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Intelligence Memorandum
The Sharpening Soviet Military Debate on Forces fors
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence8
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Sharpening Soviet Military Debate on Forces for theQ's
Summary
Soviet military leaders have been engaged for several yearsebate over military strategy and force structure. The controversy has sharpened over the past year on questions of strategic offensive force levels, the ABM issue, and the need for more flexible conventional forces.
The debate, which surfaces in the military press, suggestsetermined fight is taking place for resource priorities as planning fors goes forward. It may also reflect differences of views within the Ministry of Defense on the potential risks and advantages of pursuing arms limitation talks.
for those interests, such as th Rocket Forces and the the statements of the high command have not ment of sides in the that the older marsha retaliation" strategy tegic
leaders with clearommander of the Strategic commander of Warsaw Pact forces, majority of key officers in the demonstrated any clear-cut align-debate. There is some evidence Is continue tomassive and continued priority on stra-
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Younger officers such as Colonel General Povaliy, planning chief of the General Staff, appear toore flexible approach. They are more likely to be willing to balance the needs of the conventional forces against strategic programs.
The current round of the debate centers on the nature of modern war and its costs. Proponents of increased levels of offensive and defensive strategic forces argue from the theoryuture war would beginassive surprise attack by the US. They are pessimistic about the chances for advance warning and insist that the USSR must strive for strategic superiority, both offensive and defensive, if it is to maintain an effective retaliatory capability.
Those advocating expansion of conventionalcontend that the Soviet force ought to be more flexibly geared toroader spectrum of military contingencies. This school of thoughtthe thesis that an East-West conflict would quickly escalate into an all-out nuclear exchange. This argument currently seems to have gained ground within the Soviet military establishment.
The question of resource allocation, the second theme, has been raised beyond the perennial one of defense versus the rest of the economy. Within the military establishment it is now debated in terms of strategic versus conventional weaponry. Thediscussion also implies that costconsiderations may now have some weight in selecting weapon systems.
The outcome of the debate remains unclear. Both the General Staff publication Military Thought and the press organ of theain Political Administration, Communist of the Armed Forcos, carry articles reflecting divergent views on these ques-tions. This suggests that the debate is beingat all levels of the Ministry of Defense.
Past Doctrinal and Force Structure Issues
The current arguments in the continuingdebate among Soviet military leaders parallel in many respects those ofnternalon the state of the Soviet defense posture. At that time, the Soviet Union was apparently in the process of deciding to move ahead with large-scale ICBM deployment while simultaneously upgrading the role of the conventional forces from the doctrinal limbo into which they had fallen during thes. The arguments put forth by the military then were designed to remove the constraints imposed on the USSR's defense posture by Khrushchev's doctrine of minimal deterrence.
A statement earlier this year in theSoviet journal Military Thought indicates that these arguments have surfaced again. According to Maj. Gen. N. Sushko and Lt. Col. A. Kozlov,on the likelihood of war, and by implicationover the most appropriate Soviet strategic posture,eak point of Soviet militaryand doctrine. Sushko and Kozlov contend that
it is erroneous and harmful to rely only on deterring war and to ignore the possibility that it nay in fact occur. The continuing preparation of the United States toew war, the authors claim,that the USSR increase its defense strength and beosition to uso its power.
springboard for the current debate isof preparedness to meet the most likelyto Soviet power. Key issues in the debatebalancing immediate defense requirementsin economic growth to provide for theneeds of the next decade, and determiningmix between strategic forces and thosemilitary situations. Soviet policyarms limitation talks is also bound upsame issues.
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The Nature of Future East-West War
Divergent projections of the nature of the beginning period of an East-West war betray some vested-interest bias regarding the issue of force structure. The advocates of increased conventional weaponry have insisted that at least the beginning periodajor conflict will likely bo confined to traditional military maneuvers. The advocates of expanded strategic offensive and defensiveon the other hand, contend that the initial period will be characterizedurprise nuclear rocket attack. Each side has chosen to attack,ifferent angle, the views of the late Marshal Sokolovskiy, whose works included three editions of the book Milltary Strategy.
According to Sokolovskiy, the USSR's ability to detect an enemy's preparationurpriseattack would enable it to deal thecrushing blow of decisive significance." Sokolovskiy implied that current strategic forces maintained at
a high level of combat readiness are sufficient to retaliate effectively. This view is now challenged by those who arguereater strategic force.
opposingwho contendpower has lost much of its utilityof nuclearview that any local war involvingpowers will inevitably escalate into awar. This school contends that theought to move faster in the development offorces.
The Case for Increased Strategic Capability
theoretical question of strategicis closely related to the practical issuestrategic posture of the USSR. This8 Military Thought articleMaj. Gen. N. Vasendin andhe divergent Soviet views onuccessful surprise attack against the
USSR.
T
One view, they noted, plays down theof strong strategic defenses. This view (which is quite similar to Sokolovskiy's) holds that modern reconnaissance permits the discovery of "both the immediate preparation of an aggressor for an attack as well as the beginning of the first strike of his strategic nuclear means." With thisigh degree of combat readiness will ensure the 'swift deliveryrushing retaliatory strike."
The countering view contends that theof discovering an attack in preparation is sharply reduced at the present time, so theof surprise must be faced up to. The authors themselves conclude that the USSR must have both strong offensive and defensive forces. In their view, the deliveryimely retaliatory nuclear strike requires "powerful and numerous" nuclear weaponswell-developed antimissile anddefense."
concurrent articleolonelparticipant in6 debate, stated thefor superiority over the West in strategicsharp and more polemical terms. Writingommunist of the Armed Forces,certain unspecified authors of failingthe necessity of overwhelming The ability toiven moment and in the decisivehe said, derives primarily from superiority
in nuclear rocket weapons.
statements contain implicitincreased strategic weapons procurement andmilitary posture based on strategicoffensive and defensive. In addition, theyarguments against the initiation oflimitation talks. They argue, in effect, for
a continuation of the strategic arms race with the west.
The Case for Flexibility
assive retaliationSokolovskiy's contention that any East-West
military conflict would quickly escalate to an all-out nuclear exchange. The opposing school of thoughtthatonflict could be kept at thelevelignificant period of time. One of the major arguments of this group is that strategic superiority is not an attainable goal for the USSR and that massive retaliation does nota practical outlet for Soviet military power.
Khrushchev, Soviet doctrinethe escalationimited local conflictNATO and Warsaw Pact forces was inevitable.
It warned that the Soviet military response to Western "adventurism" would be immediate and massive. Since that time Soviet doctrine has shown signs of becoming more flexible.
advancing the causeoreseem to have gained ground within theestablishment. Advocates of this strategycommand and staff positions in the Colonel General Povaliy, planningthe General Staff, and Marshal of the Sovietcommander in chief of the Warsaw Pact
forces, are probably the best known exponents of this strategy.
Povaliy has attacked Sokolovskiy's statements on the probability of escalationuture war. He remarked ino Western military attaches in Moscow that Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy was "obsolete" and that US officials would be wasting their time reading it. He explained that Soviet strategy has no label, but that the Soviet Union is "ready to meet whatever the situation requires."
8 article in Red Star, Povaliy had given an unprecedented endorsement of the rationale underlying the US strategy of flexible response. His discussion of changes in NATO's strategy noted that massive retaliation had become "quite unrealistic and unconvincing." He surmised that NATO and the US would continue to endorse the policy of fighting future wars with the weapons that "correspond to the nature of the possiblend would try to achieve their goals with the use of only conventional weapons or tactical nuclear weapons.
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Still earlier Povaliy had extolledore flexible strategy. 7 article in Military Thought, he stated that thenuclear powers might not employ nuclear weapons in the beginningonflict or for some period thereafter, and that there would still be time to mobilize and deploy the armed forces and place the country's economyar footing.
The Povaliy articles are representative of the supportarge segment of the military establishment has givenore flexible strategy. Articles in the military press over the past year have stressed the need for the armed forces to be prepared to conduct "world as well as limited wars, both with and without the use of nucleararshal Yakubovskiy argued in Red Star,hathole range ofhe ground forces must be ready for combat operations "without the use of nuclearmploying conventional "classical" means of warfare.
Articles in Military Thought, moreover, have discussed hypothetical troop operations during the conventional phaseuture war between nuclear powers in Europe. Colonel Samorukov, writing in the7 issue, acknowledged that the conventional phase would take place under the constant threat that nuclear weapons would be introduced and that thephase wouldhort one.
For theore flexible strategy, both in Europe and in areas far distant from Soviet borders, appears to be under serious consideration. NATO's recent review of its troop strength policy in light of the events inreview which forestalled planned NATO decreases--may also reinforce this position. Any major reduction in NATO troop strength probably would have increased thethat already exist within the Soviet Politburo and armed forces leadership to structure the military establishment on the primacy of nuclear weapons and retain the doctrine that considers massivethe most reliable military strategy for the USSR.
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21. The trend toward more diversified forces is opposedroup composed mainly of older generals and marshals who for the most part are no longer in
Mow, however- the compulsory retirement of senior Soviet officers, outlined in the7 Military Service Law, apparently is being Under the new law. officers of the ranks of colonel general up to. but not including, marshals of the Soviet Union will for the first time beto retire at the agenless the Council of Ministersive-year extension. According to Army General I. Gusakovskiy, chief of the Main Personnel Administration of the Ministry ofajor effort to execute this provision will be made this year and next*
The forced retirement provision will affect senior officers of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, and command staffs of militarypaving the way for promotion of younger officers.
The Resource Allocation Issue
24- The issue of resource allocation has alwaysensitive one for the Soviet militarybut it has sharpened over the past year as the arguments over the relative emphasis that should be given to strategic and conventional weaponry have intensified.
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press articles reflect newthe military establishment to acceptcriteria for defense planning. One by Maj.Parkhononko in Military Thought,various points of view about thedefense resource allocation and the analysis
of weapon systems.
According to Parkhomenko, one view maintains that the development and procurement of new armament should be accomplished without regard for cost, for any limitation might be detrimental to nationalecond point of view advocates theof any type of expenditure for the sake of economy, national security considerations.
The author himself believes that economic factors are important insofar as they determine the more efficient way of improving military According to Parkhomenko, economic criteria in the military field should "ensure the maximumin the combat capability of the armed forcesefinite level of expenditures of materialfor the purpose of always having military superiorityrobable enemy-"
Maj. Gen. M. cherednichenko, writing in Communist of tho Armed Forces,ecried the fact that cost hadrime factor in"military-technical superiority." He insisted that the qualitative aspectseapon system, rather than cost, must always remain the determining criteria.
The military's sensitivity to costrestrictions reflects to some extent thefrom elements of the political leadership to reduce defense spending. On the Politburo level.
Premier Kosygin has argued that the future economic growth of the Soviet Union requires ateveling off of military spending. This sunxier he railed at the catastrophic" size of the USbudget and he continues to favor US-Soviet talks to limit the strategic arms race.
of the variousand arms continue to try to protecthowever. Marshal Krylov, commanderStrategic Rocket Forces, argued in Februarymilitary affairs cannot tolerate stagnationfor "uninterrupted improvementr in theof new missiles. Marshal Yakubovskiy, onhand, soon after his promotion to conmander
of Warsaw Pact forces, warned in Red Stargainstne-sided emphasis to the role and potential of nuclear weapons.
A more recent statementajor General Novikov has demonstrated in concroto terms theof some military writers to this question.eview for Redf thepublished Nuclear Weapons and the Development of Tactics, Novikov wrote that the book had serious shortcomings. "Heree wrote, "we have an instance of overestimating nuclear weapons, oftheir role in close combat, and ofthe potentials of conventional weapons.*
The re-establishment of the post of coirinander in chief of ground forces7 appears to reflect the upgrading of conventional forces in recent years. The post had been abolished4 in tho midst of
a vigorous controversy over the role of the ground forces in modern war. The restoration of this post may strengthen the hand of ground force advocates in intraservice competition for resources.
success of the proponents ofmay have inspired the toneravda interview with Marshal Krylov, Thepro-strategic-missile quality ofwas lacking. Heensitivepoint by admitting that victory could"only" through the combined efforts ofof the armed forces.
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Original document.
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