Created: 7/1/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence Office of Strategic Research


Part II

Copy Ko. (

SR7 July9




Antimissile Defense .

Antisatellite Defense


I. Trends in Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense


II. Ballistic Missile Defense

Status of Soviet ABM



for Nationwide

Force Level Projections

Deployment Timing

Antisatellite Defense

Tracking Radars


IV. Soviet Civil Defense


Figure 1: Timing of Soviet Ballistic Missile

Defense Programs (chart)

Figure 2:


Figure 3: Areas of tho USSR Most Likely to

Receive ABM Defenses (map)

Fi gure 4;


Figure 5: Soviet Radar Coverage of Ballistic

Missile and Satellite Threats



Contribution to NIE

Soviet Strategic Defenses Part II


Antimissile Defense

Although deployment of the Moscow ABM system is probably nearing completion, the Soviets areto invest heavily in ABM research and If development is successful and in theof an arms agreement, the Soviets will probablyollow-on area defense system with an IOC6 or later.

The effort to deploy ABM defenses at Moscow has produced an operational force that as9 totaledaunchers at three complexes. An additional complex will probably soon becomeof its sites in9 and the other in earlyto bring deployment of the present system at Moscow to what is probably its intended maximum of 64

The Moscow defenses will probably be expanded in the future by deploymentignificantly improved or follow-on system. Work has continued on support buildings at the two complexes where work on thearea was suspended in the fall Inrocket fuel storage at the central ABM support facility considerably exceeds current requirements.

Mote: completes the formal OSS contribution to HIE It contains sections on ballistic missile defense, antisatellitm defense, and civil defense.ontained sections on Soviet policy fordefense, air defense, and communications and naming facilities.

] econa large jLquibi.LJ.un aim

under construction near Chekhov, probably tn supplement the coverage of the Dog House, has proceeded slowly. Site preparation and construction of support facilities began more than three years ago but the firsi footings for the radar itself have only recently been constructed.

We believe deployment of ABM launchers is at

present limited to the Moscow area.

Development of ABM components continues at the Sary Shagan test center. Construction is in progress on several types of ABM radars and an improved, long-range interceptor missile,odified Galosh, is being tested.

Although some of this work is probably to improve components of the system ot Moscow, the major effort is probably directed towardystem suitable for more widespread deployment. The Soviots probably would deployystem as soon as possible. They have already invested the equivalent of aboutor the ABM defenses at Moscow and another oillion for the ABM research and development program at Sary Shagan, and in the past they havelarge and costly programs for active defensethey judged that important portionshreat could be neutralized.

In contrast to the uneven progress on the Moscow ADM facilities, the ballistic missile early warning radar system has continuod to expand, with threeDual Hen House radars started sincene is at Skrunda on the Baltic Sea coast, where it will supplement the coverage of the two existing early warning radars in the northwestern USSR. The other two are in the southern USSR, facing China andolaris threat from the Sea of Okhotsk. All three probably will be operational

Two considerations are fundamental in projecting the deploymentollow-on Soviet ABM system: the pace of technical progress at the test range, and the resources Soviet leaders are willing to devote to

If the development effort at Sary Shagan appears promising to theeployment program could be started as earlyell before development would be complete. rogram probably would not result in an operational capability4

The slow pace of deployment at Moscow, probably due at least in part to highly concurrent development and deployment, may well persuade the Soviets to delaydeployment decisions until adequate testing data are obtained. This could postpone the beginning of deploymentew systemear or two beyond the earliest likely date1 and delay IOC until at

Were the Soviets to devote resources to thisprogram at rates comparable to those of their most vigorous advanced weapons deployments of the past, they would spend a total of someillion rubles illion) to bring all units of the force operational. If the Soviets devote resources at this level to abased upon components currently being developed at Sary Shagan, they could fieldby This force would provide ADM coverage for aboutercent of the population and aboutercent of the industry, as wellarge portion of the strategic offensive and defensive forces.

The current status of the Soviet debate overresources suggests that an ABM deployment program begun during the early Seventies would be under heavy pressure from other resource claimants. We therefore judge it unlikely that resources allocated toeployment program wouldillion rubles during the period of this estimate.



Civil Defense?

The importanceigorous civil defense program was reaffirmed by Soviet leaders Since then, the level of civil defenserisen in the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders publicly view the civil defense program asthe chances ofuclear war and alsoeans forreater degree of patriotism and discipline in the populace. The basic Sovietcalls for mass evacuations of urban areas before an attack, but there are many unsolved problems-uncertain warning time, inadequateand providing supply and medical services to evacuees -

I. Trends in Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Doctrine

Strategic defense has longavoredwithin the Soviet military establishment. This position may be slipping somewhat, however, now that the technological shortcomings of present ABM hardware, internal military competition for resources, and the prospect of strategic arms limitations talks have raised questions as to the role of ballistic missile defense in Soviet military doctrine. The nature and extent of antiballistic missile deployment appears to haveajor question for Soviet military policy.


The inability of the Soviets, using presenttoallistic missile defense system suitable for widespread deployment may have exacerbated traditional arguments over the role of offensive and defensive forces in modern war. In the past, Soviet proponents of strategic offense have asserted that offensive missile forces canefensive role as well by penetrating an enemy's strategic defenses and blunting his offensive strike capability. Current statements stressing the penetration capability ofoffensive missiles, such as that by General Staff Chief Zakharov in April not only argue implicitly for expenditures on strategic forces but, by stressing the shortcomings of ballistic missile defenses, argue indirectly against devoting resources to deployingsystems in the USSR.

Technological difficulties encountered in fielding : ballistic missile defense systems may hamper efforts of strategic defense advocates to counter theseandtrong claimarge portion of the resources allocated to the military outab1ishment. eference to the US proposed ABM system by NovostiG. Gcrasimov in9 may also have pointed up Soviet problems. Gerasimov sfatod that "to be effectiveuclear attack, defense mustercent interception is impossible-"

Tho competition for resources has becomeacute in recent years as Soviet military doctrine has come to resemble more closely what in the West is termed "flexible response.- (See SR , The Sharpening Soviet Military Debate on Forcea for ,)

- 5

Thia concept implies improved capabilities for the Soviet general purpose forces, which may come at least in part at the expense of the strategic forces. As this concept has become more accepted in Soviet doctrine, strategic force advocates have retreated fromthat any war between nuclear powers wouldescalateeneral nuclear conflict. They now assert that the new conventional options only serve to emphasize the importance of the strategic rocket forces. One military writer argued in8 that overemphasizing tha importance of conventional weaponsmore serious" errorne-sidedon nuclear weapons. Ho argued that "the new possibilities for waging armed struggle have arisen not in spite of, but because of, nuclear-rocket Marshal Moskalenkoimilar line in the9 issue of the classified Soviet journal Military Thought.

The ABM question was probably one of the main points of contention in tho internal debate among the Soviet leadership prior to the decision to enter arms talks. When the Soviet government announced in8 that it would discuss offensive and defensive strategic arms limitations with the United States, Soviet spokesmen ceased referring publicly to aABM capability. Nor, with one exception in the classified press, have military writers argued during this time period that an ABM system is needed for the defense of the USSR. This moratorium, which is still in effect, is probably meant in part to lessen theof Soviet ABM developments on the formulation of defense policy in the US. At the same time, it serves to tamp down open discussion of what is probably a

sensitive internal issue for both Soviet military and political leaders. (See SR, Soviet Military Resistance to Strategic Arms Talks Increases, April"

Defensive weapon systems will probahly play an important role in any strategic arms talks with the United States. Even if there is an agreement to limit ABM deployment, the USSR will probably continue research and development of defensive strategicto keep its options open.

Three Dual Honunderprovide coverage of the US Polaris and ICBM threats from the north and northwest and two underin southern Siberia are oriented toward Chinaotential Polaris launch area in the Far East. One of the space-tracking Dual Hen Houses at Mishelcvka probably will also provide early warning of ballistic missile attack from China.

Since some ballistic missile threat approaches are not covered by present early warning radars, other radars will probably be deployed. Photography of those areas considered most likely for this deployment has been searched and no further construction has been found (soe figure

B. Future Developments

1. Prospects for Nationwide Deployment

The Soviets have been marking time on ABM deployment while continuing research and development at Sary Shagan. Some of the effort there isbeing devoted to upgrading components of tho Moscow ABM system, but will probably not lead toof the present system beyond Moscow. It is more likely that the existing Moscow complexes will be retrofitted with improvements as they become available. Significant improvement of major components, such as the site radars, might also warrant completion of some of the four unfinished complexes.

Large-scale construction projects and other activities under way at Sary Shagan are almost certainly aimedubstantial upgrading of present ABM The effort already devoted to newactivity suggests ew or greatly modified system is under development. Test firings of amodified Galosh antimissile missile have been under way forear. Large new antennas have been under construction6 on the site of thedevelopmental version of tho Dog House radar, and an incomplete Try Adds has been undergoingmodification. robable ABM launch area was hi-gun by March8 but is still under

There is no firm basis for estimating the type of missile and radar to be installed and tested at the modified Try Adds site. The similarity of


TOP sj[(

9 -

Search Areas for Soviet Dual Hen House Deployment

spacing between Galosh long-range interceptor launch positions and those at the new launch complexhowever, that the Soviets are continuingof long-range, exoatraospheric intercept systems- Furthermore, the' curtailment of the long-range Galosh deployment ut Moscow7 followed closely the resumption of activity at the previously dormant Launchry Adds facility. These events probablyecision to shift fromof the present long-range system at Moscow to developmentollow-on systemimilar role.

It is unlikely that the Soviets willerminal intercept system in operation against ballistic missiles in the next ten years. Judging from US experience with Sprint development, aterminal defense system probably could not be operational before the late Seventies, even if RftO facilities were already under construction. We have not identified any such construction. In addition, Soviet solid propellant and computer technologylags that of the US, and the developmentprint-like missile and its control radar would ba an even greater technological challenge to the Soviets than to the us.

2. Force Level Projections

have used past Soviet performance in

the deployment of advanced weapon systems to project the likely pace and magnitude of future Soviet weapon programs. An analysis of expenditures forast deployment programs provides us with measures ofwillingness to commit resources for specific weapon systems, and we have applied them to projecting Soviet ABM deployment. (See SR, Projecting Soviet AUH Deployment: An Analytical

Were the Soviets toighABM deployment program to which they committed resources over an eight-year procurement periodate comparable with the most vigorous programs of the past, they would expendillion rublesf aboutillion). For example.

the largest past effort, theurface-to-airprogram, cost lessillion rubles during the first eight years of its deployment. otal of about five and one-half billion rubles was spent during its complete procurement period ofears.

The most likely ABM system to follow the deployment at Moscow is a'long-range area defender. On the basis of the gross technical parameters expected of components observed at Sary Shagan, CMAIC hasa system whose key featuresong-range, phased-array regional acquisition radar capable oflauncher batteries as distantm. Each

battery has its own engagement and tracking radars and can control up toeloadable launchers.

If the Sovietseployment program based onystem and over the first eight years were to allocate resources worthillion rubles to it, they could probably field below) shows, for example, coverage for up to 16 of theighest value target areas of the USSR.


3. Deployment Timing

Deploymentollow-on ABM system based on the new or modified components under development at Sary Shagan appears unlikely to start Even with highly concurrent development and deployment, the first units ofystem probably could not become operational Construction and equipment installation are not yet completed on any of the new electronics and launch facilities at Sary Shagan. For example, the Roostis just now externally complete but probably will not transmit signals for several months and moreear of work willbe required to complete the modified Try Addsand launch positions at Launch Complex D.

The slow pace of deployment experienced at Moscow, probably due at least in part to highly concurrent development and deployment, may wellthe Soviets to delay future deployment decisions until adequate testing data are obtained on new This could postpone initial deploymentear or two beyond the earliest likely date1 and delay IOC until at


III. Antisatellite Defense

The Soviets have continued to condemn alleged US efforts to "militarize" outer space. This implied requirement for antisatellite defense has been given substance by the identificationpace-trackassociated with the national air defense The mission of PVO Strany (Antiair Defense of thedefend the USSR against air,and spacedefense against Data on objects dn space are probably collected and analyzed by the space-track authority, which could cooperate with other elements of PVO Strany or the Strategic Rocket Forces in conducting satellite.

A. Space Tracking Radars

Eight Dual Hen House radars at Saryat Mishelevka near Irkutsk are probablySoviet antisatellite defense. Whenradars willpace surveillance netsouthern USSR providing radar coverage

from near the horizon to the zenith. It will

ood capability to track satellites in near earth orbits.

Constructionet of four Dual Hen House radars began at each location

Each set consists of two dual radars which cover low angles of elevation (nicknamed Thin Boy) andwhich cover high elevation angles (nicknamed Fat Boy). All of these radars are externally completefor the two Fat Boys at Mishelevka. 7 and mostonstruction on these radarshalted. Construction resumed in8 and the remaining radars probably will be externally complete this year. J

j hree of theTIYIH Boy at eacn ic-ca-tionat Boy at Sary Shagan. All eight Dual Hen Houses could be operational

To supplement data on space objects provided by the southern space surveillance network, thecould also use theearly-warning Dual Hen Houses at Olenegorsk and Skrunda





IV. Soviet Civil Defense

The latest developments in this subject arein SRivil Defense in the Soviet Union,he summary of which is presented here.

Soviet political and military leaders atd Party Congress6 reaffirmed their belief in the importanceigorous civil defense program. Since then, there haseneral rise in the level of civil defense activity in the Soviet Onion.

In part, the renewed emphasis reflectstrong civil defense posture would help the USSRuclear war, but beyond that it also serveseans forreaterof patriotism and discipline in the populace. The regime's growing concern over the danger of liberal influences has stimulated increased reliance onprograms for large-scale indoctrination.

No other country has informed its people ason the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Soviet citizens now are engaged in the sixth compulsory civil defensend civil defense has become asubject in elementary and secondary schools throughout the country. Workers are also participating in compulsory training. An extensive network of staff schools trains leaders for civil defense duties. The effect of all this indoctrination cannot bebut its pervasiveness has probably conditioned most of the populace to follow orders and take self-help measures in an emergency.

The Soviet military has an important role in civil defense. Military officers supervise the program, and in wartime civil defense operations involving millions of civilian workers would come under military control. In addition, the Sovietsumber of military civil defense units,hree-year school wasin7 to train junior officers in civil defense specialties.

ThG Soviel: concept of civil defense calls for mass evacuation of urban areas before an attack, because



blast-resistant shelter is scarce and is considered too expensive to buildarge scale. Thispresupposes adequate advance warningeriod of rising tension or nonnuclear war. Some key personnel would remain in place, however, to maintain essential services, and Soviet civil defense officials have claimed that some hardened shelters are provided for them.

The evacuees would disperse into the countryside by every means of transport available. Extensive plans have been made to handle the logistics of thisbut the feasibility of an expeditious evacuation remains questionable. Transportation could be aacute problem because of competing military needs and inadequate facilities.

Even if the urban dwellers were successfullythe problems of providing fallout shelter, food, and medical services for them would remain. Soviet civil defense literature devotes much attention to techniques for building earth-covered trenches,that the Soviets intend to rely heavily on this kind of last-minute preparation. There is little evidence that materials have been stockpiled in the countryside for shelter construction or for otherservices to the evacuees.

A decision to evacuate cities before an attack would cause enormous disruption and could have anpsychological effect on the population. Soviet leaders mightapability for evacuating citiesseful option for demonstrating theirshort of hostile actionrisis situation. On the other hand, evacuationeriod of rising international tension would have provocative overtones.




Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: