CHINESE THREAT IN ASIA
C Poll tut and Diplomacy
D.iul Interests: Kort ami Taiwan
COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA
To survey recent Chinese foreign policy and alternate lines ofin the near term; to define the nature of the Chinese threat in Asia, and to estimate Chinese intentions in the area; and to estimate the longer term outlook for Chinese foreign policy.
Chinese Communist regime has fallen far shortosition of dominance In East and Southeastfor the leadership of the world revolution. Neither Its effortsdiplomacy nor at supporting revolutionary strugglespursued consistently oregard to objective realities.pretensions have earned China the enmity of thehis bizarre domestic programs have cost China greatly inrespect elsewhere in the world. Yetocation and size,traditional apprehensions of Its neighbors, ensure for it aupon Asia regardless of the policy it follows.
long as Mao is the dominant figure, major changes inposture do not appear likely. Mao will remain anobstacle to any accommodation with the USSR, andlittle alternative to continuing hostility toward theailureVietnamese Communists to achieve their aims might requirein tactics, but the Chinese would almost certainly notovert attack, nor would they be likely toajor newconflict.
Chinese aspirations for political dominancewill persist. Almost certainly Mao and his immediatenot expect to achieve this by military conquest, although forcefigure strongly in Mao's doctrines. The Chinese may hopepossessiontrategic capability- will give China greater freedom
upportar" or. more remotely, to engage In conventional war in Asia by diminbhing the possibility of nuclecr attack on China. Whatever Chinese hopes, however, the actual possession of nuclear weapons will not necessarily make China more willing toirect clash with the US; Indeed, It Is more likely toobering effect.
modifications in Chinese policy flow from Itsthe nuclear age. the principal threat from China will forbe in the realm of subversion and revolutionarySoutheast Asia. In South Vietnam and Laos, Peking must takeof Hanoi's direct Interests. China's policy toward Cambodialargely conditioned by Sihanouk's attitude. If he moves veryaccommodation with the US. Peking's pressures againstbe Increased. The Chinese may seea more lucrative targethinese-sponsored "people's war."is already providing some braining and support, but even themust realize that the Thai insurgencyong, difficultChineseore clear -cut choke In Burma, and whetherincrease the insurgency or restore more normalcould be an indicator of trends in Peking's foreign policy.
rest of Southeast Asia Is less important in Peking'sscheme because the Chinese lack direct access andfor insurgency in these areas are minimal. Peking seeksand embarrass India, but not to confront it directly sothere is no threat to Tibet.
is in the area of conventional diplomacy, which sufferedin the Cultural Revolution, that Peking could most easilychanges. Restoration of normal diplomacy wouldtrend toward recognition of Peking, and this would In rumon other countries, particularly Japan, which does notbe left behind in opening rtlations with the mainland. Taipeisuffer diplomatic losses in this process.
C.eparture of Mao could, In time, bring significant change In China's relations with the outside world. There could be contention and struggle for leadership that would freeze major policiesong intem-giium. But on balance, we believe Mao's departure willtrong movement toward modifying in. doctrines.
es* ideological approach would not necessarily make China east to deal or Uve^with in Asia. Fnrsuit of its basic naUonahst and traditional goals could sustain tensions in the area,hina tha was beginJng to realize some of itsdvanced weapon, fields couldar more formidable force In Asia than Is Maoist China.
ean of rule, lhe Chinese Communist! have not come closeChina's aspirations foe leadership or domination in Asia. Therereasons for this. China has of course had to operate from aninadequate to support the full range t* iti pretensions. Maoistwith making China the trader ia the world revolution has often ledand actions harmful to other more traditional or conventionalIn Asia. The tension and Inconsistencies in the bask Chinese approachpolicy have been magnified by frequent shifts in actual tacticsIn consequence, Peking has failed to pursue any single courseand maximum effectrolonged period.
the Bush of victoryeking joined the USSR in proclaimingfor revolution andpeople's war" against all existingin the area. But China wa* not ready to otter much practical assistanceend, local communiit parties lacked the strength for revolution, andresultto alienate the leaders and supporters of the newlyAsian governments who considered themselves anti .imperialistof Peking's support, not Its enmity,
1 The Korean war forced Chinancentrate on more Immediate security concerns, and in Us aftermath Peking shifted to the line of peaceful coexistence alxuad while concentrating on construction at home. But this line, which had considerable promise of winning friends, diploma be recognition, and broad commercial opportunities for China, gradually gave wayore belligerent and revolutionary line. By the late lWO's. the dispute with the USSR began to take shape and has sinceood deal of China's energies and attention. During thehinareat loss of prestige as the ahcurditin. administrative confusion, and economic chaos of the Great Leap became evident to the world.
owever. China secmrd to be back on an even keel and growing in strength andorking balance between support for revolutionary goals and improving China's international position seemed lo exist In Chinese foreign policy. China was closely aligned with North Vietnam and North Korea, (ommand'd respect among fHimerous communW parries, and had ettahh'hrd an "axis" with Indonesia. The revolutions In Vietnam and Laos were
Maneuvering was underwaye-AiUn conlrtence. which lhe Chinese hoped lu lum acainsl lhe USSR. Several nomtnnmuiilit stales were considering rtcognition, and France actuary took thH step Chou En-lal embarked on anlour uf Afrka. In Octolterao* archenemy Khrushchev fell and lhe Chinese ripiudcdtomic device.
uinorohlnatiun of circum*tancci Intervened to produce majorhe Chanear posture in foreignuddenly,he war in Vietnam became much mm than another war of liberation. WKh the US intervention. Mao's throriei on the validity of guerrilla war were being subjected to eitreme test, and China ttsell felt the ruk of direct conflict with the US The problrmelicate one how to assure success In the Vietnam war without provoking an American attack on North Vietnam and ulttrnateh/ China.
The entire nuesllon of haw to confront the US was apparently the subjectebate duringebate which was greatly cocplioatrd by changes In the USSR, when- the new leadership was bent on rebuilding its positionan Comnunub. especially In Hanoi. The Soviet proposal lor -united action" In support Hanoi, however, was regarded by Maorap which would ham-drtng Chutctc frcedum of action and undermine Peking's claim to be the centera new revolutionary nwemcnt. Most Important, Mao saw that anywith Moscow would contribute to the erosion of morale and Ideological purityhe apparently feared wasiprenduir, rapidly throughout the Chinese party and society.
In the rest of the world, the Chinese found (hatverestimated the revolutionary enihuiiasm of their friends. Chin En-lei's African lour was cut ihort. alter emharrass*ng reaction to hi* vivid description* ofencil Inr resolution. With the collapse5 of the "Bandung II" Conference to Algiers, China was rebuffrd In Hi effort to form an anti-Soviet and antl-US bloc of Afro-Asians The ircoenrtion by Francenot followedush of othernd the alliance with Sukarno collapsedassive bloodbath for the Indonesian Commtmisltave of violent rrprewton of the overseai Chinese community there.
Chins nacird to these circumstances, not by muling its revolutionaryhut hy calling for an acceleration of lhe worldwide revolutionarySupport dry. the various tnmrgencles,arties, and front groups uould "hi up their effort* In order to divert US resources and wear down the US will. Al the same time, the USSR andclients would be rscludcd from the newf intentiSed revolutionary activity, .nd China would remain the center of the movement.
he nethis line was to create an even wider gup between Chinete Ideological ryc*scriptlons and ob|ectfve reality. In dealing with major problems nf national teennry. especially thosehreat of confrontation wftJi the US. China wot forced lo remain cuutlnus and prudent. As the domestic crlili of thv Cultural Revolution deepened. Pel me became more and more rigid and
doctrinaire, taaenaltlvr to the idw'^ its (oodi utterly hostile and iraVsible low mil idand lucre uingty oblivious to Ihe deterioration ofosition
ven to. the Chines* leaders might have been content with their positionot been lor new development!he onset of ncgotialiom over Vietnamtantamountepudiation of the Chinese by Hanoi, seemed to vindicate the rxistnon of the USSR, and pointed lo growing Soviet influence. And the USSR engagedibslanUal military buildup in Ihe Fai East which was clearly directed against China. The Odnese have not reactedimilar buildup of their own along the Soviet (mnr'-r. and they probably do not crpet* an open Soviet attack. But they are no doubt concerned abou' Soviet efforts lo influence Internal developments in China In one way or another. All this was brought into sharper 'oeus by the invasion of <it and the sub-secruent promulgation of the "Breahnev doctrine."
In sum. by the endB. the revolutionary line had (ailed In Its prln-cipnl obfttives. It was becoming Increasingly clearettlement In Vietnam wai not likely loi strategy of "peopleshe Influence of thebe region had not been contained hart had ro fact grown, both in the communist capital) of Pyongyang and Hanoi, and in Sooth and Southeast Asia. China had failed completely tobroad united front" against thelit US and the revisionist USSR. Instead it found itselfs Chou En-tai actosowlvdged, and Moisted on moat key policy knars.
Yet Peking's lack of progress toward Its revolutionary obfectives has by no mram completely vitUied its Influence In Alia. China's location, tlrr. and history,y the traditional apprrK-niiom oF Its neighbors, ensure forajor impact upon Asia regardless of trieollows. Awareness of China's elistener and potential for making trouble affects the eurren* policies ol every country In the area.
ihe near term, Ihere does not appear to be much chance for ain Chinainternaosture. As long as Mao Is the dominantthe regime and the source of ideological guidnnr. Chinese policy willhe confined within fairly narrow limits. He is likely lo remain anobstacle to any accornrrtodation or modui vrvendl with theChinese enmity for the Soviet Union hai recentlyevelequal to thai against the US: China now has two "number oneage. Mao has become less flexible and even more obwird withgoals. There is not likely to be any slackening In his commitment tothat China is ihe center for inspiring the world revolutionutallies are not lo be found in the established Communist regimesr. but in Ihe guerrilla move mend thai have arcs-pled "Mao's thought"to persist In protracted straggle. In this sense, there Is littlecontinuing hostility toward the US.
H Yet within (his fairly rigid strategic framework, there are signs of lorn* greateractics. Tra-se signs are often contradictory and confusing, but they could beomestic attain areew phase. The growing canevrn lhat ihe US and USSR are pursuing parallel, anti-Chinese poltcirs mayactor dictating Chinese moves to compiles If or disrupt what they seeaol alliance. What such moves mightot at all dear, and rn the end llwy may be of no great ligniBcsuxr As long as Maoht ideology Is dominant however, the road to Moscow Is blocked. Ironically, the Chinese may be commc. lo fevl lhat they haveroom forHT the US than the USSlt, though of course the Taiwan question will continue lo obstructin
hether shifts in Chinese tactics do occur could depend, ol course, on dcvs-lorsmenls in Vietnam. The Chinese already perceive that the war tp Vietnam is likely to endegotiated senlensent. They have Is ken some steps to mute their opposition to negotiations. And at some point in this process, they are likely to re-emphasire their broad political Interest hi (he area, seeking to make it dear lhat no tailing settlement can be achieved without Peking's approval
f course. It is possible that the Chinese will choose not to adjurt to developments in Indochina, but rather seek In disrupt them.ailure by theCommunists lo achieve their aims would probably rot lead to eitreme reactions by the Chinese. Almost certainly (he Chineseoing to launch an overt attack In Vietnam or seize tome territory elsewhere, nor are they likely loajor new front of conflict, using their own resources. At the other eiirrrne. there fa little likelihood that the Cranes* will suddenly Iwtsime qnirscent because of the outcome in Vietnam. They are going to remain active In support of those movement- that they believe are loyal to Maoistand have some potential for cflective development.
prevails, then ord professionals may geli and rules in Peking, t*eneralPeking will be rr new initiative* of
n any ease.oreign policies are likely to be influencedignificant degree by the internal crisis. Even If the estrerncs of the Cultural Revolution are already past, it is possibleew phase of cocrdve social proerams andesorric initiatives may prove as de bill fating as ihe political purge. If. on the other laind.more moderate line in internal policies nrcYAils then orderlly restored, and the Foreign- over policy Bui as long as Mao livesent Iristabtbt) in CfWoa. Foreign policy* hi and reflect the internal line. Accordingly. >to outside events than to launch major
iii. the chinese In*- sia
ll these considitaHon, do not mean that China willegligible factor in Asia or in international polilks. Chinese goab. In Asia at least, are (airly clear. Almost allin Peldng or on Taiwan-would agree that China's nghtful position is one of political dominance on the Asian
land, and ultimately ihruurho.it East and Southeast AtU. Such aspirations hive deep historicaln tha sense. Chinahreat to Asia and to those outsideeek to play an importantsian affairs. Theii how the Chinese Intend to accomplish (heir objectives.
A. Military Power
IS. Almost certainly the Chinese do not espect toominanton by military conquest, evenere and violence figure rtroogly In Maoist philosophy and Chinese Communist practice. In the cases where the Chinese have resorted to militaryKorea andwas. In (heir view, defensive to protect the tecurtty of their borders. Indeed.principal objective of China, like snosto Insure Its security against unfriendly powers ranged along its frontiers. Where Use Chinese see an immediate threat lo their security, they wiD be prepared toorce, even pre-emptively. But neither Mao nor his immediate successors are likely tove that the Chinese revnhi-ticm can he exported by the People's Liberation Army, or that armed conquest in the style of Imperialafe or profitable course.
All this, of course, applies primarily to Chinaonventional military power, but its acquisition of nuclear weapons will not necessarily Increase ItsThe Chinese may hope that the possessiontrategicwill give China greater freedom lo support "people's war" or, moreto engage In conventional war inby diminishing the possibility of nuclear attack on China. The Chinesenly hoped to gain such freedom in the Tarwan Strait crisisS by explo.tu'R thealliance to deter the US. Moscow's refusal in that Instance lo back China with nuclear ihrrals wasajor factor in convincing Peking that It mutt have its own nuclear weapons.
Whatever may have been Chinese hopes in the past, however, the actual powsuon of nuclear weapons is likely toobering effect. China has no hope of achieving parity with either the US or the USSR In nuclearhe foreseeableespitepropaganda concerning China'i ability to withstand nuclear attack. Peking will almost certainly come to rcalire. if it doc not already, thai either the US or the USSR possesses more than suffWent nuclear weapons to devastate China.
In these cuctsmstances, Qui* Is Ukery to remain cautious in areas of possible direct confrontation with lhe US or the USSR, calculating that itsossessionuclear weapons may increase, rather than lessen, lhe changesre-emptive nuclear strike against It For some time.ikely to value its nuclear capability primarilyreat Power status symbol and for
'TVrwreaChthai thrpawlMr MHal er*-a-
. ImXMil haDtilk mimfttn> m| tf.llh*
Wwmlatit Kav.0 amiimhrr. InaaaYst
lalot rntnilfi siH aim prahabl- he qivlrr.iv
at the new few yean.
itialn sum. -Vi China actuallyuclear power during the neit devade, it will probably be subjected to the lame eoeisfraints and com-pllcatidni of policy as the other nuclear poweti.
cannot predict the ultimate ettect of Chinese acosdrKton ofon the rest of Asia.inimum China will gain greater prestigetranslated into poll Mealhis will probably mean that moreseek some rrlattonihlp with Peking at Taiwan's eapense. and that sometbe possibility of accommodation, if Chinese policy is sufficientlypermit such accommodations. However, few countries are tikefy toto China's desire to monopolize nuclear power In Aria snd toion* .or tbe area against all outside powers. Indeed, the Chinesemay increase pressures In some Asian countries to develop their ownor to ding more closely to other nuclear powers.
6 Pooplo's War
Whatever modifications in Chinese policy flow from Its advance Into the nuclear age. the principal threat from China will, for many years,he realm of subversion and revolutionary activity. Soch activity trill be conducted mainly in Southeast Asia where It relate directly to Peking's securityenying the US or other unfriendly powers positions dose to China's borders. It also irrve* to satisfy the more general Interest of Chinastablishing in own dorninance in the area and In the worldvernent,
Vietnam and Loos To these ends, Peking supports and assists the Com-munis'i in Vietnam and Laos. For tbe present, at least, Peking has to take account of North Vietnam's directoth South Vietnam and Laos. Peking could try lo circumvent the North Vietnamese and open competing line* to the National Liberation Front and to tbe Patfart Lao. But Ita chances of gaining significant influence are poor and the cost in relations with Hanoi potentially so great thataneuver is unlikely. Though sharp disagreementdop over laches in Laos, in general Hanoi and Peking almosthare Ihe same immediate goal, enrnmunist control of Laos, with Hanoi In the dornsrunt role.
a close ally of the US andS strategic base, Thailand
ey object of Chines*outheast Asia and will probably receive Increased emphasis after Ihe war In Vietnam Is settled. In this respect, Thailand Is the most obvious target for "people'she political leadership of the Thaioweking, and the Chinese ore rwovsdmg sssrn* training and arms. Moreover, the Chinese haveeavy propaganda commitment, recently the. have announced the fomvabonhai "People's Army" supreme command and publicised the new manifesto of the ThaiParty-.
he Chinese will almost certainly continue to support the Thai fnturgenti. Yet they musl rralire that the insurgencyong, difficult fight; ft has made little progrcsi in gaining the allegiance of ethnic Thais. And Thailand possesses
manyt possible that ml some point the Chirwse might want to reconsider 'b< ir support. If in doing so they could induce Bangkok to draw away from its alliance with the US.
enod of cordial Smo-Burmese relations was broken by Peking in tbe midst of the Cultural Hevotution nearly two years ago. Since then the Chinese have Openly supported tbe Burmese ComimmlU movement and pub lkly endorsed the formationnited front with the ethnic insurgents. During muchhe Insurgency did increase along the SinoBurmeie border. There Is. on the other hand, some evidence that the Chinese may want to restore more normal rcunons. Neutralist Burma would, of course, be receptive loove, especially II acceanpaniedetup in the insurgency. Thus the Chineseairly dear-cut choice between increasing the Insurgency in northern Burma and restoring more normal govrmmnil-to-government relations. How they decide could provide some indication concerning lhe relent of their commitment lo the policy of Insurgency In general.
ambodu Relations with Phnorn Penh have fluctuated In recent years, partly because ol Sihanouk's beHef that Peking Is sponsoring an Inrurgency. whkh he styles the Khmer Rouge. But the Chinese have been willing toumber ol iniults end taunts rrom Sihanouk and to furnish him arms, mainly because ol the Importance ol Cambodia to the prosecution ol the Vietnam war. The Chinese also valuect that Cambodia Ii ostensibly neutralhe long term Cambodu could be of potentialeveloping an insurgency In Thailand, with Cambodian territory possibly serving tome of lhe tamea* served fn the Vietnam tear.
ajor change In relations will probably depend less on Piking than on Sihanouk. He has long believed thai China will become the dominant force In the Far East, and he sees value in trying to use the Chinese as *to his traditional enemies, ihc Vietnamese and the Thais. In theePeking will probably continue to have considerablehnom Penh. Nevertheless, if Sihanouk leeli that (he tide Is selling against the Cornmunists in Vietnam,apable of becoming more cooperative with the US. Should he attempt to move very far in this direction, however, neither Hanoi nor Peking would be reluctant to step up political preuurei against him and lo increase support to dissident groups in Cambodia.
ther Arcai. Insurgencies in the rest ol Southeast Ada are much leuIn tbe Chtneie tcherne. mainly because the Chinese have no direct access and the Insurgents"re currently minimal. The attempt of the Maoitt-orirnled Indonesian Communists to develop an (nrurgency In East Java last summer resulted not only In laihuehe death of key leaden. Peking occasionally publicizes the ctplollt nF lhe Malayan Communist Party, which In nan pays homage to Mao. Peking, of course,onsiderable potential asset in the large ethnic Chinese popululinn in Malaysia, but lhe Communist mote-mcnt'i overidenti beat ion with the Chinese ham peri its avowed policy olroadly based move me ni with thr Malays. Peking has Httlehe
Milk movcmr-nl in thehough Chin* peilodlcally publiclrei the rtploiti of Filipino inmirrnO-
ndia. In lhehina cut* to regard Indiaompetitor (or IrWerihip in Asia, opectairv because India seemed to benefit from the support ol* both the USSR and US. Thus Chinese policy has been framed to harass and Intimidate India and demonstrateas generally Incapable of taking the roleeading Asian power. Since the border warhe Chinesiti'.iisome level of tension and threat along the Indianheir ml!;'tars aid to Pakistan serves the tame general purpose.
f China chose to. It could probably cause coroidrrable trouble bydissident* along the Indian frontier, especially In the northeast. The Chinese eap-r'y public red the Naxafbarl uprisings ba DarjeeUng, as the beginnUigao-lnsplred peasant upheaval. In Eastern India, the Chinese have propsv gandiied and apparently have provided limited arms and training to Naga and MUo tribesmen. Peking! aim seems to be to embarrass and worry New Delhi without becoming deeplv involved, and we do not foresee much change In this attitude.
C. Polities ond Diplomacy
M. In general. China's relations with the noocommunist world have suffered la conte^ucuce of the Cultural devolution Its extreme xenophobia and hysteria Impinged on Chinese diplomatic relations Foreign diplomats In Peking were abused and humiliated; Chinese embassy itafft abroad were reduced aridwithdrawn. Even now. lhe functioning of the Ministry ofemains disrupted by political campaigns aod factional disputes.
evertheless. It Is in the area of normal political relations and conventional diplomacy that the Chinese probably have 'he greatest room lor change.much effort, the Chinese ccold resume normal diplomatic activity In Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Moreover, there appears toew movement toward) diplomatic recognition of China. Though the Chinese have exhibited no eagerness lor such recognition, there is no doubt they would regard Itain, especially ifrend adds lo pre-uures in Japan and elsewhere for closer relations with China.
he neat two ye.us should present the Chinese with new opportunities for netting some influence on Japanese politics. The tensions fmociated with the Okinawa question and the US-Japanese Security Treaty all lend them selves to esploitatlon by Peking China coulderious overture to restore more normal commercial relatloni and could encourage the virits of Influentialpoliticians Toignificant Impact In Japan, however. Chinesewouldore skilled and fl*tlble cuplomacy than Peking has been willing lo adopt thai far.
eturn to more normal diplomacy does seem likely. The low of tsWaani to China hat begun to Irtcreate. relatloni with the foreign em-
hassles in Peking havr beeniome new economic agreements hive been concluded in lecent morvlhs. and rumors recuf that Ihe Foreign Minister or Chou En-tal may vHil abroad. Some reporti have Indicaied lhat Chinese ambassadors areeturn to theiris spring. However, both China's Internal politics, and ihe reaction ol Chinese leaders lo foreign events could serve lo delay move* lo restore greater normalcy to Chinese diplomacy.bnipt postponement of theebruary sernon of the Warsawlied by references lo the case of detecting Chinese diplomat Lianthat Peking is as yet undecided about its foreign pokey posture.
D. China's Vrtol Infarsnrsi Koraej orvd Taiwan
n North Korea, the Chinese have seen their influence diminish significantly, largely because of their own rude arrogance and partly because of theof therenewed cultivation of Pyongyang andsongeterioration, however, Is not likely toermanent iUlv uf affairs.in Korea are of major importance lo China, especially if tension) there coeil in'ie and the danger of hoattntiri grows. Eventually, we eapect the Chinese to repair iheir position and attempt to gain some influence over the KoreanProbably, however. China will notolicy intended tn Increaie the risks of war. Its behavior during the past year, particularfy tn the Pueblo cruii, suggest* that the Chinese are not about to pledge therm*Ives unreservedly to Kimdventurism.
X. Taiwan, of course,entral element in Chinese foreign policy. US support for theonumental obstacle to any Chinese reconsideration of its relations with the US. Peking will almost certainly not abandon Bs claim to Taiwan, and this position appears to rule out acceptancewo-China solution. Yet there la not much Peking can do to gain possession of Taiwan as long as tt is reluctant to engageilitary confront ot ion with the US. There is the possibility of pressure on ihe offshore islands (Ounrnen andove might appeal to Pekingest uf US intentions in the post-Vietnam period, especially if It could be used to aggravate relations tic.lngton aod Taipei.
IV. THE POST-MAO PERSPKTfVt
In some respectsruitless to speculate on the longer termof Chinese foreign policy. The prospect of Mao's departure overshadows all other conn derations. In many rrspccti. the situation is analogous to thai of the USSR ia the. when ihe death of Stalm unlocked Soviet foreign policy and tederies of significant new denatures. Naturally, this question is iirjpermost rn China's case also Will Mao's departureew era of significant change tn China's relations with the outside world?
We believe that Mao's departure wflltrong movement toward modifying hi* doctrines and Jettisoning his disruptiven foreignew leadership will ultimately seek to focus more effectively on national>
MtuWifonu In t< rmieali.tic world view. Even if Maoist rhetoric should temporarily survive, wo believe lhe trend will be toward rnoderating the Maoist bne In (avor of morediplomacy. Some modul Vivendi with theossible, though anythingenewal of the oldost unlikely. Moreover, we would noteturn to the tactics of peaceful coexotence as part of an effort to undermine the US position in Asia.
utrocess is not Inevitable and It would not In any case have to be steadyn interrupted. If there Is contention and struggle for the leadership, major policies could be frozenong term interregnum. The timing ol Mao'i departure and the Identity of the principal survivors could be important to policy. Finally,he response of outside powers. It wouldreat differenceew leadership had plausible alternatives or whether it brlieved that Its enemies were seeking to exploit China'i weak-nesse* and uoccrtriinliei Thus, the transition from Mao and his generation may last many years before real change* evolve. Meanwhile, support to subversiveot to active insurgencies, li Likely toontinuing role in China's external policy.
n anyess Irbologkal approach would not necessarily make China easier to deal or live with In Ana. Pursuit of Its basic nationalist and traditional goals could sustain tensions In the area,hina that was begin-nine to rcalixe some of Its potential In the economic and advanced weapons fields couldar more formidable force In Ana than is Maoist ChinOriginal document.