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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Eastern Europe and the USSR in the Aftermath of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW
RELEASE IN FULL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEUIGENCE
m by ihm UNITED STATES INTEUIGENCE BOARD
Ai fidKawd omlni
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The following inlelligenco organizations participated in the preparation of this tjstimotet
The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence orgonlialions of the Deport, ments of Stole, Dele mo, ond NSA.
Concurri/tot
Mr. ftkhard Helms, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
eorge C. Oenney, Jr. for Th* Director of Intelligence ond Research,of State
Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, Director of lhe Notional Security Agency
Abstaining?
Dr. Charles H. Reichardt for Assistant General Manager for Administration, AEC ond Mr. William O. Cregor for Assistant Director, Federal Bureau ofthe subject bo Ing outside of their (urisdicrion.
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CONTENTS
Page
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE 3
Ncar-Terra
Longer Term Outlook for Soviet Authority in Eutcrn
III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USSR
Domestic
Foreign Policies
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EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
CONCLUSIONS
Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia because of theirfear that the existenceeliable Communist authoritywas threatened by the reform movement in theThe Soviet leaders believed that if this development wastheir hegemony would ultimately be jeopardizedhole. The process of forcing the Czechs back intomold is proceeding slowly, and the Soviets may bethc end to move directly against the Prague leadership.
Romania and Yugoslavia will remain apprehensiveintentions for some time, especially in view of Sovieta right to intervene in Socialist countries. The Sovietsnot now contemplate any direct military action againstother means of pressure can beovietagainst Yugoslavia seems even less likely. Although by itsCzechoslovakia the USSR has probably for the timeassertions of national independence among its Eastallies, the growth of anti-Soviet nationalism in the areato continue and to produce new manifestations of resistanceauthority.
present Soviet leadership will probably continue tocourse somewhere between attempting to restore completein Eastern Europe and accommodating the trend towardand the expression of national peculiarities. TheMutual Economic Assistance will remain generally ineffective,an instrument of Soviet hegemony andeans ofEuropean economic development. Within thc Warsaw Pact,will probably feel obliged to place greater reliance onforces and less on those of the East Europeans.
so
the Soviet leaders were probably in basicmeasures had to be taken to arrest the reform movementover time this crisis will probably sharpen achronically troublesome issues within the Soviet leadership. Yet
"^thS Soviet leaders are likely to realize that this isropitious time for open displays of disunity. Among other things, they are probably concerned over thc effects of their actions in Czechoslovakia on the Soviet population itself.
Soviet move in Czechoslovakia did not signify aof Moscow's policies toward the West. The Sovietthe Czechoslovak problem as one internal to its ownMoscow's attitude toward West Germany will remain quitethe Soviets may authorize the East Cermans to undertakeaimed at the West German position in Berlin.
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The dust and debris raised by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia have yet to settle, and thc uncertainties left in its wake involve more than the kind of regime which will govern in Prague. Also affected are Moscow's attitudes toward West Germany and the Berlin question, its policies toward the other Communist mavericks, Yugoslavia and Romania, and its posture toward Eastern Europehole. Involved in addition are the broader questions of the USSR's policies toward Western Europe and the US and its position in tbe international Communist movement. Finally, thc Czech events could affect the relative positions of the various Soviet leaders and the stability of the leadershiphole, which may have been shaken by differences over Soviet policies during tbe crisis.
The Soviet leadership's decision to invade and occupy Czechoslovakia was apparently arrived at with some reluctance. It came only after various other forms of pressure on the Czechoslovak regime had failed and, presumably, after the leadership had decided thai the risks of non intervention simply outweighed all the probable costs of an invasion. The Soviet leaders,ajority of them, came to believe that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was no longer reliable and was in effect abandoning control over tlie country to thcthat Czechoslovakia was edging toward ate facto withdrawal from the Warsaw Pactolicy of neutrality; and that the West, and especially West Germany, was almost certain to gain greaterin Prague- Moscow apparently calculated that ihe potibcal and strategic consequences of these developments would shake its position in the other countries of Eastern Europe. And the Soviet leaders feared that this, together
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wifh the exampleiberalized socialism in Czechoslovakia, would ultimately have deeply unsettling effects on tlie Soviet population itself.
be intervention did arrest (lie political developments in Czeclioslovakia which the Soviets viewed as dangerous, but (he process of forcing die Czechs back into the approved mold is taking some time. Moscow would like to avoid fuftl>cr violence and to oblige Ihe Czech leaders themselves to take thcfor undoing the refonns so intensely suppotted by tlie population. Probably Moscow would also like to discredit thc present leaders and tothem with others willing to collaborate in the old way. To thb end the Soviets are tryinguildro-Soviet faction within the Party and to place men loyal to themselves in thc security organs and communications media. Their liope is dial ultimately the present leaders, under the demoralizing coodi-tsoris of occupation, can be divided among themselves and discredited wiih Ihe population
is difficult to see liow tlic present indued manifestations ofbe sustained indefinitely or bow these alone could force lhe Sovietsthe alms for which Ihey intervened If necessary, the Soviets willtake direct measures toeliable leadership and will use forceany demonstrations by Ihe population. If (hey are obliged to golengths, however, the political costs of the intervention will beand Ihe problems of maintaining Soviet hegemony in Easternin tlie longer term be still further complicated.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE Near-Term Repercussions
tlie other states of Eastern Europe, Romania and Yugoslaviaimmediately affected by the shock waves Sowing from theimilar Soviel move against themselves wasime quite highBelgrade and Bucharest. The reactions in each capital, however,have been different.rief period of public outrage, thehave, on (he whole, been more restrained. Clearly, as initial fearsCeausescu regime is determined not to surrender its sovereignty, but itanxious lo tailor its actions so as not lo provoke Moscow intoil. Tito, on Ihe other band, was appalled by the invasionof hisperfectly willing to say so to the Sovietsthc world at large. Hie Yugoslavs saw in the invasion an assault onprinciples and policies, both domestic and foreign, and foresee aof strain in their relations with the USSR.
f- Soviet pressures on Romania and hostihly toward Yugoslavia seem likely for some time to come. Anti-Yugoslav propaganda, some of it directed against Tito personally, will probably remain fairly intense, in part because of Moscow's anxiety lo remind lhe other East Europeans of its attitude toward all forms of "revisionism" Pressures on Romania, perhaps including hints of military moves and additional demand* regarding Warsaw Pact maneuvers on Romanian soil.
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will probably continue at least so long as Bucharest (runts on beliaving in an independent, and til times, unfriendly fashion. 'Ihc Soviets probably do not now contemplate any direct military action against ltomania, however, partlyof their calculations of the political costs and partly because they do not ^consider llomania to be as important strategically asilitary move against Yugoslavia seems even less likely. Nevertheless, apprehension about Soviet intentions will persisl in both countries for some time, especially in view of the Soviet assertionight of intervention in socialist countries.
causescu's strong domesticrests substantially on his image as aprobably not sufferesult of his efforts to cultivate tlie appearance of more harmonious relations with the USSR. These wiU probably be widely regardedimple exercise in prudence. For his part, Tito will probably push all Use harder for his program of liberal reform at home and will try to strengthen his ties with both the West and tho Third World. In Yugoslavia, tlio net effect of the Soviet action agninst Czechoslovakia will thus be to reverse Belgrade's movement toward closer rotations with the USSR and to strengthen its determination to pursue an independent and nonabgned socialist course.
lsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Czech invasion may in tlie short term strengthen the positions of the existing regimes and leaden, but it has also created new problems for ihem. Coroulka has emerged from thc crisis as still tbe principal Soviet ally in Eastern Europe; ihis will not help him with his people, nor intimidate for any length of time his enemies within (he Party. Kadar's popular reputation may suffer somewhat because Hungarian troops were used in lhe invasion, and his Party position may suffer somewhat because he supported Dubcek. Generally, however, the Hungarians are likely tomore than ever that, under Kadar, they have enjoyed relative prosperity and freedom. Ulbrlclit, in East Cermany, has seen his harsh attitude toward the Czech experiment adopted by the Soviets (and he himself thusut he has also bad to face Increased expressions of public dissatisfaction. Zhivkov in Bulgaria lias behaved entirely as the Soviets wished him to. and theirof him,esult, is probably assured for some time The apprehensive Albanians have begun toriendlier face toward both Romania and theirenemy. Yugoslavia, while stepping up their attacks on Bulgaria.
n general, the lesson of Czechoslovakia, kiteson of Hungaryit. is not likely to be lost on either the ruling parties or the people at large. The USSR Isas now moved forcefully to set limits on the permissible. No party wdl be allowed to shaie power with otber organized groups, to institute programs of reform which significantly decentralize political power or economic control or remove restraints on public media. Further, all parties will be under stronger pressure to follow foreign policies (as, for example, inward West Germany) which adhere to guidelines laid down by Moscow. For the next few years, Moscow has probablyarger measure of compliance from its East European allies, though most of them will mnlinue lo sock ways to pursue their
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own interests as best they can. In any event, resentment of Soviet authority will no doubt continue to smolder, and the political and economic forces working for greater nalional mdependenee, though subdued or underground, will continue tohreat to tranquility and to the Soviet position in the area.
lie Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia probably served, in fact, to dramatize for all the East European peoples die power and thc appeal ofzech movement and the poverty of Soviet efforts to contain it Thus while certainly made aware of the risks of going beyond the bounds now firmly set by Moscow, East Europeans have also been reminded once again of their unhappy relationshipoctrinaire, reactionary, and oppressive neighbor. Many East Europeans were clearly cliagrincd by tlic invasion of Czechoslovakia and by (he use of East European forces in tliat invasion. All in all, if the Soviet move has served to erect new barriers against tbe advance of nationalin Eastern Europe, it has also surely failed to halt the growthtrong anti-Soviet nationalism behind those barriers.
Longer Term Outlook tor Soviel Authority in Eastern Europe IL Thc Soviets have sought since3 and the death of Stalin to transform their system of control and influence in Eastern Europeargely voluntary association of allied states owing political and ideological allegiance to Moscow. The use of terror was for thc most part discontinued, heavy state-to-state economic and political pressures were played down, and cordial relations between "fraternal" Communist Parties were emphasized. In addition,organizations, principally the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) and thc Warsaw Pact, were used in an effort to coordinate economic and military affairs and to provide the Soviets with mechanisms for exercising their Bloc-wide dominance. At least some Soviet leaders apparently believedrue 'socialist commonwealth" could be established on these newand that it was onlyin accord withfor the various states of the commonwealth to identify their nationalwith those of the USSR. Other Soviet leaders were perhaps more cynical but seemed to be convinced that they couldarmonious and viable empire on the basis of strong inter-Party ties.
ut the predominant trend in Eastern Europe has been toward greater independence from the Soviet Union.he people of two countries have sought to rebel against the Soviet-imposed system; East Germany3 and Hungaryoland, swept by nationalist fires, had its moment of defiancelbania succeeded in breakingew yean later. Romania has gradually beenarge measure of freedom from Soviel dominance since thes. And Czechoslovakia,rocess now calledcounterrevolution" hy tlie Soviets, wax well on its wayver thc pastears, then, only one of the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe has remained largely untouched by Ibe currents of nationalism, and even that country, Bulgaria, was (lie scene of an attempted military coup5 which had anti-Soviet undertones.
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long Ii.of discord and dissension, and in particular, thoIn Czechoslovakia, poses some fundamental questions for the Sovietthey continue to approach Eastern Europe in the way bid down afterat the same time, maintain their posilion there, let alone encourage the
_fimii.iti.in of an enterprising and viable empire? Can CEMA ever manage tounite, and develop under Soviet leadership thc economies of thc entire region? Similarly, can thc Warsaw Pact perform adequately in die various capacities it has beenIhe various national armies be relied upon, could theyartime role against NATO, can thc Pact structure be used to help control tbe member states, could Pact forces be used once more against anotlter socialist state? Are there changes which eoald be made in either CEMA or thc Pact which would significantly enhance their capabilities?
Tlie Council for Mutual Economic Assistanceoing concern only on paper andumber of particularin transportalion andcooperation between the member states is obviously desirable, noncontroversiat, and relatively easy of accomplishment. In other areas, and in terms of coordinating and dividing specific national tasks, lhe organization has consistently run into apparently insurmountable economic and politicalRomania, for example, has3 persistently refused to surrender any of its national economic prerogatives to an international body dominated by the USSR. Tlie Soviets arc unable, or are themselves unwilling for variousreasons, to push very hard for the conceptruly united Bloc economy. It teems highly unlikely that this picture will change very much within the foreseeable future. As an instrument of Soviet hegemony, or eveneans of fostering Eastern European economic development, the future of CEMA docs not appear to lie at all promising.
Instead thc Soviets will continue to rely on bilateral relations with the Individual Eastern European countries as lhe main channel for strengthening trade ties with lhe USSR and for enforcing economic orthodoxy. Easternhopes of relaxing political controls over economic life have clearly been set back by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Economic reforms of the restricted type practiced by East Germany and Poland will remain in effect. Tho bolder programs of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, such as partial decontrol of prices and foreign trade, are likely to flounder in the absence of pcJilical
' liberalization and closer ties with the West And Czechoslovakia has been forced to drop the radical plan of setting up workers' councils like those in Yugoslavia. Trade with the West should continue to rise, as fast as thc economic facts of life |d'rmit, bui without the growing Western influence thai seemed to be in prospncl before the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
he Czechoslovak crisis has put in question the USSR's reliance onEast European Aimed Forces to function in important roles duringMoscow must consider that the Czech Army can no longer function
ro. further ddoniioft secCaiwbfl.tic* of thr Wanaw Pact againstECRET, and the fo*IIk<lining NIKB, "Sovwt and East Fiu^ican
l PurposeOP SECRET
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eliable instrument of Soviet policy, aad muM also be concerned about manifestations of nationalism in lbc armed forces of other allied states.imple matter of prudence, the Soviets probably feel obliged to place greater reliance on their own forces and loss on tliose of the East Europeans. Moscow may now seriously consider not only tbe strengthening of Its forces in Eastern Europe, but may also seek ways tonore closely integrated Warsaw Pact command structure. Steps such as these would be useful not only against NATO but alsoeans totronger instrument of control within Eastern Europe.
lie Soviets have for some time sought to enlist thc voluntary compliance of tlie Eastern European regimes but they have also been ready to applyvdsenever it seemed necessary. Though Urn approach has been foundwanting they probably are not at this point prepared to make many changes in their general policies In Eastern Europe. The Soviet altitude will probably be more unyioldmgime toward deviations, and on key issues Moscow wiU almost certainly remain harsh and demanding. But it does not now seem that the Soviets ate prepared toeneral rollback in Eastern Europe toward complete subservience and orthodoxy. Nor, however, does it seem at aD likely that the present leadership will entertain any notionsasicto the trend'toward independence and thc expression of national peculiarities.
Over the longer term, of course, when new leaders appear in Moscow, tlie Soviets might come to adapt themselves to thc process that is underway in Eastern Europe. They could, for example, become less and less concerned about the orthodoxy of other communist parties and less and less enchanted with the dreary prospects {and rising costs) of trying lo maintain their imperial position.tance would certainly have its advantages: It would help to improve relations between Moscow and the presently disgruntled leaders of Western European Communist parties; il wouldeturn to detente policiesl* Western Europehole. West Germany excepted; and il would lielp to advance the USSR's prestige within the internationalmovement and within the Third World.
Thc ideas and character of the next generation of Soviet leaders ore not, however, predictable, and we certainly do not look forward to any change in fundamental Soviet attitudes toward Eastern Europe within tlie foreseeable future. Probablyong time, hegemony exercised on tlie present pattern will be seen as vital to Soviet national interests. Certainly the present Soviet leaders have shown no disposition to allow it to crumble. Khrushchev wished to reform the empire, not dissolve it, and his successors are wary even of reform. Civen the continuing growth of Eastern European nalionalism, and given thedetermination of the Soviets to combat it. tensions between ruler and ruled are likely to be endemic and further enves appear almost Inevitable.
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III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USSR Domestic
the recent period of crisis fa Eastern Europe, the Sovietacted in publicnified collective. But Brezhnev, as the most powerful
figure on the Politburo and as tbe leader who was earlier most closely Identified with both Novotny and Cxecltoslovakia, was generally thought to be the major architect of the USSR's policies and the man most responsible for its setbacks. It seems likely that the leadershiphole was essentially united on tbc principal proposition: the course followed by the new leadership ofthreatened the vital interests of the USSR, It seems plausible,that there were different currents of opinion within the leadership over the degree of danger Czechoslovakia represented at any given moment and over what should be done by the USSR to contain that danger.
In addition, thc Czech problem will probably in time have the effect ofumber of chronically troublesome issues within thc leadership.onsequence of the invasion, for example, the Soviet military mayreater share of the nations economic resources, to the distress perhaps of some of the leaden especially concerned with the growth of the civilianPolicy choices bearing on the international Communist movement and on relations with the West may become more contentious. Discontented andleaders can be expected to try to weaken the position of rivals who might appear newly vulnerable in the wake of tlse crisis.
Tho collective has endured for almost four years, and Its ability so far to govern with few signs of inner turmoil has surpassed most expectations. The Czech problem probably presented it with its most difficult hours and may Iiave placed some of the top leaderseaker position. Although Brezhnev may,ariety of reasons, become the obvious and most corrvincingfor an unsatisfactory episode in the conduct of Soviet affairs abroad,o evidence at tin. time that any other leader has thc strength to displace him. It also seems unlikelyove against Brezhnev, or any of the other top leaders, would come too close on the heels of the events themselves.ood time for open displays of dbunity.
The Soviet leaders will wish to preserve the appearance of unity within tho collective in pari braiuse of their probable concern over tbc effects of their actions in Czechoslovakia on popular attitudes at home. Though many Soviet citizens seem at least initially to have accepted thc rationale for the invasion, or to have been apathetic about thc wholr affair, some ol the intelligentsiastrong doubts about the official reasons given. (Abrupt changes and contradict ions in the Partytoward the character of Alexanderhe enough in tlteir own right to foster skepticism, or at leastome Soviellooked on democraticin Czechoslovakiauippy augury for their own
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apparently been greatly agitated by thc invasion and. in some instances, anxious privately to disown iL Finally, within Soviet minority groups, most notably in tbe Ukraine, there apparently had been growing interest in what was going on in Czechoslovakia, cipocialry concerning the implications (or the USSB of Prague's newly tolerant altitude toward ils own national minorities.
lhe problem of intellectual and rninority group dissent in theexisted for some time, the growth of democratic and nationalistEastern Europe seems to have stimulated similar attitudes in the USSR.despite increasingly repressive official policies, signs of disaffectionSoviet Union have recently become more frequent Both intellectualsof minority groups appear to Iiave become more sullen and lesslo cooperate with the regime, and radical ideas seem to havedespite heavy-handed efforts lo subdue llicm. Clearly tbc Sovietacted as if they consider this kind of disaffection loeeplylong-term problem, though diey will probably be able lo hold It toproportions for some time.
Foreign Policies
The Soviets apparently do noi now contemplate any radical shifts in foreign policies beyond those required by the Czechoslovak occupation itself Tlie move in Czechoslovakia did not signify thc USSR's intention toeneral hardening of its policies toward Ihe West. As Croroyko made esqaaaat in his recent speed) to the United Nations General Assembly, the Sovietconsiders tlie Czcclwslovak problem as one internal to its own sphere, and lliercforeutter not subject to discussion with outside powers. The Soviet effort to solve thb problem was conceived and executed in thband the Soviets havepartially in the special ease of Westavoid entangling their policies elsewhere in the world with their actions against Prague. That Is to say, Moscow has made nomoves to change course toward lhc Third World, Western Europe, or the US
Specifically concerning lheumber of proposed programs already appear to be casualties of the Soviel move and prospectsumber of others have been placed in doubt. Small accommodations, such as the Institution of New York-Moscow air services, do not appear jeopardized, hut proposals for arms contiol and disarmament, already inherently difficult offace formidable new obstacles. Thc economic and military interests which seemed to be moving the Soviel leaders closer to the idea of some arms control arrangemeni Iiave not in and of themselves been lessened by recent developments in Eastern Europe, though lhe consensus within the collective on ihb subject may well be affected by the jtmospheie ol renewed tensionby the Czech events Much will now depend also, of course, on thc impact ol recent events on the attitudes and polioes of thc US.
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Concerning Germany, thc current lieavy propaganda and diplomatic campaign againit Bonn leemi priinarily to represent an effort to levy blame for the Czechoslovak crisis on the most convenient and useful outsideThis effort happens to coincide quite well with the traditional Soviettoward Bonn,o servesationale for the permanent statioo-ihg of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. It seems likely thai the USSR's attitude toward West Cermany will remain quite harsh, in part because Moscow fears West Germany's relations with Eastern Europeotential alternative to Sovizt influence. The Soviets dearly want no further forward movement of Bonn's OatpolUOt.
One way of seeking to blunt these West Cvnnun policies and of bringing direct pressure to bear on Bonn would be to renew tlie campaign against tbc West German presence and activities in West Berlin Tlie Soviets realize, however, tliat in the wake of thc events in Czechoslovakia, sudden moves by ihem in Berlin could quicklyajor crisis. They probably will not, therefore, attack Ihe Allied presence in Berlin directly but. instead, maythe East Germans to undertake new harassrnents aimed at the West Cerrnan position. On the whole, we think Ihc dunces ate good that there willenewal of tensions around Berlin in coming months.
In Western Europe, Ihe Soviets are seeking lo repair thc damige done their relations with the various goverrurrents and Ihe local Communist Parties by tlie invasion of Czechoslovakia. There aie no signs that Moscow is prepared to depart from its preinvasion efforts to cultivate good will, especially in France. Its task is much more difficult now, however, and thc heavy-handed propaganda tactics used against Bonn have greatly reduced Western Europe's reccptiveness to detente overtures. But the Soviets are anxious, apparently, to convince the West Europeans thai their move against Prague was essentially defensive and is not to be seenhreat against the uttegrify of any Western country.udden visit to Finland was probably undertaken to calm Finnish apprehensions about Soviet policy.ertain extent, of course, the slate of relations between East and Westatter of atmospherics. If tbe situation in Czechoslovakia appears to return tooncern in Western Europe will gradually abate, and the Soviets will probably then revert to the themes of European security and detente which have been featured in their policy for thc last several years.
Moscow's relationship will) many Communist Parlies lias been heavily damaged by the action against Czechoslovakia. The international Communist conference, which has long been sought by the Soviets and has now had to be postponed, will have liltle chance of restoring Communist unity. Both the French and Italian Parties counseled against thc intervention but were disregarded by Moscow. Official Soviet doctrine now emphasizes lhal tbc USSRuty when necessary to interfere in Ihe affairs of any fraternal Communist state, and with military force if circumstances require, lhe French and Italian Parties
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have rejected (his proposition, in part from tho conviction that it isuntenable, in part from the knowledge that it is indefensible to their tocal electorates. Despite grumbling by their Stalinist minorities and pressure from Moscow, the major West European Parties have maintained their initial disapproval of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. They will not beinto reversing this decision, although they will continue to pay Upto "proletarian Utcmatiotialism- and friendship with the USSR. The Soviets have little prospect of restoring the position of commanding influence over the international Communist movement they once held.
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