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instability and insurgency in guatemala
THE PROBLEM
To assess the prospects over the next several years for the insurgency in Cuatemala in the context of the country's continuing political,and social problems.
CONCLUSIONS
persistent insurgencymall number of leftista particularly troublesome manifestation of Guatemala'sinstability. Nonetheless, the insurgency, now in its ninthsurvived rather than flourished. The insurgents, though ableout dramatic acts of urban terror, have had little success inadherents in the countryside. Much of the energy of thehas been squandered on internal dissidence and
believe it unlikely that the insurgency, nowowexpand greatly, at least for several years to come. Over theor so, the insurgents will probably attempt to keep thethe government through sporadic terrorism, including actsofficials. Their apparent motive is to provoke the replacementMendezepressive military regime in the hopewould cause the people to' rally to the insurgency.
are some indications that/'
JSuch foreign assistance might increase the insurgency's capacity for violence and terror, and thus increase its disruptive effect.
But it would probably no! enhance the insurgents* overallseizing
endez has increased his control oversecurity forces and sharply reduced the bloody andcounter-terrorism through which they andwere combating the insurgents. The President'saction, however, still is limited, and he is unlikely to undertakeor any other actions that would coalesce the military andright generally against him. Though the security forcesable to keep the rural insurgency from getting out ofariety of disabilities, including weak leadershipand uncoordinated intelligence. The latter disability inputs themisadvantage in coping with whan terrorism.
basic political and social problems of Cuatemala areby the insurgency, and they would persist even if itif the insurgents were to achieve their interim objective ofthe establishmentarsh military dictatorship, theyour view benefit little at least in the short run. Over thethe actions ofegime might increase the prospectsemergenceore vigorous revolutionary movement; butknow at this point what role, if any, the currenttheir sometime allies among Guatemalan Communistsovement.
DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
uatemala hasong history of political instability and social and economic backwardness. Governments and constitutions come and go with little lasting impact on the largely impoverished rural masses. The population ofs now risingate of about three percent per year despite one of the highest rates of in/ant mortality in the world. About half the people arewho follow traditional ways and have little or no contact with national political and economic life. The remainder (called Iodines) consist for the most part of Indians and mestizos who have moved into contemporary Guatemalan society at the bottom of the economic ladder. Only about onein four is, literate,maller proportion than ten years ago; many
do not speak Spanish. Primitive social services in terms of health, education, and welfare compare unfavorably even with most other Latin American countries.1
Before the revolution4 the country wai ruled by more or less despotic military dictators who were buttressed by an elite of large landowners andThe revolutionary governments of Jose) and Colonel Jacoboasted some important social and economicand undertook some reforms aimed at bringing the Initios and poorer ladinos into national life. For the most part the impart was more apparent than real. Political power hadime been wrested from the right, arid the Guatemalan Communistsey rote in the Arbenz government, but the grip of tbe elite on the economy had hardly been shaken.
The limited extent of Aibenz's control over tho country became quitein the course of his downfallhen (he improvised band of men under Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, with US backing, overthrew the government without difficulty. The poorer elements of the population that Arbenz had been trying to favor made no effort to come to his defense. Upon taking power, Castillo Armas rather effectively turned the clock back to prerevolutionary times:and suspected Communists were purged mid the country'i nascentof laborers and small landowners were dismantled. While for the past decade the elites have beenosition to exercise direct political control of the government, they in fact have failed to do so because of personal and fictional rivalriesearth of rightist political leaders with any sort of popular appeal or elective program. Thus4 it has become clear once more that the Guatemalan military is the single most important political force in the country.
Memories of the Arevalo-Arbenz period have instilled in the military, and in the political right, deep suspicions of any movement even slightly to the left of center. The appellation "Communist" has been generally applied to tbe most elementary proposed reforms or steps toward moderruzatioo. The military has been particularly wary of any signseversion to the revolutionary era;3 it removed the corrupt but avowedly anli-Communist Ceneral Ydigoras Fuentes from the presidency for permitting the return of former Preiident Arevalo during an election year. In short, the political right and the military have been extraordinarily successful in opposing change. For lack of constructive political leadership, Ihe bask cooditions of politicalial backwardness,disunity, and generalbecome institutionalized tn Guatemala.
Son* basic demographic compuiwrB with neighborinj countries for the;
Con.
Guatemala Mexico Pjc* Elbirtb rate
th raleopulation) ..
Infant mortalityive
Source: Secretariat for Economic Integration for Central America. Fifth statist kal(or Central7
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he persistent insurgency by leftist extremistsarticularly troublesome aspect of the country's continuing political instability. After eight years of varying fortunes the insurgents maintain the ability to cany out sporadic acts of urbanwhich within the past year have included even the assassination of the US Ambassador and two members of the US Military Group. Nevertheless, the insurgency has survived rather than flourished. The movement reached iu peak earlyhen it controlled large parts of the Sierra de Mlnas in the Departments of Zacapa and liabal and terrorized the publicampaign of kidnaping and robbery which netted the insurgentsillion or more. Its strength then declined as the result of vigorous military counter-terror action, and the leaders are currently no closer to their eventual goal of taking over the country than they were at the inception of their campaign
ndeed the insurgents have probably always consideredar-off goal. There Li some evidenceore immediate one has been the provocation of another right-wing coup in the hope that it would rally the populace to the cause of the insurgency. The insurgents were frustrated in this hope6 when the military government of Colonel Enrique Peralta. in powerept its promise to hold an honest election for the presidency. Then, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro of the Revolutionary Partyenefitingplit of the votes of the political right between two candidates,lurality of the presidential voteajority of seats in Congress.
II. TME MENDEZ GOVERNMENT
espite this electoral success, tbe Mendez government holds office only at the sufferance of the military and the economic elite. Us demonstrably anti-Communist stance and its favorable approach to private enterprisethe PR has few backers among the economic elite. Indeed, it iswith suspicion by those on the right who recall that many of its present leaders were active in the revolution
endez realize! the limitations on his freedom of action as president. Although he is concerned with the need for national development and for social and economic reform, he apparently believes that these must be subordinated to the elementary goal of completing his term. By doing so he feels that the groundwork will have been laidegal and constitutional handling ofconflicts by his successor. This is no mean aspiration, as no electedpresident hasermut it has dispirited those who bad hoped for more than token progress on basic reforms. Pressure from the right has restrained the administration from imposing major new taxes, or efficiently collecting old ones, sufficient to finance moremall start on such reforms. The government has moved slowly, too, oo its pledge to redistribute land from the state-owned farms. Mendez has made scant useillion available in foreign aid funds; the largest single limiting factor is the lack of new taxes to meet the requirements for partial domestic financing of aid projects.
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In short, his accomplishments so far in the social and economic Geld have been modest considering the myiiad profound problems of the country.
For the first two years of his term, Mendez was especially vulnerable to charges that heaptive of the military. When an offer of amnesty to the insurgents was rejected, soon after his inauguration, be granted full authority to the military to combat the guerrillas, and appeared to acquiesce in the excesses which resulted. Local military commanders, such as Colonel Arana of the Zacapa Department, armed and Gelded civilian vigilante groups and set inounter-terror campaign, partly civilian and partly military, which killed ac least many hundreds and possibly several thousands of Guatemalans. The victimsiverse lot; some were insurgents and collaborators, but many were per* SOnal or political enemies of the vigilante leaders, including leftists generallyumber of Tit members. This campaign was successful in that It all but denied the Zacapa area to the insurgents and threw them badly off baseYet as one side strove to revenge the terror of Ihe other, the discovery of multilated bodies became commOrplace and the level of violence unusual even by Guatemalan standards.
This violence has been on the wane sincehen Mendez achieved his principal success in dealing with the militaryudden andmove he sent Ihe three leading organizers of the counter-terrorColonel Arana. Minister of Defense Arriaga, and the chief of the national police, into posts abroad. This was followed by reassignmenls of personnel throughout the officer corps.ormer law professor, probably acted from the conviction that he could no longer turn his back to the widespread lawlessness andut how he came about the political courage to act upon this feeling is still unclear. Il is possible that Mendez calculated that the right-wing vigilante groups had forfeited support even from their political allies by such acts as the kidnaping of the Archbishop of Cuatemala. It may also have become dear to him that Colonel Arriaga had lost standing among his peers, and that there were chinks in what had appeared toolidly united military.by his success in establishing this measure of control over the military, he then ordered tbe disbanding of the clandestine police and military units that had engaged in counter-terrorism around Cuatemala City. In October thetook another step In curbing rural violence by requiring the civilian vigilante bands to turn In the weapons which had been issued to them by the Army. The move retrieved roost of these weapons, but many others from other sources remain in civilian bands.
Mendez's position has been strengthened by the appointment of lessofficers to key command positions in the military'. Maintenance of goodwith the military is substantially aided by the efforts of the President's brother. Colonel Mendez. who seems to have no personal ambitions and is gen-
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erally respected by his fellow officers. Some right-wing civilians and inactive officers, however, have continued their efforts to prod tbe army into deposing Mendei. In particular, representatives of the right-wing National Liberation Movement arc active in this endeavor. At the same time the civilians realize that the recent changes in the security forces have made the time less than propitiousoup and are also looking to the election
HE INSURGENCY
Guatemalan insurgents were able to celebrate the movement'sonovember, but their achievement in longevity has notby gains in strength. The history of the movement shows thatthe energy of the insurgents bas been used up simply in trying toin the formation, splintering, and reconciliations of factions within theitself. Almost from its inceptionhe group of young Armywho founded theovember groupas confronted byof the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) to take it over. Underof Marco Antonio Yon Sosa the insurgents were able toindependence from the PGT. they received some support fromthe bulk of their sustenance came fiom successful raids on militaryandhort-lived united front was achievedilitants and Yonroup combined to form the Rebel ArmedThis evaporated the following year when Yon blasted thefor it* advocacybourgeon nationalook thehe FAR, and enthusiastically praised China and Mao.
This was the beginningtring of defections, splits, and unification attempts among the insurgent groups. Ia accord with the resolution of tbe Havana Conference4 to support the orthodox Communist parties in Latin America, Cuban aid was diverted from theo the PGT. At about the same time one of Yon's lieutenants, Luis Turcios Lima, broke with thend placed bis following under the command of tbe PGT. thus reviving the FAR. Earlyt the Tri-Continental Conference in Havana, Fidel Castro lionized Turcios and read the uninvited Yon Sosa out of the continental revolutionary movementrotskyitc."
The period after the election6 proved to be dismal for the insurgents io general and for the FAR in particular. Turcios died in an automobile crash, and operations of his band were impairedrisis of leadership. The gov* ernmeat's counter-terror tactics forced the guerrillas onto the defensive. Adversity proved to be not unifying but divisive. Acrimony grew between the guerrillas of the FAR and the party bureaucrats of the PCT.1
far eientlb) accused the PCT leaders of being more interested in securingthe party than in getting on with tbe insurgency. Since then.tbe PCTs major concern is not revolution but trying to persuade Mendel to
CoiTimuiuit governments.
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he FAR. nowan who calls himselfhad divorced itself from the PCT and once more jeincd forces withIt also recognized Yon Sosa as the leader of the Insurgency, within second place. The FAR, nowow ebb in strength andgoingather prolonged period of recuperation andmovement is stilltate of dm. leaders have been captured andthe government forces, and there are^
"TDrTorts are underway toingle command over the small bands seatierec around tbe country. The FAR occasionally receives funds from Cuba and arms purchased in Mexico, some of tbe guerrillas have been trained in Cuba, including Yon Sosa himself, who as an Army officer had also received US training in counter-guerrilla tactics-
There is some evidence that the main thrust of the FARs current effort is to develop support organizations so that the insurgents can operate in several geographic areas. Insurgent leaders hope that if operations can be mounted in several places at the same time, government forces will be overextended. Meanwhile, in view of the faltering of Insurgency movements which Castro has supported elsewhere in Latin America, the insurgency in Cuatemala remains perhaps his most important target for support
The FAR's capability for urban terror is Its principal current asset. It has carried out its most spectacular operations In Guatemala City; kidnapings and bank robberies there have kept tlio movement in funds, and the assassinations of US and Guatemalan officials have intensified the political turmoil. Inacts of urban terror, the insurgents generally have two importantover the security forces: better use of intelligence information, and the ability to pick and choose their targets. The urban terrorists also benefit from support among students. By contrast, the guerrillas in the countryside have not in eight years won and kept any significant support from (he peasants.
IV. THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY
ince the suppression of the vigilante groups, the counter-insurgency operations of the military have continued, thoughower rate because the guerrillas themselves have been less active. Recent military operations have been undertaken with more discretion, and mutilated corpses are no longer left on the side of the road to warn potential revolutionaries. Meanwhile the Army's civic action program Is being carried out with special energy in the Zacapa Department. The Army units dig wells, work on roads, run medical clinics, and conduct reading classes. These activities are probably not sufficient, however, to win over the active support of the peasants, who are politically apathetic by nature and still no doubt suspicious of the Army's motives.
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he aimed force* are capable of containing rural insurgency concentrated in one area, but probably would not be ableo so if forced to conductoperations in several widespread localities. In the countryside, the Army* operations have owed at least par! of their success to the fact that both sides have had to operate near major highways, where togistieal support for the Army has been fairly easy. The logistical system would probably break down If the Army was forced to fight the guerrillas Ln isolated areas. (At the same time, the insurgents' freedom of movement in such areas is of limited value to them under presentntelligence, plans, and operations staffs and procedures are weak in all services and ineffectively coordinated at the general staff level.an Army is weak In tactical leadership, training, communications, and transportation. The Navy,ersonnel strengthnd seven small patrol craft. Is unable to perform adequately the coastal surveillance mission.an Air Force is hampered by diverse types of aircraft, maintenance problems,eak logistic support system. Police forcesational Police, ofre in Guatemala City, as welludicial Policereasury Police. The weaknesses of the National Policeroad range of deficiencies in management and operation*.
V. PROSPECTS
Thereetter than even chance that Mendez can continue hisact at least until the approach of the presidential election ofe has seen that the military is not as monolithic as it appeared when he first took office, and will probably continue to exploit its divisions to protect his own position. We doubt that his success in first making key personnel changes in the security forces and then disarming the vigilantes will embolden him to make other drastic moves, suchtronger stand on basic economic and social reforms. The political realities of Guatemala have not changed, and Mendez I* likely to avoid any action that mightowerful right wing reaction against him
Elements of the right will surely continue plotting against the Mendez government. The partial disarming of the civilian counter-terror groups has naturally disgruntled them. Their effectiveness in persuading the military to remove Mendez will depend on the course of the insurgency and how theregards Mender's handling of it If tbe insurgents should prove capable of mounting vigorous guerrilla campaigns in more than one areaime, or of signiflcantly Increasing their urban terror, the military and the right would presseturn to widespread counter-tenor operations. Under these conditions, refusal by Mende2 to comply withemand would mean his removal. As the election0 draws closer, the Army will beariety ofpressures, rot only from Mendez but from rightists who may seeilitary takeover their best chance to win the election, and from diverse views within its own ranks. Military reaction to these pressures is likely to depend on how key military figures view their own personal interest*.
SECTET
here arc some/"
such an effort,ize that castro would probably be willing to support,e of questionable overall value. it could place further strains on the unity of the insurgency movement some insurgents have resented the irregularity of castro's financial suppoit, and would not be enthusiastic about his attempt to take over the movement. there also remains the question of the working relationship between fidel castro and yon sosa. in short foreign assistance,!/
inight increase the insurgencys capacity lor violence ond terrorism, and hence increase its disruptive effect, but it would probably not enhance its overall prospect for seizing power.
t is unlikely, at least for several years to come, that the insurgency will expand greatly. |dcspitc the unrelieved poverty of the countryside, the basic inertia and conservatism of the cuatemalan peasant will prove to be the best ally of the counter-insurgency. development of effective support among either the peasantry or the urban poor woulduch more capable andleader than yon sosa has proved to be tbe FAR is apparently short of materiel, and will probably go on being plagued with organizationaldespite its repeated emphasisingle command, there is still dissidence within the leadership and incomplete cooperation oa the part of smalleadersjover the short run, the FAR will probably attempt to keep the pressureoa the government by various spectacular acts of tenor, including actss officials, in the hope of securing the replacement of president mendezn unpopular military regime, y
ith or without increased help from castro, over the next year or so the insurgents will probably achieve at best only limited and sporadic successes, mostly in guatemala cityji" our view, if mendez can survive his full four years inacade of constitutionality will have beenleasthile. but future leaders will also find themselves captives, not just of the military and the economic elite, but also of the country's social backwardness andpoverty.
ndefinite continuation of the insurgency would of course be an important factor in preventing mendez and his successors from coming to grips with the country's basic problems. but these problems are not caused by the insurgency and would persist even if it collapsed. what if the insurgents were to achieve their purported interimmilitary dictatorship that proved bothand regressive?egime would probably bold its own against the insurgents at least over the short term. its tactics mightolarization of forces on the extremes of right and left, and increase the prospects for arevolutionary movement at some rime in the future. we cannot know, at this point, what role, if any, the current insurgents and their sometime allies in the pct would have inovement. nor can they.
SEJZR.ET
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Original document.
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