8
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
8
The Soviet Approach to Arms Control
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Ihe Control Intelligent* Agency and the intelligence oig<wi<iutiotti ol the Ooport-menK ol Stole and Defame, ihc AEC, ond.
Concurring:
iiHneputyentral Intelligance
jtjKei. rhe Dinm ofnd Research.' Stat*.
U.oseph Carrol,tVee-or. Delem* iv.tl.gtnro Agee.,
U. Gen. Marshall S. Ccier. the DVoetor. NaUonal Secwity Agency
Dr. ChoHet H. Betchardi, lor rho Asiitlont Genera! Manager, Atomic Energy Ctwemluion
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Mi. Wilharn O. Oogor, lor the AilislOflt Director. Federol Bureau ol Irwei ligation, Ihe mbtecl being oohtde oi hii jurisdiction
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tail -tsameM baa buntor relMM through ET the nISTOfUCAL luWIW PROGRAM ct tha Central intelligence Agancy.
3
It
THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL'
NOTE
Tim paper is addressed primarily lo the subject of the Soviet attitude toward negotiation of limitations on strategic weapons systems. It also evaluates briefly tho significance of the Soviet nine-point memorandum on disarmament issued
THE ESTIMATE
I. BACKGROUND
I. Traditionally, (lie Soviets have appeared lo view arms control andprimarilyield of political warfare. While such considerations have continued to color much of the Soviet attitude during the past few years, the USSR did enter into agreements on nuclear testingn weapons hi Outer sparend this year On nuclear nonproliferation. There were advantages to Soviet foreign policy in doing so, and in addition, the progress which was being made in their strategic programs gave the Soviet leaders confidence that
their relative position would not be disadvantaged by these limited agreements.
llie willingness of the Soviets to entertain more far-reaching agreements with tbe West will obviously dependery complex interplay of military, political,
and economic considerations.
t The Soviet nine-point disarmament memorandum publicly issued8 wasropaganda document. With various points addressed to different potential forums, the memorandum was evidently noi intendedacing* proposal. Probably il was aimed mainly at claiming tho initiative for the USSR and obscuring tlie fact that It was the US which, for more thanonths, had pressedew effort to negotiate limltatioris on strategic weapons. Most of the proposab contained In the memorandum are old standby* which have been usedropaganda contest for many yearsalls for banning the use of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological sveiipons, for abolishing foreign
s.,
me nl ll* considerations which bear on this subietl ate discitsied In greater detail in. "Main Issuer in Soviet MilitaryatedECRET.
seJFet
miliiary bases, and (or prohibiting unclear armed bomber flights outside nationalew of them concern matters on which Moscow has expressedm other ways, and on which it may see advantage in serious negotiation Such proposals concern limilation of stiategic weapon* sysiems. peaceful uses of the senlxd, banning underground nuclear testing, and some measures for regional arms control. None of these is fundamentally new cither, all are items tlml have been periodically promoted by the USSR at the UN and elsewhere Clearly, ihe Kis! of these is the most basic in its implications for tlie rcbtionshlp between thewers and the only one now contemplated lor bilateral negotiations.
The Soviets had, ol course, agreed lo have lalLs vtilh the US on strategic arms limitations several days prior to the Issuance of the nine-point memorandum, which was released In connectionosygin speech made al thc Moscow signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The moment chosen for the USSH'i belated acceptance of the US proposal suggests lhat the motives which underlay the decision must have been complex. The response camei-nnd when there seemed to be no noticeabV relaxation in Soviet propaganda at Lick' igainsl Ihr West; il coincided withnM-ij.militaiy .ind political pressures against Czechosioviikiu, and it was unnounced only monthsliange of administrations in Washington. Moreover, the Sovieis had long maintained that ma|or steps toward improving relations with the US were impossible during tlie Vietnam War. While on the face of things 'he moment chosen may seem improbable, some of ihese riicumstances may actually have given thc Soviets incentives to move when they did.
Both political and military factors piobably Figured in lhc long delay of tho Soviet response. For one thing, the Soviets liave customarily responded lo US arm* control Initiativesreat measure of caution and suspicion. On so comnlea and sensitive an issue as strategic arms limitations, theprobably, in fact, the resicertain elements both within and outside the Soviet political leadership must have been considerable. The period of delayurther narrowing of the gap between Soviet and American stralegic forces; the Soviets are now approaching the US in numbers of operationalballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and are alsoubmarine fore* similar to the Polaris. They must tww hasv strengthened confidence In their nossession of an assured destruction capability, and considering qualitativeIn weapon systems such as warhead, yield, the target system to be attacked, nnd damage-limiling eapabililies, ihey may actually consider that they have now achieved rough strategic parity wild. Thus, they must believe that their bargaining position in negotiation* lias become stronger.
Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia has complicatedenvironment bearing on arms conlrol. It indicated that Moscow'stoecure position in Fastcm Knrojie outss'oighedincluding its interest in early negotiation on strategic armsis Mill loo soon to evaluate the full implications oftech crisis forand specificallv fur Soviet attitudes loseaid arms control. The movedisarmament negotiations seas probably cak.uUtcd lo help offset the op-
SG#RET
prakrium the USSR suffered from the Czech intervention. Hnw Moscow's attitude loward strategic arms talks now develops will also depend on the impact of receni events on attitudes and policies in Washington. Tlic Soviets havethat the Czech crisis is no one's business except their own and Eastern Europe'sailer quite apart from questions of mutual interest to both East and West. It was in this spirit, al least, that Cromyko recently reaffirmed Soviet desires to begin talks with thc US.
II. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS
Tht Sffofeerie Relationship
Having significantly improved their relative position in strategic forces in recent years, the Soviet* probably believeonsiderable sustained effort will he necessary to maintain the position they have now achieved; the Soviets musttbat the competition in this field will not stand still. They probably fear that projected US programs will once again increase the US relative ad-vantagf considerably, unless the Soviets themselves undertake strenuous new efforts. The choices posed lor tlie Soviet leaders at present are: (a) to attempt to keep pace by making the indicated clfurt; (b) to permit the US to move out far ahead once more; or (c) to attempt by agreement lo stabilize the strategic relationshipoinl lest unfasorable to the USSR tlsan It eves hai been.
It see ins hkely thai, after the effort they hase made and the resources they have expended, the Soviet leaders would End il intolerable to see their improved position degraded. No doubt there would be some who would orgue lhat the fortes the Soviels will have under current piogiams would give them an assured destruction capability for many years to come, regardless of what ihc t'S did But it is unlikely that the pressures of military leaders and the play of Kremlin pontics would permit resigned acceptanceidening gap. Thc argument for staying in the race, fot political as well as security reasons, would probably prevail in thc end.
S Faced, however, with tlir encoming USMinute-man III (svith multiple independently targeted reentrysssdScntir Ihe Soviets must recognize lhat. if they want to stay in the race, they have work cut out loi them. Not only would there be enormous economic costs, but the Soviets would inevitably have some doubts of their ability lo match thc US over the whole range of technological development for more advanced systems Moreover, further large allocations of resources lo strategic fortes would tighten the squeeze on other rnslilary programs. This would be particularlylo those military leaders who fee) lhat the geneial purpose forces are now in pressing need of refurbishing and perhaps enlargement.
9 The outlook for the competition between the US and the USSR In the field of ballistic missile defense probably offers the SovieU grounds for concern. Theyystem of limited effect iwik-ss deployed at Moscow, but they
evsoVntly realize that more dcvrlopmmteeded before catensive deploy-incnt uoald behey recognize lhat thc US program in this held is still al an carry stage and will not aflcxl the balance of strategic power for some years, bul Ihey know that development work is going forward in the US and lhat deployment Js planned. While the Soviels, on thc basis of the extensive work they have already done, are probably confident that they can sustain thc competition in this field, they may also come lo believe that tho net result wouldast expenditure of economic resources without any effective return In increased security.
hus, there are incentives for the Soviels to consider more seriously BOW thc option of negotiations to limit strategic forces. Ihey could calculate that an agreement to stabilize Ihe slrategic relationship, or at least to slow down the competition, if achieved in the next year or two. would be lhe best means of preserving fhe improved relative position lhe USSR has been acquiring They might further think that, even If no.as finally reached, the process of negotiation itself, because of thevould arouse in Ibe US and elsewhere, would act to slow the pace of the competitionme.
fconomic Focfors
Economic considerations doubtless contributed alsohe USSR's decision to discuss slrategic arms control. To the extent that the Soviets had been motivated hy thc desire to limit over-all military costs and free resources for other purposes, they would presumably continue to want to avoidew surge in arms competition. Soviel spokesmen have, over the past year, repeatedly pointed tu lhe high level of defense expenditures in the US. Though some of thesewere probably intended as arguments lor, or justification of, increases in Soviet defense outlays, others almost certainly reflected Ihe Soviets' concern over similar rising costs in thc USSR.
Over the past several years, tlie Soviets have beenolicy of expanding stralegic programs and increasing investment in the consumer goods and services sectors of the economy while allowing rates of growth of investmen-in Iseavy industry to decline This policy limits the output of producers goods and svill ultirnateh/ retard the over-all rale of economic growth. Thus, the Soviet leaders probably must divert resources lo the producers goods sector of the economy In the near future or risk seriously impairing future capacity formilitary as well as civilian objectives The important question is which claimant is going toconsumer or thewhen? In the past, the Soviet decision would have been quite predictable; the consumer has traditionally tiornc the brunt of any resource bind. The Soviet leaders probably recognize lhal Ihe political cost of this course is giuilrr in their society now than il used lo be Therefore, as certain strategic progrnms approach planned levels, some
ull discussion o( tlie statusiiwiwels of llie Sovicl anlibnllisttc missile pros-ram. MtoS. "Sovietc Air iml MiuikilaledOP SICBET. HESTfllCTED DATA.
Soviet leaders might pieier to avoid heavy new expenditures (or follow-on military programs. An arms control agreement could reduce the pressures for such programs.
is conceivable that the new military lequuetiM-nts generated bycrisis may aggravate the resource allocations problem and thus addiocerstives to seek strategic arms limitations. The Soviets maythai oecupatson ol Chechoslovakia and new uncertainlwa about theot their allies will require lurlbcr strengthening o( Soviet forces inforward area and thc reinforcement of their general purposethc western USSR. These" requirements, in addition to the ongoingmiliiary forces along the Chinese border, will probably lead toin Soviet thealrr forces in general. The cost ol meeting theseadd to tho ciirruiil record high level of defense spending thai alreadybe generating potcnlinlly serious economic problems The Soviets may thustime bo Interested in strategic arms controlay ol conservingresources for other military programs and alsoay ofin Ihe economy generally.
III. FACTORS AFFECTING THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS
Soviel willingness to enter into arms control talks with llie US docs not. of course,irm commitment lo strive for an agreement In the early phases, the Soviets would probably concentrate on probing Ihe US position. Should they decide to get down to serious business, tbe negotiations would Inevitably be bard and prolonged.
Tlie poUtical climate at the time of talks, and deselopments on Ihcscene which might affect it for better or svorse. would have ahearing on success or failure. There will be tbe usual suspicion andon the Soviet side, and lhe problem of breaking through resisting layers of bureaucracy to get decisions will be particularly foimidabln in view of theof Ihe issues. It is likely also that there svill be divisions among the top leaders, and that politicking for future place and power svill figure in thcthey adopt. Thus. Ihe obstacles to actual achievement of nn agreement will be great, especially in the absence of some simultaneous advance towardof tlie more basic East-West issues and the improved political climate so generated.
Tho Soviets will approach negotiations with one basic criterion in mlnd; they will want their right to equality in strategic forces acknowledged ln principle. In fact, one motive they had for accepting thr US invitation to negotiate was probably Ihe belief lhat tbe US move tacitly conceded this right, or at least could be so construedcm Acknowledgment of the claim to oqualiry would be salued not merely on security grounds, bui also because nf lhc implicationwould carry lhat Ihe USSR was entitledolitical role in world affairs equivalent to that of. Thus, the Soviets would lie sensitive to any attempt from the US side lo "negotiate from strength" or toentutnent advantage in strategic lorces.
SEtfREI
SEt^tET
What in fact constitutesview ol the dtflrrcut composition of strategic forces on the two sides and their different geopoliticalsvould be recognized by tlie Sovietsroper subject of negotiationould surely bargain hard and take every advantage, but would piobably be willing in working out the problems of equivalence to consider trade-oils betweenweapons systems of the two sides. Their stew of lhe nature of power would lead them to weigh other ingredients than numlms of strategic weaponskinds of forces, political strengths andmeasuring tbe relative power of the two sides. Once involved in thc negotiations, therefore, they would piobablyisposed to break off merely Isecausc of difficultiesand they would also recognize the poliiical costs of doing so.
Thc problem of verification which has dogged all piovlous disarmament negotiations will persist. The Soviets will probably continue to resist verification procedures svhieh require thc presence of foreign inspectors in the USSR.the Soviets have regarded such inspection arrangements as militarily disadvantageous and politically harmful, if anything, their fear of ideological contagion is currently heightened. Thus, Moscow is still unlikely to accept an arms control agreement which cannot be verified primarily through national means
In mm, we believe thai Moscow's incentives to try for strategic armsand for stabilizing the USSR's stralegic relahonship wiih the US are stronger now than they have been. Nevertheless, the forces and institutions in the USSRested interest In stalling and even blocking movement toward arms control continue to bo strong, and will sveigh heavily against thc prospects for achieving an agreement. Moreover, thc absenceolitical climate of mutual tnist between the US and USSR could .vlrenr-then thc case of those forces in the USSR oppOfcd to serious negotiation and, in general, hamper efforts to achieve agreement.
4.
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