Created: 7/3/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

indicated overleaf



The Wowing intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of theof State and Defense, the AEC, ond the NSA.

Dr. Edward W. Prodor, for tho Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Mr.ennev,or the Director of Intelligence and Research,of State

Vice Adm.owronce. Acting Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Dr. Louis W. Tcrdella, for the Director, National Security Agency

Dr. Charles H, Reichardt. for the Assistant General Manager. Atomic Energy Com-million


Mr. William C. Sullivan, the Astisionl Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, tho subject being outside of hit jurisdiction.

top secner-

This materia! contains information affecting the National Defense of the within the meaning of the espioe"^nT"'11 , the trons-no'n or which in any manner to an unauthorizedrohibited.






Nun-Weapons Uses and Pipeline

In Weapons in Stockpile


Test Activity

Effects Analysb

Testing and the Lunited Test Ban Treaty




Weapons Now in Stockpile

Soviet Weapon Developments During the Past Six. Years

Futme Weapons Development and Requirements


14 andM



Power and Dual-PurposeW

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives


roi' sccrct



To review significant developments in Soviet nuclear programs over the past few years, and to estimate the probable course of theseover the next five toears.


USSRarge stockpile of nuclear weapons whichis sufficient in numbers and variety to meet the needs offorces. We estimate that future production ofufficient to support projected Soviet weapons

is now more than six years since the Soviets lasttests in the atmosphere^

jAccordingly, our estimate of recent developments in Soviet nuclear weapons programs is largely limited to what can be inferred from previous trends in weapon developments, from test yields, from our interpretation of Soviet effects testing, and from estimated Soviet military requirements.

their underground test program, the Soviets could bedata concerning the effect of neutrons, gamma rays, andmaterials, subsystems, and components. We believe thatnot been testingay effects on large components orWc believe they have been obtaining data concerningeffects.




therevidence that the warhead on thefor tlie ADM system being deployed around Moscow isthan conventional design, we can have little confidence thatnot. We have insufficient evidence from Soviet nuclearand testing to decide.

we liave no direct evidence of specific Sovietharden their warheads against nuclear effects, Soviet warheadvehicle design practices appear to provide an inherent

have no reason to believe that the Soviets plan totesting in the atmosphere. Should they elect to do so,probably would not be able to detect preparations more thanor so before the lest. Even then we could only say thatof atmospheric testing was possible.

believe, on the basis of observed speeds, that Sovietnewer ones and modified olderplants that deliver0 shafthermal capacity ofegawatts.

Soviets have evidently overcome the engineeringearlier in their nuclear power program. They havepast two years started construction on large nuclear powerin the USSR and in some East European Communistthey have tendered proposals for construction of suchthe Bloc

Sovietstrong and continuing program forof nuclear explosives and lead the world in mosthave outlined ambitious plans for future projects andconcern for the health and safety aspects. Theythey would be willing to provide nuclear explosiveother countries.




Equivalent. The USSR has large reactor complexes althe Urals and at Tomsk in western Siberia.argeat Dodonovo. north ol Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, which, weone or more reactors installed underground. We believe lhat reactorswent into operation late6espectively, andonly addition to production reactor capacity in the past severalcapacity may be under construction at One or more sites.

estimates ot cumulative Soviet production ofiven inepresent an estimated error range ofpercent above and belowcentral figure.

Tbe projection of future plutonium production4 is derived by adding estimates of production from new facilities to tlie estimated current production. Tlie low side assumes continuing production from the reactors now in operation, andeareactor that went into operation too late to be included in the estimatebe high side includes, not ooly thu increaie. but also additional production from other new facilities mentioned in paragraphmounting toear, starting

4 annual Soviet production of plutonium equivalent in production reactors will increasingly be aflected by current and future decisions and actions that wc cannot now detect or confidently predict Fulfillment of military needs and the increasing availability of plutonium from power and propulsion reactors might lead to the shutdownuge portion of the Soviet production reactor capacity. Conversely, additional needs for reactorerhaps io connection with employment of large numbers of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes or for weapons programs which wc cannot now project, might lead toincreases in annual rates of productionf, for example, the Soviets were5 to shut down production reactors at Kyshtym and Tomsk, then cumulative9 could he as low as aboutetric tons; alter-natively, if they were to start up new reactorsapacity equivalent to that

1 Wc bellevr iheeflecr al Irwi-ot yti irBcHird tn production in IDUO



cumvutivxrow Wtirom






Includes both pbtonmm and tnOura, One kilogram of plutonium is equivalent torains of tritium.

Tfceae ranges represent limllt witbio which we think the true valueigure midway between the top and the bottom of thehe most probable.

In teruu of uranium enriched toontent.

Tbe range reflect* different methodologies ande have no good basis foeost probable single figure within tbe range. (See

Calculated from cumulative produeooo ni production reactors,0 percent allowance for production and reworking pipeline, plutonium equivalent used in weapons tests, and losses through tritium decay.

' Cumulative production,roduction and reworking pipeline estimated to beercent of cumulative prcduotioo, and leu equivalent topsed in the test program and in power, propulsion, and research reactors.

at Kyjlitym or Tomsk then cumulative production9 could be as highetric tons.

he Soviets also produce plutoniumrowing number of power and propulsion reactorsf

^We believe, however, that tbe Soviets are moreleast during the next fiveaccumulate their relatively small stocks of plutoniumin power and propulsion reactors to meet future needs for fast breeder reactor fuel. For this reason we have listed this production separately to Table I. and have not included it to the amounts available for weapons.4 the rapidity with which the cumulative plutonium production from power teaelors grows will depend entirely upon the pace and extent of their power andprograms. If all the reactors estimated or projected to Table VI were to be completed, and they build nuclear-powered submarines as we now project, they could be0 tons ofear from jwwer and propulsion

rcactonevel of production, however, assumes Soviel achieve-mem of goals lhat have often been unrealistic in tlie past.

. The USSR has four large gaseous diffusion complexes for theof uranium enriched: in the Urats. Tomsk in western Siberia, and Angarsk and Zaozemiy in central Siberia. Wc believe construction at Zaozcmiy is ncaring completion. We have no evidence of initiation of new construction ofroduction facilities


Soviets may be ejperimentinrjilot-plant scale with the gaiprocess lor enrichment of uranium, but this is highly speculative.of cumulative production4 assume continued operationdiffusion buildings now in operation, at current efficiencies andno additional production facilities

productionfterprojected on the sameof no changes tn tbe sire, performance, or operating status of tbeope separationprovide tbe Sovietsumulativeofetric lorn byhese assumptions,are increasingly unlikely in the. While Soviet weapoosprobably require decreasing shares of the cumulative production, theof Soviet power and propulsion reactors will grow. Althoughproduction capacity could probably satisfy their internal needs,needsr for uranium enrichment services are expected toin the latter part ofoviet entry into this marketsignificant demands on their separative capacity and perhaps leadand expansion of their plants.

Non-Weapons Uses and Pipeline

he Soviets do not put all their fissionable materials into weapons. The principal non wrajhots umis in propulsion systems in nuclear sub-



and In other power, propulsion, and research reactors lhat require uranium enriched. These non-weapons uses and losses probably do nol now amount to more than about Eve percent of the total; however, the share is likely to grow in the future. The non-weapons uses of plutonium are negligible; considering the plutonium available from power reactors, wc doubt the Soviets would have to use plutonium from production reactors for non-weapons uses in the future.

materials in pipeline or in weapons withdrawn from (hefor quality control or reworking arc also not available for weapons information on Soviet practice in these areas. In estimating tlieavailable for weapons, wc have assumed that aboutercent ofproduction will be involved in pipeline, reworking, and qualitychecks, or used for weapons tests and replacements for tritium decay.

In Weapons in Stockpile

estimates inf the amount of plutonium equivalent anduranium available for use in weapons in stockpile take theinto account. We estimate that the Soviets have sufficientmaterials to meet the current needs of their military forces.choices of weapons design and allocation priorities available to thebelieve that future Soviet military planning will not be limited byof fissionable materials available.


Soviets have continued underground testing in the past two yearsthe same rate asithests detected6so farSee Tablehrough

oviet nuclearwhichere underground tests detonated since the Limited Test BanSigned in

of these tests have been In the Degeleu Mountain Test Arean.m. west-southwest ofver live past two years, testsarea have averaged somewhat less than one per month, with yieldslessiloton (kt)t. Testing of larger weaponst or greater have continued at Novaya Zemlya, in the Soviet Arctic,rate of one per year. Three tests7 at the Konystan Test Arean.m. northwest of the Dcgelcn area) and one8 near the Shagan River,

' TrtU oi peaceful utci of nuclear erploslvct air discuucil in Section VI below.



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'tmitfmib) attributable lo (libutrld* Ih. boroVn of (he USSR.

' Debrit pfobMf, aRrihrtaUch MiSed the USSR.

somem cast ol the Dcgeleo area, are alio not assessed lo be for peaceful uses. We believe (he Soviets will be limited to yields oft at Degeien Mountainegatons (MT) at Novayaf they continue (heir past practices with regard to risk of venting.7 they have conductedof their tests att and above at Novaya Zemlya.

n addition to weapons testing, several other activities arc going forward in the Semipalatinsk area. We believe one of theseubed reactor, probably for simulation of nuclear weaponsesearch arid developmentuclear rocket may also be under way.umber of contidcrutions appear inconsistent withevelopment.

Effects Analysis

We believe Soviet interest In obtaining weapon effects or device output information from underground testing lias increased in the past two years.

Although we have no information concerning the goals of Soviet effects test programs, analogy with those of the US permits some judgments. Such analogy suggests that the Soviets could be obtaining data concerning the effect of neutrons, gamma rays,ays upon materials, subsystems, and

Wc believe the Soviets have also tested to obtain data concerningresponse of structures to seismic ground shock effects. Additional tests may occur.

Testing and the Limited Tost Ban Treaty

Debris unambiguously attributable to sir of theoviet underground tests was collected beyond tho borders ol the USSR; debris probably attributable to five others has similarly been collected,umber of other debriscan possibly be attributed to discrete tests. The Soviets have thusto risk violation of the Limited Test Ran Treaty when they felt it was in their interest to do so.

We have uo reason to believe that the Soviets intend to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We believe the Soviets expect to continuetesting for several years in the future. Should they elect to resume atmospheric or eroatrnosphenc testing, intelligence sources would have only very limited capability to provide advanced nottcel



Wcaporn Now in Stockpile

hermonuclear Weapons. Through toe end of their atmospheric testing2 the Soviet* emphasized ihe development of miillimcgaton thermonuclear (TN) weapons, rather than relatively small, lightweight weapons of lower yield; they achieved high TN performance in the multimegalon

^Weapons based on designs first tested in12 test scries probably began to enter stockpilelder TN weaponsfor and used in older weapon systems could of course still be in stockpile.

Some TN weapons based on underground tests may now be entering stockpile,

but wc have no basis for estimating their


ission Weapons. The Soviet fission weapons program bad2 been directed toward the development of reliable, efficient, and economical

iMost of

the newer fission weapons entering the stockpile forces over the past lew years, at least for Soviet general purpose forces, have probably been these improved low.yield weapons; they probably now makeubstantial portion of the fission weapons stock pde.




Soviet! Weopon Developments DurinQ the Past Six Years

Is now more than six yeais since the Soviets lastn the

1' estimate of

recent Soviet nuclear weapon developments therefore is largely limited to what can be inferred from previous trends In weapon developments, from test yields, from our interpretation of Soviet effects testing, and from estimated Soviet rnili-taiy requirements. The number of underground tests and their associated yields suggest that the Soviets could have made advances in weapon* langing in yields from suli-kiloton upew megatons.

Weapons. We believe that aboutf the Soviel tests lhatdetected since tlse signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty wereweapons development or testing of weapons effects. Someercent ofyields oft or

"]Most of tbe tests att or less probably represented improvements in fission weapons technology, particularly indiametersdeveloping special effects warheads.

on these tests, the Soviets might now beosition tofission warheads. They might also bo developing small fission weaponsapplications as atomic demolition charges. We have, however, nothe use of nuclear projectiles for artillery in Soviet exercises. If they didearhei weapons, Soviets probably bsttaetestuclear warhead for use on SAMs: these would probablywarheadsield of upew lensc hive noconcerning the weights of Soviet sating, arming, fuzing, and Bungbut bated on US experience, we believe the Soviets should haveto reduce SAFF weights for weapons entering stockpile in theSome of the fission weapons tests in the low-yield ranges may have,testing these new SAFF systems.

hermonuclear Weapons. AImmiIercent of the underground tests datectod3 had yields alwvet. Six in rangesl probably rcpresenlcd TN device or weapon tcsiing. Tho largest Soviet umlerground testt lest in the [all0 at Novaya Zcmlya.


Jlf they have pursued the development, and have been successful, they could now have in stockpile limited numbers of TN weapons of some new types lot some of their high priority delivery systems. These could become generally available in.


e have no direct evidence of specific Soviet efforts to harden their nuclear warheads against nuclear effects. However, in their past test programs they have gained considerable experience with blast ond thermal effects. More-over Soviet warhead and re-entry vehicle design practices apjiear lo provide an inherent hardness.eassessment of some of the earlier Soviet high altitude tests at Sary Shagan. we still believe that those tests, while highly soplusticated in their missile involvement and probably well irurjumeoled, lacked the cfuractertstics of tests designed to give detailed information on weaponWe continue to believe that they were conducted primarily to obtain radar blackout data. We believe that tbe Soviets are capable of expanding their knowledge of the effects of radiation on systems and components both by means of tlieir current underground test program and through the use of various simulation techniques.

there is no evidence that the warhead on the Galoshtlie ABM system being deployed around Moscow is of other thanwe can have little confidence that it is not. We have insidficientSoviet nuclear warhead development and testing to decide.

Future Weapons Development and Requirements

Soviets could probably test up to several megatons under theTest Ban Treaty, and thus could probably meet any present ordevelopment requirements below that figure. We believe theysignificant advances in TN weapons in the sub-megaton andrange. This is anhich they appear toajor rcqu.rcment for

Unproved warheads for new strategic missile delivery systems, and jtossibly for multiple warhead application.

the Soviets have not alreadypecial dosign in therange for ABM warheads, they could probably do so withon (he basis of existing technology, and (est them without violatingTest Ban Treaty. They could also test underground the responsematerials, components, and systems. Some developments would,involve considerable effort and great costs.


The Soviets have an extensive nuclear storage system progressing from national stockpile sites and regional sites to operational storage and handling sites for all the major operational force elements thatuclear capability. In the event of war. the initial ncods of Soviet forces for nuclear weapons would probably be met by the operational storage sites, with backup from rear echelons. Movement of nuclear warheads in the USSR is primarily by rail. large cargo planes and helicoptersar more rapid, if limited, means of weapons supply-In times of crisis, and the Soviets have acknowledged such supply. Some of the stockpile sites arc dose enough to the borders of the USSR In the west and east to provide direct support to Soviet forces outside the USSR.

Wc believe the Soviets have operational storage sitesew of theoccupied by the Soviet Tactical Air Force (TAF) In Eastern Europe. As no tactical missile nuclear warhead storage sites have been Identified in Eastern Europe, it is possible that airfield sites provide limited storage for tactical missile units as well as for TAF. We do not know if the Soviets now store nuclear weapons at the sites in Eastern Europe.

There arcarge, self-contained, highly secured, military installations located throughout European USSR which wc call Sensitive Operations Com pleieshey contain large hardened structures, extensive rail and road facilities, and extensive bousing and operationalr multiplicity of facilities at each of the SOCs suggests that the SOCs have multiple functions. These functions, however, remain unclear. We believe tint one of (lie functions of the SOCs includes storage and maintenance of nuclear weapons. We have identified no specific military force or weapon system associated with the SOCs.

Command and Control

of nuclear weapons would require authorization by thewould in wartime exercise control of the nuclear units throughHigh Commandody of the top political and military leaders)

and thence through the Minister of Defense and major force commarsders. Little is known about actual Soviet operational procedures for tbe control of firing nuclear weapons. Wc have no conclusive evidence concerning Iww operational nuclear warheads on ready missiles on land or at sea arc controlled, but we assume that some form of authentication system and/or permissive link in weapons is used toigh degree of control.

e have evidence that once tlie Polilbureau has decided dial nuclear weapons are to be deployed and may be used, control over tbe allocation and use of tacticalair andwith the Front orarmy commanders. Wo believe that control by Front commanders over the specific employment of tactical weapons would be fairly light.

v. marine propulsion

he pressurized water type reactors of the early Soviet nuclearbuilt in tbepparcody had problems. Operating levels were (unitedhermal output of aboutmegawattsr0nlspeeds observed during tbe first few years of operation. Modifications made during the early to inidlDGOs apparently overcame tlscae b'rmUbons. Observed speeds of some of these early submarines in the last few years, along with theoretical calculations, indicate that these improved submarines haveplants of0 shaft horsepower, equating to an operating level on the orderWt. This is proliably close to the caj>acity originally intended. Preliminary information on the new nuclear powered submarines now entering the fleet indicates that they have at least an equivalent shaft horsepower, and by implication, reactor power.

he nuclear icebreaker Lenin bas not been in operation since5 navigational season. Following an apparent nuclear accident, repair andthat involves extensivo work in the reactor area is now in progress at Severodvinsk. Improved fuel element technology reported by the Soviets08 Is expected to be incorporated into the Lenin's new reactor systems. Tlie Soviets also will probably utilize this new reactor technology In (heir new Arktika elasi of icebreaker, which they plan to commission in Ihe. Ihe new icebreakers reportedly will have two reactors of antype, providingimes the power of the Lenin's original *shipins would equate to0 shaft horsepower.

vi. peaceful uses

he use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has alsohare ofnd material resources put into Soviet nuclear energy programs. The nuclear electric power program has been moving forward, butuch slower pace than the Soviets originally pubbcized. In contrast, their unpubliclzed

gram for lhe peaceful uses of nuclear explosives is an area in which they lead the world in most applications- The Soviets apparently intend to enter tbe free world marvel for nuclear electric power stations and nuclear explosive services.

Power and Dual-Purpose Reactors

he Soviet nuclear power program announced6 called for electric generating capacity0 megawatts (MWe)t now appears it willapacityWeuring the past two years the Soviets have placed in operation the second section of the Boloynrsfc nuclear powerew section of the Tomsk dual purpose reactor complex, and (lie experimental sodium fail test reactor at Melekess. Construction hason schedule on the second section of the N'ovovoiooe/li nuclear power station, and the packaged power reactors at Bdibiuo. However, cooUrucrion hasear behind schedule on the sodium fast reactor for desalination and power at Sbevchenko. (Seeapacity has nowWe in reacton primarily for production ofWe in the dual purpose Silwrian Nuclear Power Station at Tomsk, nnd overWe lit stations atreactor centers.

The Soviets have evidently overcome the engineering problemsearlier in their power program. They have In the past two years itartcd construction on throe typeshtrd generation of nuclear powerThey now apparently expect to double their nuclear generating capacitynd double it again0 or so. so thai by the latter date they will haveWcof nuclear generating capacity. With the contraction of these larger plants, tiny expect to be able to compete with thermal powerin high cost areas. With the construction of fourth generation plants,fast breeder reactorsenerating capacityWe or larger ins. they expect nuclear power to be fully competitive.

The main new construction program ii based on the development ofwater reactors (PWR) at tho Novovoronczh nuclear power station. The Soviets have been able to upgrade the first reactorower levelWe. Their second unit is expected to become operational in0 and shouldWe,

Utrlinng the experience gained from (liese two units, the Soviets haveWe pressurixed water reactor (PWR) unit Two of these standard units would be put together totandard PWR nuclear pownr stationapacityWe. Construction on tlie first unit oftation has begun at Novovoroneih and in the Kola power system near Murmansk; the Soviets soy they expect toimilar power sUbon near Yerevan.



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The Soviets arc attempting to enter the world power market withWe PWR power station. They have started construction oftation in East Cenrsarry; they have signed agreements to construct similar stations in Hungary. Bulgaria, and Finland; and they are carryingost studyWe station of this type In East Pakistan. These sUtions will piobably be built widely in Soviet Bloc countries, but indkatjom of plans for sales elsewhere are limited The Soviets will probably provide enriched uranium feed to nuclear power stations built within the Bloc. Their entry into the world market for enriched uranium food proltably would depend upon political rather thanconsiderations. They have indicated informally that they would meet tbe US price, although we believe Ihdr production costs are higher.

Tlie Soviets arc also planning to build nuclear power stations using two graphite moderated, water cooled reactors,tation capacityWe. The prototype for these stations is probably the Tomsk dual purpose reactor. The first of these stations is under construction near Leningrad; the Soviets have said they plan toimilar station near Kursk.

he fast breeder reactoreceiving Iieavy emphasis and greater publicity, but is apparently also encountering substantial difficulties. Two large fast breeder reactor power stations are underpower and desahna-lion facility at Shevchenko on theshore of the Caspian Sea,lanned capacityWuillion gallons of fresh water per day,We power station at lleloyarsk. Both reactors will start with cauiched uranium fuel, but are expected to use plutonium fuel in the future. We estimate that the fuel inventory required for each of these large fast breeder reactors will beetric tons of plutonium,ne year processingTlicse reactors, which are bold extrapolations of existing technology will, if successful, be major iteps toward the developmentWe fast brooder nuclear power stations

Peoceful Uses of Nuclear Explosives

The Sovietsdotig and continuing program for peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.ecent meeting in Vienna, the Soviets admitted they had conducted several nuclear tests for peaceful purposes In various media, but described only two of these tests. Other evidence indicates that sincehey have conducted at least II nuclear tests primarily related to peacefulf them have been in the past year. They have tested in atedia,ariety of purposes.

At Vienna the Sovietst entering event they conducted "several year*he reported yield fits tbathot on5 in the Konystan area of the Scmipalalinsk test site. The Soviets said they had conducted extensive radiation measurements, including some within the lip formed by throwout material. Inhey used explosivesield

on the ordert in the Taylan area of the Somipaktiruk nuclear test area. As dcbru from this test was picked up outside the USSR,ossible that the testhrowout crater. Anotheronth later in tlie same areaalso have tested nuclear explosives for moving earth. Ihe Soviets have also used kilotoo amounts of conventional explosives to derive data useful to the application of nuclear explosives to earth moving.

our tests in (he past four years (two in the past two) have heen related to the oil and gas industry. The Soviets have used nuclear explosives near Kan Si in Central Asia at estimated depths0 feet; these depths arc greater than tried by any oilier nation. One of these was loild gas well; the other was probably also for the same purpose. Two other tests, near Tyumen and Ufa were possibly to produce underground storage foi petroleum and to stimulate oil production.

ther tests can best be characterized as oriented toward understanding the phenomena of nuclear explosions underground. One of these was described at Vienna by the Sovietst testhallow salt dome conducted "several years ago for tbe purpose of seismic studies, learning aboutof salt shots and to evaluate the use of nuclear explosion cavities for .storage ond wastehe location of this lest has not been determined. Two tests were detected near salt domes at Azgir, north of tbe Caspian Sea.

at higher yields, they may have been to study explosion produced phenomena

or decouplingalt nHelium.

be demonstrated Soviet knowledge of pertinent effects in wide ranges of rock types, the depth of their understanding of specific effects, the quality of data derived from their experiments, and the degree of sophistication revealed in their projects planned for the future show thai the Soviets have devoted considerable thought and effort to the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. They have developed detailed plans for future projects thai include concern for health and safety aspects. Their plans also include projects for damming of rivers, removal of overburden, shattering an ore body, gas and oil stimulation, cavity creation for gas storage, as well as for research in cavity stability. They declared they would be willing to provide nuclear explosion services to cither countries.

he Soviet delegates to the meeting in Vienna showed great interest in the radiation problems brought about by peaceful nuclear explosions, and weie interested in developing health and safety guidelines to facilitate peaceful nuclear apphcatioiu. The delegates appeared to consider the Vienna meeting as only the beginningialogue on peaceful uses. The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty obligates Ihe nuclear powers, including the US and the USSR, to provide support to nuclear "have not" nations in the field of peaceful uses ol nuclear explosives.



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Original document.

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