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Intelligence Report
The Soviethe Politics of Nationalism '
8
SEGRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 31 December8
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The SovietPolitics of Nationalism
Su.Tjnary
of tha Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Ukraine, tha most populous and most richlyowed of the non-Russianhas emerged from the neglect of the Stalin era to occupy an important position in national affairs. party and governmenthave cautiously worked to strengthen the position of Ukrainians within theadministration and totheir influence onpolicy. They have consistently favored measures to increase the authority of local officials at the expense of Moscow, and to this extent haveelativelyinfluence on Sovietpolicy. Theirviewpoint has also been affected by persistentfrom Ukrainian the most vocal champions of Ukrainian cultural and national traditions. In an effort toocal base of support somewhat independent ofroup within tho Ukrainian leadership headed by party boss Shelest appears to
Not*; This report waa produced solely by CJA. It vasby the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Offioe of Economic Iteeaarch and the Office of National Estimates.
SECRET
have made some minor concessions to thiasentiment.
Ukrainian party and government officials had perhaps more reason than other Soviet provincial leaders to fear the uncontrolled liberalization and nationalistic reform movement in Czechoslovakia, because it threatened to raise hob with their own cautious and limited program of reform. Theylobbied forcefully in Moscow for military intervention in Czechoslovakia. Party boss Shelest apparently concluded that unless harsh measures were taken againstajor crackdown against dissi dent nationalist elements in the Ukraine could not be avoided and his own political standing in Moscow would be in jeopardy. Thus fartrategy seems to have worked. He appears to havehis position in the politburo and may havesome freedom of action at homo in Kiev.
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Introduction
At the various Communist summit meetings that have punctuated the Czechoslovak-Soviet crisis, the round face of Ukrainian party boss Petr Shelest hasamiliar sight. By all reports Shelest was one of the politburo's strongest proponents of military intervention in Czechoslovakia, and this wasactor in his inclusion at many of the talks. Shelest was clearly concerned about the effect of the Czech reforms on hisillion fellow Ukrainians in the republic. Thenationalistic program of the Ukrainianin Slovakia and the ease with which its message reached intellectual circles in the Ukraine ware particularly worrisome. Although there were no reports of any serious open unrest in the Ukraine, Ukrainian officials were clearly nervous about the potential impact of Czechoslovak developments.
The Ukrainians' jittery response to Dubcek's reforms takesew dimension, however, in light of reports that Shelest himself has been the leaderoderate faction within the Ukrainian leadership. He reportedly is by no means liberal in outlook, but is committedradual, highly controlled "Ukrain-ization" program to improve the status of Ukrainians and their culture. This program has been describedodifieda term derived from Skrypnik, the namearty loader in who presidedenuine national revival in the Ukraine after several centuries of Russifica-tion. Stalin had him purgedbourgeoisin, but under Khrushchev his name was posthumously rehabilitated. It may not be accidental that Shelest today continues to cite Skrypnik and other Ukrainian leaders purged in themong the heroes of the Ukrainian Communist movement, even though it is no longer fashionable to dwell on Stalin's victims.
The far more limited concessions tosentiment reportedly sponsored by Shelest and his followers appear designed to undercut theof Ukrainian extremists and at thc same time strengthen their own local base of support. This
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wouldigh-risk vonture under the boat of circumstances, and the Czechoslovak events may have greatly worsened the odds. Thepontaneous, and pell-mell nature of the changes under Dubcck had nothing in common with tha tight, party-controlled reforms reportedly envisaged by Shelest. Furthermore, the Czech reforms threatened to generateferment in the Ukraine and possibily to expose Shalest to the charge of nationalist deviation. ery real sense Shelest may have put himself in the forefront of Dubcek's critics to save his own skin.
Shelest's more than vigorous support of tha invasion of Czechoslovakia has paid off. His bona fides in Moscowto have been strengthened and, no matter what theof ferment in the Ukraine beforeugust, the military invasion has made its point with thc Ukrainian people. It is too soon to determine how Shelest's limited "Ukrainization program will fare, but the Ukrainian leaders can be expected to continue to fight for local interests and to maneuver to increase their influence in Moscow. The same can be saic of the leaders of the other Soviet republics, but the Ukrainians, because of the size and wealth of theirarepecialand have made the most of it in recant years.
Stalin to Khrushchev
During the Stalin era, Georgia, Stalin's nativereceived relatively preferential treatment and the Ukraine was perhaps the least favored of all the Soviet republics. Stalin was pathologically suspicious
of Ukrainian nationalism, andesult the republic came in for more than its share of purges. Tho long battle in the postwar years with the
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Ukrainian underground in the newly annexed western oblasts did nothing to improve Stalin's disposition. At tlie time of Stalin's death, the republic was economically backward and the party was weak and heavily staffed with Russians. Although thcof the western areas with their moreconscious population injected some new nationalist spirit into what was fastussified Ukraine, the effect was largely offset by constant purges.
The first step after Stalin's death towardto the Ukrainians some measure of control in their own house was the removal of the Russian-born first secretary of the Ukrainian party, Mclnikov, for excessive zeal in Russifying the western oblasts. Helnikov's downfall and his replacementkrainian was oneeries of ousters of Russian officials in the border republics on similar charges. There is some convincing evidence that police chief Beria was behind this campaign--that he hopedime when power in Moscow was in flux to win political support among the non-Russian leaders.
Khrushchev-Ukrainian Partnership
The Ukraine began to come into its own under Khrushchev, who had made his career thoro, although he himself waakrainian. He naw the Ukrainians as useful allies, but had no interest in promoting or preserving Ukrainian cultural traditions. In his climb to the top, Khrushchev looked to former party and government associates in thc Ukraine for support, and many of them moved into important posts at the center. The Ukrainian party grew, as did theof ethnic Ukrainians within it. The proportionRussians in leading posts in the republic party and government was cutigh of SO percent0 to aboutercent6 (Russians comprise aboutercent of the population of thequally important, the number of Ukrainians in leading organizations at the national level--the party central committee and the poiitburo (thenspectacularly. The Ukrainians' sense of pride and
id.-nl ity qi cw
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Khrushchev's alliance with the Ukrainian wing of the party lasted3 During this time, thc Ukrainians' influence on domestic affairs was clearly recognizable. They were then and areconsistent in advancing programs advocating some form of decentralization--anything to increase local authority at Moscow's expense. Thoy were strongly opposed to Stalin's centralized economic management, and they supported Khrushchev's move6 to destroy Stalin's reputationeader andarxist theorist. In fact, Presidentormer party boss in the Ukraine, was still reaffirming the regime's commitment to de-Stalinization in6 when all other members of the politburo had become silent on the issue.
Khrushchev's administrative reformhe division of the country into large economic regions to administer industrialkrainian stamp on it. The reorganization allowed Khrushchev to disband elements of the entrenched Moscowbureaucracy that was antagonistic to his It also brought the Ukraine and otherubstantial measure of control over the economic life of their areas. The Ukrainian leaders made the most of the opportunity, and charges of "localism" soon cropped up against then and other equallyregional leaders. Khrushchev himself complained later that the Ukrainians had successfully lobbied for ft factory to produce the Zaporozhets passengerin hisotally unnecessary concession to local interest.
The Ukraine with its strong rural strain has been an innovator in many areas of agricultural economics and management. Khrushchev's preoccupation with the problems of agriculture and his efforts to introduce various incentives to stimulate growth in thissector reflected his Ukrainian experience and the advice of his Ukrainian supporters. The Ukrainians, however, could not quite sell Khrushchev on ono of their favoriteroposal loecentralized system of elective unions to manage the country's collective farms. The scheme, which would haveonsiderable loss in central ministerial control over the farms, ia now again being proposed to Moscow.
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The Ukranians alao produced the KharkovLiberman, whose proposal that an enterprise's performance be measured by its profitabilityrominent elament in the attempts beginning5 to reform the economic system. While Libermanhas never publicly carried his idea through to its logical conclusion, other Soviet economists have done so, and it has led them to proposals for thoin economicrevisionist concopt of "market socialism."
The marriage of political convenience between Khrushchev and the Ukrainian group began to go stale toward the end The decisive break camo with the ouster in0 of his second-in-command in the party, whoative Ukrainian and former head of the Ukrainian party. Khrushchev began to turn more to the Leningrad party organization for political support, and there was an accompanying shift in Soviet policiesreater emphasis on tighter centralapproach favored by the Loningraders. The regional economic councils (sovnarkhozes) came under increasing attack, and steps were gradually taken to nullify many of their features by creating new layers of management. The establishment of tho supreme sovnarkhoz in3 all but undid the original schema. Khrushchev alsotepped-up Russification drive in the minority areas, againpartlyesult of the growing influence of his Russian advisers.
Language Problems
One of Khrushchev's most unpopular proposals concerned the status of minority languages in the schools. In the school reform bill ofhrushchev proposed that parents in the non-Russian territories be allowed to decide whether theirwere to go to schools taught in the native lan-guago or in Russian. Children who wont to theschools would not be required to study the native language, but the study of Russian by all pupils would continue to be mandatory. There was an immediate outcry from spokesmen from the non-Russian areas, charging that this system would put pupils who chose tho native-language ahcooIsurtherdisadvantage and that parents would feel
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compelled to send their children to Russian schools whanever possible. The bill was passed, however, with only minor modifications.
The status of minority languages in the schoolsensitive issue. For Ukrainians, who havefew other marks of cultural and ethnic apartness from the Russians, tho Ukrainian languageital factor in the preservation of thoir national identity. Althoughercent of tho Ukrainians in the republic claimed Ukrainian as their nativo tongue in the last Soviet census,nly in rural areas does it appear to be used much any more. The pressure to learn and use Russian is enormous; knowledge ofis the key to educational and professionaland in'almost all higher educationalinstruction is in Russian. Money, teachers, the best equipment,flow into the Russian-language schools. Furthermore, the Ukrainian cities have long been heavily Russified and the Russianhas come toadge of cultural Urbanized Ukrainians tend to look down on tho Ukrainian languageuaint, peasant dialect, the language of the lower classes. krainian student who insists on speaking Ukrainian when he knows Russian runs the real risk of being classified by officialsudding "bourgeois nationalist."
Inchool year, the last timefigures wore published in theercent of the children were reportodly enrolled in Ukrainian-language primary and sacondary schools. Some unpublished official figures acquired by aWestern student on schools in thc Ukrainian cities forS9 school year, however,lear picture of the trend toward Russification under tha present conditions of rapid urbanization. In Kiev9 percent of the pupils ware in Ukrainian-language schoolsi in Kharkovercent;K .? in percent .
Even in Khmelnitsky, in the western Ukraine,ercent were in Ukrainian-language schools. the best efforts of thc nationallyUkrainian intellectuals toense of pride among Ukrainians for their language and signs that Ukrainian officials are now taking some steps to end discrimination against the Ukrainian language,
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the trend toward the use of Russian seems irreversible as the population becomes more mixed andimprove.
Post-Khrushchev Era and Podgorny's Eclipse
Several officials closely associated with the Ukraine were again named to leading posts in Moscow in the spring3 and, with the ouster ofinhe stock of the Ukrainians rose again. ew brief months their influence on domestic policy was again dominant. One of the first acts of the new regime was to lift restrictions that Khrushchev had placed on the farmers' private plot. thewasy Ukrainian party boss Shelest. One week later he wasto full membership on the party politburo (then presidium). Of theembers of that body, five were the remnants of Khrushchev's earlier "Ukrainianarty secretary Brezhnev, second secretary Podgorny, deputy premier Polyansky, deputy head of the RSFSR party bureau Kirilenko, and Shelest. and Kirilenko, although they consider themselves Russian, were brought up in the Ukraine and made their early careers in the Ukrainian party organization. The common background of this group haslose political bond and some similarity in outlook.
Brezhnev heeded the Ukrainians' views in drafting the major agricultural reform inut he soon moved to reduce his dependence on their support by working more closely with theSuslov, Shelepin, and voronov, andegional group new to the national scene, the Belorussians. The Russians and Belorussians seem to be strongof centralized control as opposed to the Ukrainians preference forleast to the republic level-
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The major blow to tha favored position of the Ukrainians was Podgorny's gradual eclipse. It has never been clear who was behind tho campaign tohis powerful position as virtually second-in-command of the party: shelepin, Brezhnev, or both. The first round was narked by the firing of Vitaly Titov in5 as head of the key party organs departments. Titovormer associate of Podgorny from the Kharkov party machine in the Ukraine. This was followed in5 by the publicationentral committee decree reprimanding the Kharkov Oblast party committeeax policy on admissions to the party and for putting more stress on quantity than on quality. The decree was an obvious attack on Khrushchev's policy of mass recruitment into the party throughout the Soviet Union, but itpecialfor the Ukraine and Podgorny, as the choice of locale indicated. The Ukrainian leaders, Podgorny included, had sanctioned mass admissions in theirto strengthen local party cadres after the lean years under Stalin. 21 theparty grewercent while the growthwas6 percent. Curiously, despite the clear message of the Kharkov docree and theslowdown in the rate of admissions for the countryhole, the Ukrainian party apparently continues to expand almost as fast asanother successful aspect ofUkrainization program."
In September, another graduate of the Kharkov organization, Rumyantsev, was removed as chief editor of Pravda. hampion of fairly liberal causes, like Podgorny at that time, Rumyantsev's ouster marked the end of what hadrief, but, by Soviet standards, permissive period. In late September, measures that increased the authority of plant directors were passed, but at the same time, in seeming contradiction, the centralized ministerial structure was re-established. This could hardly haveelcome step to the Ukrainian leadership, as it meant the end of the last vestiges of the sovnarkhoz system. Sharp criticism
by Ukrainian Gosplan chief Rozenko and some other regional leaders in8 of the serious lack of regional planning under the re-established branchis evidence of their continuing discontent.
Inodgorny was relieved of his post on the party secretariat and named to replace Mikoyan as USSRargely ceremonial post. The Ukrainians' influence in policy circles washurt by the lossower base of one of their members. The intellectual ferment both in Moscow and in the republics that broke out into the open from4 to5 certainly was the cause for Rumyantsev's removal and may have been one factor in Podgorny's gradual eclipse. Furthermore, there were signs of friction between Moscow and Kiev on how to handle the outburst of nationalist unrest in Some of the Ukrainian trials that followed may not have been completely at Shelest's initiative, but may have been aimed at discrediting his leadership in the Ukraine.
Nationalist Ferment in the Ukraine
In the months immediately following Khrushchev's ouster inension that had beenup in intellectual circles in the Ukraine over Khrushchev's Russification drive broke into the open, primarily in university circles in Kiev and Lvov. Meetings were held, bold speeches delivered, protests signed, and petitions delivered to various officials, high and low. Many of the Ukraine's most prominent intellectuals were involved. They demanded an end to discrimination against the Ukrainian language and called for strict enforcement of the constitutional rights of Soviet minorities.
At first, the authorities did not go beyond breaking up meetings and detaining the leaders, but inS widespread arrests began. By the end of September,ersons hadbeen arrested by the KGB on charges ofanti-Soviet nationalistic literature. (The arrest of Moscow writers Sinyavsky and Daniel also occurred in) In the springboutersons who were still being held were put
on trialumber of cities in the Ukraine. the trials were held in secret, word spread, large public demonstrations took place outside the court rooms, and more protests were circulated. At this point, Ukrainian authorities reportedly decided that the trials were proving counterproductive. ecision was taken to use less conspicuous methods, such as firing dissidents from their jobs, and the number of arrests dropped off. There was one notori-ousofoung reporter who was sent by his Komsomol (youth organization) unit to cover one of6 trials. Outraged at thejustice meted out, he compiled all the evidence he could gather on the trials. opy of hiswas smuggled out of the USSR and published in Paris. Chornovil'was arrested in7 and sentenced to three years inentence later commutedearalf.
Although the shift to more subtle tactics against dissenting intellectuals apparently has beennowhere was it more evident than in the Ukraine. Several of the more talented young Ukrainian writers and literary critics who were apprehended in5 were soon released, reportedly because they were well known in the West and it was thought any move against them might stir up an international fuss. Another was released allegedly because of poor health. There is an unconfirmed report that in8 the Ukrainian KGB chief refused to carry out an order from headquarters in Moscow to arrest onewriter and petition signer on the grounds that his arrest would only cause more dissension.
Furthermore, the sentences given the defendants in the mass trials of earlyto six years-were slightly more lenient than those given on thelevel for comparable offenses (Sinyavsky and Daniel wereears, respectively). As in the case of Chornovil, many of the sentences were later reduced,umber of those who werenow seem to be hack in Kiev signing protests and again being harassed by the authorities.
krainc maintain that tha leader of the opposition to Shelestthe Ukraine and the chief proponent of severe measures against Ukrainian nationalists-was the Ukrainian party secretary inculture and Propaganda, Andrey Skaba. Hints of differences between these two on the nationality question abound. elegation of Canadian-Communists of Ukrainian descent whoonth in the Ukraine in7 was struck by the differing viewson the issue of language discrimination by various officials. They noted that Skaba and the minister of education insisted that the language and nationality problem in the republic had been solved and that, in any case, fulfillment of nationaldoes not depend on language, but on technical progress. On the other hand, Shelest and certain
ico i. anu terrain
others were willing to acknowledge that there
v.
The delegation noted wide diversity in theuse of the Ukrainian language, in party meetinqs and in many of the ministries of republicUkrainian was used. In ministries of all-union subordination, Russian was more likely to be Used The delegation was particularly impressed, however, by the Ukrainian planning chief, Rozenko, who said that he firmly believed that Ukrainian should be spoken in the Ukraine and took issue with the allegations put forward by Russophilos that Ukrainian lacks an adequate vocabulary for scientific-technical usage.
During the Canadians' visit, tho subject of the Ukrainian Writers Congress in6 kept cropping up. By all accounts, ittormy The problem of the Ukrainian language and its declining status in the republic seems to havethe proceedings. The published excerpts of Shelest's speech to the congress quote him asabout the necessity of ur beautiful Ukrainianindication that heonciliatory approach, at least in public. Thecomplaints of the Ukrainian intellectuals on the
nay d There arc
reports, for instance, that all courses are now being
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taught in Ukrainian in Lvov University,ow Ukrainian-language publishing house has just been.
In the fallccording to sources In the Ukraine, Skaba accused Shelest of nationalistand the Ukrainian source presumed that one or the other would have ton December there began to be rumors that Skaba was in difficulty and he was removed from the secretariat at the end of March. At about thatontroversy arose overovel by the venerable chairman of the Ukrainian Writers Union, Oles Honchar. The novel, entitled Sobor (Theaments theof the traditional Ukrainian rural way of life under the onslaught of urbanization with itaand, by implication, Russian culture. When the book first appeared int received favorable reviews. But by May, as tension between Moscow and Prague mounted, the official assessment changed,ampaign against it was launched in the Ukrainian press. Honchar was accused ofand an "unhealthy" preoccupation with the past and with Ukrainian traditions. Again Shelest seems to have played an ambivalent role. Re met with Honchar and other members of the writers unionfriendly" talk onay,ubsequent reportoviet source stated that he had strongly backed Honchar. The latter still holds his post on the Writers Union, and the attacks against him seem now to have ceased.
An additional reason for Honchar's difficulties was his sympathetic attitude towardther Ukrainian writers whoetter earlier in the year protesting the trials of Chornovil and ofand Galenskov in Moscow. There was muchin official Ukrainian circles over this letter, and stringent efforts were employed to force the signers to apologize publicly. umber of signers were dropped from their teaching jobs and from the Ukrainian Writers' Union.
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To what extent these difficulties within the Ukrainian intelligentsia affected the Ukrainianattitude on Czechoslovakia is not known, but the Ukrainians were clearly worried. They introducedmeasures to inoculate tho Ukrainian public against thc Prague infection, and, at the same time, placed pressure on Moscow to cope with Dubcek. as to the actual reaction in the Ukraine, particularly in the western areas, to the Czechoslovak reforms and to the Czech-Slovak federation scheme is fragmentary. Certainly the impact was potentially profound. But events moved fast and,esult of Moscow's mounting attacks on tho dangers of thedeviations and its stepped-up campaign to tighten ideological controls at home, the dominant mood in tha Ukraine changed from hopeful anticipation to fear and consternationeriod of domestic reprcsssion was in the offing.
Ukrainians Lobby for Action Against Dubcek
In addition totorm of propaganda in the Ukraine against tho dangers of bourgeois ideology, the Ukrainian leaders became active in Moscow. At the July plenum, which was called toeport by Brezhnev on the Czechoslovak situation, no fewer than three Ukrainians spoke in thenumber of the total speakers. Shelest spoke, as is customary; the plenum was also addressedecretary from Dnepropetrovsk and by tho party boss of the Transcarpathian Oblast on Czechoslovakia's eastern border. The latter official is notember of the central committee and would not normally have attended the plenum. The speeches were never published, but it appears highly unlikely that those men got up to argue for moderation in dealing with Dubcek.
Reports since the Invasion ofugust all agree that Shelest and Podgorny pushed for intervention. Czechoslovak sources contend that at the key summit meeting in Cierna before the invasion, Shelest was the most violent of all the Soviet leaders in his attacks on Czechoslovak policies. Moreover,ostinvasion television address, Shelest washarsh toward Czechoslovakia, and his speech was toned down for publication in tha Soviet press.
The Ukrainian faction has strongly supported Brezhnev on the Czechoslovak issue. Shelest, into his concern with the potential problems in the Ukraine, had his own position on the politburo to protect4 His strategy appears to have worked thus far. He has been fairly prominent since the invasion. He accompanied Brezhnev to the Polish party congress in mid-November and hosted the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks in Kiev in early December. He has thus far been able toajor crackdown on dissenters in thedevelopment which would probably hurt his standing as much as it would the Ukrainians.
Conclusion
At the October revolutionary celebration in Kievovember/ embassy observers felt that there were far more large Ukrainian flags and national emblems in proportion to pictures of Lenin than one would expect to see in Moscow. One observer was prompted to comment that the Ukrainians seemed to be missing the "religious" significance of the occasion and that the Ukrainians should give some thought to putting Lenin back into the October anniversary lest some day they be accused of nationalist deviation.
These are only small ripples and there is no signuilding tide. Nevertheless, as long as the Ukrainians retain their sense of nationaland the evidence suggests that national consciousness is growing among the Ukrainian people even while they are being increasingly molded into the Soviet political and economicwill find some expression in Ukrainian politics. The Ukrainian leaders for their part can be expected to push uniquely Ukrainianand to be on the alert for opportunities toreater measure of authority in their own affairs. In doing this, they will be tempted to make use of nationalistic sentiment, but will need to take care lest this instrument be turned against them.
Original document.
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