CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 11-1-69: THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM ( SR SP 69-2)

Created: 4/1/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

lA HISR/RICAi REVIEW PROF'

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence Office of Strategic Research

CONTRIBUTION TO : THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

EXPENDITURE IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

MICROFILMED

Copy No.pril 9

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Conlcr.ts

Page

Summary

I. Soviet Space Expenditures to Date

Space Program

Space Program

II. Future Soviet Space Expenditures

III. International Space Cooperation

Tables

Expenditures for Soviet Space

Programs,9

Expenditures for Major Items

in the Soviet Space Program

Chart

Estimated Expenditures for Soviet Space

Programs,

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Expenditure Implications of Soviet Space Programs

Summary

Soviet space expenditures grew rapidly1 The trend has continued upward since then, butlower rate due largely to the tapering off of spending associated with manned spacecraft programs and attendant support activities, including the development of large boosters. Even so, early indications are that the expenditures9 could approach S7 billion.*

Many of the resources required by the space effort are of the same type required for strategic military programs and for economic growth. Because of this, it seems unlikely that space expenditure levels during the next few years will be appreciably

* Dtraci information on actual Soviet expenditures for space is not available. The estimates reflect the aosts of known and estimated Soviet programs as though they had been incurred in the United States. The coat estimates are intended to convey anof the approximate size of Soviet space programs measured in financial terms.

Estimated aotte of the Soviet space program in this contribution differ from those contained in the OSH contribution to the Memorandum to Holders of. Annual expenditures since6 are now estimated at somewhat higher levels, for the most part due to the stepped-up activities in certain Soviet space programs, including development ew spacecraft, over the past year.

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higher than present levels- On the other hand, the vigorous pace of activity89 suggests that the high priority of the spacehas not been reduced. Consequently,probably will not fall below their present level.

Civil programs* continue to account for most of the space expenditures, rising from just0 million1 to aboutillion The manned lunar landing program is the most expensive-Its cumulativedevelopment of the very large booster, the spacecraft, and other hardware--are expected to totalillion when they terminate The civil share of funding for space stations will total about S3 billion on the completion of current programs

Expenditures for military space programs have increasedhare of the total, reaching2 billion or about one-fifth of all The reconnaissance satellite program continues to account for the largest share of costs

* The distinction between civil and military space programs was arrived at by using the US institutional frameworkodel, Soviet programs that compare to US programs funded by NASA have been placed in the civil account* Those that compare to US space projects funded by the Department of Defense have been placed in the military account. Other Soviet programs^ such as space stations, have a less clear primary intent, and costs forrojects have been divided equally between the two accounts, While this approach permits gross comparisonsOS and Soviet data so constructed, it probably is not the way the Soviets view their space costs*

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in the military category, representing overercent of military space spending

Soviet expenditures for cooperation inspace projects have been insignificant to date. Unless the restrictive security policy of the USSR iswe think thisfunds allocated for international cooperative space ventures are not expected to increase appreciably.

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I- Soviet Space Expenditures to Date

Upoviet space programsinor claimant of total national resources. From the0 the total cumulative spending amounted to onlyillion. But1 the space program was becoming more diversified, and outlays in that year amounted to more0 million (soe Table 1, opposite page). Physics and astronomyand lunar and planetary probes were expanding. Manned programs, starting with the Vostok/Voskhod series, were requiring even higher annual outlays than unmanned programs, and funding for thesatellite program had started.

As these programs progressed, expenditures rose sharply {see the chart below). 1utlays climbed by an average ofear,evel5 billion

Estimated Expenditures for Soviet Space Programs

BW!on

US OolUi4

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Estimated Expenditures for Major Items ln Hie Soviet Space Program a/

Expenditures Projected96 US S)

Expected Completion of Funding

Total Expenditures

to Completion (Million6 US $

oyuz

Circumlunar

Very large booster

New spacecraft

Manned lunar landing b/

Large hydrogen upper stage

Nuclear upper stage

Physics and astronomy

Lunar/planetary

Meteorological

engine improvements

Military

Inspec tor/rescue Early warning Reconnaissance Navigation

Civil/Military

Large space sta ti on Very large space station Conur.uni cations Advanced research Construction Administration

ontinuing Continuing Continuing Continuing

ontinuing Continuing

ontinuing Continuing Continuing Continuing

ontinuing Continuing Continuing Continuing

ontinuing Continuing

ontinuing Continuing Continuing Continuing

data in this table reflect the costs of known and estimated Soviet programs as though they had been incurred in the United States and are intended to convey an appreciation of the approximate size and composition of the effort in financial terms, b. Expenditure excludes development of the very large booster, the spacecraft, and

other components.

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Expenditures have continued to increaseut the growth rate has slowed down Total space spending8 was probably4 billion. xpenditures areto reach8 billion. Most of the expenditures during the past three years went for the manned lunar landingew spacecraft for the circumlunar program, spaco stations, and reconnaissance satellites. anned programs accounted for overercent of all space spending.

A. Civil Space Program

Civil programs continuo to account for most of the space expenditures, rising from just0 million1 to about S5 billion

The manned lunar landing program is the most expensive. Prom the beginning of funding4 to its anticipated endrogram costs alone are expected to amount to nearly S7 billion, and hardware development costs, anillionillion, so that the entire effort will costillion before it is completed. (See Tablepposite page, for ostimatedfor major items in the spacopending for tho new spacecraft associated with the circumlunar program, which is estimated to have startedill total about S3 billion by completion The civilian share of funding for space stations (arbitrarily set at one-half the total cost) will accumulate to aboutillion

Expenditures on science and applications accounted for about one-sixth of total civil space outlays Spending here was chiefly for physics and astronomy programs, lunar and planetary probes, and certain applications such asand communications satellites. Theseare expected to havp about the same relative importance

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Support expenditures, in which development of new large boosters is the major contributing factor, accounted for much of the growth of civil space outlays during the. This spending accounted for more than half of total owever, little more thanercent of the civil costs were incurred foritems, mainly becauseapering off in spending for the development of large boosters. This trend is expected to continueewof boosters is needed, possibly in.

The large booster program has involved two systems, theuch bigger booster, which have overlapped in their development. costs for development of there estimated at someillion from thoir start1 to their ending Funding for the larger booster began2 and will continue0otal cost of aboutillion. Final costs for this item could be higher if the program stretches out much beyond

Other support items include administration, advanced research, international projects, tracking and data acquisition, and construction. Although expenditures for these items are significant in the aggregato, no single item is of particularby itself.

B. Military Space Program

Spending for military space programs is becoming incraaningly important. It grew from0 million1 to nearlyillionr nearlyercent of total space outlays. The reconnaissance satellite program continues to be the most expensive item in the account. 8 costs of the reconnaissance program werer more thanercent of all military spending. Continued growth in expenditures for reconnaissance is expected.

Manned programs are also beginning to play an important role in military space spending. The

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largest category of expenditures associated with manned programs is the military share (one-half) of the costs of space stations. Also included in total military expenditures are funds for an inspection satellite program beginning8 and endingith an overall cost of3 billion. Spending for other applications in the military category is less substantial, amounting to only aboutercent of the military totalpending for support programs accounted for nearlyercent of total military space expenditures

II. Future Soviet Space Expenditures

Although any projection of the level of Soviet expenditures for space is subjectairly wide range of uncertainty, spending levels over the next few years are not expected to be significantlyi'. fron Lhe pnrsent . Spacoqr.inii require many of the same type of high qualityas are required for strategic military programs and for economic growth. Because of tho relative scarcity of such resources in the USSR, it seems unlikely that expenditures for Soviet space programs will be appreciably higher during the next few years than they now are, with an upper level3 of no more than aboutillion.

The vigorous paco of activity8 and so farowever, suggests that the high priority of the space effort has not been reduced. Consequently, annual spending3 will probably not fall below tho present level of almostillion. The current successes of the US in spaco would also seem tootivation for continued heavy Soviet spaceeven if there ia no direct race for specific accomplishments between tho two countries.

Ill. International Space Cooperation

The USSR has shown an increased willingness in recent years to cooperate with the US and other nations on some spaco projects, but tho impact of these ventures on Soviet space expenditures has been

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insignificant. The estimate of Soviet spaceto dateokenear for Soviet participation inspace ventures.

The technical data that could be acquired through extensive cooperation with the West would be useful in Soviet space and scientific efforts. The secretiv policy of the USSR, however, is expected to continue to limit cooperation to areas where there is obvious gain to the Soviet Union without the disclosure of technological strength, weakness, or accomplishment that could reveal Soviet military capability.

The few space agreements which the Soviets have entered into have paid off well by providing useful data that they could not otherwise obtain because of technical or geographic limitations, with little cost or risk of exposure. In the agreement with the US to exchange satellite weather data, for ex-

the SciVlP'o fh?-

The USSR's decision to attend the Intelsatin February9 may have indicated athat Intersputnik cannot compete with the Intelsat Consortium and suggests thai the Soviets may be interested in some form of cooperation in international communication efforts.

Original document.

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