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Komeito Seeks the Middle Road in Japanese Politics
Special Report
8 SC
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KOMEITO SI-fcKS THE MIDDLE ROAD IN JAPANESE POLITICS
In the four years since its formation, theGovernment Party--hss become aforce in Japanese politice. As thearm of the militant Soke Gakkai Buddhist lay organisation, the Konteito has enlarged upon earlier successes of ita predecessor, the moreorganised Koseiren, by winningIn the Japanese Diet. Following its success in the House of Councilors election inhe Komeito plans to runandidates in the next Lover House election which could be held sometime next year. The other political parties, which in the past have tended to view the Komeito and soka Gakkaiemporary fringe element on the Japanese political scene, are increasingly concerned over the growing strength of tha Komeito.
In recent monthshasgradual movement toin both tacticsresulting in positions which are ir.with USKomeito is nowthat theSecurityphased out duringand thatwith communistexpanded substantially.
At this stage in its development, theisrossroads. Torulyforce in Japanese politice, it must break out of its close embrace with the Soka Gakkai and broaden its appeal among such diverse elements as labor, the press, small business interests, and the rural populace. Should it bethe Komeito has an excellent opportunity in the coming years to fill the growing void in Japanese politics between ths rulingparty and parties of the left which areincreasingly displaced from the mainstream of Japan's political life.
Komeito. established by the Soka Gakkai inucceeded the Koseiren, which ran candidates in local elections and for the Upper House of the
The Komeito inherited from the Koseireneats in theHouse andeats in local assemblies. The Soka Gakkai sought to expand its
political influence by running Ko-meito candidatae for the Lower Kouse, where the real legislative power in Japan lies.
The decision of the Soka Gakkai to enlarge the ecope of its participation in Japanese politica waa partly motivatedeed to keep ita membership growing, aa wellesire to hold the interest of the members it already had. Another important motivation clearly was the Soka Gakkai's wish toechanism through which itsgreat, but heretofore diffuse, influence could beinto practical politics. The Soka Gakkai probably also wanted to broaden its base of financial support by attracting small businessmen and othersin securing theof ita followers.
Leadership
The Komeito owes much of its success to its young and able leadership. In this respect itistinct edge over the Japan Socialist Party, the largest opposition party, which has been handicapped by ita predominantly older, less flexible leaders. The leaders of the komeitoadvanced to their present positions on the basis of their proselytising and organisational talents. Host are dedicatedin the Soka Gakkai and in Nichiren Buddhism, but are not so dogmatic that thay areto changes in the Japanese political climate.
The leadership of the Komeito also differs from that of the Socialists and of the otherparties in that it does not visibly suffer from factionalism. The unity of the Komeito leaders has, in large part, accounted for the party's ability to adjust its policies to what the leadership sees as shifts in Japaneseopinion. The Socialists, on the other hand, have generally been unable to develop newbecauseonstantof leadership brought about by endemic factionalism. Thus, the Japan Socialist Party hasbogged down by intraparty bickering while the Komeito has moved forward with considerable elan.
Domestic and fr'oraign Policy Lines""
The ideological framework in which Komeito objectives are cast is broadly derived from that of the Soka Gakkai. The ultimate aim of the Soka Gakkai is the establishment of ademocracy in which every individual has beento the principles ofas partew "third world." This -third world" is to be basedaguely defined *neo-socialIsm" which willthe welfare of the entire people rather than just theclass. The Komeito and the Soka Gakkai place considerable emphasis on the fulfillment of material desires during aown lifetime, rather than sacrificing in this world in
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rin i'nraign nisi
to be rewarded in thehilosophy of thishas an obvious appeal to those elements of Japanesewhich have not fully shared in the prosperity of postwar Japan.
In the realm of practical politics, Komeito policiesreflect trends in public opinion rather then the doctrines of Nichiren Buddhism. Thehas attempted to find the broadest possible consensus among Japanese on each issue and has then fashioned the Komeitoaccordingly.
The Komeito effort to align policy with public opinionin large part forabrupt tactical shifts on such issues as the reversion of Okinawa. During the, Komeito policy stressed Okinawa's strategic importance and thenature of the reversion problem, inowever, the Komeito demanded theand complete" reversion of Okinawa as well as theremoval of all us nuclear bases and most conventional bases there. The Komeito no doubtthat this new position would appeal to many morethan the earlier, moreposition.
Since the formation of the Komeito, its politicalat least in tactical terms, has gradually moved toward the left. The shift has come from conscious efforts by party leaders to attract broader electoralprimarily at the expense of the Socialists.
Theine onmatters is aimed at the left as well as at disenchanted supporters of the Liberal The party has calledomprehensive welfare state,ubstantialof income, and theof certain, as yet undesignated "key" industries.
The foreign policy of the Komeito is based on the rather vague concept of "complete Related to this is the party's hardening position on the Mutual Security Treaty with the OS. Until recently the Komeito considered the treaty the best arrangement underconditions but opposed it in theory. Now it is demanding that the treaty be phased out in three stages during The Komeito maintains that the treaty subordinatesto the US, that it exacerbates tensions in Asia, and that it may involve Japanar against its will.
Komeito foreign policy has not wavered so much on certain basic issues, such as opposition to the war in Vietnam andof increased exchanges with Communist China. The Komeito insists that Japan, because of its importance in East Asia,reater role in easing
tension between China and thelthough it recognizes thenuclear threat to Japan posed by China, the Komeito
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claims that Japan itself will be isolated if it continues to follow the US policy ofChina. The Komeito advocates that Japan recognise Chinathat China be admitted to the UN, and that Japan'sties with China be This pragmatic position isttuned to views long held by the Japanese "man in the street."
The Komeito's leftward shift may be more tactical than Tho essentiallynature of theseems to indicate that the current tactics representopportunism more than firm oonvictions of the Komeito lea-tors. Furthermore, much of the party's financial support comes from small businessmen and shopkeepers, who are among the most conservative elements in Japonose society.
Tactics
With the Komeito's awing toward the left, le has shown an increasing willingness torate with tho Socialists and the Japan Communist Party in the Diet to further Komeito's The Komeito has, however, repeatedly stressed that thiscooperation does not indicate approval of Socialist and Communist ideologies. has bean, and likely will continue to be, on an issue by issue basis. Particularly in the casa of the communists, there is considerable ill will between the parties because they often compete for support from the same
proletarian elements in Japanese society.
The Komeito is relying more and more on the street protest rallyolitical tactic. The highly disciplined Komeito has shown several times recently that it can quickly andmobilise supporters for demonstrations. Itupporters virtually overnight for an important issue such as agitation for review of thoSecurity Treatyhe Liberal Democrats clearly respect this capability of the Komeito, and can be expected to avoid action on matters which could arouse strong Komeito
The Komeito's politicalare becoming increasingly sophisticated. There now Is lessendency to resort tounethical campaign methods,reater reliance on Komeito mobilisation skills, both in the street and in the polling booth. Because of the high degree of discipline of Komeito supporters, the party boasts the mostuse of votes of anyparty in Japan. Komeito discipline has also enabled the party to persuade followers to move to areas of weak electoral strength in supportomeito candidate, even when they had to find new jobs and homes.
Sources of Support
Komeito still draws its largely from the ranks of the Soka Gakkai, whoso membership
comprises primarily members of the lower and lower-middle classes clustered in urban areas. of strongly nationalistic sentiment are also attracted to the Koraoito because of its stress on Japanese ways.
The Komeito is now making plans to expand Its support in the Japanese labor movement, where its influence traditionally has been weak. The Komeitolast year that it wouldew laborbe called the Democratic Labor Council--after the next Upper Bouse elections. Accordingecent policy statement, abody will be set up latend the labor unionwill ba organised sometime next year.
The Komeito laborwill be aimed primarily at workers in small- and medium-sized onterprises. The potential for Komeito growth in this area is clearly indicatedecent Ministry of Labor survey, which revealod that two thirds of the nearlyillion employed workers in Japan do not belong to labor unions. Che majority of these workers are employed in small-and madium-sised enterprises.
The early formationomeito-sponsorad labor union would be opportune because of the fluid situation in thelabor movement. Theof Sohyo, the major labor organisation, has declinedas has its membership. Furthermore, the percentage of
union members in tho totalof employed workers inas also been declining. TheKomeito leadership isgradual growth" for the new union during the first four or five years.
Domestic Political Significance
Unencumbered by an outmoded and inflexible Ideology, themay beetterto reflect the generalon particular issues than any of the other oppositionperticuarly the Socialists and the Communists. The Komeito thus appears to beosition toreat need in Japaneserelatively middle-of-the-road opposition party which is attuned to the views of the broad masses of Japanese. If the Komeito is to fill this role,ill, however, have to undergo an extended period of substantial change and growth.
There are several majorto the growth of the Komeito, but according toindications, the Komeito is beginning to overcome many of them. Ita most serious liabilityelatively narrow base of support. The Komelto's heavy dependence on Soka Gakkai members is becoming an increasingbecause the growth of the Soke Gakkai has been losing Although the Komeito has made significant gains in recent elections in terms of seats won, the percentagein the size of its vote i has begun to fall
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tha local level. Thetoabor union in pare may have reflected concern ever the slackening rate of growth.
There has been some recent evidence, however, that the Kcmeito's base of support is now expanding beyond the Soka Gakkai. According to Komeito claims, in the Upper House election last July the Komeito vote in some areas was mora than double the number of Soka Gakkai voters in those areas. In Kobe, for example, the Komeito claims to haveotes although there wereligible Soka Gakkai voters. Although Komeito claims must be treated with caution, it appears that the Koaelto has successfully extended ita appeal tooka Gakkai membersodest but significant scale.
There is some indication that Komeito support in rural areas is also Increasing. Komeito leaders point to the party's growing electoral strength in such areas as Pukuoka. Party representatives have visited other rural areas to investigate ways to expand Komeito support amongoka Gakkai members. The Komeito reportedly isincreasing itssupport in small villages by expanding Soka Gakkaifor transmitting complaints of villagers upward from the village Level.
In urban areas, the Komeito support from amongoka
Gakkai elements could snowball rapidly if thereudden deterioration In tha political or economic aituatlon in Japan. Even without radical change for the worse, the Komeito seemsof at least moderate growth during the next few years because of the continuing rapidof Japanese society. The constant migration of ruralto the citiesontinuing influx of insecure and maladjusted people to replace earlier arrivals who nova up the socioeconomic ladder.
Another factor which may, however, inhibit Komeitoparticularly into thelabor movement, is the opposition that the Komeito's planned labor union will draw from the other major labor unions, already apprehensive about the threatened Komeito expansion into their domains. As yet the major labor organizations, particularly Sohyo, have publicly ignored the Komeito's plans. Sohyo,about its decliningis, however, now eyeing the large numbers of unorganized workers in small- and medium-sized enterprlsos--also the prime focus of Komeito attention.
Tha failure of the Komeito to win the support of anysegment of the Japanese labor union movement thus far has deprived the Komeito of one of the traditionally important core elementsapanese opposition party. This in combination with the failure of tha Komeito to attract
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support: from Che mass media and the intellectuals, alsoimportant core elements of the political opposition, limits the ability of the Komeito to functionodern political party.
The Komeito may be able to compensate partially for the lack of allegiance from established labor union leaders by creating its own labor union. There is also evidoncerowing respect for the Kcateito in the Japanese mass media, particularly since the recent Upper House election. Japanese intellectuals, se well as many middle-class Japanese, tend to view the Soka Gakkai and the Komeitoanaticalorganisation. Although the Komeito Is gradually gaining respectabilityesult of its efforts to mirror the widest range of Japanese public opinion, many Japanese still identify its aims very closely with those of the Soka Gakkai. The Komeito will have to disassociate itself from this image if it is to attract the support of the elements of Japanese society necessary for it to function as an effective opposition party.
The Komeito's growingin maintaining ironamong the rank and file as the party membership expands nay also affect its future success. Many of the younger recruits to the party's ranks tend to lose interest quickly. Discipline may also be weakened if the Komeito sacrifices organisational
cohesiveness and single-minded dedication to Nichiren Buddhism in order to broaden the party's appeal. Thus, the Komeitois facedecision which can fundamentally alter the present character andof the party.
Government Party Concerned
The Liberal Democratic Party apparently is anticipating significant Komeito growth; Liberal Democratic leadershave privately expressed concern over Komeito prospects in the next Lower House elections. Preliminary Liberal Democratic estimatesossible loss of ten seats to the Komeito. Liberol Democratic Secretary General Pukuda recently cocarented that his party might have to put off elections0 in order to develop more effective counter-measures against the Komeito's expanded electoral efforts. Pukuda's comment undoubtedlythe increased awareness of Japanese political observers of the political significance of the Komeito following the Upper House elections last July and the Komeito's subsequent announcement thatandidates would bo entered in the next Lower House elections. The earlier tendency of the Japanese "establishment" to underestimate the strength of the Komeito has been subjected to serious re-examinatloa,in what in many cases are probably inflated estimates of the Komeito's growth potential. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
Original document.
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