8
8
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Supersedes
Soviet and East European General Purpose Forces
SvbmttiW by
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Cup:l't.' in by ffco
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As indicated ove'leai8
359
this aiiimore;
Th* Central InWIigene* Aoency ond lh* intelligent* oigonaationi ol theii of Stat* anrlnd lh* NSA.
Concurring!
Vic* Adm. Holm Taylor, Deputy Director. Central Intelligent* Mr. Thomot I. Hughei, ihe Director oland Reieorch.of S'Ot*
It. Gen. Joseph f. Carroll, the Oeclor. Delenie Intelligence Agency It. Gen. Monholl S. Cow. the Direcior. Nolionol Security Agency Dr. Octal H.or iKeG*neroJ Manager.nergy Cora mamwrn
Abstaining*
Mr. William O. Cr*gcr. 'or (heUM Director. Federal Svreejv of lnv*ft>galioe
lh* rt bsfj ui.ti.de ol "I
SIXULi CONTENTS
Page
THE
CONCLUSIONS
1.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET THOUCHT BEGAHDINCPURPOSE FORCES 6
SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 8
CROUND o
Categories of Divisions
Number and Types of
Armies
Fronts
V. TACTICAL MISSILEU
VI. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT AND THEATER AIR DEFENSEM
Tactical Aviation14
Support from Slrategic
Air Defense15
VII. CENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL17
Preseni Forces18
Capabilities Against Carrier Task Forces ond Scalir.cs of19
Capabilities Againsi
Capabilities for Suslaining Long-Range Operations21
VIII. NUCLEAR. CHEMICAL. AND BIOLOGICAL
Nuclear Warfare22
Chemical Warfare22
Biological Warfare23
Page
AND SEALIFT23
Airlift and Air Assauli23
Scihit and Amphibious 24
CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES24
General Considerations
Ground
Air26
Naval26
XI. WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES ACAINST27
XII. TRENDS0
Ceneral Considerations .
Tactical Missiles32
Theater Air Forces and Air32
Naval Forces33
East Europeau34
Table I: fctimated Number and Deployment of Soviet Line5
Table II: Estimated Numbers and Deployment of Soviet Tacticalin Operational Units, by Location and TypeG
Table III: Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical Aircraft37
Table IV: Estimated Numbers and Deployment of Soviet Ceneraland Submarines byovember37
Table V: Estimated Numbers and Types of Soviet Naval Aircraft38
Table VI: Estimated Slrenglh and Readiness of Eastern EuropeanPact38
Table VII: Estimated Numbers of Eastern European Tactical Aircraft,
1
Table VIII: Estimated Number and Deploymenl of East European Naval
Vessels byy39
CCCRCT
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet and Eastgeneral purpose forces throughspecially against NATO, and general trends in those forces over the nextears.
CONCLUSIONS
thc past two years there hasarked increaseinformation regarding the Warsaw Pact general purposeUie ground forces, including the observationealoperation against Czechoslovakia. Consequently we now haveclearer picture of the strcngtlis and weaknesses of those foicesmake more confident judgments about total numbers of unitspresent deployment, their levels of equipment and combatand their capabilities for mobilization and deployment.
find that thc structure of Warsaw Fact theater forcesto reflect the reorganization of aboutears ago, whichon thc assumption that any war in Europe would bellie outset. The arguments for greater flexibility over theyears have not resulted in any structural change,hasontinuing program for the modernization,
estimate that Sovietivisions have lesswe had previouslyategory II divisions haveercent of thc equipment found inivisions,nearly full complements of such equipment, and are manned
' We now(hatootorired rtSV div&ioai hat*ajor Htm of equipment tad Uoi diviuout. There fpim were firit presented in theto IloMeii of NitT. "Soviet aad East European General tSupeae Fori* UlrW
1
at aboutercent oftrength. From the Czech crisis, however, wc know that Category II divisions can be brought up totrengthew days by calling up reservists and vehicles from the civilian economy. Category III divisions ate al even lower levels of equipment and personnel strength, and wc believe are intended toase for longer term mobilization.
D We estimate that at present there areivisions (including theategory II divisions recently and perhapsraised to3 Category II divisions.ivisions in the process of build-up tor II. andategory III divisions. Thc totalivisions reflects an actual increase ofivisions resultinguildup along thc Chinese border.
Soviets would probably have little difiSculty intho personnel required to fill up their reducedHowever, those divisions would have quantitative andshortfalls in equipment when compared to Category Ie>^rnple, we beheve that therehortage ofnd that about half thc total inventory of APCsnonamphibious models.
areoviet ground armies. Most of those withinwould require the mobilization of army-level supportto commitment, but the armies in the Group of Soviet Forces(CSFG) aie almost certainly combat-ready as they now exist
C. The front is the highest Soviet wartime field headquarters for thc operational control of general purpose forces. The CSFC isa front in being and the only one that exists at combat-ready strength in peacetime. Additional fronts would be formed through mobUIzaUon in thc event of war. Efficient operation of the fronts' logistical services would be of critical importance from the outset of military operations; the combined total of mobile stocks of POL and ammunition in divisions and Geld armies would be sufficient for about hve days of intensive combat
OWy of fighters.ghters are in air regiments with the primary mission of air defense andrc in regiments whichrimary mission of ground attack. In addition, there arcight bombers in ground attack regiments and thereighters and light
sccurr
bombers in reconnaissance and strike reconnaissance units.esult of the buildup againsi China, thc numbers of tactical aircraft have increased somewhat over the past year or so, and we expect ihis trend to continue for the near future. Most of the aircraft delivered lo the force in recent years Iiave been late modelishbeds, which now constitute more ihanercent of the aircraft in air defense regiments.oncurrent modernization program, about half of the aircraft in ground attack regiments have been replaced by theitter and about half of thc light bomber force with llie Brewer.
I. All Soviet tactical fighter regiments receive training for other than their primary missions and could be used for either air defense or ground attack roles. However, most Soviet tactical fighters were designed as interceplors; their performance as fighter-bombers is characterized by their small payload capacity, short range, but quick turn-around time. The Soviets apparently plan to deploy groundfighters as near as possible to front lines.
J. Soviet theater air defenses arc deficient against low altitude attack. However, iht- Soviets are now deployingissiles toect airfields in Eastern Europe. They arc also deploying new low altitude radars in thc forward area. Additional measures which the Soviets have taken lo protect iheir tactical aiicraft from attack while at home base include revetments, hangarcltcs, dispersed parking, and increased light antiaircraft artillery.
K. Thc Soviets areajor effort to improve tlicirwarfare (ASW) capabilities. New ASW ships have been built, new detection dovices and improved ASW ordnance haveand ASW training has been increasingly emphasized. Despite this continuing improvement in equipment and training, we continue to believe that Soviet capabilities to detect, localize, and classifyoperating in the open ocean will remain very limited for the next several years.
L. Tlic Soviet Navy has made substantial progress in developing flexible forces to project seapower beyond the periphery of the USSR. The emphasis in new surface ships and conversions is on air defense and ASW, as well as improved seaworthiness and range capabilities. Three new classes of altack submarines, at least two of which are nuclear-powered, are now in scries production. Thc Soviets employ
iCCRCT-
nd merchant ships to support their naval force in the Mediterranean, now augmented by shore supportmade avadable by Egypt. Without shore support,any major increase in long-range operations wouldugmentation ofauxiliaries, not only wiih merclumt shipping, but also with ships designed to provide specialized technical support.
M. The East European countries have aboutivisions roughly analogous lo Sovietivisions, aboutnderstrenglhandombat aircafl. The usefulness of these forcesonfrontation with NATO rests squarely on the political reliability of thc various East European regimes. Soviet confidence in those regimes must be shaken by recent events in Eastern Europe.
N In the eventar with NATO, wc believe that the Soviets would seek to assemble 5ve fronts in Eastern Europe opposite the Central Region. Three of these would be in contact with NATO: CSFC the only front in being, in the center, and, at leastolish front on the northern flankzech fron* on the southern flank Two more frontssecond strategic echelon" would be formed primarily from Soviet forces in the Belorussian and Carpathian MDs and moved initially into eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia.
O. This force, when assembled, would comprise on the order0uclear capable rockets and missileonventional artillery tubes,ombatround attackn air defense regimentsn reconnaissancehe force would possess formidable capabilities for all types of military contuigcncies in the Central Regl0n, but its best capability would be that for which it was designed-nuclear theater warfare. In this contingency, Warsaw Pact Gro support would be augmented by the massive nvedium-range balhshc missile/intermediate-rangc ballistic missile deployment and medium-range bombers in the western USSR. The force would be less effective for sustained conventional combat.
P. We believe that, in extreme emergency conditions, theis capable of completing mobilization of the men andintended for Central Europe and to
SCCRCT
-SCREf
move essential combat elements forward inays, if DM process is not interrupted by hostile military action. However, thc complete integration of these fronts as combat-effectivelions would require more lime. For that reason, the USSR would almost certainly take about three weeks to complete its mobilization and forwardin any drcumstances which permitted it to control the timing.
Q. We believe that Soviet plans for mobilizationeriod of high tension in Europeeriod of covert preparations. The Soviets do not expect the subsequent overt mobilization andto go undetected by NATO. If the Warsaw Pact were observed to be mobilizing and deploying forceseriod of high tension with NATO, NATO would certainly be alarmed by the increasing danger of armed conflict, but it would be impossible to say whether the Warsaw Pact mobilization was precautionary and defensive, or an attempt to coerce NATO byhreatening posture,irm decision to attack.
R. Soviet policy decisions concerning the future development of general purpose forces will be heavily influenced by recent events in Eastern Europe, which must have raised serious questions concerning thc longstanding policy of heavy reliance on East European forces in any conflict with NATO. Also affecting such development are the continuing buildup along the Chinese border and thc continuing growth of capabilities for distant limited military aciion. Thesewill probably combine to exert heavy pressure on thc Soviet leadership for increased outlays for general purpose forces. If demands are forthcoming to Improve substantially Soviet eapabililies forconventional operations, the cost of meeting them would be very high, with intensified competition for resources with claimants for the strategic forces and thc civilian sector. Tlie results of thiscannot be confidently predicted, but we believe that thc outlays for general purpose forces will increase in some degree.
S. On balance, wc believe that llie combat readiness of Soviet forces in the western USSR will be maintained at levels somewhat higher than was the case prior to thc Czech crisis, that theof ground and tactical air equipment will continue at about the present pace, and that there mayodest increase in tbeof army- and /ronf-levcl support units. We believe that thewill also seek to increase substantially their capabilities to con-
SCOUT
duct ASW operations in thc open ocean and sustained long-range naval operations.
T. The future size, quality, and status of East European forces will depend largely on the outcome of Soviet reexamination of military policy in the light of recent experience. Thc Soviets may conclude that heavy reliance on the East Europeans is noound military policy. In this case, there would probablyeduction in Eaststanding forces. It is more likely, however, that the East Cerman, Polish, and Bulgarian forces will bc maintained at approximately ihcix present strength for the foreseeable future and will be improved in quality. In any case, thc Soviets may press for tighter controls over East European forces, perhaps through the subordination of Easttheater forces to Soviet fronts.
DISCUSSION I. INTRODUCTION
During the past two yean there hasarked increase of goodregarding the Warsaw Pact general purpose forces, especially the ground forces, including the observationeal military operaUon againstConsequently wc nowuch clearer picture of tlie strengths and weaknesses of those forces and cart make more confident judgments about total numbers of units and their present deployment, their levels of equipment and combat readiness, and their capabilities for mobilization and deployment.
Wc think lhat some aspects of thc actual status of the Soviet general purpose forces revealed by our new information and analysis reflect an internal struggle for thc allocation of resources over thc pastears. Therefore,iecessary explanation of the present composition of the Soviet general purpose forces,thc ground forces, wc beginummary review of the evolution of Soviet miliury policy and doctrine during lhat period and their impact on those forces.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET THOUGHT REGARDING GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
the death ofoviet military thought washis conception of the USSRontinental power encircled by hostilevulnerable to invasion. This conception had deep roots in the Russianin Stalin's personal experience. It led lo the conclusion that thefor the security of thc "Socialist Fatherland" was massive ground
forces capable of deterring ot re|ielling invasion. Naval and air forces were .egarded as merely auxiliary. Although Stalin supported tire development of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems, because the US had them, be continued to Ihink in continental tenns and no one dared to advocate aconception during bis lifetime.
n conlrast, Stalin's successors have thought of the USSR as one of only Iwo world powers that should be capable or exercising influence andrespect in any part of tlie world. Khrushchev perceived that in Order to achieve this status, as well as to ensure the security of the Soviet homeland, the USSR must develop strategic attack nnd defense forces strong enough to neutralize US strategic superiority byondition of mutualFrom his point of view, general purpose forces hadecondaryelation to Ibis requirement. Consequently lie gave priority to strategic forces in the constant competition for tbe allocation of limited scientific. Industrial, and financial resources. There were Soviet military leaders whoand supported Khrushchevs purpose, but die tjadiiionalisu considered him obsessed about rockets and obtuse about the cootmuiog Deed for more efficient general purpose forces.
Uientil the, thc Sovietsaras nuclear at the outset. Tbey therefore undertook' lo shape theirto advance swiftly across Western Europe in thc aftermath of aFor this concept, Uie Sovietsequirement for anof tanksarge number of missiles and rockets to providenuclear fire support. Armies were to advance by night and day,in stride. Tbe concept called for much less infantry, all mountedarmored carriers. The conceptuick war obviated the needservice support; the nuclear nature of the war and the fluidity of (beless conventional fire support from artillery and tactical aircraft
thehe Soviets had gone far in reshaping their theateralong these lines. They were capable ofoice of overagainst NATO; they liad heavy nuclear and chemical missile supportto the ground forces, supplementedassive medrum-rangeballistic missUe {MRBM/IRBM) deployment inUSSR; tbey were light in infantry, tube artillery, aii-to-groundground-to-air defenses, and especially so in service support. All linebecome essentially small armored divisions, but were not fully providednew kinds of equipment called for by the Soviet concept of theaterfor resources from strategic defensive and offensive forceslimited the production of new model tanks, amphibiouscarriers, and tactical aircraft Moreover, they still relied heavilymobilization of undcrstrength units and tbeir forward movement fromThus In theoviet theater forces had been largely, but not
completely, restmdurcd in accordance with Soviet doctrine for theater warfare in Europe.
At this junclurc. however, some Soviet military leaders began to question Ihe established theater warfare doctrine in the light of thc condition of mutual dcteriencc which was then emerging and US advocacy of ihc doctrine of flexible response. These Soviet military spokesmen generally agreed that the war with NATO would not necessarily bc nuclear from the outset, but there wasdispute over the probable durationonnuclear phase of conflict.
We believe that much of the Soviel miliiary leadership came lo sec ofor theater forces capable of fighting both quick nuclear war and longer nonnuclear war. However, Soviet theater forces, as actually constituted and equipped, were deficient in some respects for either contingency. Availability of adequate theater forces for nuclear war depended on the assumption of enough warning time in which to mobilize and deploy westward additional Soviet forces and no effective NATO military action against lines of cemmurtfeatwo during the reinforcement. Moreover, while the restructured Soviet ground forces slilla formidable capability for nonnuclear warfare, the contingency ofnonnuclear conllict would have required expensive reconstituuoo of sup-porting arms aod services.
was wt disposed to hinder the development of strategicorder to meet thc requirements for Soviet theater forces visualized byHe was openly contemptuous of theii demands for the groundevidently insisted that instead tliey rely on improved East Europeanin place. Apparently Ihc contingency of sustained conventionaldismissed on the assumption that the conventional phase wouldew days.
Khrushchev was kinder Io thc Soviet admirals. While he stoppedof conventionally.armcd cruisers, healher ambitiousto improve thc Soviet Navy by givingtrategic missile attack capability, increasing its capabilities to fend off US attack from the sea, and beginning the developmentorce capable of operatingistance from home waters.
Khrushehevs successors did not adopt his scornful attitude toward ground forces, and complaints by military spokesmen subsided. Nevertlieless, the ground forces share of military expenditures has not been significandy increased. This suggests tliat, under the pressures of economic restraints and priority needs in strategic forces, the Soviet marshals agreed to forego temporarily most of their claims for theater force improvement on the promise of sausfaedon later.
III. SIGNIFICANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
recent years, there hasoderate upward trend in the sizegeneral purpose ground and air forces. Ihis has resulted almostthe buildup of forces along thc Chinese border.he number of
mSkmm
ground divisions in lhat area has almost doubled,arked improvement in readiness; thc numlier of tactical air regiments has increased sharply. The buildup against China involved tbe creation of new uniuerceptible decrease in strength opposite NATO.
hc intervention in Czechoslovakia brought about significant changes in Warsaw Pact military posture. Eleven Soviet division* were moved foiward Irom Ihe western USSH. This movemeni,elective mobilization ofunits remaining in the USSR, provided an extensive exercise of Ihe Soviet icinforcentent plans against NATO. Tlie ultimate cffeei on Warsaw Pactand capability ts not yet dear. Much ol tbc Pact intervention force has returned to former stations, leaving four or five Soviet divisions and supporting elements in Czechoslovakia. Soviet confidence in lhe Czech forces will almost ceilainly be impabed, at least untilmore reliable political regime is developed in Czechoslovakia. They may maintain an increased readiness posture Ln tbe western USSR to compensate.
In the past yoar or so tbe Soviet Navy has made substantial progress ui developing flexible forces to project scapower beyond tbe periphery of the USSR. New classes of long-range ships equipped with modern air defense weapons and sophisticated electronic equipment are joining the licet. Training exercises of greater complexity, scope, and realism have been held, including an afloat support operaUon in the South Atlantic. Surface and submarine forces now operate regularly In tbe Mcdilerranean. while recent "show the Bag" visits in the Indian Ocean areaider scope of Soviet naval aspirations.
8 the Soviets put into effect tlie first major cliangc in their draft lawshc term of service of ground and air forces draftees has been reducedears, of navy drafteesears. Call-ups will be madeonths rather than annually, lhe sbotter terms of service will increase Ihe numbci of men receiving military training by about one-half, but may have an adverse effect on the expertise and readiness of Soviet forces.units will lose one productive year per man, whileharply increased trainingproblem which grows as forces become more complex and technical. Other provisions of thc new law indicate concern for these negative effects: age-in-grade provisions governing active duty service have been liberalized to permit officers through thc grade ol colonel to bo retained longer in active- service,road new piclnduction military training programeen instituted.
IV. GROUND FORCES
uring the past year wc have exploited all available information to study the status of Soviet ground forces in East Germany, in the western mlb'tary districts (MDs) of the USSR, and along the Chinese border, particularly as
9
regards the quanUty and charade, of their holdings of major items ofhese studies are illuminating with regard to the composition and combat read.-new of Soviet ground foices. particularly those opposite thc NATO Central Region.
c havearticularly detailed analysis of two Soviet divisions in Eastmotorized rifle and oneestimate theirlevels with confidence. The motorized rifle division hasajor items of equipment and thc tank division.f these major equipment items consisl of combat and special purpose equipment which has no civilian equivalent. TheO0 items arc mainly general purpose vehicles. Analysis of elements of other Soviet divisions in East Germany supports our belief that the two divisions examined are typical of Soviet divisions in the forward area and that their assessed equipment levels are coned. It is evident that thc Soviets consider all lhcir divisions in thc Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (CSFG) ready for commitment to combat without furtherWc have therefore taken thesetandard to judge other divisions in the USSR.
Categories of Divisions
Tlie Soviets describe their military units as being maintainedull state of readiness for immediate operations" or else at "reducedhere are also referenceseduced strength units capable of being made "ready to proceed to areas of concentration in severalhe divisions in CSFC and other Soviet divisions comparable to them in holdings of major items ofmanning, and training activity arc manifestly in the Em category, which wc designato Category I,
Other Soviel divisions have onlyoercent of the major items of equipment found inivisions, with indications ol substantially reduced manning and training activity. Wc estimate that the peacetime personnel strength of most of these divisions is about one-half lhc strength ofivisions; thatew is probably substantially lower. Soviet preparations for military intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated, however, that these shortages in men and equipment can bc suppliedew days by calling up readyand general purpose equipment from the civil economy. Wc designate divisions of this description as Categoryeduced strength divisions capable of being made ready to move out "in several days."
here are also some divisions wiih even less equipment than Category II divisions and appreciably lower manning and training activity. We believe that they are not intended to be employed for early reinforcement, but rather Uiat they arc cadre divisions designed toase for longer lermWe designate divisions of this description as Category III.
'By "major Herns of equipment" wc mean ill lelf-propelled vehiclesept motorcycle!)Urge towed itemsrtillery and two-iile traders.
areivisions in iho USSR thai, for the lime being, we arecategorize. They arc now in lire process of being built up. All bui one ofstationed near the Sino-Soviet frontier. Wc believe lhat by thc end ofwill have been made intor II divisions.
operation of this system was illustrated by thc Soviet militaryin Czechoslovakia. Of theivisions from the USSR employed ineight werend three were Category II divisionstotrength in men andc estimate thatsame timether Category II divisions were raised lo Category Iwere retained in the USSR.
Wc eslimatc that at present there areivisions (including theategory II divisions recently and perhaps temporarily raised to3 Category II divisions,ivisions in tlie process of build-up tor II, andategory HI divisions. For the distribution of Soviet divisions by type and locatioo, see Table I.
We believe that all Soviet divisions stationed in Eastern Europe areI. and that all but one of the divisions in the western border MDs opposite the Central Region of NATO are eitherr Category U. Wc believe that this will be true of the divisions along the Chinese border as well when the buildup ts completed. All Category-Ill divisions are motorized rifle, except for one tank division. They are stationed for tlie most part in the interior res-ions of the
The Soviets would probably have little difficulty in quickly assembling the personnel required to fill up their reduced strength divisions. However, when compared toivisions, they would have quantitative and qualitative shortfalls in equipment.
On the basis of equipment holdings observed in the CSFC. we estimate that on the order0 armored personnel carriers (APCs) would beto equipoviet divisions and army-level combat support units. Analysis of new evidence relating to tbe production and distribution of APCs indicates that the current inventory is lessut wc are as yet unable to measure witb confidence lire amount of the indicated shortage. We believe thativisions are fully equipped in this respect, but that someU divisions would have to use general purpose trucks as personnel carriers.
It appears also that about half of the APCs in units arend. They are essentially armored trucks; they are not amphibious and have limited cross-country mobility. Thehich Is gradually replacing them, is amphibious and has better mobility, bui itigh silhouette and topside entranceew low-silhouette, track-mounted, amphibiousbas begun to enter inventory.
' Eight Sovietivisions from Rail Orouoy and three from Hungary were also employed.
11
the event of mobilization the Soviets would have to acqoirefor use in theirivisions. The Soviet poUcy ofpurpose trucks from thc civilian economy was confirmed byduring the Czech crisis. Cargo and tanker trucks along withwere called up from agricultural and indi.si.iu! enterprises. Mostwere probably used for logistics support. This system isormer Czech general reports dissatisfaction with it amongand Soviet military leaders. There are obvious military disadvantagesinherent inystem; there are obvious peacclimcto the truck-shy Soviet economy.
certainly the Soviets have adequate numbers of tanks fornd II divisions. Most of these4Swhichegan to enter inventory aboutears
rCoducinS atank,n0 have entered inventory. The number of tanks for Category III divisions is less certain. They would, bc older models.
Number and Types of Divisions"
now estimate that thereoviet line divisions of threemotorized rifle, tank, and airborne. The indicated increase over thenoted in, Tbe Soviet and East European CeneraldatedECRET, is an actual increase resultingcontinuing buildup on the Chinese border.
We estimate that there areotorized rifleotorized rifle division has0 menedium tanks. TheSoviet objective is to mount all infantry in thc division in amphibious APCs but at present more than half of the APCs in Soviet motorized rifle divisions arc not amphibious.
Ther* arcank divisions, allf which in combat-ready statusenedium tanks-an unusually high proportion of tanks to personnel Tank divisions in East Cermany are about one-third equipped with the2 tank, the rest being the earlierSs. Four or five of the tank divisions are lieavy tank divisions.ombat-ready status theyeavy tanks and assault guns (twondedium tanks (one regiment).
According to Soviet statements, in both classified and unclassified sources motorized rifle and tank divisions have been designed for speed, firepower, and shock action in short-duration combat, with correspondingly minimal organic service support. Division stocks of fuel and ammunition are sufficient for about three days of combat 'Ihe divisions are apparently designedightresh division.
* For detailed geographical breakdown of Soviete I.
SE6RFT
here arc seven Soviet airborne divisions. Each probably hasajor ileins ol equipment and0 men. All are in combat-ieudy status. They are not assigned to field armies, but are centrally controlled in Moscow. In wartime they would piobably be allocated to fronts tor specific operations.
Armies
We believe that, in mafor theaters of operations, Soviet divisions are intended to fight as components of armies, normally Soviet armies would be committed lo cOmbal with their peacetime divisional structures, although Soviet doctrine poimili the reallocation of divisions to meel contingencies. There areoviet groundost ol ihoso within thc USSR would require the mobilization ol army-level supporl units prior to commitment. The. armies in CSFC, however, are almost certainly combat-ready as (bey now exist.
Soviel field armies haveine divisions and additional supporting units. They are of two types: lhe lank army in which allajority of the divisiont arc tank divisions, and the combined arms army in which allajority of the divisions arc motorized rifle- Tbe Soviet field armies in CSFC, less their divisions, total0 men and are combat ready.
The number and type of support units found in Soviet armies vary.typical army support wouldignalcud brigadeunchcrs, an artillery brigadeattalions, anegiment of lb1 launchers, an engineer ponton bridge unil and an assault river crossing unil. Tlie service support unils of Soviet field armies are sufficient lo provide their subordinate divisions with the necessary level ol transportation, maintenance, and ammunition and fuel supply for about two additional days ol combat. Beyond this time Soviet armies rely on the rear services of the front for mafor logistical support.
Fronts
The front is the highest Soviet wartime field headquarters for thecontrol of general purpose forces. Fronts do not exist in peacetime, but would be formed from certain MD headquarters inront wouldof three or more field armiesactical air armylus combat and servico support unils. The rear services of the front are responsible for most of tlic administrative support of the combut units, including supply, evacuation, medical service, construction, and maintenance. The limited provision for these kinds of support al division and army level makes the efficient operation of Ihe front's tear services of critical importance from the outset of military operations: the combined total of mobile stocks of POL mod ammumtioo in divisions and field armies would be sufficient for about five days of intensive combat.
Tlie CSFC isront in being and the only one which exists at combat-ready strength in peacetime. Plans probably exist for the Polish and Czech
'There ire alsooviet corps headquarters. We believe that nwU Soviet roipr perform
stablishments, as well as the Soviet Carpathian MD and the Belorussian MD. each toron( in wartime. In each of Ihese potential Iron! areas there arc three or more fieldAA. and limited additional combat and service support units. For each potential front except the CSFC. mosl of the serviceunits would have lo be created by mobilization. Other potential Soviet fronts probably exist in thc southern and far eastern USSR, and possibly in theUSSR- Ground armies and TAAs arc stalioncd in each of these regions. Bulgaria also could probablyront.
mobilization of Soviet front and army-lcvcl support units woulddifficult and time consuming than Ihe mobilization ol Category IIelements of these higher level commands exist in peacetime,of Ihe nondivisional units, particularly rear service elements, wouldbe mobilized. Many of the front's rear service units are to be drawntbe civil economy.
MISSILE SUPPORT
Soviet ground forces rely on rockets and missiles for delivery of supporting nuclear and chemical fire. Sovietivisionshree-launcher battalion of Frogs; Category II divisions have two or three Frog launcbers; some Category III divisions have two launchers. Brigades of0issiles provide support at army and fronl level. We believe tliat the CSFC has six or seven Scud brigades, probably with nine launchers each, including one brigade for each army. Armies in tlie USSR liave Scud brigades also, some with six and some witb nine launchers.
Soviet ground commanders have long complained of thc lackactical missile system with the range and mobility suited to thc needs of thc front. Tbe Soviets haveissile, tbehich may be intended to meet these needs: it is capable of0 pound payloadange. We have not, however, observed it with Soviet ground forces.
Soviet ground units are abo equipped with several versions of antitank guided missiles and multiple free rocket launchers. The latter are area-target weapons which canarge volume of firehort period ofarge proportion of the conventional fire support for ground forces is provided by tliese weapons.
AIR SUPPORT AND THEATER AIR DEFENSE
Tactical Aviation'
mission of Soviet Tactical Avialion. which tbe Soviets call AviationFront, is lo support thc ground forces. Air elements with this missioninto TAAs, which in wartime are assigned to fronts. Tactical airair defense, offensive strikes, and reconnaissance. Tactical airprovide transportation support lo ground forces-
Table II and Table
0 lhc number ol aircraft in Tactical Avialion wai drastically reducedajor program of cjuablative improvement through tbe development and introduction of new model aircraft was begun Tactical Avialion is nowlargely of lighter aircrafl. Tin; number ol light bomber* is only about one-iUth of lheigure, while the number of fighters in ground attack regiments has almost doubled.
estimate lhat there are nowighters in regimentsmission is air defensen regiments whose primary miiMouattack. Iu addition there arcight bombers in groundandighters and lightn reconnaissance andunits,
Soviet lactical lighter regiments receive training for other thanmissions and could be used (or either air defense or ground attackmost Soviet tactical fighters were designed as interceptors- theiras fighler-bombers is characterized by small payload capacity,but quick turn-around time. The Soviets apparently plan to deploylighters as near as possible to front ones.
0 thc Soviets haveubstantial rrualitative improvement in llie air defense elements of Tactical Aviation. Most of tho aircralt delivered to the force In recent years have been late modeliihbcds, which now constitute more thanercent of the aircraft in air defense regiments-oncurrent modernization program, aboul half of lhe aircraft in ground atiack regiments have been replaced by thc SUV Fitter and about half the Ught bomber force with the llrcwer. About half of thc reconnaissance units alio have received new model aircraft
In the past two years, deliveries of new Fitter fighter-bombers and Brewer light bombers to Soviet foices have virtually censed, leaving half thc giound atiack and light bomber regiments equipped with oldnd BeagleProduction of the Brewer and tbe Fitter for Tactical Aviation has ceased or is ceasing, although some Filters are being produced for cxpoit
Tactical Avialion is organized intodentified TAAs. phisAA in the Transbaikal/Mongoha area. TAAs vary greadyand composition. By far the largest is that in tbe CSFC. which hataircraft Tbe six air armies in East Cermany, Poland. Hungary, andborder MDs contain two-thirds of the0 operationalassigned to Tactical Aviation. About two-thirds of this force is madenewer aircraft types; about one-third of the aircraft are older Frescos,Beagle light bombers- In addition to the operational aircraft of thearclder model fighters and light bomben which areat thc air bases of Tactical Aviation. The purpose of these aircraftbut they may serve in some training or administrative role andused as replacement aircraft
believe (hai the buildup of rorces in the Transbaikal/Mongolia areathe sixe ol Tactical Aviation by some 2S0 aircraft over thc pastwouldorceypical tactical air army, containing fiveight bomber regimenteconnaissance unit. Thestill under way, and the force probably will be increased bythis area.
Soviets have in thc pasteserve estimated at moreolder model aircraft that could bc used as replacements or tounits. We believe that,esult of deliveries made to Aral)thc equipping of the new regiments in fhe Sino-Soviet border areas,was reduced toircraft.
of Tactical Aviation in tlte Far East has been possible, inwithout diminishing (he professional qualifications of its personnel.the expansion is being accomplished by transfer of trained personnelTactical Aviations possible that personnel normallydischarge are being retained lo man the new units. Anollrer potentialpersonnel is DOSAAF. Wc have no knowledge of an organized airsuch as would bc necessary if other sources of personnel were insufficient.
Tactical Aviation units provide light troop transporthe ground forces withight transports such 'as Cabandelicopters, primarily Hound and Hook. Sovietthe use of helicopters is demonstrated in the continuing development ofand the modification of some to carry guns or rockets.
Support from Strategic Forces
believe that major front commanders would request and receivefrom thc medium bombers of Long Range Aviation (LRA) and thcintermediate-range missiles of SRF in the event of nuclear war. Theforce has tlie capability to launch conventional bombing attacksof theater forcesonnuclear war.
Air Defense
Soviet theater air defense is dependent mainly on Tactical Aviation,surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) play an important role. Tactical air capabilities arc continuingmprove; most fighter air defense regiments arc now fully equipped with all-wcalhcrnter-ccptois. An air defense control system with semiautomatic features has been deployed within tlic Warsaw Pact area. In East Cermany efforts arc being made to improve this system so as to provide better coordination between SAM and fighter defenses.
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have aboulissile battalions, and there are probably anattalions assigned to the ground forces
16
-SEGflH-
iiuidc the USSR. These elements probably compriseaunchers. The medium to high altitudeystem is used primarily for defense of relatively static installations, since it is not mobile enough to provide continuous support to maneuvering ground feces. Doth thend theppear capable of carrymg nuclear warheads, but there is no evidence that such warlieads have been provided for use by theater air defense forces oruitable warhead has been developed for the SA-4.
SAM, low
he Soviets recognize their deficiencies in defending against low altitude atiack and are taking steps l0 improve their position. They are deployingissiles to protect airfields in East Germany. Poland, and Hungary, and may mtroaucing the mobileanef into theater forces.ew low altitude
a undcr development. Squat Eye radars withdetection capabibties are appearing in (he forward area.irebar flghters entered the operational inventory of TacticalThese aircraft have better low altitude capabibties than other Sovietdo not have an effective look-down, shoot-down capability. All thesehave notontinuous tracking and interceptvery low altitude
he Soviets rely heavily on light AAA for air defense of groundhaveew radar-controlled, quadmountcd,mwhich the Soviets have taken to protect their tactical aircraftwh.le at borne base include revetments, hangarettcs, dispersedincreased bght
VII. GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES
he principal military missions of ihe Soviel general purpose naval forces arc defense against seaborne attack, interdiction of sealines of corrimunteations antisubmarine warfarend support of operalions ashore. In recent' years Soviet naval forces have also been used increasingly for the poUticalof promoting Soviet influence and interests abroad. In the Mediterranean the Sovet naval presence has been sharply increased and servesolitical counterweight to the US Sixth Fleet in addition to maintaining close sttrveillance of Western naval activities. Tbe Sovieis have recognized the need to develop effective forces capable of countering Weslern naval power much farther to seaward and of irihibiting the capabilities of olher powers tohird World" states. Construction programs for new types of submarines and surface ships, better equipped for sustained, long-range operations, are underway andgc reconnaissance aircraft have been added to the Soviet naval inventory. Development of tactics and techniques to make more effective use of modern ships and weapons systems is being pressed, particularly in cruise-missile attack ASW. and air defense.
SCOUT
Present Forces'
ubmarines* The submarine force ron tunics to be thc most important element in tbe Soviet Navy. It now hasorpedo attack and CO cruise miuilc submnrinci. All Soviel submarines have mi no laying capacities. Although the size of thc submarine force will probably remain fairly stable for the next several years, ils composition will be changed and its capabilities improved by Ibe incorporation ot additional unils of three new nltack classes. Older unitshased oof.
of current classes of cruise-missile submarines appears towith the lasl unit of thclass expected to beyear. More than half of tlic Soviet cruise-missile submarines areAll are equipped withissiles and torpedoes, and have amission against naval ships, especially aircraft carriers. They could bcland targets, however, if the Sovietsequirement for such
ii cr new classes of general purposeC, V, udnow in scries production. Tbe first units of the nudear-powered C- andarc operational, bringing tolte number of nuclear-poweredunits. Design improvements incorporated inndin the area of sound quieting, will enhance their ASWadditiun.lass may be fittedew weapon system ofcharacter; it could be either an antisubmarine or an antiship weapon.
Trie El-class is considerably smaller than the other two; its propubion system
remains undetermined.
urface Fonts. New major surface combatant ships with surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) are still being pioduced, but the emphasis in current surface ship construction and conversion programs is on air defense and ASW, as well as unproved seaworthiness and range capabilities. Wc believe that the primary mission of thc new helicopter carrier, Motkvti, which recently Joined the Beet, is ASW. It is also equipped to serveask force command ship and has significantly improved air defense capabiUtics. includingthree-dimensional radarew naval SAMn addition il it capable of landingenime byecond ship of Ihis dass will enter service byhere areAM-equippcd ships now in service (seven of them also equipped wiihndore such vhips are being added to the fleet each year. Eleven older ships arc equipped with SSMs, but most cf
* Fvf the ritimateii number and deployment of Soviet generalpr and HibrnarUiu by tvpe. see Table IV.
'Soviet ballistic rnUiOe rubnarines arealefic iliriut alw hiw torpedo altack and mioeUymg cipibuiHea.
" The bundle* hu not been observed pceWouilv and thei yet
thesc probably will be converted to fixen addition to their missile armament, these ships are equipped with antisubmarine systems and antiair-nail guns, in some cases dual purpose guns.
Combatant ships noi equipped with missiles includendscorts. Five additional cruisers,estroyers, andscorts are in reserve status; the time required to make them ready for sea isThe navy alsoarge number of smaller combatants and auxiliaries, including palrol boats equippedhort-range cruise missile, submarine-clvueri. and minewarfarc ships.
Naoal Aviation. The Soviet Navy is dependent almost exclusively on Land-based aircrafl for support of its operations; thc few exceptions are shipborne ASW helicopters. In recenl years thc emphasis In Naval Ambon has been on improving reconnaissance and strike capabilities against surface ships and on ASW. The force now includesombal aircraft, of whichrc jet medium bombers.f tbc latter aircraft are equipped witb.ipper air-to-surface missileomere probably equipped with them.elt Tbe remaining medium jet aircraft consist of tankers and reconnaissance aircrafl.ew equipped for use ih an ASW role. The force also includesear long-rangeaircraft,et light bombers,SW patrol aircraft, andelicopters. The total number of naval aircraft hat remained fairly stable during tbc pest year, thc Hormone ASW helicopter equipped with dipping sonar, and the May loog-range ASW palrol aircraft have been introduced into operational unitsew Bears and Blinders have been added."
Coast Defense- Near the approaches to Soviet naval bases are someoaval coast defense sites which employ tbe Samlet (SSC-2b) cruise missile; tlie effective range of the Samlet varies fromo, depending on tbe location of the guidance radar. In addition, wc believe thai.obile coast defense version of the SSC-la Shaddock cruise missile, iiund is gradually replacing thc Samlet.
Capabiliiies Against Carrier Task Forces and Sealines of Communication
naval capabilities lo combat carrier task forces and toof eommunicaaons are based upon missile-equipped mediumsubmarines. SSM-equlpped surface ships serve to back up thoseBear reconnaissance aircraft are assigned the mission ofdata to cruise-tnlsslle-cquipped submarines and surface ships.of tlie Bear for this mission bas considerably extended the distance frombases in which these cruise-missile force* could be effective. Thisarked increase in the number of aircraft of LRA that haveinterception of naval ships al sea, suggesting the possibility that someLRA might be employed against naval forces in ibis way.
" See Table V.
19
atrols by Soviet torpedo attack and cruise-mltnle submarines beyond local opetating areas approximately tuplcd3nd activity again increased7 by almostercent. Patrols by cruise-missile units7 approximately doubled thc numberut8 decreasedOn thc other hand, torpedo attack submarines have continued the high level of activityn tho Mediterranean,8 the number of units deployed approximated thatut thc average patrol duration wat increased overercent through the use of Mediterranean ports.
lie Soviets havearticular interest in tlie Mcdilcrrancan area; tlie squadron there has grown to become the largest naval force which fhe Soviets have ever maintained out of borne watersegular basis. On thc average, the squadron now consists olajor combatant ships, more than half of which are missile equipped (with SAMs, SSMs, orinor combatants.oorpedo attack submarines normally operate with rhe squadronuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine is often there. Tliey have also deployed to the Mediterranean (heir newest classes of ASW ships, including tlie Moskva with its ASW helicopters. Six reconnaissance -configured Badgers and three ASW equipped Mail amphibians are operating from Egyptian bases. These aircraft have Egyptian markings, but wc bebeva they have Soviet crews.
oviet capabiblies against sea communications arc greatest In theAtlantic and northwest Pacific Of the moreorpedo attack and cniise-misiiUi submarines in (lie Northern Fleet, we estimatehird could be maintained continuously oo station io tbe Atlantic approaches to Europe. In llie Pacific about one-third of the more thaneneral purpose submarines could also be kept on station in the approaches.clalively small number of submarines could be maintained continuously on patrol off the US mainland for any length of time; we estimate thu number at about IS torpedo attack and cruise-missile submarines in the western Atlantic and about half as many off Ihc US wesl coast. As more nuclear-powered torpedo attack units eater service, these numbers will increase.7 the SovieU maintained as afloat logistic support station for submarines in the mid-Atlanlic for about five months. This group is believed lo have supiwrted an extended deployment of at least four submarines, includingI class which evidently remained at sea for about six months. Use ofupport station wouldonsiderable increase in the numlier of submarines which could bc maintained on station and would extend the area of patrol activity, but it would be highly vulnerable in time of war.
Capabilities Against Submarines
he Soviets arcajor effort to improve Iheir ASW capabiliUes. New ASW ships have been designed and built, new defection devices aad improved ASW ordnance have appeared, and ASW Iraining has beenemphasized. We believe tbat current Soviet ability to detect,calire. and classify submerged submarines in the open ocean Is very limited, bul lhat detection potential increases appreciably within coastal areas con-
b'guow* to Soviet naval bases. Capabilitiesdentify and destroydelected within tange of an ASW platform aie considered good. Soviel recognition of deficiencies in thc ASW Geld is implicit in thc sigtiificant advances observed during the past year; tbe first of two helicopter earners, tbe ASW-cquipjicd Moskva, has become opciationsl, as have Hormone ASW helicopters with dippingow lower frequencyong-range shore-based ASW patrol plane (then air-launched ASW torpedo, andurface-launched ASW rocket weapon. All three of thc new classes of attack submarines (C. V. and B) will almost certainly cihibit improved ASW capabilities.
he advent of the Polaris submarine undoubtedly induced anxiety over the lack ol long-range submarine detection systems. Present Soviet lechnology in ihis field piobably lags behind that of the US by aboutears, At present, Soviet fixed underwater surveillance systemsery limited range andcapability, they are intended for inshore defense in the vicinity of naval bases-[_
nits cflccuvencss is uncertain, but capabilities comparable to those of US systems arc believed to be liighly unUI<cly.[_
he constant watch off Polaris advanced bases as well as Soviet writings indicate the gravity of Soviet concern regarding the Polaris threat to the Soviet homeland- Nevertheless, despite continuing improvement in equipment andwc believe that Soviet capabilities to detect, localize, and classify submarines operating in thc open ocean will probably lemain very limited lor thc neat several years.
Capabilities for Sustaining Long-Range Operations
n their efforts to expand the capabilities of the navy to conduct sustained, long-range operations, the Soviets are continuing construction of submarines and surface ships with improved endurance and sca-kecping qualities, and support capabilities are gradually being improved by the introduction of new types ofl. it ic; as well as by improved tcclinique. Tbc Soviets continue toystem of naval auxiliaries and merchant ships toaval force in Ihe Mediterranean and7 experimented with an afloat base concept for support of submarines in the mid-Atlantic. Over the lastonths thc Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, in particular, has considerably expanded its capability to conduct extended operations. Egypt has made shore support faoiHties available to Sovicl fleet units, and assistance by Algeria in the western Mediterraneanossibility. With their present resources the Soviets can support limited naval operations on the high seas for extended periods of time, or Urges operationsew weeks. Without shore support facilities any mafor increase in long-range operations would require augmentation of existing auxiliary forces, not
21
only with oilers and cargo ships from the merchant fleet, but also with ships designed to provide specialized technical support to naval forces at
VIII. NUCIEAR. CHEMICAl. AND BKXOGtCAl WARFARE Nuclear Warfare
c beheve that the number of nuclear weapons allocated lo gcneialforces has increased considerably in tbe past few yean. Nuclear weaponsariety of types and yields are available for delivery by tactical rockets, missiles, aircraft, andmall number ul torpedoes and depth bombs. Thc Soviet system of command and control over nuclear weapons appears well-designed to reserve to tbe naUonal leaJership the decision lo initiate tbe use of these weapons.
7V. For reasons of tactical readiness and lactical efficiency we would expect tactical nuclear weapons to be stoted in some Soviet depots in the forward area. We have identified some storage sites imirv. Jiately adjacent toairfields io Eastern Europe which are probably intended for storage of nuclear weapons. We have no evidence, however, that nuclear weapons have actually been deployed to tlie forward area, indeed. Czech procedures indicate that nuclear weapons for their forces in that area are held in tbe USSR.we believe that the Soviets could react quickly lo provide nuclear weapons to tho using units of theater forces. The Sovieis almost certainly have not entrusted any nuclear weaponsheir East European allies, nor do we believe they will In peacetime. Even in wartime, they would retain close control over any weapons allocated to tbe East Europeans.
Chemical Warfare
e beheve that the Soviet leaders think ol chemical weapons as essentially tactical weapons, but they consistently group them with nuclear weapons as "weapons of masshe Soviet leaders thus probably conador them subject to the same political constraints as those imposed on nuclear weapons, and any decision regarding their initial use almost certainly would be made at the highest political level. Tbe Soviet leaden almost certainly would authorize thc use of toxic chemical agents by their theater Geld forceseneral nuclear war.onnuclear warower capable of retaliation in land, they would probably not initiate the use of toxic chemical weapons.
oviet and East European theater forces have excellent capabilities for both offensive and defensive chemical warfareeapon sysiems forof chemical munitions are available at division, army, and fronl-level; chemical defense units exist down lo regiment. Defensive equipment includes new detector kits, but these do not provide adequate warning against nerve agents.
SO. The Soviets have an extensive stockpile of various toxic chemical agents and have munitions desiguud for employmentariety of tactical ground,
all
and naval weapons, Wc estimate that tho Soviet agent stockpile, whiclito increase, is on lhe orderons, and production capacity is increasing. Over hall the stockpile consists of modem nerve agents and theof older chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and phosgene. We believe that aliout one-third of the warheads available foi Soviet tactical missiles and Frogs are chemical. Chemical aitillery and mortar shells arechemical warheads for multiple-launcher rockets are probably abo available.
Soviets have an extenuve CW research and developmentin the nerve-agent-associated field of orgnnophosplmrousefforts appear to be directed toward improving agent toxicity, skinand interference with therapy. Research related to incapacitatingcontinues.
Biological Warfare
research and production capabilities are ample to support awarfare (BW) program. Soviet documents indicate that thc USSRto employ BW in the event of war and is concerned to be preparedagainst it In particular, the Soviets areystem forWhether the USSR would itself initiate BW ii less certain.writings the subject is linked witb nuclear and chemical warfareigh degree of political control and restraint. Tlkere is.evidence which indicates that front commanders would be authorizedBW tactically in circumstances in which Warsaw Pact forces wereto withdraw, and that tbe means to do so could then bethem.
IX. AIR AND SEAIIFT
Airlift and Air Assault Capabilities
Tbe Soviet! continue to add to their military air transport capabilities. There are now moreedium transports assigned to Military Transport Aviationf whichreubs.f tho latter have been allocated to support airborne troops; these could lift assault dements totalingen and supporting equipment Ior airdropadius of aimepending on tbc model of aircraft used and tbeirAboul half of the Cubs assigned to airborne troops have Improved range and weight-carrying capabilities; theso could liftaratroops withequipmentadius of0ange. In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented by other aircraft fn VTA or by moreedium- and long-range aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.
The range and payload limitations of thenderscore the importance of the neweavy transport, which can carryounds of cargoroopsadius ofm.angehe first few of these aircraft are now in limited service and at least one was used lo support the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Wc believe that someould be
operational byith tbcbe Soviets would be able to airlift all types of equipment assignedotorized rifle division. This aircraft could also airdrop all items of equipment of an airborne division.
SS. Major elements of one Soviet airborne division were airlifted from the Baltic MD to Prague in thc Czech crisis. Some Bulgarian and Polish units were probably also airlifted. These air movements were well within (he capabilities of theeet serving airborne troops.
Seoliff and Amphibious Assault
We estimate there are eurrcnlly0 men in thc naval infantry, organized into brigade-size units, with two brigades located in lhc Baltic Fleet, two brigades in the Black Sea Fleet, one brigade in (he Pacific Ocean Fleet, and one brigade in the Northern Fleet. The naval infantry's missions areto assist in seizing critical beachheads and to conduct diversionaryon tbe seawardorce of battalion0 men) bas been present from time to time in the Mediterranean aincehey have conducted at least two landing exercises, suggesting that the Soviets may intend to use the naval infantryoken intervention force. However, we beheve that they would do so only at tbe invitation of the local government and only where there Is little risk of direct cootrootation with the West.
Tlie current imall number of landing ships limits amphibious operations to battalion or brigade-size landings in each of the Heel areas. New landing ships with greater speed, operating range and capacity are being built, however, and there will probably be an increase in thc strength of the naval infantry.
In addition to their military scalift capability, wc estimate that the Soviets could, by using their merchant fleet under various loading conditions,oivisions in the Baltic. Black, or Pacific Fleet areas,ivisions in tbe Northern Fleet area. This lift capacity is being improved by the aevjuisition of new merchant ships, many of which are characterized by high speed, long endurance, large hatches, and heavy boom capacily. Scalift by merchant ships would require the use of ports, however, and could not be adequately protected beyond waters near the USSR.
X. THE CONTRIBUTION OF EAST EUROPEAN FORCES Genera! Considerations
ears ago thc Sovietsilitary policy which soughtEast European theater lorces of sufficient size and quality to meetmeasure their requirements for combat-ready unils in placeThis policy provided for aboutast European divisions and someaircraft deployed from thc Black Sea to the Baltic. Alongndoviet aircraft stationed hi East Europe, thesebear Uie initial brunt of war with NATO, cither offensively orCzechs and Poles would form two of lire three fronts on the mainmovement across Central Europe.
-SECRET
hb policy wis probably attractive to economy minded Soviet political leaden, since It leduced tbe peacetime requirement lor combat-ready Soviet lorces Tbe cost of large national lorces wai to be borne by tbc Eatt Europeans themselves, who wcro expected lo purchase huge quantities of Irieir arms Irom tbe USSK. ll was probably much less attractive to those Soviet military leaders who would have preferred lo rely on their own forces rather than on allies. There was no integrated Warsaw Pact command and staff structure; command of tlie Eait European forces was vested in the various national Ministers of Defense. This arrangement institutionalized the fact that lhc miliiary viability of the new policy rested squarely on lhc political reliabdily of the East European political regimes. Soviet marshals may have considered that the examples of Yugoslavia. Albania, and Hungary put in question the reliability of such regimes, but would have found it awkward to argue the point.
trong national military foices had beeti created ia most ofEuropean counlries, but sluing currents uf nationalism were erodingsolidarity of the East Europeans with Moscow. The Czech crisisis but thc latestcries of developments putting in question theof East EuropeanHungarian irisurrection, Romanianthc abortive Bulgarian coup, and Polish militarymvolveanent in the Middle East crisisnly the Ulbricht regime independent upon thc Soviets fo survival, remained relatively freeof unreliability.
the Warsaw Pact's first real military operation wasa member country, Cirxhoslovakia. In order to suppress atendency that bad alarmed the East German. Polish, aod Soviethad been encouraged by Hungary and Romania (and Yugoslavia).of this event have been unsettling in Eastern as well asit not only stimulated anti-Soviet popular sentiment, but abowithin the Polish and Hungarian parties and governments.fate of Czechoslovakia is Likely to discourage any East European regimeits national independence in opposition to Soviet interests forlo come, Soviet confidence in llie political reliability of those regimesarmed forces must also be shaken. The Soviets will probably seek tomilitary status quo ante by pchtical action to ensure the reliability of the
respective East European regimes, counting on the political apparatus within tlie armed forces and military dBcipLuie to ensure the reliability of Ihe forces
themselves, but they cannot ignore the residual anti-Soviet sentiment engendered
by Ihe Czech affair.
Ground Forces
ast European line divisions are generally patterned on thc Soviet model, although there are substantial variations in some counlries. Evidence fromindicates that Czech and East German divisions are quite similar to Soviet divisions in structure.
For numbers and rrrenRtb of Earl European ground toicr-r.I.
2b
-SCCRCf-
Easi European field armies do not exist as separate entities in peacetime, bui would be formed during mobilization from staff elements and units of the territorial military commands. East European field armies would containivisions and combat and service support units, and would be similar to thc Soviet combined arms armies.
In thc "northern tier" there arcast European line divisions roughly equal to Sovietivisions: six East Cerman,olish, eight Czech. In addition, there are three Polish and three Czech undcrstrength divisions which could probably be mobilizedeek. In the event of war thc Polish and Cuxh divisions would be organized into Geld armies and national fronts would probably be estabbsbed. Tlie East Cerman forces would apparently be integrated into the Soviet front, CSFC, or perhaps some of them would be assignedolish front.
In the "southern tier" there arc aboutast European divisions roughly analogous toivisions: four Hungarian, five Romanian, and five Bulgarian. There aredditional East Europ can divisions which are roughly analogous to some of the least ready Soviet Category II divisions: two Hungarian, four Romanian, and six, possibly seven, Bulgarian, Even at full strength, none of these divisions would be comparable in military effectivenessnorthero tier" division. In particular, the motorized rifle divisions lack APCs; tbeof the Romanian and Bulgarian tank divisions includes one less tankthan other East European tank divisions, and there isower level of support equipment. Most of tbe motorized rifle and tank divisionsabove have one organic Frog battalion (two, or in some cases threend each potential East European Geld army has one Scud brigade (six launchers).
Air Forces"
Judged in the light of equipment, training, and normal operations. East European air forces are largely for national air defense. Ofombat aircraft, almost all are interceptors. Tbe proportion of new model aircraft in East Euiopean air forces has increased Irom one-quarter last year to one-third through thc debvery of new fighters. Almost all aircraft delivered to the East Eitropeans during thc past two years have been all-weatherFishbcd) Interceptors,
Czechoslovakia. Poland, and Bulgaria have ground attack air regiments. Only the Czechsignificant number of new modelround attack 6ghtcrs. The Poles have mostly older models in the ground aitack roles; the Bulgarians have one regiment of- All East European fighter regiments, however, conduct training in both ground attack and air defense.
Novol Forces"
European naval capabilities continue to improve with moreexperience and tbe acquisition of more modern equipment. As with East
"See Tabfcee Table VIII.
secieH-
scour
European ground and air forcei. thc "northern tier" naval forces are larger and better equipped. In thc Baltic area Warsaw Pact interileet coordination hasand the East Cerman and Polish navies havearger role. The East Cerman Navy is organized for coastal defense, including mmewarfare. while the Polish Navy emphasizes amphibious and submarine warfare. InPolish submarines and suilace ships have operated both mdepcndenlly and with Soviet units in thc North and Norwegian Sons.
XI. WARSAW PACT CAPABILITIES AGAINST NATO
n this section we confine the discussion to Soviet capabilities against the Critical Central Regron ol NATO. Soviet unils located and piobably(or operations in this area are the most powerful of the Soviet (beater foices. Other Soviet forces are deployed and available for operations against NATO in oilier regions and to preserve Soviet border security elsewliere.
Tho Soviets formerly assumed that any general war with NATO would beginassive nuclear exchange and planned that, in the aftermath of such an exchange, Soviet forces would advance rapidly to seize critical objectives before NATO forces could recover from the destruction andcaused by Soviet nuclear strikes. In recent years, however. Warsaw Pact military exercises have been conducted on tbe basisignifccanlry different scenario. In (lie first place, it is assumed that war with NATO would be precedederiod of high tension that would provide sufficient warning to permit the mobilization and deployment of Warsaw Pact forces. It is further assumed that thc war would beginATO conventional attack. Warsaw Pact conventional forces would defeat this attack, whereupon NATO would resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Then the Warsaw Pact forces, reinforced from the USSR and using nuclear weapons, wouldounteroffensive thai would overrun NATO Euiope. It is notable that no strategic nuclear exchange is taken into account.
For the contingencyenera) war wllh NATO, Warsaw Pact foices in lhe Central Region would bc deployed in two "slrategicc believe that thc Ent echelon would consist of three fronts in contact with NATO forcesine fiom the Baltic Sea to tbe northern border of Austria. Initially at least, the
northern front would be under Polish command, the southern front under Czech
command. The central front would be the CSFC.
The only one of these three fronts capable nf immediate combal is the CSFC.ar emergency, die East Cerman divisions would be incorporated into il and the East Cerman Air Force would be used to augment the air defense capabilities of its TAA.
The northern front might include some Soviet and East Cerman forces normally sUboncd in thc northern part of East Cermany. but its aeaUoo would require the mobilization and forward movement of Polish forces. The Poles have Iwo ready armies with nineine divisions,mall airborne divisionmall amphibious assault division.hird army (four divi-
sions) and frontievtl elements would require mobilization. Tactical air support would be provided by the Polish Air Force and the Soviet TAA in Poland. Support on the seaward flank would be provided by the Polish and East Cerman navies and elements o( the Soviet Baltic Fleet.
IDS. At least initially, thc southern front would consist ol three Czechivisions) supported by the Czech Air ForceAA. Two armies (eight divisions) are maintained in combat-ready status The third army (fournd much of tlie /root-level support, would require mobili ration.
c believe that thc secondould consist of two Soviet /rents formed in the Carpathian and Belorussian MDs and moved forward through Poland and Chechoslovakia. We believe that thc front from the Carpathian MD is intended to take over the southern front from thc Czechs on arrival. Similarly, the front from the Belorussian MD is probably intended to take over the northern front.
he front from the Carpathian MD would consist of threeivisions)AA. That from the Belorussian MD would abo consist of threeivisions)AA, toourth army (five divisions) trom the Baltic MD might be added.
he Soviet military intervention in Chechoslovakia lias introduced tome uncertainty rccirding present plans for constituting thc southern front. For the time being at least, the Soviets must question the reliability of the Czech foices. but they apparently perceive no urgent requirement to take over the southern front from them. Our present evidence indicates lhat tbey have left in Czechoslovakia four, possibly Eve, Soviet ground divisions andactical aircraft and these forces are generally strung out cast of Prague, leaving tho southern front with NATO lo the Czechs. However, there are iineertaJnUcs in our evidence that do not pennit ruling out one or more additional divisions in Ihe Soviet occupation forces,ubsequent repositioning to assume atortion of the southern front mission In any case, if the Soviets were toerious military confrontation willi NATO, they might erpedile lhe forward movement of (be front from lhe Carpathian MD to reinforce or take over the southern front.
he above described force when assembled would comprise on tbe orderuclear capable rocket and missileonventional artillery tubes,ombat0 in ground aitackn air defense regiments,nhis force would possess formidable capabibties for all types ofcontingencies in the Central Region, but its best capability would be that for which it wastheater warfare In this contingency, Warsaw Pact fire support would be augmented by the massive MRBM/IRBM deploy-(Drnl and medium-range bombers In the western USSR. The force would be less effective for sustained convenlional combal.
The above deialbed forceud ground force. I< doc* not Includeact force* la
hould (ho Soviels elected lo execute lhc above described buildup against NATO, they would probably also mobilize their forces opposite Scandinavia and the southern flank of NATO for contingencies in those areas. In tbe laller area, only the Bulgarians are likely to contribute to offensive action, supported by ibe Sovicl theater foices from tlie Odessa MD. Ibey could launch an offensive against Greece and European Turkey. Further, the Soviels would mobilize from interioreserve of tho High Command. Initially, this reserve wouldthe armies of the Kiev MD and some of tlic airborne divisions in tbe western USSB. We believe that this reserve would later include some of the less ready divisions which are not subordinate to the reinforcing armies, including some (rum the Moscow MD. This reserve of Ihe High Command would be available lo reinforce tbe forward area in the course ol operations.
vidence concerning probable Warsaw Pact planning indicates that the Soviets believe they could complete the essential elements of mobilization and rcinfoiccrnciit in aboutays under conditions of extreme emergency in which Ihe timing of its buildup would be crucial. We believe thai (be Warsaw Pact is capable of completing mobilization of the men and vehicles reqidred lo organize thentended for Central Europe and to move essentialelements0 days, if tbe process were not interrupted by hostile military action. However, tho complete integration of these fronts as combat-effective organizations would requireime. For that reason thc USSB would almost certainly take about three weeks to complete its mobilization and forward deployment in any circumstances that permitted it to control the timing.
n the case of the Warsaw Pact military intervention in Czechoslovakia, in which thc timing was entirely subject to Soviet conirol, covert preparatory phases of mobilization probably began in mid-July. The callup of reservists and civilian equipment piobably began oouly with the announcementrear-serviceyugust, the official termination date of the exercise, most of lhe deployment from the USSB had apparently been completed. In this case, thc partial mobilization and movement were accomplishedittle over Ihree weeks.
Classified Soviet writings indicate that they do not espeet overtand reinforcement to go undetected by NATO. Critical to the execution of iheir plans is tlie expectation of several days of covert preparations,eriod of high tension in Europe. During tlic coven phase the Soviets would probably attempt to cover preparations by ostensible exercise activity, as Ihey did in tbe Czech crisis. They would probably erpect the initial stages of the overt phase to become apparent to NATO intelligence, particularly in view of the need lo mobilize East European lorces and lo assemble vastol rail and motor transport from thc civilian economics.
In the case of Czechoslovak] x. the existenceritical stale of tension between the USSB and tbe CSSR. and the threatoviet military intervention.
Gccnrj-
werci well known in advance, but ic waa impossible to say wl.other and when lhc Soviets would actually intervene, or whether they were only seeking to coerce the Czechs hy threatening to do so. Similarly, ii the Warsaw Pact weremobiU"neorceseriod of high tension mil. NATO, NATO would certainly be alarmed by the increasing danger of armed conflict, but it would be impossible to say whether the Warsaw Pact mobilization was precautionary and defensive, or an attempt to coerce NATO byhreatening posture, or evidenceirm decision io attack.
XII. TRENDS8
General Considerations
oviet policy decisions concerning thc future of general purpose forces will be heavily influenced by recent events in Eastern Europe The majorfor Soviet rnUitary policy in Europe is lhat of the reliabibty of tlie East European regimes.how of political solidarity, (hey were able to secure tbe participation of theseGerman, Polish,ndm the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But thc feelings of their allies were probably mixed and the Soviets cannoi regard this operationrue measure of their reliabibty. The only completely submissive Soviet allies at this point arc East Cermany and Bulgaria. In these circumstances thc USSR probably seesrequirements for Soviet theater forces for Europe
he changing situation in Eastern Europe will probably prompt aof basic Warsaw Pact mUltary planning and postureis NATO, in any such reexamination, basic assumptions concerning the likelihood and probable nature of war in Europe may come under critical review. One assumption has been that war would beginATO atiack instigafed by West Cermanbc heavy outlays of men and materiel for Warsaw Pact theater forces arc based largely on this notion. Another assumption has been that NATO would inevitably resort to nuclear weapons in any major conflict. Tim Idea has apparently been under attack by military spokesmen for some time. Should either or both of these basic assumptions be finally discarded there could be profound changes in the size and composition of Warsaw Pact thealer forces.
Olher recent trends which increase the pressure for more and betterpurpose forces include the steady buildup on the Sinn-Soviet border and the still small, but growing. Soviet capability to project armed strength beyond Bloc borders. If the Soviets seriously pursue moreoken capability for distant limited military action, that would requiretepped up investment in combatant and logistical ships.
Thc above considerations will probably combine to exert heavy pressure on the Soviet leadership for increased outlays for general purpose forces. If demands arc forthcoming to improve substantially capabilities for sustainedoperations, the cost of meeting (hem would be very high, witb mtensi-
i
Red competition (or resources wiih claimants for the strategic lorces and the civilian sector. Thc results of this competition cannot bc confidently predicted, but we believe that tlie outlay of resources (or general purpose forcei will increase in some degree.
extent of increase in the size and quality of general purposebinge directly on thc Soviet view of prospects lor arms controlwouldcaledown of strategic oflense and defense costs.il unlikely that thc Soviels would attempt to keep paceewslrategic forces competition and at tlic same lime make heavy additionalin general purpose force capabilities. Ihc interplay of theseproduce any ooeariety of possible Soviet responses lo theater
one extreme, the Soviets could conclude lhal thc threat fromdiminished, and that tbo possibility of either nuclear or notuiuelearNATO wos not great enough to warrant greatly increased outlays forIn Ihis case, current trends in theater forces would coniinue. withiu strength opposite China, and continuing, but alwaysprograms.
At thc other extreme, the Soviets might decide thai tbe threat from NATO was as great or greater than ever and that tlie Warsaw Pact had lieen considerably weakened,arge increase in combat-ready theater forces in tho western USSH and possibly in Easlera Europe. Ihey might also conclude lliat much greater ca|iabllity for suslained conventional warfare was required, and lhat, wiih or without formal agreements, stralegic weaponswould level off, freeing resources. In this case we might seeharp increase In llie number of line divisions, or an increase of the infantry in divisions and of fire support and logistics strength al all levels of the ground forces. We would alsoaster replacement of aircraft in tacticaligher percentage of ground altack aircraft,cticial improvement ln the air defense capabiUly of theater forces.
It is more likely, however, that the Soviet leadership will continue to shy away from clear-cut strategic decisions, and will arrive insteadollage of compromises. It is in this expectation that we forecast future developments in the general purpose forces.
Cround Forces. Over the next few years Soviet theater ground forces will probably increase. Atdditional ground divisions willbe created along the Chinese border. In the western USSH, the Soviets wdl probably increase the size and readiness of their groundmayrortf-in-beutg In the Carpathian MO and may organize additional divisions and army headquarters. For the foreseeable fuiure. about four or five Soviet divisions will probably remain in Czecliostovakia in addition to thehat woro in Eastern Europe prior lo the Czech cniis.
SKRfrf
2 lhc Soviets probably wit! have ended ptodudioofter having equipped about one-third of their tank units widiew model medium tank to begin entering the forces in the next
year or so. probably replacing thefe.8 the Soviet tankl probably consist of roughly equal proportions of this new, and
T-SSs. Also,8 Ihey will probably have replaced thcnd
APCs with amphibious models.
will probably be some improvement in Die conventionalol Soviel ground forces over the period,0 toercenttube artilleryimilar increase in the standing logistical supportat all levels. There may be an increase in thc number of infantrymenwith each squad mounted in its own armored fighting vehicle.
Tactical Missilos
ew short-range ballistic missile to replace the Scud may become operationalystem would probablyaximum range greater than that of tbe present0 am.he system would probably emphasize unproved reliability, accuracy, mobility, andlogistical support, and would be capable of carrying cither nuclear, CW/BW.K warheads. In addition, thc Soviets will probably deploy thon support of GSFG and othernls within the next year or so. No replacement for thes forecast, but this system will probably be modified to provide qualitative improvements in accuracy and reliability.
Theater Air Foices and Air Defense
There will probably be further increases in Tactical Aviation deployed along the Chinese border over the nextore fighters and light bombers. Tbc Soviets may also activate new tactical air regiments fn the low-strcngth TAAs in thc western USSR. Over the longer term, the totalof Soviel lactical aircraft will probably decline somewhat as newer models reduce thc requirement for large numbers of older fighters and bght bombers. We believe that byhere willombat aircraft in Tactical Aviation.
Tlie primary requirement for new aircraft for Tactical Aviation is re-placement of theFresco) fighters and tiro Beagle light bomber in ground attack and reconnaissance units. We beheve lhat thc Soviets arc now testing several new aircraft which could meet the requirementew fighter. Three of these. Flagon B, Faithless, and Flogger, have short takeoff and landing capabibties and offer speed and dispersal advantages over current models. Thc Floggerariable geometry wing aircraft which wouldreater range than the Fitter fighter-bomberimilar payload. We beheve that tbe Flogger will begin to enter inventory in thehort or vertical take off and landing fighter, based on Flagon or Faithless design, could begin to enter inven-
CCGMT
lory in about lour years. Thc all-weatherFishbed) interceptor isto be the mainstay of tactical air defense units for the period of this estimate.
nother new aircraft, (he Foxbat. wuuld significantly' improve (hc range and load-carrying capabibties of Tactical Aviation. It will almost certainly be deployed with strategic defense forces as an interceptor, but we believe that variants of the Poxbat will be developed as tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft as well, replacing some Beagle light bombers. It could begin to enter the inventory of Tactical Aviationears. Theoe of the largest and ch-aily the most expensive fighter thm fai developed by (he Soviets.we believe that tbe rate of delivery to Tactical Aviation will probably be slower than with previous modeb.
air defenses will continue to improve through thenew missile systems and new radars. The mobileay now beforce inventory, and the mobile, low altitudeay begin towithin (hc nexl two years. Wc believe that the Sovieis will notsystem for theater force defense against ballistic missiles during tbe period.
Naval Forces
believe the Soviets will seek to increase substantially ftcirto conduct ASW. particularly on the high seas, and sustained long-rangeThe present emphasis oo air defense in tbe surface forces wiDtlie Soviet capabUity to conduct wartime naval operations beyond theshore-based fighter cover. The majorequippedfrigates, andenlering (lie fleet have improvedseakeeping. and ASW capabibties. Present major surface shipand conversion programs will continue at leastnd weaboutAM-equippcd shipsnits abo equippedwill be ui service bynother new class of missile shipintroduced about that time. Escort speeds up tonots arc. Some additional helicopter carriers may be butll toward (heol the period.
mphasis in new aitack submarine programs will continue to be on nudear piopulskm and improved ASW capabibties. We believe that the annualof attack submarines will reachonits (atf which will be nuclear-powered) by thc. The addition of new attack submarines to thc order of battle will be accompanied by (lie retirement of the numerous medium-range units.esult, the number of torpedo attack submarines will decline by aboutercentut the proportion of nudear and long-iange diesel units will increase substantially. Oforpedo attack units estimated for that period, someill probably be new units. Soviet airborne ASW capabilities will also be enhanced by (he continued introduction of tha Hoimonc ASW helicopter and thc May
irCRCT
oa^cna?!
atrol aircraft. An active sonobuoy will probably be introduced during this period. Additional installation of variahle depth sonars will probably be made in escort ships and destroyers. Efforts will continue to develop anlong-range underwatct surveillance system.
ithin tbc not year or so wc expect to see the deployrncnt of asystemlass submarines; it may be either aniisubmarine orew type of improved cruise-missile for submarine use may be introducedeplacement for tlicxisting Blinder aircraft could be equipped with an anlifhipping version of theew medium jet bomber configured lor ASMs might be developed by the.
Eos' European Forces
Ihc future size, quality, and status of East European forces, and the extent lo which they will supplement Soviet theater foices will depend largely on the oulcome of Soviet reexamination of military policy. The Soviets may conclude in the light of recent experience that heavy reiiaricc on the East Europeans is noound military policy. In this case, there would probablyedtaction in East European standing forces. This development would be welcomed by most East European regimes, which Iiave chafed under thc heavy economic burdens imposed by miliiary establishments which are very large in comparison to the resources of lhciredi ction of the Czech foices by at leastercent is probably under way now. It is likely, however, that the East German. Polish, and Bulgarian forces, will bc maintained at about their present strengths, for tbe foreseeable future, and will bcin quality. Strengths of East European air forces will probably decline somewhat as obsolescent models arc phased out faster than newer models are purchased from thc USSR. In any case the Soviets may press for tighterover East European forces, perhaps through the subordination of East European thnnter forces to Soviet fronts.
GCCRCT
II
OOOOOOOOOwoIO!
r
oocooc !
5
an oo
"I s
M - . - .-
[
AiU&itlitei
ins*
5 e <-
sixncr-
-SECRET-
:gg.t
t
Aw
Ground Aitr:i
l^fht Itomber
Itccoaealssanee and fte-toimDistance Suihe .
TOTAL..
III
ru-7
8
it. 18
mc-17
160
SSO
ESTIMATED NOMBItRS OF SOVIET TACTICAL AIRCRAFT (Ai)
m
65
ISO
440
too
M
(90
MO
3
nmiwr.3
ISO
v.. I.
NllgTHO
IM
LU
Air defense awl around aitaek regiment* of Tart leal Aviation arc eion-(rained aod have aome capabilily (or othei Ihan lhcir primaiy nuMioisi
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND DEPLOYMENT OP SOVIET CENERAL PURPOSE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES BYOVEMBERFLEETS
Bl.tk
lie
Maw
Submarine*
auncher.)
0
s
S
Attack Submarine*
0
:> -:
0
Range DmmI
34
DMaal
5
Class (ueicknUrW proj-iksioo)
0
35
Surface StiifM
Ughl CrulMra
3
Dcstroyeri
4
Dealroyera
fl
a
scoria.
Carrier!..
1
Surface Skips
246
Include* one SAM-equlpped liebl erniaerbe Black Sea Fleet.lodudea four Id the Caspian Sea.
37
TABLE V
ESTIMATED NUMBERS AND TYPES OF SOVIET NAVAL AIRCRAFT
Il8
HEAVV BOMBERS
Bear
MEDIUM BOMBERS
Dad BO' A
0
Blinder 5
LIGHT BOMBERS
SO
PATROL AIRCRAFT
Mail *
HELICOPTERS
Hoiiod and
Totals (orodade appro.iro.Wlyankers. S5 recwinaiwanee (including5 configured for ASW andonventional bomber*.
It is believed that almost all Badger B's are now configured lo carry the Keltissile, although no firm evidence ot conversion esisU. for the Black Sea Fleet Air Force.
Some ol these may be theut regardless of model. all Blinders ara now performing in lhe reconiiafassnce and/or free fall bomber role.
TABLE VI
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND READINESS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS
ANALOaOCS
A-SLOCO06Soviet
CatII
SraEMOTK Diva urd TK aJik apt ukd M
Easi
1
Cscehoslovakla
?2 16 1 1
There arc indications Ibat Cicchoslovakian forces are being reduced by al leaatercent.
TABLE VII
EHT1MATKU NUMBBKS OF EASTtiUN EUROPEAN TACTICAL AIKCltAFT
JS
Or/rn tOtai*
Bulgaria
EmI
Poland
TOTAL Hid
5
Includes naval unit*.
TABLE Vill
ESTIMATED NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF EAST EUXtOPKAK NAVAL VESSELS BVB, BY COUNTRY
AREA
mania
Types
Guided
Torpedo Beau;
Patrol Boate
Minesweepers
Mine* weeper*
Ships
Craft
Figure* in parentheses are augmenting toast (frontier) guard unlU, which now operate in close ooordinalion wiih the navy.
fc Sii ndditfonaJ uuits in rt*jervc &nd others under cotLUructian.
39
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