. Two Marquardt ramjets would power itsash over the target area. Once the FISH decelerated, twohitneyurbojets would bring it backase. The ramjet exit nozzles and wing edges would be constructed oferamic material that could withstand the high temperatures of very high speeds and wouldradiofrequency energy from radar pulses. Convair stated that the FISH could be ready by January IWI.**
Convair's proposal depended on two uncertain factors, first and foremost was the unproven technology of ramjet engines. At the lime, no aircraft in existence couldarge, ramjet-powered craft into the sky and then accelerate to sufficient speed for the ramjet engines
'onviJr cOrunvoi on thexio . -AKftaafd
> IIConvaJi Qi.iiiOn. Generalri.ivt9 (S)
to be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in windthere was no available data to prove that these engines would work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain factor wasomber that was supposed to achieveefore launching the FISH0 feet. This version of8 was still in (he design stage.
Convair's proposalajor setback inhen the Air Force canceledroject. Conversion of the older,upersonic launching platform for the FISH was ruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties involved. Moreover, the Air Force was unwilling to part with two aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even hadrogram not been canceled, however, the FISH proposal wouldnot have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that Che added weight of the FISH would preventrom achieving the speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.
The Convair proposal was ihercforc unusable, but the Lockheed design with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the
Land committee. Onhe committee rejected both
designs and tO'innwd Ok COMpCMicM. Lockheed continuedork onesijn that would be less vulnerableefection, and Convairew CIA contract to design an air-breathing (win engine aircraft that would meet (he general specifications being followed by Lockheed."
Following recommendations by the Land committee, both Lockheed and Convair incorporated the Pratt St Whitney /S8 power plant into their designs. This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jci-powcied flying boat, the Glenn L. Martincamaster. and was the most powerful engine available.8 (he Navy had canceled (he Scamaster program, which had lefthitneyuyer for thengine."
Although (he Land committee had not yet found an acceptable design, it informed President Eisenhower on9 thatsearch was making good progress. Concerned aboutetec(ion and possible interception and awaic (hat the pholosatcllite project was encountering significant problems, the President gave his final approval to the high-speed reconnaissance aircraft project."
THE SELECTION OF THE LOCKHEED DESIGN
By the late summeroth Convair and Lockheed hadnew designsollow-on to. Convaii's entry, known as (he KINGFISH. used much of the technology developed for.ncluding stainless steel honeycomb skin, planiform wing design,rew capsule escape system, which eliminated the need for the pilot toressurized suit. The KINGFISH had twongines inside the fuselage, which significantly reduced the radar cross section. Two additional
OSA Hluoiy,JO. p. 15
)t*.cVh.Bj,0n.4 <fi?
WHOSS.
Lockheed's new entry was much like its first, but with several iiYOdificationsewi. too. would employ two of tbe powerful JS8 engines. Lockheed's major innovation in reducing radar returnesium additive in the fuel, which decreased (he (adar cross section of the afterburner plume. This improvement had been proposed by Edward Purccll of Ihc Land committee. Desiring to save weight. Kelly Johnson had decided not to construct2 out of steel. Traditional lightweight metals such as aluminum were ou( of the question because they could not stand the heat that would beas2 flew at. so Johnsonitanium alloy.
Onockheed and Convair submittedoint Department of Defense. Air Force, and CIA selection panel. As the table shows, the two aircraft were similar in performance
Division. Gcnnal Oyn>mk< Corpoisiion.Sumnurvelly lalintonlit pitfi. ito-m; in the Ai<tun-;l
to;nn illyn it. uu ot Ovfcih.i. in
nd"
f
.lunicierisiics. although the Lockheed design's specifications were slishily belter in each category. The Lockheed design was alsoin term* of overall cost. In (he vital area of vulnerability lo radar detection, however, the Convair design was supetior. Its smaller site jnd internally mounted engines gavemaller radar cioss. section than the"
Comparison of Lorthcfl
A-ll
K1MCHSH
32
3.?
(lou!)
n<n
nm
nm
nm
Altitude
ft.
ft.
ft.
ft.
ft.
1l
nimnuoy (forrcran without engines)
million
million
Some of the CLA representatives initially favored the Convair KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they were eventually convinced to support (lie Lockheed design by the Air Force members of the panel, who believed that Convair's costand production delays on8 project might be repeated in this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had producednder budget and on time. Another factoras security. Lockheed had experience inighly secure facility (the Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared by the Agency.
Despite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection panel remained concerned abouts vulnerability to radarand therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for reducings radar cross sectionn Idhe CIAour-month contract to Lockheed
,
io pioeccd wiili iimjradjr studies, acrodynaiijic structural tcstv. anddesigns. This research and all laier work2 look placeew codename. Projeci OXCART, established at the end of9 to replace iis more widely known predecessor.1anager for OXCART was 'ho had long been associated withrogram.
EFFORTS TO REDUCES RADAR CROSS SECTION
During the springelly Johnson's Skunk Workswhich (hen numbered onlybegunull-scale mockup of the proposed aircraft. The mockup was to be tested for its radar cross section by Edgertoo.ricr (EG&G) in
ckhced objected to this siteits pylon would not support the full-scale mockup and because the facilities were in full viewearby highway. Ongreed to movcjts radar test facility-JIfl
When the new radar test facility with its larger pylon was ready. Johnson put2 mockup on at specially designed trailer truckmmT* IShe mockup was in place atop the pylon, and radar testing could begin. These tests soon proved that Lockheed's concept of shape, fuel addilive, and nonmetallic parts was workable, but it would fake more thanonths of testing and adjustment before the OXCARTatisfactory radar cross Section.
If was in the course of this radar testing that the OXCART
U Hlnrr.U Ninety.
ClCn'SliCaPPcarancc- Edwardand lia" comcheoryontinuously curving airframe would be difficult to trackadar pulseit would preseni few corner reflectors or sharp angles from which pulses could bounce in the direction of the radar. To achieve the continuously Curving airframe. Kelly Johnson added ihin. curved extensions to Ihe engine housings and leading edges of thend
eventually lO (Ik fuscljjjc itself,ulijl is litmviiach side. A( first Johnson wjs concerned ilut thesehi ions might impair the airworthiness of Ihc plane, but wind lunncl testingthat the chines actuallyseful aerodynamic lifthe vehicle. Because titanium was very brittle and therefore difficult to bend. Johnson achieved the necessary curvature by combiningpieces of titanium called fillets. These fillets were glued to the framework of the chinespecial adhesive.esin.
On later OXCART models the fillets were made fromresistive honeycomb plasticlass-fiber surface that would not melt at high speed- When struckadar pulse, thechines tended to absorb the pulse rather than reflect iL Aapproach was used for the leading edges of the wings. Again electrically resistive honeycomb material was fabricated intoshapes, known as wing teeth, and fitted into the titanium wings. Both the metal and composite fillets and teeth were held in place with the newly developed epoxy cements.
The greatest remaining area of concern ins radar cross section was the two vertical stabilizers. To reduce radar reflections. Kelly Johnson canted (he stabilizersnd fabricated them out of resin-impregnated nonmetallic materials. Once these changes were completed, the only metal in each vertical stabilizer was asteel pivot The Air Force, which later ordered several versions of the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted die laminated vertical Stabilizers."
THE OXCART CONTRACT
Byockheed had demonstrated (hat its concept of shape, fuel additive, and nonmetallic pans would reduce the OXCART'S radar cross section substantially. Richard Bissell,was very upset to leam that the changes had lededuction in the aircraft's performance, which meant it would not be able to attain the penetration altitude he had promised to President Eisenhower. Kelly Johnson then proposedduce the aircraft's weightounds and increase the fuel loadounds, making it possible
UrtWSK.1I/ 0S4f>.
to achieve the dcsiicd target altiiudc0 feel. Afterward, he noicd in the project log: "We have no petfofmaoce margins left; so (his project, insiead of beingimes as hard as anyihing we have done, isimes as hard. This maiches the design number and
These changes satisfied Bissell. who notified Johnson onanuary that the ClA was authorizing the construction off the new aircraft. The actual contract was signed onockheed's original quotation for the projectillion forircraft, but technological difficulties eventually made this priceto meet. Recognizing that fabricating an aircraft frommight involve unforeseen difficulties, the CIAlause in the contract that allowed costs to be reevaluated. During the next five years, this clause had to be invokedumber of occasions ass costs Soared to more than double the original estimate.3'
new technologies necessitated
by oxcarts high speed
According to (lie specifications, the OXCART aircraft was topeed of4 knotsiles per second, which would make it as fastifleangeautical miles, and reach altitudes00 feet.ew aircraft would thus be more than five times as fast asnd would goiles higher.
"John-ia.
p.en^jjo^
One major disadvantage of the OXCARTs great speed was high temperatures. Flying through the earth's atmosphere ateated portions of the aircraft's skin to. An aiicraftat these high speeds and high temperatures required fuels, lu-.bricanis, and hydraulic fluids that had not yet been invented. The OXCARTs fuel requirement calledow-vapor-pressure fuelow volume at operating temperarures; ihe fuel would also be usedeaf sink to cool various parts of the aircraft.required lubricants that did not break down at the very highrating temperatures ofpeeds. This requirement led to the
invention of synthetic lubricants. Lockheed alio had to search long OXCARTpiodmtion (sal
and hardydraulic fluid that would not vaporize at high speed
but would still be usable at low altitudes.uitable hydraulic
pump was just as difficult. Kelly Johnson finallyump
that was being developed for North0 bomber
project.'*
Some of the greatest problems related to the high speeds and high temperatures at which (he OXCART operated resulted from working with the material Chosen for theAfter evaluating many materials. Johnson had chosen an alloy of titanium
OXCART pilot suit
haracterized by great strength, relatively light weight, and good resisur.ee to high temperatures, but high in cost. As strong as Stainless steel, titanium weighed slightly more than half as much. Obtaining sufficient quantities of titaniumuality suitable for fabricating aircraft components proved very difficult because methods for maintaining good quality control during the milling of titanium were not fully developed Up toercent of the early deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation had lo be rejected. It was nothen company officials were informed of the objectives and high priority of the OXCART program, that problems with thesupply ended. Even after sufficient high-quality titanium was received. Lockheed's difficulties with the metal were not over. Titanium was so hard that tools normally used in aircraft fabrication broke; new ones therefore had to be devised. Assembly linewas not possible, and the cost of the program mounted well above original estimates." .
The high temperatures that the OXCART would encounter also necessitated planning for the pilot's safety and comfort because (he inside of the aircraft would befioderately hot oven. To save
: to.n
elly lotnm tmi ik imwfcn of uv
a.fCrafl.pi'CM wOuhf lltcrcforcOypc Of SfOCtfwith in own cooling, pressure control, oxy-en supply, and oilier necessities foe survival.
DESIGNING THfi OXCART'S CAMERAS
Providing cameras for2umber ofXCART managersrkin Elinephotographic
for the new aitcrafL These cameras wouldange offrom high-groundresolulton stereo to extremcly-high-rcsolu-tton spotting data.
The Perkin-Elmei) entry, known as ihcamera.igh-ground-resolution general stereo camera usinginch lensnch film. Il produced pairs of photographswathile* wide with anpcrCcni stereo overlap. The systemoot film supply and was able toines per millimeter andround resolution ofnches.
To meet severe design constraints in the areas of size, weight, thermal environment, desired photographic resolution, and coverage. Perkin Elmer's Dr. Roderick M. Scott employed concepts neverused in camera systems. These included the useeflecting cube ratherrism for theoncentric film supply and lakeup system to minimize weightonstant-velocity film transport "hat provided for the contiguous placement of stereo images on one piece ofTilm. and airban for the film transport and takcup
Bntnv. called the Typc-ll camera,igfceonvergent stereo deviceinch lensnch film. It produced pairs of photographswathiles wide wiih
anpercent stereo overlap, ft hadoot
supply and was able toines per millimeter and provide
ground resolution of 17
4
Hbmy., X.ffi^ oxcartsi
TV Hycon cmiy. designed by lima Baker and known a* liteV camera,potting camera with cxircittcly-high-ground icsoluiion In fact, il was un advanced version of (lie highlyamera developed for lherogram.S-inchensocus imagesnch film. Likeamera il could provide seven frames of photographywalhiles wide with stereo overlap oniles of (he swath, lite Hycon camera carried the largest Him supply of ihc three0 feel. Ii was able toines per millimeter andround resolutionersion of thisnch Hycon camera, known asamera, later saw serviceR
Each of (he three camera systems had unique capabilities and advantages, so all three were purchased for the OXCART. Before ihey could be effectively employed in lhe aircraft, however, new types of camera windows were needed. The OXCARTs camerahad to be completely free from optical distortion. Achieving this goal was difficultindow whose exterior would beto temperatures'F while Ihc interior surface would beT. After three years and the expenditure ofillion inand development, (he Coming Glass Works, which had joined this efforterkin-Elmer subcontractor, solved (he problem ofamera window (hat could withstand tremendous heat differentials. Its quaiU glass window was fused to (he metal frame by an unprecedented process involving high-frequency sound waves."
Later in the program, the OXCART received yei another camera system.lie Texas Instruments Corporation developed ancamera for Projects (hat were being used towhether the
his stereo device, known as trie
as adapted for use in OXCART. The camera had anlength ofnchesoot supplynch film.resolutionilliradian spatially, andon the ground. It could be used for both day ?nd night
wji-si,
CHOOSING PILOTS FOR OXCART
nrogram, (he Air Force providedrojeci OXCART, including (raining, fuel storage; and weather service. One of (he most important areas of support was the provision of pilots: all of the OXCART pilots came from the Air Force. Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most, advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and well niotivatedj
[Because of
the limited size of2 cockpit, they had to be under six feet (all and weigh lessounds. Following extensive physical and psychological screening.otential nominees were selected forsecurity and medical screening by (he Agency. By the end of this screening innly five individuals had beenand had accepted the Agency's offer of employmentighly classified projectery advancedecond search and screening raised the number of pilots for the OXCART to eleven. The thorough screening process produced an elite groupots; all but one of thesefficers eventually became
Xi)
seOCS)
SELECTIONESTING SUE FOR THE OXCART
From the very beginning, it was clear that Lockheed could not test the OXCART aircraft at its Buibank facility, where (he runway was too short and too exposed to ihe public The ideal testing site would be far removed from metropolitan areas, away from civil and militaryeasily accessible by air. blessed wjih good weather, capable of accommodating large numbers of personnel, near an Air Forceandunway ateel long. But no Such place wase found.
After consideringir Force bases Richard Bissell decided to'
!Although its personnel accommodatio'is. fuel
"oxcart OSay.V.fl.
storage capacity, and lunwjy lenjih were insufficient fo> tin: OXCART program, ilicemote location would greatly case ihc lasfc of maintaining ihe program's security,oderaterogram could provide adequate facilities Construction began inl7 shuttle service ferried work crews from Ourbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to ilic site.
Theoot runway was completed by ISelly Johnson had been iclucunt totandard Air Force runway with expansion joints everyeet because he feared the joints would set up undesirable vibrations in the speedy aircraft. At hisoot wide runway was therefore constructed offoot-wide longitudinal sections,eet long butThis layout put most of the expansion joints parallel to theof aircraft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.
Additional improvements included the resurfacing ofiles of highway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in the necessary fuel. The need for additional buildings on the base was met by thehree surplus Navy hangars were dismantled, moved, and reassembled on the north side of the base, and moreurplus Navy housing buildings were also transportedS*jA
All essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery
date of the2
Unfortunately, this delivery dale began to slip further and further into the future. Delays in obtaining the titanium, and latercaused the postponement of the final assembly of the first plane. Eventually. Kelly Johnson and Agency project officials decided totesting without wailing forngines by usingengines, designed for the. to test2 at altitudes up0 feet and at speeds up to.hange, however, meant thai the engine compartment of the firsthad lo be reconfigured to accommodatengine. Lockheed hoped that this substitution would permit the delivery of the2 by1 and its initial test flight by
Lockheed ran into so many technological problems with the OXCART effort thai by1 its costs had swollen toillion and were still climbing. Something obviously had to be done
reOUCC ClLpClKlllUlO Alter llllXllMOjCCI CjlllCtjKidctlecrease (he number of deliverableend ine nt No.0 ihe coniract reduced fromohe numberoracost2 million.'
The canceUaiioa of llicseas offset by an Air Farce order for the developmentupersonic intercepior variant of2 to serveeplacement for the NorthA Rapier interceptor project, which had been canceled inith the assistance of thei Hg0&fmWTQ^SHi^Kfre, the Air Force entered into an agreement with Lockheed to produce threeased on2 design but modified toecondand three air-to-air missiles. This effort was called Project KEDLOCK. Thelater redesignated ihe) wasto intercept enemy bombers long before they reached the United States, and initial Air Force plansorce of upf these supersonic interceptors. In fad, only three of these planes were built and delivered duringime frame because Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the program as ameasure. The Air Force bore all of the costs of theCIA was only involved in helping to write "black" contracts."
Lockheed was not the only OXCART contractor having (rouble containing costs: Pratt Sc Whitney was fighting an even bigger battle. Inhitney overruns threatened to halt (he entire OXCART project. At the suggestion of Cdr. William Holcomb in the office of the Chief of Naval Materiel. Richard Bissell asked the Navy to assist in funding's development. After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion ili.itight be used in future NavyVAdm. William A. Schocch. Chief of the Navy Materiel Command that had originally financedngine, authorized the transferillion in end-of-year funds lo the project, thusthe OXCARTs head aboves i( turned out.as never usedavy aircraft.
'OSAhip. TO..W'Sio-y/
"OSAM. pp
ort onSI.
po*ts" hkM " " 11
d
DELIVERY OF THE FIRST OXCART
Thenown as. was assembled and tested at Burbank during January andince it could not be flown toaircraft had to be panially disassembled and putpecially designed trailer that cost nearlyhe entire fuselage, without the wings, was crated and covered,oadeet wideeet long. To transport this huge load safely over the hundreds of miles to the site, obstructing road signs weretrees were (rimmed, and some roadbanks had to be leveled. The plane (eft Buribank on2 and arrivediwo days later.
After the fuselage arrivedits wings were attached andngines were installed, but the aircraft was still not ready to be tested. This new delay was caused by leaking fuelroblem that would never be solved completely. Becauses high speeds heat (he titanium airframe to more. Lockheed designers had to make allowances for expansion. When the metal was cold, the expansion joints were at (heir widest. In (he fuel tanks, these gaps were filled by pliable sealants, but the fuel forngines actedtrong reducing agent Uiat softened the sealants, causing leaks. Thus, when fuel was first poured into the aircraft.eaks developed, Lockheed technicians then stripped and replaced all theedious and time consuming procedure because the sealant required four curing cycles, eachifferent temperatureeriod ofoours. The engineers were never able toealant compound that was completely impervious to the jet fuel while remaining clastic enoughxpand and contract sufficiently. Thes tanks continued to leak, so when it was fueled, it only received enough fuel to get airborne The plane would then rendezvousanker, top off its tanks, and immediately climb to operating altitude, causing the metal to expand and the leaks to
CHANGES IN THE PROJECT
Richard Bissell. whose concern for the viability of6 had led to the establishment of Project OXCART and who hadits growth all along, was no longer in charge when Ihc first
XCAHr
OXCART aircraft took lo ihc air. He resigned from lhend his departureajor reo<gamiai.onreconnaissance program. The
Ihc Direcoraie of Plans, wilhircraft (OXCART
^
Research headedSfy^m^ Tl* folio JkUlftTr. irJ andorgan.zcdas name changed to rhe Directorate of Science andt4gR> ^jj^fj^aaast^vas iis firsi head. TlK Overhead
, .. projects belonged to Ihe Office of Special Activities, headed/dueling of (he OXCART vT .a- jl
now had the title of Assistant Director for Special Activities. These project management changes in the CIA had no immediate impact on the OXCART project because thewas still in the development stage, handled mainly byood deal of continuity was provided by officers who had servedumber of years withrogram and were now involved with OXCART: jffMjWjgghgN thr Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities: Cwt^lSfcij^a; die Air Force's project officer for the two aircraft; iiiiTtfjMffiKIWWilii'iiii who oversaw Ihe day- to-day affairs of the OXCART project.
OXCART'S FIRST FLIGHTS
With new sealant in its fuel tanks, the prototype OXCART wastake to the air. Onest pilot Louis Schalkor an unofficial, unannounced flight, which was antradition. He new the craft lediles at anof abouteel and encountered considerableof (he improper hookup of several controls. Theserepaired and on ihe ncxl day.pril. Schalkinutc maiden flight.eautiful takeoff, thebegan shedding the triangular filleis thai covered ihe work of tlic chines along ihe edjc of ihe aircraft body. The lost
cu which had Uccn sccwiedwin. cnosyudaffixed.be Mk.ilw torn, itac
10
next four days.
Ooce the fillets were in place.OXCARTs official lirst (lijhi (ooll place Onitnessed by^wuimbct of Agencyonnel includingtvt P'cscni. and Kelly Johnson noted in the project log,as very happy io have Dick see Ihis flight, with all thai he has contributed to theThis official first flight was also the first flight with the wheels up. Piloied again by Schalk. the OXCART took offnots and climbed0 feet. Duringminute flight,2op speednots. Kelly Johnson declared it to be Ihc smoothest first lest flight of any aircraft he had designed or tested.uring the second test flight, the OXCART broke the sound barrier,peed of
Four more aircraft,wo-scat trainer, arrived at the testing site before the end of the year. During the second delivery onhe cxira-widc" vehicle carrying the aircraft accidentallyreyhound bus traveling in the opposite direction. Project managers quickly authorized paymentor the damage done io the bus in order to avoid having to explain in court why the OXCART delivery vehicle was so wide.
One of (he biggest problems connected with flight testingwas keeping its existence secret. Realizing that the nation'scontrollers would be among the first unwitting people tothe plane, (lie Deputy Assistant Director for Specialhad called on Federal? to brief him about the craft'sask his assistance in keeping ilfully
INxi^m .
. ^ffSttwfcr'OXCAltr- OU Miamy clop.
with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to handle reports of unusually fast, high-flying aircraft. Air controllers were warned not to mention the craft on the radio but to submit written icpons of sightings or radar trackings. The Air Force gave similar briefings to NORAD. the North American Air Defense Command.'*
iibaadv requiredicSK,,,
nsign Ac:suble<'* cocK.Sh3IKd projection at the front-knowna designed to move io or out as much as three feet tnaPtute and contain the shock wave produced by the aircraft a. high pecT bus preventing .he shock wave from blowing ou, .he fire m-
side the engine
Another JSE engine problem in3 was foreign object damage. Small objects such as pens, pencils, screws, bolts, nuts, and metal shavings that fell into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial engine testingamaged impeller and compressor vanes. To control the prufaiem Lockheedrogram thatays, shaking of the nacelles, installing screens over various air inlets to the engine, and even having workers wear coveralls without breast pockets. Another source of foreign object damage was trash on .he runways. Thengines acted like immense vacuum cleaners, suckin* in anything lying loose on the paving as they propelled2 down the runway for takeoff. To prevent engine damage.personnel had to Sweep and vacuum tiie runway before aircraft takeoff.'*
2 the Agency and the Air Force ordered two more versions of the OXCART (in addition to2 and theneodification of2 to carry and launchfcel-Iong drones capable of reachinghe two-seater mothership received diehe drone was calledhis project was known as TAGBOARD. The originalof the drones and mothership was sponsored by the CIA. but in) "he project was turned over to the Air Force, which had overall responsibility for unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.
Development ofombination continued
when an1 launch caused the loss of its mothership
and the death of one of the crew members. Afterward the Air Force
turned2 bombers to carry the drones "
" OU Hhwy..v.rlDp.iK" ot UxlWwd SB.
,
"i
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NEW VERSIONS OF THE OXCART
Tin! second new version of ihc OXCaKT was anotheraircraft. In2 the Air Force ordered six "reconnaissance/strike" aircraft, which were designedonduct high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance of enemy territoryuclear strike. This new aircraft differed from2 versions in that it was longer,ull-blown two-seat cockpit, andarge variety of photographic and electronic sensors. The additional weight of all this equipment gave Ihc Air Forcelowerspeedower operating ceiling than thenhe Air Force addedore aircraft io this contract,otal
THE QUESTION OF SURFACING
A VERSION OF THE OXCART
As the funds being spent on Air Force versions of the OXCARTdramatically, the Defense Department became concerned (hat it could not offer any public explanation for these expenditures. At ihc same time. Agency and Defense Department officials iccogniicd the growing dangerrash or sightings of test flights could(tic program. This led the Defense Department in2 and3 to consider surfacing the Air Force's interceptorof2 toover for OXCART sightings or crashes and an explanation for (lie rise in Air Force spending. Somehad also become aware of the aircraft's existence, raising concern that the sectcl would eventually come out in the press. Agencyremained reluctant to reveal the existence of any version ofnd the issue soon came to the attention of the PRAB. .lames Killian and Edwin land strongly opposed disclosing OXCARTsand in3 they presented their views to President Kennedyeeting attended by DCI McConc and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Killian. Land, and McCone succeeded in persuading the President and Secretary of Defense to keep the OXCART'Secret for the lime being.
-2 4mWkWWttfi&'
Later that year supportetS of the idea of surfacing the OXCARTote powerful argument for theirneed tothe supersonic technology (hat had been developed for the
OXCART. This technology would be invaluable lex Air Forcesuch as0 bomber and Ibf the civilian supersonic(SST) then being discussed in Congress. In the falleveral Presidential advisers expressed their concern to DCI McCone that Lockheed had0 million headstart in theof supersonic technology, giving theremendousover other aerospace companies workingupersonic transport. McCone passed these concerns on to President Kennedy onustays before the fateful trip to Dallas. The President instructed CIA and the Defense Department tolan for surfacing rite OXCART but to await further discussions with him before taking any action."
"John A. McCone. "Mfinooihlun' of Meeiiiv; inoom for (he Puipotc of Dixuninifacin- ol .heCIflMtMmmmi iotm. Men.<we-io forctober Ivoi.DO dflWm*mW
President Lyndon B. Johnsonetailed briefing on the OXCART program from McCone, McNamara, Uundy, and Rusk onovember, after just one week in office. McNamaraersion of the OXCART. McCone was morecalling for the preparationtatement that could be used when surfacing became necessary but arguing thattep was not
3G
ytfl Agreeing will) McCOAC'S pOMKM. President Johu-tai ihe issueeviewed again in February.**
One additional argument in favor of surfacing tlie OXCART wj> ihe realization thai ihe aircraft could noi be usedly undetected over the So*ict Union.2 the United States had become aware of the effectivenessew Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut one of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic targets visually because of Iheir small, nonpersistent radar returns. Byomputeradar, the Soviets could now weight Iheradar returns and identify those produced by high-flying, very fast objects."
By4 DCI McCone had become convinced thatwas necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be able to carry out its original intendedof the USSR. The Tinal decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART cameational Security Council meeting ant which all of the participants supported (he decision to surface. That same day President Johnsonews conference at which he(lie successful development of an "advanced experimental jet aircraft,hich has been (estcd in sustained flight at moreXX) miles per hour and at altitudes in excess0
President Johnson had spoken of1 rather than thend the aircraft that was actually revealed to thewas the Air Force'sroject thai had already beenollowing the President's announcement, iwo of
those aircraft were hastilywn to Edwardsrccoui this point on, lite Air Force versions of the OXCART were based a) Edwards andiversion so thai the faster and highert the *HS5fflS9irtOuld continue testing Out of the public eye.
The President's announcement did not mention the CIA'sin the project, which remained classified, but keeping the Agency's extensive role in the OXCARTa secret was not an easy task. The first step had been to separate the Air Force's versions of2 from the Agency's by moving Ihc Air Force aircraft to California. Next, those firms that were to be given the new technology had to be briefed on the program and agree to abide by the same secrecythen in force with Lockheed. Moreover, everyone witting of OXCART (including those no longer associated with the program, such as Allen Duties. Richard Bissell. and General Cabell) had been briefed about the impending Presidential announcement, so that they would not think that the need for secrecy about OXCART had ended."
The process of surfacing versions of the OXCART continued onhen President Johnson revealed the existenceew Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, 'which he called thectually, the President was supposed'to sayforDeciding that renaming the aircraft was easier than correcting President Johnson, the Air Forceew"strategicexplain thes designation.
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING
The2 crash occurred onetachment pilot, realizing the airspeed indication was confusing and erroneous, decided to eject. The pilot was unhurt, but the plane was destroyed when it crashed near Wendover.ovet story for the pressthe plane as.ere groundedeek while the accident was investigated. The malfunction was found to be caused by ice that had pluggeditot-static tube used to determine airspeed."
" OSA llhuuy, chap. 2u, p. lb
n
Twoere lost in later testing.nirashed ifcik landingitch-control servo device froze, rolling die planeing-down position. Ejecting from an altitudeeci, the pilot was blown sideways out of the craft. Although he was not very high off the ground, his parachute did open and he landed during the parachute's lirst swing, fortunately he was unhurt, and no news of the accident filtered out of the base. Eighteen months later, onrashed immediately after takeoff because of an improperly wired stability augmentation system. As in the previous crash, the pilot ejected safely, and there was no publicity connected with the crash. An investigation ordered by DCI McCone determined that the wiring error had resulted from negligence, not sabotage."
2 made its first long-range, high-speed flight onhe flightinutes.inutes of which were flown at speeds greater than. and the aircraftiles at altitudes00 feet. By this time, the OXCART was performing well. The engine inlet, camera,navigation, and flight-control systems all demonstrated acceptable reliability.
Nevcrrheless. as the OXCART began flying longer, faster, and higher, new problems arose. The most serious of these problemsthe aircraft's wiring. Continuing malfunctions of the inletcommunications equipment. ECM systems, and cockpit instruments were often attributable to wiring failures. Wiringand components had to withstand temperatures, structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Such demands wcie more than the materials could stand. Not all of the OXCART's problems could be traced to materiel failures, however, and Agency officials believed that careless maintenance by Lockheed employees alsoto malfunctions."
Concerned that Lockheed would not be able to meetschedule for operational readiness, the Office ofDirector ofe,fv
Johnson5iscuss the project's problems. Johnson not only assigned moresupervisors to the project but also
i-njpt
"OSA /dun*.jn. p.
ilccMcd wtoffiaWSSLmd lake chant ol tiw OXCART'shimself. His presenceig difference, as can be Seals notes in the project log:
/nusny hemsanagerial, materiel and designI had meetings m* vendors to improvehanged supervision and bad daily wftl wm them, going Over in detail all prolilcms an thencreaied the supervision in lhe electrical groupe tightened up lhe inspectionreat deal and made intpeeiion stick.
It appears that the problems are one third due io bumfe addition of so many systems Io2 hat greatly complicated lhe problems, but we did solve the overall problem."
These improvements in on-site management got the pioject back on schedule.
Byhe final validation flights for OXCART deployment were finished. During these tests, the OXCARTaximum speed ofn altitude0 feet, andflight lime abovefinutes- The maximum endurance testovember.
Office of Special Activities, stating. "The lime has come when the bird should leave its
Three years and seven months alter its first flight inhe OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now lime to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built
DISCUSSIONS ON THE OXCART'S
FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
Although the OXCART had been designed io replacetrategic reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the Soviet Union, this use had become doubtful long before the OXCART was ready for operational use.ffair0 made Presidents veryto consider overflights of the Soviei Union. Indeed. Piesidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had both siaied publicly that lhe United States would not conduct suchaecreiary of
Vl.J
M
Defense McNamara told DC( McCone that he doubted that the OXCART would ever be used and suggested that improvements invery likely eliminate the need for the expensive OXCART program. Strongly disagreeing. McCone told McNamara that he had every intention of using OXCART aircraft to fly over die Soviet Union.
McCone raised this issue with President Kennedy inime when the-reat number of failures and the intelligence community was clamoring for belter photography to confirm or disprove allegations of the existence of an antiballistic missile system at Leningrad. Unconvinced by McConc's arguments for OXCART overflights. President Kennedy expressed the hope that some means misht be devised for improving
J'llm A. MfcCi"iC.iKi'iiiid. "Suoim:ny ill" iiii'ctuv; with Sft'iClJi;
MoVjmjiU jih! Skcctiij" Cit|KiliiC.Cunn jiiJ Mr McC"a>nly>CI recwu. (Si; McCorw. HoihWivJiiihile.villi itwAprii Pjlm lic*U.XTI 'words
Although ovcillighk ill tike Sovieto Oui Ol the question, tlieventual employment elsewhere inworldtrong possibility, particularly after (lie Cu!xin Missile Crisis of2 demonstrated the continuing need for manned strategic reconnaissancekx been able to supply the kinds of coverage* had carried ouioverflight of Cuba Neverthelessurface-to-air missiles (as had once again been demonstrated by the downinguring the Missilend project headquarters had even briefly considered sending7 over Cuba inven though tire aircraft still lacked thengines and would have had to use much less powerfulfter (he Missile Crisis ended. Airs continuedhotograph Cubaacit superpower understanding that such monitoring of the withdrawal of (he missiles would proceed without interference. Bui the possibility of future Soviet or Cuban action againsts remained, raising (Ik dismaying prospect (hat the United Stales would not be able to (ell if Ihe Soviet Union was reintroducing ballisticinto Cuba. .
Such fears became acute in (lie summer4 after Soviet I'temierhrushchev told' foreign visitors such as columnist Drew Pearson, former Senator William Benton, and Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag that, once (he US elections had been held ins flying over Cuba would be shot down. Projecttherefore began preparing contingency plans (Projeci SKYLARK) for (he possible employment of OXCART over Cuba, even though the new aircraft was not yet ready for operations.he Acting DO. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, ordered the project Staff to achieve emergency operational readiness of Ihe OXCARTn case Premier Khrushchev actually carried out his threat to shoots.
Ita meet this deadline, the Office of Special Activitiesetachment of five pilots and ground crews to conduct (lights iocamera performance and qualify pilots forperations. Simulating Cuban missions during training flights, the detachment
-2i,* "tu'dli spMiiftifar."
p.
demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights ol' Cuba hyovember deadline, which passed withoul any hostile aciion by (he Soviet" or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop ihefor sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these preparations were valuable training for the OXCART program, even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, thewere reserved for more critical situations.
When the Agency declared that OXCART had achievedoperational statushe aircraft was still
not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned electronic counter measure devices had been installed.enior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct
initial overflights of Cubaull complement of warning and jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.
One reason for the delay in completing OXCARTs electronic warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use ofM devices could, in the event of the loss of an OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment used by Air Force bombers and fighters. Even if OXCARTs ECM devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to work out countermeasures.
Such concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach to aniiradar efforts in Projeci KEMPSTER. This project attempted to develop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART toan ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar cross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA alsoumber of mote conventional ECM devices for use in the OXCART."
As the OXCART'S performance and equipment continued tothere wis renewed consideration of deploying (he aircraft Overseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity wasOnC1 McCone. Secretary of Defense McNamara. and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed tbe
hazardserial reconnaissance of Ihc
ihrcc years .hedie Air Force had losi numerous reconnaissance drone's. The three men acreed tohead wiih all rhe preparatory steps needed Tor the OXCART to operateso that it would be ready in case the President decided to authorize such missions.
Project BLACK SHIELD, the plan for Far East operations, called for OXCART aircraft to be based at Kadena airbase on Okinawa. In the first phase, three planes would be flown lo Okinawaday periods,ear, an operation which would involveersonnel. Later there wouldermanent detachment at Kadena. In preparation for the possibility of such operations, the Defense Department7 million to provide support facilities and real-time secure communications on the island by early
In the summerfter the United States had begunlarge numbers of troops into South Vietnam. Southeastecame another possible target for the OXCART. Because lheuses for reconnaissance missions over Noah Vietnam was threatened by the deployment of Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles. McNamara asked the CIA5 whether it would beto substitute OXCART aircrafts. The new DO, Adm. William F. Rabom. replied that the OXCART could operate ovet Vietnam as soon as it had passed its final operational readiness tests.*'
Formal consideration of proposed OXCART missions involved die same approval process that was usedverflights. In laicfter the OXCART had passed its final validation tests,ommittee met toroposaltodeploy the OXCART to Okinawa to oveifly Southeast Asia and tJSWl Although lhe committee did not approve deployment, it ordered theand maintenanceuick-reaction capability, ready lo deploy to Okinawa withinays after notification.
There the matter remained for moreear. During the first halfCI Raborn raised the issue of deploying the OXCART to Okinawa at liveommittee meetings but failed to win
' oSa Hifuux.;o.
OXCART.3
Mtliiocni support. Tlic iCS and (lie PFIAO supported ihc CIA'-;of OXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Depgnnicnihowever, thought that the poliiical risks ol* basing (he aircraft inwould almost certainly disclose il io Ihcany gains from lhe indulgence the OXCART might gather. Onhe divergent views were presented io President Johnson, who upheldommittee's majorityagainst deployment for (lie lime being.*'
The CIA then proposed an OXCART overflight of Cuba in order to test lhe aircraft's ECM systemsostile environment On IS Septemberommittee considered and rejected this idea on the grounds that sending OXCART over Cuba "would disturb (hecalm prevailing in that area of our foreign
With operational missions still ruled out, proficiency tiainingthe main order of business. This led to improvements inplans and flight tactics that enabled (he detachment to reduce the time required to deploy to Okinawa fromaysecords con-(inued io fall to the OXCART. Onockheed test pilot flew28 kilometers over the continental United States in slightly more than six hours, for an average speedilometers per hour (which included in-flight refueling at speeds as lowilometers perhis flightecord for speed and distance unapproachable by any other aircraft.
Two weeks later,2 crasheduel gauge malfunctioned and (he aircraft ran out of fuel short of lheiloi Bfififittijeeied but was killed when he could nol become separated dom the ejection seat To preserve the secrecy of (he OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press (hat anas missing and presumed down in Nevada. This loss, like the three preceding crashes, did not result from difficulties caused by high-speed, high-temperature flight but from traditional problems in-hetent in any new aircraft.
Proposals for OXCART operations continued to surface, and in7 the CIAetailed request loommittee io use (he OXCART to collect strategic inielligenceew
OXCARTp iiOhi
-OXCART* ^
sj.iviei missile system. As earlyhe iiutlugcno:
begane concerned uIkuii ihe actual purpose ol' new missile insial-btions that first appeared near Tallinn. Estonia, and soon spread alo.ij ihc northwestern quadrant ol the Soviet Union. Attempts to plKHO-graph the sitesbeen rrustraicd by the prevailing cloud cover in ihe region. Because ofack ofinfonnation about the missile sites, thereide divergence of views within the intelligence community about their purpose. These views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installationslong-range, surface-to-air missiles designed to counterbombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn siteseployed antiballistic missile system.
Photointcrpreters insisted (hat imageryesolution ofonches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern, and configuration of the engagement radars associated with (heElectronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed dais about the Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that couldthe Tallinn emanations when ihe radars were being tested. Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockonact thai prevented analysts from knowing theor any other performance characteristics of the radar.
To settle the question of the purpose of the Tallinn installations. Office of Special Activities plannersission that would use the high resolution of the OXCARTs camera along with's sophisticated ELI NT-col lection equipment. This project'sname was Project SCOPE LOGIC; its classified title was Operation UPWIND.
The proposed projeci involved launching2 OXCARTflying italtic Sea rendezvousrojectlying fromOXCART would fly north of Norway and then (urn south along the Soviet-Finnish border. Shortly before Leningrad,2 would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea. skirling the coasts of Estonia. Latvia. Lithuania. Poland, and East Germany before heading west to return loH^ entire flight wouldiles, take eight, hours andinutes and require four aerialings.
Although2 would not viotaie Soviet airspace during this dash, it would appear to Soviet radar network operators to be headed for an overflighl penetration in ihe vicinity of Leningrad. It was
hoped lintis passage would pnwoke_ Soviet airctivate the Tallinn system radars in order to track ihc swift OXCART aircraft. As? made its dash down the Baltic, itsamera would be filming lhe entire south coast. If Agencywere correct in their assumption thai the Tallinn systemounter higli-altiiudc aircraft at Ions; ranges, then the OXCART would be in jeopardy during tins dash down the Baltic. Nevertheless. Agency weapons experts believed thatpeed and suite of electronic countermcasures would keep it safe from the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile installations.
While2 was conducting its high-speed dash along the Baltic coast of Eastern Europe,ould be flying farther out to sea. safely beyond the. range of all Soviet SAMs.*
Agency and Defense Department officials supported themission, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly opposed it andommittee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson.'"
Z DEPLOYMENT: OPERATION BLACK SHIELO
Although the Tallinn mission was still being considered innother possible employment for the OXCART came underThis time the proposal was for OXCART to collect tactical rather than strategic intelligence. The cause was apprehension in Washington about the possible undetected introduction ofmissiles into North Vietnam. When President Johnson askedroposal on the matter, the CIA suggested that the OXCART be used. While the State and Defense Departments wctc still examining the proposals political risks. DCI Richard Helms
.jisccl ihc issuePresident loJltlMMi's "Tuesday lunch" onay Helms got llic President's approval, andIA put ihc BLACK SHIELD planeploy the OXCART to the Far East into effect later ih j; same day.
The airlifl of personnel and equipment to Kadena began onnd onay the2 flew nonstop fromKadena in six hours and sixecond aircraft arrived onay. The2 left onay. but the pilot had trouble with the incrtial navigation system nnd communications near Wake Island. Herecautionary landing at Wake,re-positioned emergency recovery team was located. The problem was corrected snd the aircraft continued its flight to Kadena on the following day.
Before the start of the operation, the CIAumber of key US and Allied officials on the operation. Included were the US
By3 days after President Johnsons approval. BLACK SHIELD was ready to fly an operational mission. Onay. the detachment was alertedission on the following day. As the takeoff time approached. Kadena was being deluged by rain, but. since weather over the target aica was clear, flight preparations continued. The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and look off.
This first BLACK SHIELD mission flew one flight paih over North Vietnam and another over the demilitarized zonehe mission was flown at0 feet and lasted three hours andinutes. While over North Vietnam,2 photographedfnown surface-to-air missile sites and nine other prior-iiy targetss ECM ecjutpment did not detect any radarduring theich indicated that the flijht had gone completely unnoticed by both the Oiincse and North
HflM> -OXCARTp7
Duringext lil weeks, there WCN alerts farLACK SHIELD missions, seven of which were aeiually flown Only fourhostile radar sign-Is. Bylvc BLACK SHIELD missions had provided sufficient evidence for analysis to conclude ihai no surface-to-surface missiles had been deployed in Northam."
Projeci Headquaiters inplanned and directed operational BLACK SHIELD missions.-
A typical mission over North Vietnam required refueling south of Okinawa, shortly after takeoff. After the planned photographicthe aircraft withdrewecond aerial refueling tn the Thailand area before returning to Kadena. So great was the plane's speed that il spent5 minutes over Vietnam5 minutesiwo-pass" mission. Because of itsmile turning radius, the plane occasionally crossed inton getting into positionecond pass.
After the aircraft landed, the camera film was removed and sent by special plane to processing facilities in the United States. By late summer, however, an Air Force photo laboratory in Japan beganthe processing in order to place the photoinlelligcnce in the hands of US commanders in Vietnam withinoursission's
BLACK SHIELD activity coniinued unabated during the second halfromugust to6 missions were alerted andere flown. Oneptember one SAM site tracked the vehicle with its acquisition radar but was unsuccessful with its FAN SONG guidance radar. It was not untilctoberorth Vietnamese SAM siteissile at the OXCART. Mission photography documented the event with photographs ofsmoke above the SAM firing site and pictures of the missile and its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment aboard the OXCART performed well, and the missile did not endanger ihe
ISJ|
Initial storage arrangementst Palmdale
POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO THE OXCART
The OXCART wassi high.altitude reconnaissance aircraft-for (lie CIA, although the Office of Special Activities did briefly consider several possible successors to the OXCART during the. The first of these, known as Project ISINGLASS, wis prepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its Convair Division's earlier FISH proposal and itsighter in order to create an aircraft capable ofeet. General Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fallnd OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would still be vulnerable to existing Soviet coumemveasures.ore ambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration as Project RHglNBERRY (although some of the work seems to have come under the ISINGLASS designation ashis proposala rocket-powered aircraft thatbe launched2 mother ship and ultimately reach speeds as high as Machndof upeet. Because building this aircrafi would have involved tremendous technical challenges and correspondingly high costs, the Agency was not willing to cmb-irk onrogram at itime when the main emphasis in uvcihcad reconnaissance had shifted from aireiiili to satellites.esult, when the OXCART program ended in the summerS. mi mme advanced successor was wait, ina in livethe
THF OXCART PROGRAM
uucndcdeplaceollect* of strategic in.elligc.ee. thc OXCART was never used for (Lisriefas
strictly forewarningi,sP^*1
con.ribu.ed very link to .he Agency;S
By the titnc OXCaRT became opcration; filled the role originally conceived Cor it. Theadvanced aiarafi ofh century had become an anachronism before it was ever used operationally."
The OXCART did no. even outlast. Ihe aircrafi it was. supposedeplace. The OXCART lacked the quick-responseof ihe smallernit could be activated overnight, andeek it could deploy abroad, fly sorties, and return to home base. The OXCART planes required precise logistic planning for fuel and emergency landing fields, and (heir inertia) guidance system* needed several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers hid to be deployed in advance along an OXCARTs flitrht route and be provisioned with the highly specialized fuel used byAH Of thisreat deal of time and Ihe effort of several hundredission could be planned and flownhird fewer personnel.
Although the OXCART programtrategicaircraft with unprecedented speed, range, and altitude, themost important contributions lay in other areas' aerodynamic design, high-impact plastics, engine performance, cameras, electronic countcrmeasuies. pilot life-support sysiems. antiradar devices, use of non metallic materials for major aircraft assemblies, andin milling, machining, and shaping titanium. In all of thesethe OXCART pushed back the frontiers of aerospace technology and helped lay the foundation for future "stealth" research.
m On""
The only lime mc enemy came close io downing an OXCART was onuring his first pass over North Vietnam.
pared to launch missiles but ncilttcr did.ott^*second pass the North Vietnamese fired at least sii missiles at the OXCART, each confirmed by vapor trails on mission photography. The pilot saw ihese vapor trails and witnessed three missile detonations nearhich was traveling att0 feet. Postflight inspection of the aircraft revealediece of metal had penetrated the underside of the right wing, passed through threeof titanium, and loopedupport structure of the wing tank. The fragment wasarhead pellet but probably debris from one of the missile detonations that the pilot observed.*?
BLACK SHIELD missions continued during the first three monthsith four missions flown over North Vietnam out oflerts. The last OXCART overflight of Vietnam took placeuring thti same three-month period, the OXCART made its first overflight of North Korea after the USS Pueblo was seized onhe goal of this mission was to discover whether the North Koreans were preparing any large-scale hostile move irt the wake of this^
Secretary of State Dean Rusk wasecond mission over North Korea for fear of diplomatic repercussions should the aircraft come down in hostile territory. The Secretary was assured that the plane could transit North Korea in seven minutes and wasto land in cither North Korea or China.omminee thenecond mission over North Korea, which was flown onhird and final overflight of North Korea8 proved to be (he last operational deployment of the OXCART aircraft."
THE END OF THE OXCART PROGRAM
ecade had elapsed between the time when the concept for the OXCART aircraft was first examined and the2 wasdeployed. Now after onlyperational missions, the most
OXCART-
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aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. Theof the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the aircraft; the causes lay in fiscal pressures and competition between the reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the Air Force.
Throughout the OXCART program, the Air Force had beenhelpful; it gave financial support, conducted the refueling program, provided operational facilities at Kadcna. and airlifted OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the Vietnam and Korean operauons. Air Force orders for variants of the CIA'sthenterceptor aivd theeconnaissancehelped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART. Nevertheless, once the Air Force had built up its own fleet ofaircraft, budgetary experts began to criticize the existence of two expensive fleets of similar aircraft.
InS. the very month that? had beenoperational, the Bureau of the Budget circulated athat expressed concern about the costs of? andrograms. It questioned boihiota! number of planes required forombined fleets, and the necessityeparate CIA fleet.memorandum recommended phasing out? program byu and stopping any further procurement of the SR-71
models. tiie Sccrctaiy ol OcfaMC rejected 'his recommendation,because iIkcia4ional by"
Intureau of die Budget'study group was established to look for way*educe the cost of lhe OXCART andrograms. Tlic study groupconsi%tedrom the Bureau ofP*&tekkb^ib&'om Dcpannvenl ofIA. The study group listed three possible courses of action: maintain both fleets, mothballut share the SR-7ls between CIA and the Air Force, or mothballnd assign all missions lo Air Force SR-7Is. Onour high-level officials met lothese alternatives. Over the objections of DC! Helms, the other threeSecretary of Defense Cyrus Vance. Bureau of the Budget Director Charles L. Schultie. and Presidential Scientific Advisero terminate lhe OXCART fleet. Concerned that this recommendation would strip the CIA of itsreconnaissance capability. Helms then asked lhal theleet be shared between CIA and the Air Force*
Four days later. Schultie handedraft memorandum for the Presidentecision either to share theleetCIA and the Air Force or to terminate the CIA capabilityHaving just received new information indicating (hat theerformance was inferior to that ofelms asked for another meeting to review this data. His concern was thai (heould not match the photographic coverage (hat2 could provide Only one of thes three camera systems was working anywhere near the original specifications, and that was its Operational Objective system which could onlywathiles wideesolution of0nches.samera couldwathiles wideadir resolution ofonches and oblique resolution ofnches. Thus,s camera covered three times as much territory as lheamera and did so with better resolution. In addition,2 couldeet higher than thend was also faster,aximum speed ofompared with thes
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fd llic Strength otimw Bureau of (he Budget memorandum wascd io Prcsid
ermi
tron of the OXCART program
This decision mean, that CIA hadchedule for
SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputyecretary Vance on7 una,j^to, be placed in storage, with the process lo be completed by thenance directed tha,ouTdsume respons,bn,iy for Cuban overflights7 and wou
ntil these capabilities were developed. OXCART was loam able to condua assiEnmenaday notice for Southea Asiaeven-day notice for Cuba."
All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had co,ingle operational mission, which did no. occur until 31
1 nvr^ir ^lhC ini'il,ion" Asi. tne OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities Soon some high-level Prcsidenlial advisers and Congressional leader began to question the decision to phase out OXCART, and the issu. was reopened.
The OA contended that2 was the better crafther. faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main uined thai its two-seatetter suite of sensors,hre.-
ectors, side-looking acnal radar, and EU NT-col lection gear. In
for.esolve this argument, the two aircraft were pmedach otherlyoff codenamed NICE GIRL.2 and aniew identical flight paths, separatede b, one hour, from north to SOuth roughly above the Miss.ss.ppi River The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre-senut.ves of the CIA. DIA. and other Defense Dernnmen. intelli-gence organizat.ons.
Theroved inconclusive Both phc-sgraph*ided .magery of Sufficient quality for analysis. The a'-I2 TVpcl
bjective camerasmfe
ool film supply. On ilic Other hand, ihcJ infrared, side looking aerial radar, and EUNT/COMINTequipment provided some unique intelligence not available fromir Forceadmitted, however, lhat some of this equipment would have to be sacrificed in orderrovide theiih ECM gear."
Although lhe flyoff had not settled the question of which aircraft was superior, the OXCART didemporary reprieve in latehe Johnson administration decided to keep both fleets for (he time being, particularly because the OXCART wiiflying missions over North Vietnam. With expenditures for the Vietnam war rising steadily, the question of reducing (he costs of. competing reconnaissance programs was bound lo surface again. In the springhere was yet another study of the OXCART andrograms. Onhe new Secretary of Defense. Clark Oiffdrd. reaffirmed the original decision to terminate lhe OXCART program and store the aircraft. President Johnsonihis decision on 21
Project headquarters8 as the earliestdate for phasing out all OXCART aircraft.' P'ace^ storage, and the aiicraftwercTscheduled to returnune. Unfortunately,before this redeployment look place.8 duringflight from Kadena lo checkew engine,iles east of Manila. Search and rescue missions(race of the plane or its pilot. Jack W. Weeks. Several daysremainingeft Okinawa io join the otheraircraft in storage at Palmdale. California. Becausewere smaller than either of the Air Force's versions, thethai could be salvaged for Air Force use wereOXCART's outstanding Peikin-Elmer camera cannot beecause the two-seater Air Force aircrafl has acompartment than that ofonstructed from onemost durable mcials known to man but unable to fly for wantthe OXCART aircraft arc fated to remain inactivefor many, many
"OXCARTttA:iWu-.y.-
Original document.
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