CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.S
honorable david packard chairman,teering group
report of the foreign political and military reactions study group: general purpose force;
1. on behalf of the foreign political and military reactions study group(orward the general purpose forces phase of its work for nssu-3.
the report necessarily iswith the analysis of first-ordermilitary effects, the particularlevels of soviet forces described are at as the report points out
lthough the body of intelligence analysis underlying the soviet forceisautionary note is required. the quantification of force levels and system capabilities.may create anof precise information, especially about future forces and systems, which would be quite unjustifiable in the light of the extent of our information."
copies of the report areif you require them.
bruce c. clarke7 chairman foreign political and military reactions study group
Eec Def Cont Kr.
1NTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 3
Study Croup Report
FOREIGN POLITICAL AND MILITARY REACTIONS TO US STRATEGIES AND FORCES (GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES)
Foreign Political and Military Reactions to US Strategies and Forces (NSSM-3: General Purpose Forces)
I. Soviet Policy Objectives for General
Purpose Forces 5
II. Representative Soviet General
Purpose Forces 6
III. Reactions to US Strategies and Forces
Representative Soviet General Purpose Forces Opposing Proposed US Strategies and Forces . . 25
Foreign Political and Military Reactions to L'5 Stratuaiuo and Forces (NSSM-3: General Purpose Forces)
This paper provides an assessment of possible political and general purpose force responses of selected major foreign nations to specifiedUS courses of action. It focuses on the Soviet Union, Conununist China, and our major allies in Europe and Asia.
nd II present brief discussions of Soviet general purpose force objectives andlevels of Soviet forces inn order to provide some perspective of ths likely Soviet responses to alternative US strategies. Part III discusses the probable impact of US general purpose force strategies on the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other major nations of the world.
This paper does not discuss the relationship between Soviet strategic forces and Soviet general purpose forces, nor does it consider the impact of us strategic forces on Soviet general purpose forces. These topics will be treatedatter stage in thetudy.
In estimating foreign political and military reactions to the various US military strategics
Bote; This report uaa prepared under theof the Central Intelligence Agenay withfrom the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Systems Analyeie), the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Securityhe Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the national Security Cour.oil Staff.
under consideration, we proceed from certain general views, which it would be well to state at the outset.
HiLh respect to the Soviet Union and Communist China, it is probable that neither seeks territorial aggrandizement by military aggression.* Instead they would prefer to exploit the fears,and weaknesses which would be createdhange in the global or local military balance, in order to extend and consolidate their politicalover their neighbors.
The USSR has used force mainly to improve its prewar position against an anticipated German attack and to preserve its postwar hegemony in the Eastern European buffer region. Communist China hasin Korea andmilitary force in areas adjacent to its borders. Although the variations between them are considerable, both the USSR and China see military power firsteans nfthe homeland (including, in the Soviet case, the buffer region of Eastern Europe) and, beyond this,eans of bringing about political changes favorable to them in other countries. Thus we think it misleading to consider that either has aurge to invade its non-Communist neighbors, thatigh level of countervailing military power deters them from this course, or that the diminution of this opposing power would "tempt" them into aggression.
There are important exceptions to this To the Chinese, Taiwan and the offshore islands are regarded as domestic territory and would almost certainly be taken by force if no military risk were involved. And North Vietnam and North Korea clearly will use all feasible means to pursue
1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff note thathaa, in recentterri-
torial aggrandizement by direct militaryibet and India. If either the USSR orChina considers the risks to be minimal, they may do bo again.
the unification of their countries by force; in North Vietnam's case, it is clearly ready to employ force in Laos.
Even if all this is true, however, manyand Asians do not accept these propositions. They fear that, if the military balance tilts in the Communist favor, they will be subjoct not only to increased political-military pressure, but to outright invasion. Thus, the overall strength and precise disposition of US forces needed to assure our allies may be quite different fron that which we would judge necessary to prevent open aggression. Many of our allies are highly sensitive in their desire to have US forces on the ground to contribute to conventional defense and, particularly in Europe, toink, credible to all, to the USdeterrent.*
Finally, we would emphasize tho second aspect of the Communist view of military power mentionedan instrument of political pressure. If we think that the USSR would not invade,and withoutilitarily weakened West Germany, for example, we also believe that it would work vigorously to disorganize the politics of West Germany, and that military power and the implied threat of its use would be antool in that effort. hinese invasion of Thailand is very unlikely, but Chinese efforts to promote Thai insurgency and to remind the local combatants of China's own great military strength are quite likely. In some instances, the Communist states might seek to bring the local Communist party
Tn this latter connection, the Department of State representative notes that our European allies have indicated increasing concern over the relative improvement of Soviet strategic capabilitiesie those of the VS. As the Europeans have seen improvemente in Soviet strategic capabilities, they have become increasingly sensitive,nstrategic arms limitation talks, towhich reductions in US general purpose forces in Europe may have for the interrelations between these forces and US strategic offensive forees in deterring the Soviet Union.
to power; in others, to maneuver into office leaders responsive to theirn Laos and Cambodi
We are not so confident of these propositions that we would trust them to deter all Communist aggressionorld in which the US had disengaged from all its present commitments. And we recognize that, in various circumstances, political conflicts may become so acute and intentions so unclear that at some point military attack might commend itself to the Communist power involved. Our intention is merely to stress that, in mostajorof US military strength has been to stabilize the international alignment of pro-Western and even neutral governments on the periphery of the Communist world.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and tke Office of the Secretary of DefenseSecurity Affairs) believe that the foregoing discussion givesweight to the contribution of countervailing military power as ato Communist aggression. They believe that the Communist states have greater motives--the pursuit of national interests, the commitment to support allies, and the desire to encourage wars of nationaluse military force beyond their borders than is here suggested, and that opposing US and allied forcesreater role in deterring them from this course of action than indicated above.
The Department of State representative is in general agreement with the view that it would be misleading to base US policy on the assumption that either the USSH or Chinaompulsive urge to invade its non-Communist neighbors. However, thefeels that it would be imprudent to assume that the removal of countervailing force would not increase their incentive to pursue basic foreign policy objectives by military means. The present concern in Peking and Moscowossible major
confrontation uith the US certainlythe use of overt force. If the VS presence were removed, the inhibition would probably decline. At the same time, the removal of the US presence would make the use by the Communist powers ofpressures, backed by the threat of militaryar more effectiveand to that extent reduce the necessity of actually having to apply overt foroe.
I. Soviet Policy Objectives for General Purpose Forces
The objectives of Soviet general purpose forces
are, first, to defend the territory of the USSR
from attack and, second, to support its political
objectives abroad. The demands placed upon the
general purpose forces may be considered in terms
of three fairly distinct areas of concern for the USSR.
On their western borders, the Sovietsilitary capability to defeat NATO forces and to occupy Western Europe in the event ofwar with the West, however the war might start. They want to preserve political and militarywithin the Warsaw Pact in order to retain the East European buffer zone.
In the east, the Soviets are increasingly concerned to protect their border against anyencroachments and to be prepared for any contingency arising from internal instability in
The Soviets want to support the attainment of political objectives byisible and impressive presence for possible military use at the southern border and beyond the peripheries of the Soviet bloc. To this end theyaval combat force in the Mediterranean and land forces along the borders of Turkey and Iran. They want to expand their maritime activity and make it possible for various naval units to show the flag regularly in selective parts of the world. Their
recent activity in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf are examples of this.
Because of the complexity of these requirements Soviet long-run planning in the field of general purpose forces is less likely to be directlyby corresponding US planning than is the case in the field of strategic forces.
The major objective of Chinese Communistpurpose forces is defense of the homeland. Forward deployments along the southern frontier serve as forceful reminders of Chinese interests in these areas, but Peking has not given high priority to equipment programs that would improve China's ability to project its power over long distances beyond its borders. In general, apart from extreme US policy changes which radically altered the military situation near its borders, we expect Chinese planning for general purpose forces will be relatively insensitive toUS force structures.
II. Representative Soviet- General Purpose-Forces
Three illustrative general purpose forcedesigned to approximate reasonable Soviet reactions to the several US alternative strategies and force structures proposed forre shown in the Appendix. Although the body of intelligence analysis underlying these force packages isa cautionary note is required. Theof force levels may create an impression of precise information, especially about future forces and systems, which would be quite unjustifiable in the light of the extent of information.
The major differences in the three projected force packages are qualitative, not quantitative, especially in regard to ground and tactical air forces. The total number of army divisions does not vary greatly between them, but there aredifferences in manning and equipment levels. These differences are noted in the footnotes to the tables in the Appendix. Similarly, the majorin the tactical air forces are in the rates at which new aircraft are introduced.
III. Reactions to US Strategics and Forces
A. USithdraw to Western Hemis-phere; maintain capability for major Western Hemisphere contingency only.
If the US adopted this strategy, the world would bo thrown into an uproar. imultaneousand extension of US nuclear commitments could mitigate the feelings of defenselesancss, but not very much. European and Asian allies andwould be pulled in two directions: toward regional security arrangements with their non-Ccmnunist neighbors; and toward accommodation with their Communist neighbors.*
The Communist powers would probably be slow to respond, partly out of disbelief. They would first want to assess tlieir new politicalflowing from the demoralization of the non-Communist states. The USSR would increase its pressures on West Berlin as part of its campaigneneral European settlement on Soviet terns. China would give more serious attention to tbefor an invasion of Taiwan while seeking politically to undermine the Nationalist government. For North Korea, one of the cardinal inhibitions on invasion of South Korea would be removed.
7 The representatives of the Department of State, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) believe that this paragraph does not fully convey theof negative European reactions to this strategy. The reaction of our European alliesSto the Western Hemisphere would be general consternation. Some countries might explore the possibilitynified European defense system, but any such initiative would likely founder under present or realistically foreseeable circumstances. Although the Europeans together have the economic means to provide defense against the USSR, they lack unityredible independent nuclear deterrent. Revived historical jealousies among the states of Western Europe would probably also contribute to the demise of any initiative toward collective defense without US participation. Sooner or later the West European countries would probably seek accommodation with the USSR on Soviet terms, to the detriment of US interests.
The Soviets' military response to US0 would probably be to structure their general purpose forcesevel approximating the NIPP-Lo projection but with additional strategic airlift/ sealift and surface naval forces. Under thisthe Soviets could afford to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe. The need to sustain theirin Eastern Europe and the desire tohroat against Western European countries would, however,eductionevel lower than NIPP-Lo. The decrease in general purpose forces in Europe would be partially offset by increases in the Far East forces.
The Soviets could be expected to increase their strategic airlift/sealift and surface naval forcesate greater than NIPP-Lo in order to take advantage of the removal of the US presence from many parts of the world. The Soviets would test the new power relationship, probing for such political gains as the traffic might bear. They would be concerned not to do this so fast as to make it likely that the US would reverse its The Soviets have not always shown great political sophistication in these matters, however, and they could move more rapidly than would be prudent. In any event, if the Soviets found their actions did noteversal of the US strategy,urther buildup of Soviet naval and airlift/ sealift intervention could be expected.
Both the Soviet Union and Communist China would intensify their efforts to extend theirin the world by all feasible means, including security arrangements and military and economic aid programs.
B. USaintain worldwide capa-
bility to aid allies except against direct Chinese or Russian invasions; sharplyUS force for NATO, rely on nuclear weapons; do not meet conventional Chinese invasion in Asia.
We assume that, in adopting this strategy, the US would publicly replace the strategy ofresponse with some form of early nuclear response as its doctrine for deterrence.
He also assume that the US, in itsof this policy and the way in which itconducted its affairs, would reaffirm existing commitments and try to make clear and credible its continued interest in and involvement with Europe and Asia. Thisrucial assumption, for thepuilback of forces from abroad wouldproduce foreign political reactions approaching those described under US Strategy 0.
The Soviet Union would react withand caution. It would want to gauge theand extent of US commitments which, though publicly reaffirmed, had been so altered in form as to raise new doubts. The Soviets vould also want timo in which to assess the reactions of US allies, hoping that disarray among these countries would provide them with opportunities for political gains. Their initial military response would be totheir general purpose forces in the sameas under US Strategy 0.
* In the view of the representatives of theof State and the Joint Staff, more(since the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee would be severely undermined) is that no euoh crude Soviet move vould be necessary to extend political influence over the several states of Western Europe. Political pressures backed by overwhelming military superiority would be sufficient.
Once the assumptions noted above becaire clear, we think it highly unlikely that the USSR would conclude that surprise attack in Europe had become an attractive or feasible course of action. This view rests on the continuation of the USdeterrent as well as the considerationsin tho Introduction.* In the special caso of West Berlin, the USSR, urged on by East Germany, would probably feel encouraged at some point toits pressures. The Soviets would expect in these circumstances considerable progress toward their versionuropean settlement, including formal acknowledgement of the division of Germany. Pressures on Berlin would be aimed at promoting this outcome.
The Soviets would probably also come to believe that they could safely increase their military involvement in non-NATO areas where OS defense commitments were not formal and clear-cut. In tho Middle East, however, their conclusions would depend heavily on what sort of naval presence the US retained in tho Mediterranean. If the US totally withdrew from this area, the Soviets would judge that increased involvement carried little additional risk; withdrawal of, soy, half the present level of US strength would probably not greatly affect, in and of itself, the Soviot calculation of risks. The actual outcome would be influenced by the Soviet judgment of UShether Moscow concluded that these withdrawalstrong tendency to neo-isolationism which lowered tho likelihood that the US would use the Sixth Fleet in various contingencies.
We doubt that the USSR would make any early moves to reduce its own forces in Europe. It would not want to encourage in Eastern Europe the thought that it was prepared to loosen its grip. And the Soviets wouldreater concern,at first, about the role of West Germany in Central Europe in the absence of large US forces there. They would nevertheless perceive anin their security. The US reductions might lead them to conclude that they could stretch out re-equipment programs for their general purpose forces. They would probably also feel freer toto any requirements they saw for transferring units to the Chinese border areas. ime, and assuming that the European members of NATO did not moke up for the US withdrawals, Moscow would probably reduce its forces in Eastorn Europe, pulling, say, one quarter or more of itsivisions out of East Germany.*
* The representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Staff believe that prudence on their part might cause the Soviets to maintain their present level of military forces in Central and Eastern Europe to pursue political objectives there--and quite possibly more long-range goals than they can now imagine as feasible.
The Soviets would be of two minds about the Asian aspects of this strategy. They would see US withdrawal as an opportunity to extend their own influence, but they would also fear, particularly with respect to Southeast Asia, that thiswould work more to Chinese advantage than to their own. In addition, they would be concerned that, to the extent that the Sino-Americanwound down, the groundwork was being laid for Sino-American collusion against the USSR.
In these circumstances, the USSR would probably step up its cultivation of state-to-state relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. Insofar as it could do so without compromising this aim, it would give greater support to Communistin the region. In Northeast Asia, Moscow probably would not look with favoresumption of the Korean war, which wouldush to Japanese rearmament and riskeversal of the new US policy, while bringing no direct advantage to the USSR. Nevertheless, we do not believe that thowould curtail their military assistance to and political support of North Korea.
There would be much consternation when the US broached this strategy in NATO. Doubts about the US nuclear commitment would initially riseigh level. The Europeans would anticipate thoprospect of renewed pressures to increase their own conventional forces. Many Germans would fear that the US move would expose them dangerously to Soviet pressures and perhaps evenacit sellout of their interests. Even thoughentertain no great hopesegotiated mutual reduction of forces on the continent they would be dismayed that unilateral US action had foreclosed this possibility.
Longer-run reactions would dependreat extent upon subsequent Soviet and American behavior. If the USSRolicy of menace and threat, and the US political response seemed less than adequate, the initial fears about the value of the US nuclear guarantee would not only persist but grow. The more likely case, however,
to? fiKPTi m
is that the USSR vould concentrate upon political pressures in pursuing its demands for acceptance of the European status quo. We also assume that the US would conduct itselfanner which minimized erosion of the credibility of thedeterrent. In those circumstances much of the oarly consternation in Western Europe would subside in time.
In the field of strategicowering of the nuclear threshhold would probably cause much turmoil. Host of NATO's Europeanstill retain considerable concern, however, over flexible response because they fear that it weakens the deterrent to conventional and limited nuclear war in Europe.* This concern appears to be growing as appreciation of the consequences of limited nuclear war becomes more widespread. The shift in posture by the US would be large and abrupt enough, however, to cause its allies first tosecurity alternatives. European nuclear deterrents would attract new attention, and voices on the German right would be heard to question West Germany's policy of nuclear self-denial. Efforts to uniteuropean nuclear force would still face great difficulties, however. We doubt that, in the end, the NATO allies would decide to increase their own contribution offorces very much, or that problems of strategic doctrine would be grave enough to destroy the alliance.
The chief problem would be Germany. The Germans would, of all the allies, feel the mostinsecurity. We do not think, however, that Bonn would decide to accept the isolation andenmity which wculd be the consequenceational nuclear weapons program. Nor would the
7 Attime we note that the NATOofficially support the flexible response coneept in supporting the current HA TO strategy. The key elements of HATO strategy ere la) direct defense, (b) controlled escalation, and (o) general nuclear response. HA TO strategy conforms toguidance furnished to the NATO Military Co
Germans want to provoke the alarm of their allies and the USSR by increasing their conventional forcesjut which would reduce thebetween German and non-German forces in the alliance is more likely, unless Soviet conduct seemed tolear and present danger.
The Germans would alsoeakening of their political position. This could cause
to feel that they had to go further along the
line of extending recognition to East Germany in hopes of promoting detente in Central Europe. At
same time, they would seek to move closer to
France. The recognition that West Germany'ssecurity guarantee still rested with the US, however, would limit these trends.
Evenontinued US nucleara reduction in forces in Europe on the scale considered in this strategy would, in the long run, diminish US influence in the alliance.
trend would make it harder to get the Euro-
peans to accept various US proposals and to main-
*an anti-Soviet frontide range of
issues. But it might also help to facilitate the
within NATOuropean grouping in-
toommon view and to pursue
common projects. The oppositeisin-
of NATOeries of unilateral na-
tional movements toward Sovietbut less likely.
The reprtsentatives of tht Joint Staff, tht Office of the Secretary of DefenseSecuritynd theof State believe that this station underrates RATO reactions to this strategy. Our European alliee might conclude that the
of these forcesreoursor to
total disengagement from the continent. They vould tend to doubt that the remaining "trip wire" forces vould providt thelink between NATO forces in Europe and
'US strategic deterrent.
|under Strategyur European allies
be increasingly inclined tovard accom-
modation with the USSR. There is athat the Europeans vould attempt to
nified conventional defense capability, while depending for the short term upon the US nuclear guarantee. they would realize that in the longer term European countries alone or in concert would have to acquire anuclear deterrent against the USSR. Otherwise, there would be little point in making the increased conventional effort. Without centralized political institutions, European effortsnified defense would probably fail.
The Chinese probably would feelto increase their political and militaryto "people's wars" in Southeast Asia, They would also judge that their own security wasand would expect their influence in Asia to grow. The likelihood of large-scale Chinesewould not be significantly altered, but probing actions against the offshore islands would be likely. Taiwan would notirectof its security, presuming the retention of allarge part of the Seventh Fleet, but it would be concerned over the possibilityore complete US withdrawal from Asia,oncomitant rise in Communist China's stature, in the longer term.
Both Koreas would judge that theof all American combat troops from South Korea, whatever the US said, greatly diminished its commitment to tho defense of that country. This would, in our view, increase the chancesorth Korean attack. South Korea, anticipating
this, would press the US very hard foraid andew treaty commitment. tho other hand, the US leftart of
South Korea the chances of war proaaoiy would not change very much, although South Korea wouldassert the opposite.
In the above cases, the reactions of all concerned would be affected by the extent to which they believed that the US had won or lost the war in South Vietnam. We consider in thistwo illustrative outcomes. In the first, the US withdraws from South Vietnam, leaving ineak neutral government or worsen the second, it hasettlement whichtable pro-Western government in Saigon with control of theand leaves at least sone US advisers in theavorable outcome").
China and North Korea on the one hand, and Taiwan and South Korea on the other, would be encouraged or discouraged in obvious ways by these variants. Ke think that these alternativein Vietnam would not radically alterin these countries to tho US option, but the "unfavorable outcome" in Vietnam would probably encourage China to increase further its support for "people's wars" in Southeast Asia. Hanoi, on the other hand, will bo far more sensitive to the course of US policy in South Vietnam than it will to tho US regional or global posture. Nevertheless, there would be some effect from the adoption of this strategy. In the "favorableanoi would probably conclude that USendered unlikely the resumption of US bombing and ruledS invasion, and that it could calculate its strategy in the South and in Laos and Cambodia In the "unfavorablehe North Vietnamese would interpret USs giving it great freedom of maneuver and timing as it mixed political and military tactics in completing the takeover of the South.
Thailand regards externally supported insurgency as the most serious threat to itsalthough the Thai do not discount completely the possibilityarge-scale invasion from China or North Vietnam. While the Thai expect the US to reduce its combat forces substantially after tho fighting ends in Vietnam, they would be shocked if all US combat units were withdrawn from the mainland of Southeast Asiaietnamese settlement. In the worst case, complete withdrawal of US forces from the mainland following an unfavorablein Vietnam, the Thai would probably begin byore definite US commitment in the formutual defense agreement. If these efforts failed and tlie Thai became convinced that the US had abandoned its SEATO commitments, they would probably gradually abandon their Wostern-oriented foreign policy andore neutral position and an eventual accommodation with Peking.
C. US StrategyATO oriented; provide
for initial defense of NATO except against worst-case surprise attack followingmobilization; same asn rest of the world.
In considering this and succeedingwe assume that the US framesanner designed to maximize the deterrent value of its forces.
As concerns the European aspects of this strategy, the USSR would perceive no substantial change and therefore would not be prompted toits policies. With respect to non-NATO areas, it would probably conclude that the overallof US general purpose forces provided it with some increased freedom to pursue its foreignobjectives. Soviet concerns about theof this US posture in Asia would be similar to those outlined under US Strategy 1.
The Soviets' military response to this US Strategy wouldontinuation of their present
general purpose force structure trends. The threat to the Soviet Union--the US forces in Europe and the continental US forces available for use inat approximately the same level as in the existing US deployment. Soviet forces in Europe could be expected to remain at existing levels; the Soviet posture in the Par East would belargely independent of US actions; and the Soviets can be expected to continuearitime presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
NATO members would not be much concernededuction of US forces and commitments in Asia. They would be anxious, however, forthat this move did notubsequent withdrawal from Europe.
Asian reactions would be similar to those outlined under US Strategy 1. This is true, to an important extent, for all the succeeding options as well, since in all these cases USin Asia is almost the same. Noithernor non-Communist governments are likely to react very strongly to the stated variations in forces available for Asia but deployed in theUS. Apart from deployments in Asia, the important variables are the level of military assistance and the persuasiveness of declared US commitments, as well as the outcome in Vietnam.
With respect to US Strategy 2A, if the Vietnamese outcome were favorable, most Asianwould judge that US commitments remained valid despite the NATO orientation of our strategy. Xf this orientation were combined with anoutcome in Vietnam, however, US credibility would be difficult to maintain. In this instance, pressures would mount for higher levels of military aid and increased assurances of support or, failing this,hailand.
D. US Strategysia oriented; peacetime forces for sustained defentic against Chinese invasion in Southeast Asia or Korea; same as inor NATO.
In their thinking about Europe, theprobably would be governed by reactions falling between those described for USnd 2A. They wouldarge reduction of US forces in Europe, presumably accompaniedoclaratory policy lowering the nuclear threshhold. At the same time, they wouldubstantial airlift/sealift capability and would have to assume that forces in the continental US, although intended for Asia under this option, were available for commitment to Europe. Thus their calculations of the risks associated with forward moves would tend to fall between thosefor USnd 2A. The Soviets' military reaction would be to structure theirpurpose forces at about the same level as for US Strategyut transfers of forces from Eastern Europe to the Far East would be less likely.
Soviet tactics toward Western Europe would be designed both to encourage any neutralism generated by the US moves and to guard against the possibility that,iminished US presence. West Germany wouldelatively moreand less constrained power.
NATO allies, perceiving the same changes as did the USSR, wouldittle differently. They would, out of prudence, tend to discount US rapid deployment capabilities which tho Soviets, out of prudence, would tend to credit. Theirwould be similar to those outlined under US Strategyith one important difference. Even if the US did not make oxplicit the Asian orientation of this option, this would emerge over time. When it did, Europeans would be thrown into political confusion. Raving been assured of the priority which the present administration attaches to Europe,
NATO governments would in this case judge that the US policy reversal was so substantial as to call into question the nuclear deterrent.
To the extent that the Asian orientation of this strategy emerged, Communist China would judge that the threat to its security, and thaof Soviet-American collusion, had increased somewhat. With US regional deployments unchanged, however (and perhaps reduced in Southhis reaction probably would not be so strong as to lead to changes in Chinese behavior in supporting "people's wars."
In Vietnam, avorable outcome had beenriority for Asian commitments might help somewhat to restrain Hanoi from an earlyof heavy fighting. In the case of anoutcome, US Strategyould have littlein this regard.
Non-Communist governments would react along the lines discussed in US Strategy 1.
E. US Strategyeet either Warsaw Pact or Chinese invasion as in Strategiesnd 2B, but not both simultaneously.
This would be perceived abroadolicy of adhering to existing commitments in all regions while reducing forces somewhat but maintaining present deployments in Europe. Reactions would be those described for Europe under US strategynd for Asia under 2B.
F. US Strategypproximates currently approved strategy; meet Warsaw Pact and Chinese invasion as in Strategiesndimultaneously.
US Strategyame as Strategyeet Chinese in Korea and Southeast Asia simultaneously.
These two strategies would be seen abroad as essentially identical. Forces and deployments would be perceived as roughly similar to those which presently exist (except perhaps in Korea, for which see the discussion of would therefore be minimal in bothand non-Comwunist governments, which would tend to conclude that US policy remained unchanged.
These strategies, and Strategics 2E,s well, are based on the contingency thatmajor wars might occur with tho Warsaw Pact in Europe and with China in Asia. One question is whether this contingency could over the next fivo or six years arise outoordinated full-scale Sino-Soviet attack on the US and its allies in both Europe and Asia. Given the state of relationsthe USSR and Communist China, any suchmilitary thrust could come only, after aredirection of relations between the two major Communist powers. approchement would evolve slowly and almost certainly would be highly visible to the West.
Over the next several years, the moreconcern probably should be whether, if the US were at war with one major Communist power, the other night attack, notesult of prior coordination, but unilaterally. In considering such possibilities, wo note that the contingency presumes that the US has gonear footing ip at least some respects. It also presumes that either nuclear weapons have been used or that the possibility of their use has risen.
The Study Group is divided as to theof an attack on our allies by either the USSR
or Communist China if the US were at war with the other. Some members of the Study Group believe that the increased risk of US retaliation withweapons would be recognized by the nation not at war and tiiat it would, therefore, act with Other members of the Study Group are of the opinionajor US involvement in oneof the world would be viewed by the USSR or China as an opportunity for profitable overtin another area.
The members of the Study Group who believe that the Communist leaders would act with restraint think it highly unlikely that the Soviets wouldthat aggression in Europe carried less risk should the US become engagedajor conventional war with China. On the contrary, they believe that the Soviets would almost certainly conclude that the nuclear threshold in Europe had droppedand that, if the USSR attacked, any. restraints on the US response arising from domestic opinion would be minimal. These members argue that the main concerns of the USSR, as illustrated by their reactions to Vietnam and the Middle East crisis, would probably be to avoid direct involvement and to position themselves to profit from the outcome of their rivals' struggle. These considerations would be even stronger if the war in Asia had become nuclear.
Similarly, in the view of these members,ajor war were in progress in Europe, the Chinese would probably judge that US propensity, to meetin Asia with nuclear weapons had greatly increasedecond aggression might confront the US with the choice of abandoning one theater or resortinguclear response. They would almost certainly believe that the risks of the latter choice were too high and that China, as the much weakerpower, would receive the nuclear blow. Tt is recognized, however, that the Chinese might see this contingency as an opportunity to increase theirshort of invasion, in Southeast Asia.
For thesethe contingency of
what might be calledwar, involving
the USSR in EuropeChinese in both Korea
and Southeast Asia,as even more unlikely.
On the other hand, the members of the Study Group who are of the opinion that the Communist leaders would look upon US involvementajor war as an opportunity to act elsewhere consider that, in the, eventS war with China, the Soviets might conclude that it would be advantageous to initiate military moves in Europe and in the Middle East. These members note that the commitmentignificant part of the US armed forcesar in Asia would unquestionably weaken the USto respondrisis elsewhere and that the Soviets, therefore, could feel free to act in an aggressive manner.
Similarly, in the eventar in Europe, these members of the Study Group believe thatChina would not view the risk of US nuclear response as having risen significantly andwould become more aggressive in Asia. these members consider that the Chinese might recognizo an increased risk of nuclear war, but be willing to accept increased risk in view of the improved opportunity for military successfrom US involvement elsewhere.
have not been
The Study Grouphole believes that the probable reaction of North Korea to USelsewhere would be one of restraint. ajor and prolonged US Involvement in Vietnam has not led Pyongyang to conclude that the risks of attack upon South Korea are lower. But therehance that European war, if it were lengthy and indeterminate, might persuade the North Korean leadership, which is unusually bold and single-minded, that amoment for invasion had arrived. On balance, we think this chance is small, so long as US combat forces
iron South Korea.
G, US Strategyonduct either sustained
defense of NATO and holding action in Asia (Korea and Southeast Asia) or initialof NATO and sustained defense in Asia.
Our NATO allies would react negatively to this strategy and toecause they
provideustained conventional defenseEurope. The Europeans see suche-run of Worldnd II andrelish the prospect. US capabilities toprolonged conventional war in Europe wouldthe credibility of the US nuclearEuropean reactions would be even morewe pressured our allies to match ourNATO allies do not interpret the strategyresponse" or of "direct defense" toa sustained defense. In fact, they doenough war material to enable them too 45
The Soviets' reaction to this strategywouldontinuation of their presentpurpose force structure trends. They maysome forces slightly in response to the increase in US logistic stockpiles and tactical aircraft, but
1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that cur NATO allies, in effect, support the sustained defense concept in supporting the current NATO strategy of direct defense. (a) Direct defense seeks to "defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy choosee to fight." The ministerial guidance to the NATO Military Committee which led to theof the concept of direct defense imposes no time limitation on planned duration of the direct defense phase. "Full options for direct defensewhen NATO can successfully counter anyat whatever place, time, level, and duration it occurs." fb) The Joint Chiefs of Staff further considertrategy of sustained conventional defense of Western Europe would not evoke the kind of negative reaction as stated. The principalreaction would be based upon economic constraints, rather than the validity of the strategy. The growing concern of the NATO allies over the effects of aexchange, even at the tactical level, suggests that this strategy might become mora acceptable over time. The alternative to the sustainedowering of the nuclear threshhold with the associated risk of high levels of collateral damage.
overall they probably would view the threat to the Soviet Union as being approximately the sane as in the existing US deployment.
H. USeet enemy capabilities worldwide.
USame as Strategyut less capability assumed for allies.
The Soviets would perceive an increased threat to their position in Europe. Theyuildup of their own general purpose forcesevel approximating the NlPP-Hiand with pressure on their East Europeanikewise- 1'. under this option, three more US divisions were deployed to Europe, the Soviets' concern would be grave and thoir buildup rapid. Some general purpose forces intended for tho Far East would be diverted to Europe.
The growth of Soviet airlift/soalift and surface navaj forces might be temporarilyduring the buildup of the forces opposite NATO. Over the long term, however, these forces can be expected to increase as currently projected.
buildup on this scale would--asabove for Strategythe security concerns of most NATO allies. It would arouseopposition on the grounds that it revived the cold war and negated the chances of relaxinq tensions. Gerirany would be the principalof the increased US capabilities, but Bonn would not be willing to meet the increased offset requirements and needs for additional trooparising from three additional US divisions in Europe. NATO members would be unwilling toorresponding increases in their own forces.
3. Rest of World
Those postures would increasethat body of world opinion which regards the US outlook as excessively military and fears that the US is arrogating to itself the role of -world policeman.- Some Asian allies would value themilitary aid associated with US Strategy 3.
Representative^Soviet General Purpose "Forces Opposing Proposed'US Strategies ana Forces
Because of uncertainties in both nonmilitary and military factors, we cannot define Sovietto US actions with precision. We can, however, describe the general levels of effort that the Soviets might devote to general purpose forces inn relation to different US postures.
The three illustrative general purpose force packageu shown in the following tables have been designed to approximate reasonable Soviet reactions to the several US alternative strategies and force structures proposed for NSSM-3. Although the body of intelligence analysis underlying these force packages isautionary note is Tho quantification of force levels may create an impression of precise information,about future forces and systems, which would be quite unjustifiable in the light of tlie extent of our information.
The representative force packages arowith the Soviet forces projected for then the Notional Intelligence Projections for Planning The present trends in Sovietwith modern arms,airlift/cealift capability, and development of the ability toore extensive navalexpected to continue to some degree in each of the representative packages.
The components of the Soviet reaction forces have been costed in detail in National Intelligence Projections and Estimates. Average annual costs varyow ofear implied by Soviet Forceoear for Force Packagen equivalent US cost terms. Both figures include only costs of equipping
and maintaining the specified forces underconditions with normal levels of operating reserves. The costs vould be considerably higher if the Soviets were to begin preparations forustained conventional war. Economic considerations as they affect Soviet decisions on conventional forces are discussed more fully in the section on interactions between strategic andpurpose force postures.
Soviet General Purpose Forceseetructuredikely Soviet response to US Strategies, and 2B, generally corresponds to the low projection for Soviet ground and tactical air forces in existing national intelligence and to the high projection for airlift/sealift and surface naval forces. Forceseehe likely level of response to US Strategies 2A, 2AB, 2C, 2D, and 2E, generally corresponds to the middle of the range of existing national intelligence. Force Package 3 (see Tableesponding to USnd A, generally corresponds to the high projection for ground ond tactical air forces and to the low projection for airlift/sealift and surface naval forces.
The major differences in the three projected force packages in regard to ground and tactical air forces are qualitative, not quantitative. The total number of army divisions does not vary greatly between them, but there ore substantial differences in manning and equipment levels. The qualitative aspects of the force packages are noted in the tables. Similarly, the major differences in the tactical air forces are in the rates at which new aircraft are introduced.
orce Package 1
Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces Opposing US Strategics 0, ndContinued)
SSG and SSGN SSN
Heavy reconnaissance Kedium bombersatrol/ASW
3 CO 0
Motor! jo'! rifle divisions or
ndicates full-strength divisions. Catogory ripercent strength in men and major items of equipment.
b. This force package projects Increase* and improvements in artillery, logistic support, and nuclear-capable rocket and missile launchers to be phaseden- to fifteen-year period instead of the projected five- to ton-year period estimated
orce Package 2
Projected Soviet General Purpose Forces Opposing US Strategies 2A. 2AD. 2C. 2D, andContinued)
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