THE SITUATION IN BRAZIL

Created: 2/13/1969

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: SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

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The Situation in Brazil

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OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As Indicated ovnIm,9

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CONTRflCLED DISSEM

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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation 'of-

Central Intelligence Agency and lhe intelligence organize!

Mr.'-tfCgor. for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Inveiligotion/

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This material contains information ,offeding lhe National Defense of the United States within tho mooning ofespionage, laws,C,the Irani; -mission orwhich in dny .nsVitner to qii imawtliorizecf person ssiproN-Sfted.

CONTENTS

THE PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

1.INSTITUTIONAL ACTS

Economic Cains

Military Appteh^mion

The Adoption ofnd IA-8

U. THE REVOLUTION AFTER IA-5

PROSPECTS

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

ANNEX: Texts ol Institutional Actsnd 6

THE SITUATION IN BRAZIL

the problem

To assess the character and short-term prospects for the military regime, and to estimate the implications for the US.

conclusions

8 lite Brazilian Governmentfifth and much tlie most rigorouseries of Institutionalsince the military takeover of Brazil inInstitutional Actnd subsequent measures completedassertion of direct military control over the country'sBut recent events have done little to shape any positivethe "Revolution" and theyong period of sustained,internally unstable, military rule. At present, it is notwithin the goverrimen! or the military ultimate power lies.

to the military regime is weak and unlikely toseriously its control. Still the regime is likely to be troubledelements within the Church, the universities, andopposition will be important to the extent that it influenceswithin theustained period of political andcould stiffen the resolve of those who feeloredictatorship is needed in Brazil.

urbanelatively new phenomenonwill continue to trouble the government. Whileaywho would prefer political apposition into participation init is unlikely that for the foreseeable future Brazil wil! haveproblem with insurgency.

relations with the US are likely to be under straintime toajor reduction of aid from the US, whichdeeply resented by the regime, woulderious setback to the

progress recently made in controlling inflation and encouraginggrowth. This in turn would exacerbate present politicaland tend to strengthen those in the militaryore nationalist and independent stance. Yet, no matter what its level, resumption of aid would not be likely to lead to aof needed social and political development. Nor would itstrengthen the hand of any "moderates'" in the government. But no matter what action the US takes with respect to aid, there will almostontinuation in Brazil of the nationalistic trend that has been growing sincend only interrupted during World War II and the Castello Branco period.

DISCUSSION

I.INSTITUTIONAL ACTS

On8razilian Governmentecree which nearly completed the assertion of strong direct military control over the country's political life Thi' was the fifth, and much the most rigorous,eries of Insti-mnonal Acts promulgated since the military takeover of Braril in

For decades the Brazilian military had prided itself on its fumtion as guardian of the Corutifiibon. It was an exercise of this function which led tbe military lo overthrow President Coulart and frustrate what it considered his subversion of both the Constitution and Brazilian institutions generally. Even then, the move came only after months of prodding by conservative political leaders and the small clutch of perennial coup plotters in the officer corps who were alarmed at Goiilart* apparent toleration of corruption, economic chaos, and political tumult. Suspicion that Coulart intended to move Brnr.il steadilyia/ilinu brand of communism, as well as his encouragement of mutiny in the ranks, finally united the military against him.

After the removal of Coulart, however, an increasing number of military men came to believe that power could not safely be returned to the politicians, and that unlyustained period of military tutelage could Itra/Jl achieve order and initiate tlie economic preconditions for social and political reform. From time to time during the presidency of Marshal Caslello Branco, and again under Marshalumber of influential military officers have insisted that strong measures be brought into play to defend the 'integrity of the Revolution" and toesurgence of those aspects ot Brazilianife which they saw as producing turmoil and holding back the procrst of

Economic Gains

Since the Revolutionhe military government has had considerable success with its economic policy. This has been particularly notable in view of

the deplorable economic situation it inherited. The poUtical instability and unrest which led to tbe overthrow of tbe Ooulait governrnent lad been paralleled by adverse economic performance. Brazil'sgrowth rate, as meaiiired by domestic product, bad steadily dot lined4 it had fallen two percent. Inflation was rampant and the deficit in Brazil's balance of payments continued lo grow. Hit new military governmentroup of economic technicians who devised programs which would gradually contain inflatiun and at the same time accelerate tbe rate of growth The rate of inflation fell fromercent4 tohe growth of gross domestic product improved to above three percent5 and above four percent

Although theilva regimeusiness recession due to tbe severe curb on credit imposed under Castello firanco, ifoortomic growth againevel of bctwewi four and five percent7 and the rise in cost of living dropped toercent- Moreover, the level of industrial investment rose almostercentreliminary data indicate that8 was the best yearnflation was again held down to aboutercent and gross domestic product grew more than sixi>rts reached an all-time high and thereignificant impiovement in foreign exchange position. Asarge government deficit was incurred whichenewed program for strict economies in current expendituresfter the promulgation ofiha adopted stringent measures over theof btar) and civilian figures to reduce this deficit.

These economic aceompbshments Have not. however, engemlered any great popularity for the government, except In (ha business community, or even any great enthusiasm among most of the military themselves. Nor could they beto. given tlte burden of austerityrogram requires. Economic programs undertaken by thevernrnent have been impressive when compared with the chaos which was developing under CouLut, but measured against Brazils longstanding, great, and growing needs, the progress made to date does not appear encouraging. Even alter almost five years, the military leaden appear to have it clearer idea of whom they have to defend their "Bovo-lutiou" against than what,ositive sense, they have to achieve or how to go about achieving it. Their actions have taken place in an atmosphere of strong moral fervor against conuption inpolitics, the tcooocoy. and the press, and against dissent lo the universities and the Church. With tbe exception of certain of the economic programs described above, their goals have been far fiosn rei'olutiotiary in the sense of profound and lasting change in social and economic institutions.

Conflict and confusion have also existed within the military ever4 as to the Revolution's political format. Cattrlto Branco (who at first was prepared to hold the scheduled presidential ekretionnd thenilva attempted to balance the expediency of authoritarian rake with numUrning some of the attributesepresentative government. Nevertheless, political lile under the first four Acts was severely circumscribed and figures connected with previous governments were deprived of their political rights. The list of political cassations

was extensive and included politicians and civil servants as well as the three former presidentsnd Coulart. Tlie Acts also gavepowers to the executive at the expense of Congress and pushed the gmernmcnt of Castello Branco into un Increasingly authoritarian posture, but the constittitional forms were preserved. Tlie Filth Institutional Adnder his successor has now demolished most of these.

first glance the sweeping powers granted to the president underseem urmecessary. The Revolution had already been mstituti0nali2edauthoritarian Constitutionhichajor part of theto executive power of llie fiist four Acts. Congress and the courtsless accepted tbeominance of the political process, andfor public opposition were suppressed or neutralized. Finally, theendowed itself with the legal machiiiety to control the selection of thenot only for the ejection1 but for Others beyond.

Military Apprehension

the almost five years of military government there bas beenamong officers of the armed forces on the goals of thesometimes deep frustration with the performance ol Marshal Costa epresident There is also growing discontent among workers and theminority of the population generally. While studentbeen commonplace over the last few years, those which took placeS aroused concern among Ihe officers, as the students seemedexpanding their support among liberal prelates, and for the first time tosome support from labor and other elements. Most Brazilianspolitically apathetic, but military officers were becoming highlywhat they considered indignities suffcied at the hands ofpopular song mocking them. In any cave, they were aware that thehad only made the populace ycameturn to the Kubftscbeknational optimism, political laxity, and free spending.

Some alarmists in the officti corps saw all this as an omnous portentradual reversion to the Coulart period They blamed the inadequacies of the regime alternately on tlie trappings of constitutional democracy that remained and on tbe man they had placed in the presidency, lnstnutions such as the press and the still somewhat independent judiciary were special targets. The formers criticisms of the regime were regaided as undeiminiiig theand the Utter was in their view too mindful of the letter of the Corati tiition in such actions as letting arrested students off with httle or no pureshrnent.

The greatest disappoint ment to the military, however, was the rather passive performance of$ consi'tisui candidate, Presidentilva. They came over time to view him as unwilling or unable to take effective action against these "counter-revolutionary" currents. Most of tho officer corps chafed under the passivity of his regime but were divided us to how In coiiectmall minority felt that the president should be replaced by some tougher military

figure, and others may have felt that control should revert to the civilians, but most agreed lhat the military should stick withdva while pressuring him to take firmer action against corruption and dusidence, both of which they equate with rssioo.

The Adoption ofnd IA-6

ltimately, it was Congress' defense of its diminished prerogatives that catalyzed the military into taking action against the fractious civilian* loinor opposition federal deputy, Marcio Moreira Arves, had bitterK' denounced the militarypeech before tbe Chamber of Deputies; it was little noted eiccpt by the military, who demanded thai the goveniment prosecute him for "undermining theilva agreed to do so but found that he had to overcome the constitutional stipulation that deputies enjoyed political immunity while addressing the Chamber. Wishing to proceed under the letter of tbe law, tha government set about pressuring the Chamber ofinto voting to bit Arves' immunity. But in December, just as it appeared about to succeed in doing so, many of the generally supinemajorityRENA, rebelled against the government's clumsy attempts to insure thuir acquiescence and voted with tho opposition to dcleat tbebill,

he strong, almost instantaneous reaction of the military leaders forcedilva into issuingbe Act gave the president power to recess Congress (which heo intervene in the states, to go further than before in suspending political lights, and to "establish restrictions orrelated to the exercise of any other public or privaten"tho guarantee of habeas corpus is suspended in cases of political crimes against national security, social and economic order, and consumerhe president is now empowered to confiscate tbe property of those who have "etsriched themselves illicitly while in public officeA* with the earlierActs, all actions carried out under this one arc "excluded from judicialSee ANNEX for complete text.)

ithhe military appears to have forsaken for the foteieeublc future its attempt4 to forge an effective political arm of the Revolution.as aimed not only at tbe scattered militant left and politicians of the Kubitschek-Qua dros-Coulart stripe but also at the former revolutionaries wlrcte defiance, if left unchecked, could presage the dissolution of the Revolution and facilitate the return to tin' typo of politics that they had overthrownhe new list of those denied political rights forears included Carlos Lacerda (who had switched from being the Revolution's most avid civilian partisan4 to its most fearedome of the congressmen (both ARENA and opposition) who had voted against the government, and the owneroderately anti regime newpaper tliai hid also initially backed the coup. Other congressmen were denied their seats but not deprived of other political rights.

he judiciary was also purged and three justices of the Supreme Court were forced to retire, shortly afterwards the chief Justice and another justice resigned in protest These and other attacks on the judiciary have since been codifiedixth Institutional Act, datedhe new Act among other things takes account of the five retirements by reducing the court fromoembers. It further limits lhe courts" rights to consider habeas corpus and removes the right of appeal from military tribunals in the case of political offenses. This Act is similarly closed to judicial review. (See ANNEX.)

uch withdrawals of political rights are continuing.ebruary lhe president recessed the state legislative assemblies of Guanabara (the city of Bio deao Paulo. Pemambuco. Rio de Janeiro, and Scrgipe because they had "contradicted the fundamental ethics on which the Democraticwashe Complementary Act which formalized the recess also accused the assemblies of "abusing rights which they did not possess, including the granting to their members of undue remuneration and advantages, as well as promoting acts which violated the dignity of the mandate given to them by theeanwhile the number of federal congressmen deprived of their mandates was increasedearlyercent of the total. As anthat this was not the last of such actions, tbe president also announced the creationGenera! Pohtical-.Military Inquiry Commission" which would cany out the investigation of "subversive" or counter-revolutionary acts.

II. THE REVOLUTION AFTER IA-5

he Fifth and Sixth Institutional Acts greatly strengthened the military government's powers to eliminate opposition and impose its will. There has been, however, no concurrent charting of positive social or pohtical reforms orto replace the old order and the dismissed institutions. The goals of the Revolution once again seem to empluisize the negative (anticomiptlon,nd few among the military appear lo have any notion how to deal with the country's vast social problems.

e economic programs, left largely to civilian planners, remain intact Apart from officers with regional interests, few among Ihc military havethemselves deeply wilh economic matters- But there arc signs that strains may be developing between budgct-minded planners and those officers who favor the development of rural areas. When lhe Minister uf the Interior, General Affonso de Albuquerque Lima, resigned, he denounced the planners' diversion of funds from development of the Northeast towards expansion of urban industry in the South, in Icrms calculated to enhance support for his political ambitions. If growing numbers of military officers take sides in this dispute, or if die military regime begins to apply the strictures ufore generally among civilians, it will become increasingly difficult for die economic planners lo continue their constructive role. One possible portent of this has been the criticism by Roberto Campos, the chief architect of Castello Branco's economic progiam, of the present government's economic policy since IA-5.

Much ol Ihe impetus foritis been attributed by many senior officers to iheir subordinates at Ihe battalion level. The whole range ol grievances ol these lower ranking officers is difficult to ascertain; among othi'r things they had previously complained of low salaries and indecisive leadership. The former condition lias made them especially intolerant of politicalll levels, and many feel that prosecution of malefactors has not been sufficiently stringent. The facts that Congressman Arveseputationlayboy and wasrrirrimcnt. wealthy family were particularly galling Some of the junior officers are said to fasoi populist programs such as swneping agrarian leform, and to have expressed hope that the Act could now make this possible. And some senior officers have attempted to exploit such feelings. In paiticulai, Albuquerque Lima has already made overt appeals lor their support.

In general, distinct factions in the military are not yet identifiable. It is evident that not all the officers were lobbying fort the very time it was being drawnmall group of perennially dissatisfied majors andmay have been plotting with Carlos Lacerda to overthrowuva. Other officers almost certainly feel that the Ad went too far. and hope that its harsher aspects can be toned down. Most officers, however, probably approve of it Of tins iitcVeterrmnate group, tbeost likely content at present to scrutinize the government's actions and apply pressure if the government appears to beealous few, regarding themselves as in some special sense the "conscience of therobably want in any case to deposeftva. But such desire for finding stronger alternatives must beby the realization that at present none is attractive and that attempts to create one could seriously split the military establishment.

Such trepidations have keptilva in office if not in power. His initial resistance to the Act probably further reduced his prestige within the military, but he is attempting to regain strength with the help of his Army Minister and the more moderate generals He hopes to profit from the current confusion within the military perhaps by making important changes in the cabinet and the command structure. The resignation of Albuquerque Lima removed onerival, but this may turn out toixed Messing.ilva also aspires tu transfer the commanding general of the First .Army, who wasin forcing the Act upon him. Apart fiom securing his position, theplans arc vague. He has indicated some interest in gradually restoring the constitutional facade, and would like to see Congress openedew months under die controlhastened and obedient government party.

iii. prospects

ne thing seems clear in an otherwise murky situation: the likelihoodong period ol sustained, but possibly internally unstable. nUhtary rule Although there prolahly still arc some within the military who doubt tbe efficacy ofmilitary rule, they arc and probably will he forhileby tho revolutionary zealots, who can play on the pride, snd fears of die vast majority of officers.

This, prospect Mauds In contrast toilva's earlier hopes for gradual movernent toward more civilian participatioii in the government Among other things, heas consfdering lhe selectioname civilian at president in lhe indirect election announced forut now the closing of Congress, which is tlte nucleus of the electoral college tbat chooses thecasts some doubt that there will be an election at alL And the future of the Congress itself remains in question.

urther weakening cf existing civilian and political institutions is probable. Military zealots are likely to pressure the government into at least some additional purges of poUticians at all levels. There arc already plans to investigate corruption and subversion at the state and municipal levels, and local military commanders have prepared lists of likely offenders. Some sort of investigation and repression of university professors and students Is also likely. Such action* would doubtless be justified by an alleged need to lemove all obstacles to "social reforms' and other moves toward modernization. Someleaders may soon press for agrarian reform efforts in the Northeast, but wc do not believe thaiajor and costly program. More likely they are interestedell advertised hut limitedaimed as much as anything at appealing to idealistic youngperhaps to foreign observers as wetL

Various factors giveetter than even chance of retaining office through tlse rercsainoer of his term, the most notable being the general lack of consensus within the mshtary as to an attractive alternative. Jockeying for power and maneuvering for survival rather than pushing for broad reforms, are likely to characterize the year or so before the president is due to leave Oatofls He hasairly adept manipulator in the past, but now clearly has less room for maneuver. In particular, he will be under strong pressure to implement oppressive measures and to crackdown cjuickly on any manifestations of active opposition. He may seek to temper the government's actions In such circumstances by trying to rally the moderates within the military; this, however, could prove toisky course. His major problem will bo to avoidrisis within lhe military which would unite it against him. As1 approachesconimuttdcrs will probably concentrate on the struggle to succeed rather than overlltrnw him. Now SO years old,ilva is not in robust health, and his removal might occur through death or illness. If he is repUccd. it will almost certainly beilitary figure or junta; we cannot predict with any confidence who the new leaders might be.

Pohtical apposition to the military government ji too weak and disorganized to off ir any kind of serious resistance. Most civilian sectors have been apathetic or hostile toorrsaderable amount of support for it was generated vvithin the business community. Even there, enthusiasm has been quarried with some appreliension over the possible damage to the economy because of hostile foreign and domestic reaction to the Act, and over possible applications of its confiscation clause. Most of the politically literate who saw some hopu In Costa e

s.

Silva's Inaugural pledge to "humanize the Revolution" have been demoralized by the wave of censorship and ormression. Yet tbe civilian politician* have been widely discredited and the government's repression of them has caused no public Outcry We conchidc that no political figure is likely to rise soonymbol of civilian resistance to the military.

Organized Labor has chafed under military rule, and in particular itsprogram which broughtontinuing decline in real wagesS andtagnation. But compared with other major Latin Americanitmall percentage of the total labor force; it has traditionally been controlled by the government and its leadership has been notoriously flaccid. Periodic wildcat strikes are much more likely than protests organized by labor leadership

Studentsredictable source of opposition to both the Act and the regime. During the past year they were the only group to Initiate organizedagainst tbe government and managed lo appear more effective than they bad at any time in the past. In July in Rio de Janeiro military men were alarmed to see normally passive Cariocas support ihc students by hurling bottles at the police in one demonstration and marcrdng with them in another. Provisions of lhe new Act and the tougher atmosphere, however, make student demonstrations far riskier than before. Physical repression Is likely to be more brutal, and the regime is no longer hampered by the writ of habeas corpus or sympathetic judges. This alone will tend to deter all but tbe bravest and most determined Attemptsake common cause with Labor will probably be fruitless as well Labor's attitude to radical student movements probably is more nearly like thai of lhe rank and file of the AFL-CIO in the US than tliat of some sympathetic labor unions in France.

Wc believe lhat the Church is the unly institution that could begin to marshal serious resistance against the government. Over the past few years most Brazilian prelates have been movedrowing sensitivity to the effects of economic and cultural poverty on the population. Tbe Church in general has increasinglyoice for reform. Moderate clerics who might havetbe removal of Goulart have more recently attacked the military and the government for its lethargy in combating social ills-as generallyby the Church, and even the conservative cardinal archbishop of Rio dc Janeiroomily attacking the government.

Despite its unhappiness over the prevent situation, the concerned clergy is also divided and confused as to what role the Church should ploy in changing it. church leaders have generally been quiet sincemall but possibly growing minority lias argued in justification of revolutionary- violence, but most reformist priests are political modes itlash with the military Nevertheless, strains between the mi Diary and the Church are likely to increase. Some military-officers believe that the priesthood is crawling with Communists in cassocks. If priests began to take an active role in organizing protests, such officers might

si

force the government into an open conflict with the Church, one effect of which wouldurther polarization of Brazilian society.

Sporadic urbanelatively new phenomenon in Brazil, will continue to plague the government. Never very widespread or on the whole destructive, it has nonetheless been galling to the police and military who, at least until recendy, have been generally unable to arrest the terrorists. Ofconcern has been the extent to which the terrorists may have infiltrated the security forces. In Ihe eyes of the military, the leading terrorist is theCommunist leader Carlos Marighella, an advocate of violent revolution. The Size of his group is unknown, and it may be one among several small terrorist organizations. On the other side, rightist terror groups have also been carrying out bombings in an attempt to goad die military into further repressive action. Whileay drive some who would prefer political opposition intoin terrorism, wc doubt that, at least for some time, Brazil willajor problem with insurgency.

In short, the opposition, whether through political action or violence, is not likely to challenge seriously the regime. The quantity and quality of the activities of the opposition, violent and otherwise, will have an effect on the regime but only insofar as they have an impact on the various factions within the militaryustained period of sporadic terror, student dissldence, and manifest popular dissatisfaction with military rule could stiffen the resolve of those wbo feelore extensive dictatorship is the only way forertain number of corporatist-minded officers have expressed Ihe opinion that the state should extend even further its control over the economy. On the Other hand, sustained turmoil would undermine the confidenceew more military leaders in the ability of the military establishment to govern.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

Brazilian relations with Ihe US are likely to be under strain for some time to come. The generation of military officers who fought in Italy is reachingage and the newer breed lacks that bond of sympathy with the US. Military officers, like Biazilians generally, are now far more Susceptible toarguments than before, and the day is pastoreign minister could say (as Castello Brancos did) that "what's good for the US is good forany military men are as responsive as civilians to the charge that the US is trying to manipulate Brazilian affairs for its own purposes, and bitterly resent critical editorials in US journals. The government has grown increasingly nervous over the withholding of US aid. Pro-US figures {largely veterans of the Castello Branco era) have remonstrated with officials of the US Embassy lo the effect that the failure of the US to resume economic and military aid could bring about the seizure of powerore dictatorial, less friendly group.

A major reduction or outright denial of economic aid from the US, whicheeply resented by the regime, woulderious setback to theefforts to control inflation and encourage rapid economic growth. This in

turn wouldresent poll!teat uncertainties and tend to strengthen those ui the military presently pushingore nationaliHie and mdependent stance. Vet, since the roots of the present crisis are political rather than reonomic, Ihe resumption of US aid would not necessarily strengthen whatever "moderate" officers ivmain in theilva government. Opponents of the regime,those in the Church or the universities, will more than ever resent the conO:,nation of US economic and military assistance as helping to keep an inept and repressive dictatorship in power. This kind of hostility will extend to US aid efforts in such civilian vectors as education. Nor would the resumption of aid he likely to leadlourishing of needed social and economic reforms. But no matter what action the US takes with respect to aid, there willontinuation in Brazil of the rationalistic trend that has been growing tuvcend only interrupted during World War II and the CasteDo Branco period.

INSTITUTIONAL ACTreamble

L. The Prescient of tlve Federative Republic of Brazil, after consulting the National Security Council:

Considering that the Brazilian Revolution of4 had. according to the Acts through which it became institutionalized, foundations and objectives which aimed at giving theegime which, meeting the demandsuridical and political system, would assure an authentic dernocratic order based on liberty, respect the dignity of the human being carry on the fight against subversion and ideologies which are contrary to the traditions of our people, and the fight against corruption, and thus seek the essential means for the work of economic, financial, political, and moral reconstruction of Brazil, so as to be able to faceirect and immediate way die grave and urgent problems on which depend the restoration of internal order and the international prestige of our country (Preamble of Institutional Actf;

Considering that the Government of the Republic, which is responsible for the fulfillment of those objectives as well as for order and internal security, not only cannot permit that persons or antirevolutionary groups work, plot, or act against it, without failing lo meet the commitments which it assumed before the Brazilian people, but also that the revolutionary power, in issuing Institutional Actffirmed categorically that "it was not said that the revolution was, but that it is and will continue to be" and therefore the revolutionary process in development cannot be slopped;

Considering thai this same revolutionary power, which is exercised by the President of the RepubUc, in convoking tbe National Congress to discuss, vote, and promulgate the new Constitution, established that the Revolution, besides representing "the institutionalization of the ideals ami principles of theshould "ensure the continuity of the revolutionary work" (Institutional Act;

Considering, however, that clearly subversive activities originating in the most varied political and cultural sectors have proved that the juridical instni-ments which the victorious revolution gave to the nation for its defense,and welfare, are serving to fight it and destroy it;

G. Considering, thus, that it becomes imperative to adopt measures to prevent tbe high ideals of the Revolution from being frustrated and lo preserve order, security, tranquillity, economic and cultural development of the political and social harmony of the country, which are threatened by subversive processes and revolutionary war;

onsidering lhat al) these facts which disturb order are contrary to the ideals and consolidation of the4 movement and compel those who

are responsible for ii, and who have sworn to defend it, to adopt the necessary measures to avoid its destruction;

esolves to issue Ihe following Institutional Act;

Institutionol Act Number Five

Article L. The Constitution of7 and the State Constitutions, with the changes contained in this Act, remain in force.

Articlehe President of die Republic may decree recess of the National Congress, the State Assemblies, and the Municipal Chambers throughedicts with ortate of siege being in force. They will be called to operale again only by decision of the President of the Republic.

Until the Congress begins operating again, the executive power may legislate on all matters established in the Constitution and laws of

During die recess, senators, deputies, and councilinen will receive only their basic salaries.

In case of recess of municipal chambers, the financial and budgetary inspection of municipalities which do not have auditing agencies will be exercised by the auditing agency of die respective state. Its action will extend to auditing functions and to the judgment of accounts ofand other persons responsible for public properties and values.

Articlehe President of the Republic in the national interest may decree intervention in the states and municipalities without the limitations set forth in the Constitution.

Sole paragraph. The inlerventors in the states and municipalities will be appointed by the President of the Republic and will exercise all functions and duties which are the respective responsibility of the governors or mayors and will enjoy all privileges, salaries, and benefits fixed by law.

Articlen Ihe interest of preserving the Revolution, the President of the Republic after consultation with the National Security Council and without the limilations established in ihe Constitution will be able to suspend die political rights of any citizen forears, and to cassatc federal, state, or municipal elective mandates-Sole paragraph. Federal, state, and municipal legislative members whose mandates are cassated will not be replaced, and the parliamentary quorum will be adjusted in accord with the number of places effectively filled.

Articlelie suspension of political rights based on this Acterminate the right of special hearing for certain privileged officials;

suspend Ihe right to vote and toandidate in labor union elections;

prohibit activity or manifestationoliticalpply when necessary the following security measures: (a) freedom under vigilance, (b) prohibition against visiting certain places, (c) designation of place of lesidcnce.

Tbe Act wmch determines the suspension of political right* mayrestrictions or rmihibitions related to tbe exercise of any other pubbe or private rights.

The security measures dealt with inf this article will be applied by the MinUtei of justice and excluded from review by judicial authority.

Articlehe following constitutional or legal guarantees are suspended: (a) hfe tenure. |b( fixed place of employment, (c) job tenure, plus tbe exercise of functions for fixed periods,

The President of the Republic through decree may dismiss, remove, retire, or place in availability any holders of the guarantees referred to in this article as well as employees of autonomous agencies, of publicor of mixed public and private organizations, and he may dismiss or transfer to the reserve or retire members of tlie armed forces Orpolice. He may also assure, when appropriate, the salaries and other advantages which are due them according to their time in service.

The provision of this article and its first paragraph applies also Inmunicipalities, the federal district, and die territories.

Articlehe President of the Republic in any of the cases established in the Constitution may decree ortate of siege and fix the period it will be in force.

Sole paragraph. In cave the National Congress is recessed, theof paragraph I,f die Constitution is cUspensed with.

Articlebe President of the Republic, after invvsugation, may decreeof property of any persons who have enriched themseKeshile exorcising public office, including positions in autonomous agencies, publicor mixed public and private organizations, without waiving any penal sanctions which may also he applicable.

Sole paragraph. If the properties arc proved to tie legitimately acquired, they will be returned.

Articlehe President ot the Republic may issue complementary edicts for the ewutioo of this Institutional Act as well as adopt, if necessary, for the defense of the Involution, the rnaajuraa established in itemsnd (e) offf the Coiutitutioo.

Article ltl. The guarantee of habeas corpus is suspended in cases of political crimes against national security, social and economic order, and consumer economy.

ll activities carried out in accordance with this Act, itsActs, and its respeethe effects, are excluded from rudKial review.

he present Institutional Act goes into effect on this date and all provisions to the contrary are hereby revoked.

SEC

Brasilia,igned by the President ol the Republic and all Ministers of State.

Complementary Edict No.fhe President of the Republic in accordance withf Institutional ActfS resolves to issue the following Complementary Edict:

Articlen accordance withnd its paragraphs of Institutional Actfhe recess of the National Congress is decreed as of this date.

Articlehe present Complementary Edict goes into effect on this date and all provisions to the contrary are hereby revoked.

Brasilia.

institutional act no. 6

By the President of the Republic:

Whereas, as indicated in institutional Actfhe Brazilian revolution reaffirmed that Its cmittilutive power had not been exhausted but that its action is continuing and will continue unabated to achieve tbe revolutionary movement's high ideals and consolidate its work;

Whereas, as the highest institution in thehe Federal Supreme Court is an institutiononstitutional nature and receives from theits duly defined structure, preiogatlves. and jurisdiction:

Whi'reas, the government, which still retains constitutive power, hasthe need to alter the composition and jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court to benefit the system of justice Itselfiew to strengthening itsas an eminently constitutional court and, by eliminating some of Its duties, to facihtatr the exercise of its prerogatives,

Whereas, persons affected by the pohtical and adsunistrativc penalties of the revolutionary process must receive equal treatment under the rule of theprecepts and other legal regulations originating in them.

The following Institutional Act is issued;

Articlehe provisions of the Constitution of7 hereinafter named shall be worded as follows:

. The Federal Supreme Court, situated in Brasilia and having jurisdiction throughout tbe territory of the nation, is composed ofustices.

Ttie justices will be appointed by the President of the Republic, after their selection has been approved by the Federal Senate, from among native-bom Brazilians overears old. exceptionally versed In the law. and of spotless reputation.

In offenses involving their posts the justices will he tried and sentenced by the Federal Senate

. The Federal Supreme Court has authority: II. To bear cases of rsrehnary appeal invohing;

of habeas corpus in decisions of last resort orbanded down by local or federal courts when thebe avoidedetition based on the case;

tourcign stateerson domiciledin the country are parlies;

established In, Paragraph 2.

o hear extraordinary appeals from decisions of sole resort or last resort handed down hy other courts when decisions under appeal meet the following conditions:

against some provision of this Constitution or denyof some federal law or treaty;

some federal law or treaty unconstitutional:

valid some law or actionocal governmentbeen challenged on the basis of the Constitution or a

the law an interpretation differing from thethat has been given by some other court or theCourt itself.

. It is the prerogative of the military courts, in cases of military offenses defined by law, to try and sentence members of the armed forces and persons having similar status.

his special prerogative may be extended to cover civilians in cases presided for by law to suppress crimes against the nation's security or the military Institutions.

.he Superior Military Court has original jurisdiction in trying and sentencing governors of states and their cabinet members for crimes mentioned in tbe first paragraph.

he law will control the application of the penalties of military legislation in wartime.

Articlehe provisions ofnd itsf Institutional Actf8 apply to persons coming under Articlend its sole paragraph of Institutional Act4 or ArticlefActf

onstitutional amendments enacted by Complementary Actsto Institutional Actf8 are hereby ratified.

Articlehere shall be no judicial review of any of the actions carried out pursuant to this Institutional Act and its Complementary Acts, or dieireffects.

Articlehe present Institutional Act shall take effect as of this date; any measures to lhe contrary are revoked.

Brasilia,S.

Assistant Chief of

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Original document.

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