SECRET/SENSlItVE
Mandwory Review Document
18
SECRETTSErlSITIVE
ONTROLLED DISS EM
The following intelligent* organizations participated in the preparation of this
The Central Inteffigence Agency and the Intelligence orgoni rations of theof State and Defense, end the NSA.
Concurringi
Vice Adm. Rufvt Taylor, the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence
Mr.vghca. the Director of Intelligence ond Research, Deportment
of State
U. Gon. Joseph F. Carroll, Ihe Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Ll. Gen. Marshallarter, the Director, NanonoJ Security Agency
Dr. Chat lei H. ftelchordt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Com-minion ond Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisctctie-v
WARNING
secret/semstlivf-"but1 on
COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS IN LAOS OVER THE NEXT YEAR
conclusions
the past year the Communis is have greatlycombat forces in Laos. The combined Pathet LaoArmy (NVA) forces now numberhey could overwhelm the regular and guerrilla forces ofLaotian Government (RLC) In the coming dry season.do not think that the RLC could expand the size or capabilityforces sufficientlyronths from domestic sourcescontain the Communists.
do not believe that the Communists intend to conductdrive to the Mekong, lestove provoke US entryLaotian corridor and perhaps upset any negotiations underwayVietnam. However, in the next few months, we expectto exert further military pressure on governmenton guerrilla outposts, in order to strengthen theirposition. They now demand mat US bombing ofhailedrerequisite to discussions of an internalmust be based on "the realities of the current situation."
if NVA resources were released from South Vietnam,that this would in itself alter Hanoi's intentions in Laos,forces already there can launch an offensive without furtherThough developments in Vietnam could changeconcerning Laos, in general we believe that thehope to achieve their objectives without running great riskscounteraction.
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DISTRIBUTION
DISCUSSION
Hanoi has ambitions to control all of Laos, but bai been unwiltmg to take actions there which would jeopardize higher priority goals in South Vietnam. In particular, Hanoi has limited the scope of its military actions in Laos, in part, at least, out of concern forarge-scale US ground action against tho vital supply routes to South Vietnam which runotian territory.
Since2 Geneva settlement, the war in Laos has been characterized by Royal Lao Government (RLC) offenstva during the rainy season (May to October) when the mobility of Pathet Lao (PL) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces is restricted, and by Communist counteroifensives during the dry .wason (November to April) to retake lost areas, often just in time to seize the rice harvest Thus an uneasy equilibrium has been established, withfactors operating on the RLC and political factors on the Communists to restrain actions that mightajor reaction by the other side.
In the political field, both sides have continued to pay lip service to2 Geneva Accords, which neutralized Laos, and until recently to the Zurich and Plaineires Agreements, whichripartiterightists, neutralists, and the PL. This arrangement hai persisted despite the fact (bat the PL vacated their cabinet seats inhese are still kept open for them by Souvanna, the neutralist Prime Minister. Until this Jury it seemed as though the PL objective, despite their denunciations of Souvanna, was the restoration of the tripartite arrangements.
L RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
recent events, however, suggest that the Communists area new position. For the first time, they haveombing haltprerequisite to discussions of an internal pohtical settlement.while still reaffirmingnternational agreements, they havethat the internal settlement must take into account "the realitiescurrent situation."
private. PL and Soviet spokesmen have explained that sucha recognition of PL control over Urge areas of Laos (they datfnof the territory and one-half then addition, theytin' US and its "puppets' have destroyed the tripartite structure,no longereutralist faction, and that the presentis. in effect, illegal. Apparently, the PL are laying thearger roleew government, and may demand that thewith them in the so-called National United Bloc" occupy dieheld byeutralist faction.
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iW^rfDISTRIBUTION
While thus signaling their intentioneorder the old tripartitethe Communists have reaffirmed their regard tor the monarchypermanent feature" of Lao national Life, Indeed, the whole point of the rather odd visit of the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Julyour year absence seemed to be toramatic distinction between the King and the present Lao government, and this line has been supported by the new Soviet Ambassador and the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX) spokesman in Vientiane. The Communists have always paid deference to the King's position and may hope that the King's desire to preserve the kingdom andnited national community can be played upon to their advantage.
The Communists are taking other steps to Improve their political position. During the past rainy season, they have made more of an effort than ever before to consolidate control over their territory. After unsuccessful attempts to terrorize mountain people who have been assisting RLG guerrillas in the north, the Communists are seeking to win them over by cajolery. This is apparently partider effort to improve their hold over the mountainous and sparsely populated reaches of Phong Saly, Luang Prabang, and Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces, where they have been stepping up their propaganda and politicalprograms. Newly constructed roads give the Communists access to hitherto isolated areas. In the south, PL troops have been busy trying totheir hold over the rice-rich Sedone Valley, where the government carriedevelopment program5 untilhere are recent reports that the PL civil administration is being reinforced by Lao political cadre who have just completed political training in North Vietnam. One report indicates that in Savannakhet Province North Vietnamese political cadre have beento the Communist administration for the first time.
By the fallhe RLG had made considerable inroads on territory that the Communists held' The Communists finally responded by turning an RLG offensive in the Nam Bac areaebacle for the government inuring the remainder of the dry season,eries of defeats lo the RLG which added up to the worst government setback since the precarious days1heimpact was considerable. Thereood deal of apprehension in Vientiane that the Communists would break out from the previous pattern of military action and push on to the Mekong.
But this did not happen, and perhaps the most notable feature of the rainy season now drawinglose was the lack of significant new moves by either side. The Communists did not press their advantage, butore intensive political consolidation of their territory thanRLG forces, who for their part, usually regain considerable terrain in the rainy season, had only some limited successes in the northeast and in the
' Sir cnlrrspir jii maps.
sECRFjj^sfcNamVfT*
area around Muong Phalane. RLG progress has been nil In the Sedone Valley in the south, in Borikhane Province, and in other potrntially significant regions.
developments in the military and political Gelds seem to forma pattern related in Large part to Cornmuniit strategy in South8 woulddecisive" phase in Vietnam. Hanoi movedits logistic capabilities in Laos, strengthen its forces there, recoverand set back and demoralize RLG forces, And in their recentthey have set the stage (orew- settlement on moreterms should the situation in South Vietnam move into seriousshort, the Communist* havetronger military position whilesame time they are preparing, if the situation in Vietnam warrants, toa more active political phase in Laos.
II. CAPABILITIES
Our estimate of current PL/NVA strength in Laos isL0ompared toear ago. The most important increments have been in combat troops, where PL strength has grown00 and NVA strength0o oppose these Communist forces the RLCotal ofen. Theae include0 combat troops of the regular armyombat troops of the neutralist forces, and0 guerrillas,f whom arc Meo tribesmen commanded by General Vang Pao in the northeast.'
PL and FAR troops are probably about evenly matched in terms of the general effectiveness of individual troops or battahoos, and man for man the Meo guerrillas are probably better fighters than either. The NVA forces, how-ever, are definitely better than the FAR, and the psychological impact on the latter when attacked by the NVA is often sufficient to precipitate their defeat. This qualitative inferiority it somewhat compensated for. however, by air nip-port provided by Royal Lao Air,perating out of Udom in Thailand with Thai pilotc and USAF aircraft operating out of Thailand. In good weather, the Lao flyactical sortici per week, the Thai pilotsnd the USAF. Such success as the RLC has enjoyed2 is due largely to the combination of this air support with effective use of friendly guerrilla forces
several years, Souvanna and othereaders, including thehave (elt that if il were nut for the presence of NVA troops, RLCprobably quickly dispose of the PL threat. In our view, this itoptimistic. Although in terms of present ttrrngths on both sides. Royal
' Thk taxu* ii for backxTouadealv andnot la be wed or repubhtbad hi any outery boWere of this muMw.
'See Annexetailed breakdown of order at hard* far both CooununUt and RLC
SECRE^iSaWSTTlVE
SKRETVSJNSWVt;
Lao combat forces would then outnumber those of the Pathct Lao by more than two to one, we do not believe that this numerical advantage would be Jnnivr. in view of (he many wealaveases andhat will continue to limit FAR effectiveness whatever enemy it coofrants We do believe that the PLonsiderable amount of NVA support toajor attack, and that without if, the RLC could almost certainly contain them. We also believe that In northern Laos the Meo guerrillas could put considerable pressure on (he PL. But RLG forces could probably not reduce PL forces and territory veryatsubstantial outside logistical and air support.
continuestimale,we did inL/NVA forces now in Laos have the military capability toHLC area of controlew enclaves in fairly short order. Theyso without diverting resources from South Vietnam or drawingfrom the North. And we do not think that RLG forcestheir sue or capability sufficientlyronths fromalone to contain (he Communists.
III. COMMUNIST INTENTIONS
are several options openhe Communists over the neator so. There are various indications of preparations to resumeas the dry season commences, and it is possible that thedecided to exercise their military superiority and quickly overrun mostThey might think this would be an effective means of putting thenew pressures toeneral settlement in Indochina. Weis unlikely. The Communists would necessarily feel considerableover US counterrnoves in thecorridor, especiallyune of
changeover In American administrations. And, as long as the outcome in Viet-nam is in doubt and under some sort of rifgotiatioo, we believe that Hanoi would not run needless military risks In Laos before the chancesewsettlement there had been tested.
do expect, however, that Communist forces will keep uppressure on ltLG forces in the coming dry season. In theGeneral Vang Peo's Meo guerrillas have longhorn inparticularly in Houa Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces, theyonsiderable effort toumber of guerrilla sites and(heir claims. They will probably also try to clear the guerrillathe border of northeastern Khammouanc Province- with Northwell as in the northwest Provinces of Houa Khong and Luang Prahang.south, they will maintain the threat to the Mekong frail IhakhekProvince. They wiD attempt to disrupt US-sponsored aidprofjama. And, of course, they wiD protect their vitalsupply routesouth Vietnam in (he Laotian corridor.
rrTTtDDISTRIBUriON
Wo anticipate more direct political pressures on Vientiane and toe King, whiiilitary move* will serve to reinforce. At some pofiil. depending again on aV^lopmcots in South Vietnam, the Communists might offer to open oegotunons. providing the bombing in Laos ended. In any case, Hanoi would beheve its military pressure* would improveeventualon better terms.
ajor change in (he situation in Vietnam could affect Hanoi's calculations. But we do not beheve thai the release of NVA assets from South Vietnam would, in and of itself,ecisive factor hi changing Hanoi'i policy in Laos. In the eventietnam lettlerncnt favorable to them, the North Vietnamese would anticipate that political pressures would cause Laos to fall into their bands fairly soon. They would therefore sec no need for ambitious moves in Laos that might risk upsetting any agreements reached on South Vietnam, particularly respecting US military withdrawals. Should the settlement be unfavorable In (bo Communists, we believe that military caution in Laos would appear even more desirable to them.
Eventually, if the Communists cannot achieve what they want in Laosombination of pressures, they may resortigorous militaryBut for now, they appear to be moving slowly, calcuiatlng that the outcome in Vietnam will be suchew settlement in Laos can be reached which would provide (hem an improved power position, from which they could ultimately take control.
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SECRET^SewSTTlVEDDISTRIBUTION
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Order of battle information onmmunist tones in Laos is derivedumber of sources. The most important are informants contacted by clandestine frimdly guerrillas and by road-watch teams. Other usefulis obtained from prisoners androm civilianlow-level administrativefrom special sources. The estimates of enemy strength are best in those provinces where friendly guerrillas and other assets arc most active: Houa Khong. Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang. Khamrnouane, Savannakhet. Sara vane. Attopeu. and Sedone. It is least reliable along most of the South Vietnamese border, in northern Phong Saly, southern Sayaboury. and northeast Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Provinces. In the otherwhere we rely largely on the Laotian Army reporting, the qualityit is reasonably good for Vientiane and Borikhane, but poor for Champassak. Sithandooe. and Wapikhamthong. Estimating the number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA! and P'thef Lao (PL) troops is also complicated by the mixture of NVA and PLthin many individual battalions.
On the whole, we think the estimates are reasonably accurate and support our conclusion that Communist strength in Laos is greater than at any time in the past. Strengths fluctuate somewhat between the dry and rainy seasons, however, as the NVA tend to put combat troops in for the dry seasonparticularly elements of the Sloth NVAthen withdraw them during the rainy season. NVA combat troops outnumber the PL troops in the southern provinces of Saravane, Attopeu, and Sedone, where, as might bothe defense of their supply and infiltration corridor to South Vietnam is most critical. There are about an oqual number of NVA and PL troops in Houa Phan (Sam Neua) Province. In the remaining provinces, the PLthe NVA substantially, andr. uc wC laMwl MVAn four provinces: Sayaboury. Vientiane, Champassak, and Wapikhamthong. The dissident neutralist troops are all in Xieng Khouang and Phong Saly Provinces.
SKRET/SEblfiTTTVE LIMITED^fTTSTRIBUTION
LIMlWrTDISTRIBUTION
TABLE A
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS
North Vietnamese Forces
Independent
Troops and Advisors in Mixed
AAA
Total NVA
Command and Support Troops
Engineers
TOTAL NVA Forces0
Lao Communist Forces
Independent PL0
Infantry In Mixed Units (with NVA troops or
Dissident Neutralist
Armor
Artillery
AAA 3tJ00
Total Lao Communist
Command and Support Troops0
Engineers and Construction
TOTAL Lao Communist Forces 0
GRAND TOTAL0
SECRET/^NSTTlvE IIMJIW-TJIST RIBUTI ON
SECRE*yStN SIT IVE HTTitD DISTRIBUTION
TABLE B
0
ROYAL LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES
FAB (Royal Lao Army J
Infantry
Artillery
Armored
Total Combat
Support Troops
TOTAL FAR
FAN (Progovemment Neutralist Forces)
Total Combat
Support
TOTAL FAN
uto-defense deDefense Forces)
RLAF (Air Force) 0
River Flotilla
GUERRILLA FORCES
Northwest Tribal Guerrillas (Yao and Others)
Northcentral Tribal Guerrillas (Irregulars inand Phong Saty
Meo Tribal Guerrillas 0
Centra] Laos Tribal Guerrillas
South Laos Tribal Guerrillas (Lao fit
0
CRAND
'Figure* in this category are for background use only. They are not to be used orId any outer publication by holders of this estimate
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