CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Created: 7/18/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

APPROVE Ii FOR3

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

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Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

Vietnam: Situation report. (Pace i)

NATO: Alliance representatives have generally en-Horsed US intentions to enter strategic armstalks with the USSR. (Page 2)

econd round of communal violenceimminent. (Page 3)

India: The political crisis is becoming more acute. TP^gi" 4)

onduras: Some fighting continuesa cease-fire may be near. (Page 5)

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USSR: Naval force in the Gulf of Mexico (Page 6)

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Jul 69

Intelligence Bulletin

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Malaya ia: econd round of communal violence appears imminent.

The recent ousteropular extremist leader from the executive council of the ruling UnitedNational Organization has strengthened theof extremist elements within the party and the Malay community to force Primeesignation and precipitate an openwith the Chinese, Rahman has been for both the Malays and Chinese the symbol of conciliation with the Chinese community*

the extremists' strategy is to

provoke further racial incidents, thereby forcing intervention by the predominantly Malay army, manyof whose junior and middle ranking officers favor

the extremists1 position. This would be followed by the ouster of Rahman along with the entire Malay "oldresumably including Deputy PrimeRazak, the moderate head of the emergency An extremist Malay government would be formed and the Chinese community would be suppressed. " ain, , however, that this time the nese are ready to retaliate with force.

An initial effort to carry out this strategy may have been made yesterday when analay students demonstrated at the University ofin Kuala Lumpur demanding Rahman's resignation. The students dispersed without provoking any Chinese reaction, but furtherarewell do so.

Whether communal violence resumes now depends largely on the government's firmness in suppressing Malay provocations and its swiftness in initiating policies acceptable to the extremists. Razak's in-eoc*'s*ver'eS5 suggests, however, that the government

may well fail to halt the growing power and militancy of the extremists and to prevent the outbreak ofviolence, which will almost certainly beuch larger scale than before.

Jul 69

Intelligence Bulletin

3

"India: ove to oust Prime Minister Gandhi appears co be in the making within the Congress Party.

deputy prime minister Morarji Desai's

resignation from the cabinet has set in trainpolitical activity which has drawn into New Delhi virtually every Congress Party leader of any consequence. Despite strong pressure on Desai to avert an open break in the party, he says he is willing to fight.

A party vote of confidence on the issue ofleadership may be taken when themembers of Parliament meet onuly. left wing is standing behind the Primewhile more conservative elements areby her old-guard opponents. Personalitynonideological factors will also play an im-

portant role.

Mrs. Gandhi's supporters are assertinghave more than enough votes tolearfromongress parliamentarians,may well be inflating their strength. Therecent actions have aroused unprecedented

opposition within the party, and some of her most steadfast supporters are shaken.

Key Congress leaders, including HomeB. Chavan, are attempting to)Siey may be successful despite the tension which If the parliamentary group should adopt a

motion, the ruling party could split

deeply that the country's present single-party

government would be in jeopardy. I

Because of Ihe shortage of time for prcmralion of loU item, lite analytic mlcrpretaiion presented here has been produced by ihe CentralAgency wiihout ihe part icip;ii ion of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Department of Defense

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LEIonduras: Some fighting appears to continue although there are signs that ancease-fire may come soon.

The major sticking point in the mediation has been the time allowedeturn to the status quo ante. Honduras insists that Salvadoranforces withdraw withinours of ancease-fire, but the Salvadorans are holding out forours. The OAS team hopes to move closerolution today.

Honduran officials, having agreed toease-fire, consider that El Salvador's failure to do the same automatically brands it as an aggressor under the Rio Treaty. There is feeling within the OAS that the immediate cessation of militaryof Honduran soil is basic to the inter-American system and not subject to negotiation.

There were tentative indications that Honduran troops were gaining ground lost earlier. Bothare short on arms and equipment, and bothare seeking arms abroad.

that as of 16

1 'Suly,ondurans had been reported killed.

The Honduran Government anticipates strong public reaction when the names and numbers of casualties become known.

disruption is being felt throughout

Central America. Costa Rican media are expressing pessimism over the future of the Central American Common Market, The Guatemalan foreign minister has indicated that his government is under public

ressure to Hdos some factories areYr^aylngper3cmnel beCause of trade interruptions.

Jul 69

Intelligence Bulletin

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NOTE

USSR: The Soviet naval force scheduled toa one-week visit to Cuba onuly hastwo groups in the Gulf of Mexico. Theof three guided missile ships and twosubmarines practiceduly in an areaof New Orleans. The support ships ofnaval squadron remained at anchor aboutwest of Key West, Florida. ovietsubmarine, which has not been part offorce, became the first known Sovietunit to operate in the Caribbean Seaighted moving south between Puerto RicoDominican Republic onuly.

SECRET

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board on9 approved the following nationalestimates:

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Soviet Attitudesthe US"

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