REPORT OF THE FOREIGN POLITICAL AND MILITARY REACTIONS STUDY GROUP: STRATEGIC

Created: 4/18/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

9

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David Packard

Chairman,teering Group

Report of the Foreign Political

and Military Reactions Study Group: Strategic Forces

* .

On behalf of the Foreign Political and Ullitary Reactions Study Group, orward the strategic forces phase of its work for NSSU-3

As directed, tbe Study Group gave most attention to the reactive aspects ol Soviet military policy and force structure in relation to different US strategies. The Groupon how these factors would tend to Influence Soviet force and weapons decisions that must be taken in the near term if they are to have an operative effect on Soviet forces by thea. The Group recognizes that the Soviets are not limited

to reacting to US initiatives and that there is room for initiative in Soviet political and nili-tary decision making in tbe selection of strategic objectives. This is particularly true in the longer term.

3. Because the report necessarily is concerned with the analysis of first-order political effects and with presently available or predictablo the particular combinations and levels of Soviet forces described, particularly in the latter part of tbe period, are at best illustrative. As the report points out

unjustifiable information."

quite of our

c Copy No. f_

See Dtf OoU kr.

"Although the body of intelligence analysis underlying the Soviet force packages isa cautionary note is required. Tbe quantification of force levels and systemmay create an impression of precise Information, especially about future forces and systems, which would be in the light of the extent

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM 3

Study Group Report

foreign political and military reactions to us strategies and forces (strategic forces)

Copy No.

9

See Del Coal Kr. I-

Summary 1

Introduction 5

I. Objectives of Soviet Strategic

Policy 6

II. Soviet Views on the Strategic

Balance

III. Future Soviet Strategic Forces

Range of Effort for

Strategic Forces. 9

Responses to US Strategies

and

IV. Communist Chinese Reactions:

Strategic Forces 24

V. Major Non-Communist Reactions:

Strategic Forces 25

Appendixes

Soviet Strategic Reaction

of the Soviets' view of Their

Assured Destruction

Implications of Representa-

TO.

tive Soviet Strategic Reaction

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9

Foreign Political and Military Reactions to US Strategies and Forces (NSSM-3: Strategic Forces)

Summary

We believe that there are both military andobjectives that determine Soviet strategicand forces. On the military side, the primary aim is touclear attack on theby the US, Communist China, or any otherto minimize damage to the homeland in the event thatfails. On the political side, the primary goal is to sustain, both in the Soviet mind and in worldeneralized claim to equal powerin relation to the US.

The Soviet Union has increased its strategic power substantially during the past few years. Its leaders probably are confident that they areough strategic equality with the UStrong deterrent capability which is recognized by the US and by the rest of the world. We believe the Soviets recognize, however, that for the foreseeable future it is not feasible for them to achieve damage limitingwhich would permit them toirst strike against the US withoutery high level of damage in return.

A major concern of Soviet leaders at this time probably is how to maintain the capabilities of their strategic forces in the face of the significantbecoming available to theMIRVs. The Soviet leaders probably believe

'vote: This report uae prepared by the Foreign Political and Military Reaction* Group. This Group includedfromartm*nt of State, the Joint Chief* of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Syeteme Analysis), the Office of the Secretary of Defense Security Affairs), the Arm* Control andAgency, the Rational Security Council Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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that they will have to undertake expensive newprograms if they are to retain the strategicwhich they have recently achieved at great cost rand effort. The USSR's decision last July to open talks with the US on the limitation ofeflection of their concern.

Although it is clear that Soviet leaders areto changes in the US force postures and strategies, the relative weight of this factor as opposed to other considerations bearing on new weapons development and deployment is difficult to determine. Hardon the particulars of Soviet defense decision making is generally lacking and Soviet literature on the subject is often contradictory. Consequently, the reactions described in thisthe quantifications of force postures during the latter part of thebe regarded as highly

Soviet concern with the threat represented by US forces will not necessarily evoke an immediate and equal response to each US move. National outlook, internal bureaucratic structures and rivalries,and technological considerations, and other factors prevent the operation of perfectlyreactions based on military calculations. against the background noise and distortion generated by political debate in the US, the Soviets will not necessarily perceive accurately all USand actions.

Soviet military planners, however, will bewith existing and potential US weapons and forces and they will allowargin of safety when assessing an uncertain future. US development programs for advanced systems such at aysa, ULMs, aICBM, and abm will tend to push Soviet planners toward worst-case contingency planning against the eventual deployment of these systems.

Faced with the declared strategy of US Forceseeking full denial of Sovietcapabilities--the Soviet leadership might

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conclude that the US was preparingirst strike against the Soviet Union. We believe that the USSR would respondery large-scale military effort, curtailing civil programs where necessaryear war economy.

The Soviet leaders would interpret any of the strategic postures included in US Force Category II asS determination to threaten the strategic position of the USSR. He believe that the USSR would respond byarder political line and by increasing defense effortsroad front.

We believe that the improvements being planned under US Force Category III together with the de-clared US strategy probably would lead the Soviets to conclude that their present policy of exploring the possibilities of arms control, coupledeadiness to improve and expand their own forces, was their best course.

If the US adopted any of the alternatives in Force Category IVnilateral basis, the Soviets would be surprised. They would, upon reflection, recognize that the reduced US forces planned would stillormidable deterrent against surprise attack or high-risk courses of action by the USSR. They probably would attribute the US action to difficulties in the US economy and society. Soviet military efforts might proceedubdued tempoesult of the US action, but it isthat force levels would be much lower than the NlPP-Lo projections.

US Forceresumes the existence of formal arms control agreements with the USSR. The Soviet response to this Force Category, therefore, would be constrained by the provisions of any such agreements.

Communist China's strategic force capabilities and objectives through there unlikely to be affected by US programs. The Chineseconsider that the small ICBM force they can acquire in this period will enable them to exert

greater political pressure on their neighbors while inhibiting US actions. We doubt that theirwould be much affected by higher US offensive force levels or by either the presence or absenceS ABM system.

A decision by the US to substantially its strategic position in relation to the go against predominant European hopes and despite support for such moves by those wn deep fears and suspicions aboutharp reduction in US strategicould cause great concern to European gove and reduce their confidence in the US will touclear umbrella over NATO.

The middle range of US options would have little effect on other potential nuclear powers--lsrael, India, Japan, and Sweden. Responses to US adoption of strategies at either extreme would vary depending mostly on whether or not the US action was accompaniedimilar Soviet action. For example, if the US made significant reductions in its strategic forces and the Soviets did not, the incentives to go ahead with the development of nuclear weapons in these countries would be increased appreciably.

Attitudes and defense policies of NATO countries are less likely to be influenced by variations in the US strategicleast within the middle of the range ofby the way the USand deploys its general purpose forces. Any major change in the US strategic posture, especially one which might cast doubt on US deterrent capability, however, would cause them great concern.

improve USSR would

etain intentions. robably

rnments and ability

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Introduction

This paper provides an assessment :of possible political and strategic force policy responses of selected major foreign nations to specifiedUS courses of action.

nd II present brief discussions of the context of Soviet strategic policy decisions in order to provide some perspective on the likelyresponses in the complex process of strategic interactions. US actions and forces are only two among many considerations that affect Sovietdecisions. We identify, but do not discuss in detail, some of the other important factors where they are appropriate to the interaction situation being considered.

Part III focuses on future Soviet'strategic forces. ange of alternative levels of effort that the USSR might reasonably adopt to achieve its strategic objectivesepresentative forcefor each level of effort are presented. These representative forces are presented in the detail necessary for costing and for performing strategic simulation calculations. They should not be considered as representing more than one of the many combinations of forces that would be possibleiven general level of effort.

The representative Soviet force packages are then related to the range of US strategies and forcesby tho Interagency Working Group fornd likely combinations of US forces and Soviet force levels are identified. We have considered only first-order effects in the analysis. No attempt has been made to work through all the possible iterations of the interaction process.

This paper does not discuss the relationshipSoviet strategic forces and Soviet generalforcesi nor does it consider the possible impact of US general purpose force policy on Sovietforces. These topics will be treatedater stage in thetudy.

Part IV discusses the probable impact of USforce policy on Communist China. The responses of major non-Communist countries are examined in Part V.

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Appendix Arepresentative forcelikely range of Soviet effort duringn support of strategic programs. Appendix Ba simulation of the view the Soviets might have of their deterrent posture under selected combinations of US and Soviet strategic force structures.ontains the expenditure implications of theSoviet strategic forces described in Appendix A.

at

re independent CIA submissions to the report. They were not considered in detail by the Interagency Working Group because of the specialized nature of the analysis.

I. Objectives of Soviet Strategic Policy

We believe that there are both military andobjectives that determine Soviet strategic policy and forces. On the military side, theaim is touclear attack on thewhether by the US, Communist China, or any otherto minimize damage to the homeland in the event that deterrence fails. On the political side, the primary goal is to sustain, both in the Soviet mind and in worldeneralized claim to equal power status in relation to the US.

The way the Soviets would actually structure their forces, given their assessment of theirmilitary and political objectives, is not clear and would depend in large measureroad array ofthe nature of the strategicwith the US, Soviet economic andrealities, and the political environment in the Soviet Union.

The Department of State believes that thie report does not give euffioient to the political aspects bearing on Soviet deoieion making in the field of advanced weapons; but understandseparats and more detailed analysis on thie subject has been prepared by CIA in connectionelated NSSM.

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The exact weighting of military and politicalwould be influenced by the ways in which the US force decisions were made and justified, and by the size, pace, and qualitative characteristics of the US forces as they emerged from the decision. The Soviets probably believe that their present deployment programs would meet their military and politicalif the US chose not to exercise its presentfor deployment of new or improved weapon systems.

The Joint Chiefe of Staff believe that "deterrence" and "parity" are only minimum Soviet objectives. Clearly the Soviet range of strategic options is broader than one-for-one reaction to US choices and decieione. The Soviets have resources to fashion etra-tegic forces that fully exploit theirtechnology, support their worldand related ambitions, and take reason-able cognizance of US capabilities and force postures. On the record they are likely to do so. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefe of Staff utsh to emphasize that the reactive Soviet strategiee identified herein must be ueed with caution.

II. Soviet Views on the Strategic Balance

During most of the past ten years the us hasa commanding lead over the USSR in the number of weapons each could deliver against the other's homeland. Soviet intercontinental strike forces,have been built to levels sufficient to prevent the US from having confidence that it couldirst strike against the USSR without receiving an unacceptably high level of damage in return. Inthe medium range and intermediate range systems targeted against Europe provide further weight to the Soviet deterrent. The confidence of the Soviets in the credibility of their deterrent has certainly been strengthened by the increments made to theirforcesnd they are aware that the US shares this assessment.

The Soviets also have exerted major efforts to deploy defensive systems. ighly redundant air defenseimited missile defense system.

and recent high priority efforts to develop ASKtestify to the degree of Soviet interest in strategic defense. The Soviets almost certainlyhowever, that for tha foreseeable future it is not feasible to achieve damaga limitingwhich would permit them toirst strike against the US withoutery high level of damage in return..

Moat Soviet leaders are probably satisfied that the forces they are building demonstrate toand to the worldough strategicwith tha US is being achieved. In tha Soviet view, the attainment of this objective provides not only military security, butasic psychologicalto their ability to influence world affairs. Soviet political dealings, which are often conducted in difficult circumstances with reluctant partners and suspicious neighbors, are facilitated to thethat the USSR can represent itself credibly as an equal to the most powerful "imperialist" state.

The Department of State believe* that while thi* description of how th* Soviet* view their relative strategic poeition ia fully consistent and logical in term* of how th* US approachss this problem, it is not clsar from evidence available that the Soviet leaders have the same perspective or goale, or that they oan be regarded as oonetanis.

A major concern of Soviet leaders at this time probably is how to maintain the capabilities of their strategic forces in tho face of the significantbecoming available to thaaccurate MIRVs. The Soviet leaders probably believe that they will have to undertake expensive new deployment programs if they are to retain the strategic position which they have recently achieved at great cost and effort. The USSR's decision last July to open talks with the US on the limitation of strategic systems is aof their concern.

III. Future Soviet Strategic Porces

A. The Range of Effort for Strategic Forces

Because of uncertainties in both nonmilitary and military factors, we cannot define Soviet responses to us actions with precision. We can, however,the general levels of effort that the Soviets will devote to strategic forces during. Five illustrative strategic force packages have been designed to approximate reasonable limits to the range of Soviet effort and to place intermediate benchmark levels within the range. Although the body ofanalysis underlying these force packages isautionary note is required. Theof force levels and system capabilities may create an impression of precise information, especially about future forces and systems, which would be quite unjustifiable in the light of the extent of our The task of defining the range of Soviet effort was approached along the following lines:

1. The Soviet forces projected for then recent National Intelligence Estimates and Projections for Planning represent the range of most likely Soviet courses of action in view of theirevaluations of US policies and programed forces. It is with respect to this existing national intelligence, which constitutes the base case for the analysis in this study, that our evidence on Soviet objectives and weapons is clearest and where the body ofanalysis is most complete. Forcendhich are shown in detail in the force structure tables, generally correspond to thend describe the lower and upper limits of the base case projection used in this study.

2. We examined each of the alternative US Force Categories and judged whether it was likely to be perceived by the USSRignificant departure from the former US strategy and programed forces. For the appropriate cases, we assessed the extent to which the Soviet leaders would feel compelled to respond to their new perception of the changed strategic This review provided the basis for establishing the range of likely Soviet effort, corresponding to the broadened range of possible US policies.

We then designed representative sets of forces to set benchmark levels within this range of Soviet effort. The force packages are illustrative only, and should not be viewed as being the onlymixes and levels of weapons that the Soviets could deployiven level of effort. They take into account such factors as the weapons options most likely to be open to the Soviets as well asand economic feasibility. Technological and economicproductionprobably would make it very difficult, but notfor the Soviets to achieve all of the programs in the force packages specified for high levels of effort.

Brief descriptions of each force package and tables of forces over time are presented inA.

B. Options

The immediate options available to Soviet planners to respond to the planned improvements in the US strategic forces appear to be quite limited. In the strategic defensive field they appear to be some years away from development of an ABM system which would make an extensive national deployment program worthwhile. They stillomprehensive answer to the low-level aerodynamic threat. On the naval side, the present ballistic missile submarineprogram is already receiving priority We also believe that strategic weapons FUD programs are already operating at high levels and could not be speeded up appreciably even with the addition of some new resources.

The Soviets' options for stepping up their strategic weapons effort appear to fall mainly in the areas of strategic offensive missiles, specific near-term options probably include the following:

1. Deployment of theICBMlater this year, orOBS/DICBM afterand further testing These could be deployed in existingilos as fast as production, installation, and checkout would permit, or in new

silosonstruction period ofoonths. Deployment would probably be limited to, say,oissiles, given the accuracy and pay loadof theeneral attack weapon.

olid-prppellant ICBM in

a mobile mode beginning inirst-year activation rate of perhapsaunchersotal eventual deployment of perhapsaunchers.

Deployment of tho solid-propellantt additionalfar it is at only onetime with launcher start-ratesa month during the first year and possiblyevel of aboutonth in the peak year. This wouldairly rapid buildup in numbers of .ICBMs, with IOC initially coming aboutonths after the start of construction.

Maintenance of present rates ofeployment,as an easy way to build up numbers or ICBM launcners with proven weapons. The SS-11

has already gone through an extended deployment program and would appear-ready to be supersededewer weapon. It would, however,uicker and cheaperin.numbers than the SS-9. On the other hand, theould provide greater flexibility in that it can be usedehicle for special weapons like ther multiple warheads andard target capability.

limited nunber ofith MRV ioccre available during the This would increase the"effectiveness of

the Soviet force by permitting large soft targets to be covered more evenly but would not be comparable to the enhanced capabilities associated with antargetablarimitive MIRV would probably not be availablen accurate MIRV usable against hard targets not

C. Soviet Responses to US Strategies and Forces

During the past three years the Soviets have improved their position from what they probably saw as an adequate, but not entirely satisfactory,to one which more closely matches that of the

j US. They undoubtedly believe that their security has improved, but they must now see, in US programshance that they will have ton even higher pace than in the past if they are to maintain their relativethey measure it.

Soviet concern with the threat represented by US strategic forces will not, however, necessarily evoke an immediate and equal response to each US move. National outlook, internal bureaucraticersonal rivalries, economic and technologicaliderations, and other factors prevent the operationeat system of perfectly symmetrical reactions based on military calculations.

The Soviets do not necessarily makeumerical balances of strategic forces an overriding priority at each point in time. They did not fully exploit their capacity to produce long-range bombers and did not even approach economic limits forof first-generation ICBMs. Whilelose eye on the existing balance, they have at times postponed redressing imbalances. Time lags in the process of defining policy and force goals and bringing the forces into being, as well as imperfect perceptions of the strategic relationship, make the system one of complexity and interaction rather than one of discrete actions and reactions.

1. Soviet Perception of Changes in the Strategic lialance

This study assumes that no deliberate attempt will be made to conceal US objectives,and force structures from the Soviet Union. Against the background noise and distortionby political debate in the US, however, theprobably will not clearly perceive all USand actions. Although the Soviets may notdiscount announced US intentions, uncertainties about US objectives and the long lead times required by modern weapons will require Soviet planners to focus on an uncertain future.

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In any event, the Soviets are likely to feel they have more accurate information on existing US weapons and forces than on US strategies and it is primarily to the weapons and forces that they will gear their response. At the same time, the Soviets will allowargin of error in calculating the future. Soviet awareness of US development programs for advanced systems such as AMSA, ULM, AICBM, and ABM, which are included in most contemplated US Force Categories, would raise concerns for the future and tend to push them toward worst-case contingency planning against the eventual deployment of these systems.

In the nature of things, action and change are more quickly seen by the observer than inaction and stability. Sustained US efforts leading to higher strategic force levels probably will be accuratelyby the Soviets, and will generate immediate Within technological and economic feasibility, such US efforts will tend to stimulate Soviet reactions. On the other hand, US decisions for restraint andpaced changes in force levels probably will be more difficult for the Soviets to perceive and evaluate, and are much less likely to cause them to amend their previously planned programs.

If the US initiates new military programs or expands and accelerates existing programs, thewill probably look on this as indicative of more aggressive policies andotential threat to their own security requiring effective counteraction. They will be less sensitive to US actions involving the curtailment or delay of programs. Rather thansuch decisions as reflecting more limited US objectives, the Soviets will tend to findthat lie outside defense policy objectives, such as economic or political constraints ordifficulties.

The Soviet leaders have in the pastistinction between strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems. Consequently, they may be lessat least publicly, to US actions involving aABMSafeguard--than to improvements in US offensive weapons.

T

Control

The prmary Soviet political response to the previously planned improvements in US strategic capabilities has been an increased interest instrategic arms liaiitation talks with the US. One of the objectives of the Soviets appears to be to maintain the relative strategic position they have achieved without having to escalate their defense spending again to keep up with the US. An agreement that permitted each side to have forces sufficient to retaliate effectively and which could be presented credibly to Soviet citizens and the world generally as "equal" to the US in some measure would probably be acceptable to the Sovietsay of achieving this position.

The costs of responding effectively to US MIKV and ABM programs probablyrustrating prospect to the Soviets, considering the large ICBM programs they have been supporting3 to narrow the gap in strategic capabilities. In the absence of an arms control agreement, however, the Soviets almost certainly are prepared to react to the impact of new US programs by increasing their own strategicboth in numbers and in quality. Extensive test programs for special trajectory offensive weapons and multiple warheads are under way, and furtherof an ABM system is continuing.

To some extent higher levels of effort by the US might increase the Soviet incentives to reach an arms control agreement. There isoint, however, beyond which the Soviets would judgeolitical response offered no real prospects for achievement of their objectives, and they would abandon the idea of an arms agreementeans of maintaining stability in the strategic balance.

Combinations of US and Soviet

Strategic Forces"*"

Variations in the force structuresfor each of the US force categories might be

See th, sentation forces.

(Figuren page IS for of the likely combinations of US

graphic pri and Soviet

probability assessment;

soviet responses to us strategic forces

force category

1

FORCE PACKAGE

UNLIKELY

of soviet response

Category presume* arm* control agreement!.

The Soviet force would be corotrained by the term* of aflr8imentt.

UNLIKELY

rbrcM or rim*prmnnd in Append" A.

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perceived by the Soviets as requiring; somewhatlevels of forces or, more likely, they might affect the timing of individual Soviet programs. For example, those force alternatives which place heavier emphasis on sea-based strategic systems than on land-based or airborne systems probably would requiredifferent structuring of Soviet strategic forces. The land-based systems in these force alternatives, however, are not phased down until thend the accurate sea-based MIRV systems probably still would be viewed by the Sovietshreat to their retaliatory capability. It is unlikely, therefore, that these force alternatives would generate basically different levels of Soviet effort.

There probablyeneral tendency in thein othercarry outprograms for new weapon systems even when thereubstantial change in the original requirement. Past heavy investments and the vested interests of powerful special groups make it very difficult toajor program once it is under way.

a. US Forcetrategy A

alls for deployment of strategic nuclear forces to minimize the likelihooduclear attack on the US, totrong retaliatory capability, to limit damage, and toelativeto the US even in the eventoviet first strike. This strategy implies: n assured destruction capability; US defenses;ome US counterforce capability.

Facedeclared US strategy of seeking full denial of Soviet retaliatory capabilities, the Soviet leadership might conclude that the US was preparingirst strike against the Soviet Union. This in itself would be as important to the nature of the Soviet response as the forces the US set out to build.

We think it unlikely that the Soviet leaders would conclude that, to forestall this strategy,

they should enter into arms control talks and make the necessary concessions to gain early agreement. Instead, feeling themselves deeply challenged, they would greatly increase their military efforts, making whatever cuts in civil programs they deemed necessary, and would begin to convert to an almost complete war economy.

The hard line expressed in these moves would probably also be reflected in Soviet politics, leading to more repressive domestic policiesew balance in the Politburoore dogmatic and anti-Western set of attitudes. Communication between the US and Soviet governments would shrink, but there would probably be conciliatory changes in Soviet foreign policy toward Western Europe in order toon the reactions among NATO members.

The State Department believes that the Soviet reaction to US Forcerobably would be more compreheneive thanin the preceding paragraphs. It isthat the Soviet reaction wouldider gambit of political warfare, including possible initiatives in the arms control area in order to exacerbate adverse reactions in Europe or Japan.

In their strategic forces, the Soviets would probably seek numbers substantially higher than those in the NIPP-Hi forceix that would,at least, be heavily oriented toward retaliation based on large additional deployments of present systems. (See Soviet Forceor an illustrative force structure.) The Soviets would be extremely sensitive to the timing of US programs and would attempt to keep up with developments in US forces in time as well as in weapons.

At the samerograms would be stepped up for multiple warheads, penetration tactics and aids, and ABM systems. The Soviets would probably also seek an early dramatic psychological impact by conducting more tests of new weapons, perhaps showing some deployment of mobile ICBMs, and starting several new ICBM groups.

Giveneaction, Soviet forces considerably in excess of those in the NIPP-Hi force

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structure could result, but only by virtually stopping economic growth and greatly depressing consumer welfare.

b. US Force Categorytrategy B

alls for strategic nuclear forces which will minimizeuclear attack on the US, willa strong retaliatory capability, and, for the caseS first strike, will limitandelative advantage to the US. This strategy implies: n assuredcapability; ix of US counterforce and defense to achieve outcomes to the overall advantage to the USS first strike.

The Soviet leaders would interpret any of the forces in this category asSto threaten the strategic position of the USSR. Regardless of the pronouncements made by the US, the Soviets would be struck by our intention toew generation of systems across themanned aircraft, land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and ABMs. The prevailing Soviet reaction would be that the US had embarkedourse toegree ofwhich it could then use to threaten or humiliate the USSR.

This prospect would lead some Soviet political and military leaders to argue that the US was preparing for war and to urge responses approaching those noted under US Force Category I. Others would probably believe that prospective US strength, and the strains of trying to match it, underlined theof reaching agreements on arms control. They would be met with the counterargument that US policy was insincere andourse which made acceptable agreements unattainable. If the USSR nevertheless entered into negotiations, its position wouldemand that the US either forgo deployment of these new-generation systems or consent to parallel Soviet advances. The US strategy that this Force Category reflects would almost certainly increase the difficulties of reaching agreements.

Politically, the Soviet line toward the US would harden. This would not go ao far,as to preclude all dealings on matters of common interest oracit collaboration to containdangerous situations in other areas. In Western Europe, Soviet diplomacy would become active in an effort to take advantage of the opportunities for divisiveness opened by the new circumstances.

The Soviets would conclude that they had to increase their defense efforts and theirspendingroad front. We would expect them to develop and deploy forces that would exceed the present NIPP-Hi forces. (See Soviet Forces Soma degree ofreater defense effort would result. The extent would be determined by their choices withto sacrifices in economic growth, consumption, or military strength in general purpose forces.

c. US Force Categoryetween Strategyr.a Strategy C

mplies: an assured destruction capability;ix of US counterforce and defense to achieve outcomes to the overall advantage of the USS first strike. alls for forces which willtrong retaliatoryand concurrently minimize theof nuclear attack on the US. Thisimplies: n assured destructionS defenses and counterforceprimarily for use against Nth countries and/or small attacks.

The Soviets would recognize in tha US planning for the advanced offensive and defensive systems included in this Force Category that future US strategic capabilities could be considerably greater than implied by the concept of "stable They probably would view the US strategy as an attempt to maintain superiority or dominance.

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The Soviets would tend to discount the US explanation about improvements designed tooffensive capabilities for restrained nuclear-war and would conclude that the changes would improvecapabilities to fight any kind of war. They also would almost certainly believeecision to set in motion an ABM program would not stopefense so thin as to be irrelevanteneral nuclear Instead, they would expect that the momentum of the program would lead to US efforts to thicken the defenses against the Soviet threat.

This overall view of the potentialwould Impact on Soviet arms control policycomplicated way. The Soviet decision to agreetalks was difficult to reach, and it issufficient opposition remains to keep theand to restrict the Sovietany discussions which may

Some Soviet leaders would feel that the US strategy reflected by the forces in'this Force Category strengthened the argument for an arms agreement that could prevent the US programs from materializing. Others probably would argue that relatively smallexpenditures on Soviet strategic forces would negate the US effort. This group probably would also assert that the US actionsack of good faithime when both sides were trying to get talks going. The Soviets might judge that their negotiating position had been weakened and this might cool their desire for talks. They would, however, believe--despite the stated USthisigorous US effort to improve itsstrategic position relative to the USSR.

On balance, we believe that the US force improvements being planned under this Force Category together with the declared strategy, probably would lead the Soviets to conclude that their present policy of exploring the possibilities of arms control, coupledeadiness to improve and expand their own forces, was their best course.

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In tha absence of an arms limiting agreement, we believe the Soviet response to US Force Category III would tend to drive the USSR to alevel along the lines of the present NIPP-Hi forces. The pace of US programs, however, would be important to the Soviet reaction, and the USSR might delay some deployment decisions pending successful RDTSE of multiple warheads, penetration aids, and an improved ABM system.

d. US Force Categorytrategy C

alls for forces which willtrong retaliatory capability and concurrently minimize the likelihood of nuclear attack on the US. This strategy n assured destructionS defenses and counterforce capabilities primarily for use against Nth countries and/or small attacks.

If tho US adopted any of thein this Force Categorynilateral basis, the Soviets would be surprised. They would, upon reflection, recognize that the reduced US forces planned would stillormidable deterrent against surprise attack or high-risk courses of action by the USSR. It would be difficult for them towhy the US was willing, without an arms agreement, not only to forgo deployment of new systems, but also in forcesndo allow its existing strategic forces to run down. In the end, they probably would attribute this decision to difficulties in the US economy and society. They might, in addition, recognize in the USesire to elicit reciprocal reduction on their part. At the same time they would be prone to believe that the US decisions would not stick and would soon be reversed.

In considering their military responses, we believe that some Soviet leaders would want to take the opportunity to improve the Soviet strategicbut they probably would be concerned about doing this so fast as to make it likely that the US would reverse its policy. Balanced against this view, other

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leaders would want to seize the opportunity to limit spending on strategic forces in order to allocate more resources to civilian programs or possibly to obtain more general purpose force improvements.

Thus we believe that unless this OS strategy were the result of an arms agreement, the USSR would adjust its programs so as not to arouse US fears that the USSR was seeking to significantly undercut the US assured destruction capability. The resulting Soviet strategic posture probably would not be much lower than the NlPP-Lo threat.

If the forces posited in US Force CategoryS negotiating position rathernilaterally announced posture, the chances of reaching an arms limitation agreement which confined US and Soviet forces at theseat somewhat higher levels, probably would be good. It is unlikely that, the USSR would accept eitherrirst'stage in strategic armsespecially given the inclusion of KIRVs in IV-C.

e. US Forcetrategy D

ndertakes through arms limitation and reduction agreements to limit strategic forces. If enforceable limits on offensive forces are attainable, it might be possible to achieve war outcomes with low levels of fatalities and damage to both sides. This strategy implies: o assuredcapability for either major power relative to the other; ood US damage limiting capability primarily throughforces; apability to deter Soviet nuclear attack on the US by denying anyto the USSR from such an attack;apability to deter or to prevent significant damage by attacks from any Nth countries.

The strategic force postures included in this Force Category presume the existence ofarms control agreements with the USSR. The Soviet

forces, therefore, would be constrained by theof such agreements.

ermits retention of sizable offensive forces, but in the face of the extensive missile defenses also permitted, the Soviets probably would believe that their deterrent was no longer credible. s even moreand deletes allew offensive forces by the end of the period. We see virtually no chance that the Soviet Union is prepared now to contemplate the drastic reordering of its strategic posture that would be necessary to reach agreement on mutual forces at this level.

Suspicions of the US, confidence in the USSR's present deterrent posture, and the influence of Soviet military and military-industrial interest groups work against Soviet agreementadicalin offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Soviet leaders probably would believe that thesewould degrade their statusuperpower. They not only derive great satisfaction from thisbut they see it as their major political asset and security guarantee against the capabilities of second-rank nuclear powers.

top

Likely Soviet responsesariety of strategic force limitations and reductions under arms control agreements are considered in detail in

H

Communist Chinese Reactions: Strategic Forces

Communist China's capabilities and objectives in strategic weapons through thereto be affected by US programs. The Chinese would see progress toward arms limitation oras conclusive evidence that the US and USSR were in collusion and they would not see any lessening of the threat. Even if faced with higher force levels the leaders probably could do little to increase the basic pace of Chinese advancedprograms. At most, the US decision to deploy an ABM system might make deployment of an earlyICBM less attractive than greaterof MRBMs, but even this is doubtful.

The Chinese will recognize--under any of the optionsong time to come both the US and USSR will be able to visit enormous destruction upon them. This, rather than the particular size or characteristics of the forces planned for, is what will influencebehavior. They do believe, however, that each milestone in their advance in strategic weapons strengthens their claim to great power status and forces other states to treat them with greater caution.

TO

In this context the Chinese will probably consider that the minimum ICBM force which we estimate they will acquire in theill enable them to exert greater political pressure on their neighbors and give them somewhat greater freedom of action by increasing the inhibitions to US actions. We doubt that higher US force levels, including ABM deployment, would cause them to change this calculation.

ret

V. Major Non-Comnu.iist Reactions: Strategic Forces NATO

NATO attitudes and defense policies are less likely to be influenced by variations in the US strategicleast within the middle range of theUSby the way the DS structures and deploys its general purpose forces. Our NATO allies believe that their security depends ultimately on the deterrent strength of US strategic forces. They value our conventional forces in Europe as an indication of the importance we attach to our commitments there andledge toward the activation of our strategic forces whan and if needed. Any major change in tha US strategic posture which might cast doubt on itscapability would cause them great concern. If the US does adopt strategic goals which appear to thato be risky or otherwise undesirable, they are likely to react in tha first instance by seeking tohange of course on the part of the US, rather than by altering immediately their ownand policies.

European reaction to the Safeguard proposal has been mixed, but generally mild. Thereeneral feeling, however,hick ABM deployment by the US would tend to intensify the arms race, add little to the credibility of the US deterrent, andthe defenselessness of Western Europe. These concerns wouldertain amount ofand demands for increased consultation within NATO but probably not any more serious reaction.

A US decision to strengthen itsis the USSR would go against predominant European hopes and thinking, despite the likelihood that moves in this direction would be welcomed by those who retain deep fear and suspicion about Communist intentions. In the case of US Forceperhaps even Force Categoryfor detente and for an eventual overcoming of theof Europe would be set back, and the US would get the blame.

In the case of Forceand perhaps even Force CategoryEuropeans would probably conclude that the US was deliberately forcing the pace of the arms race. Although their ultimate assessment of the situation would depend on how the Soviets reacted, the NATO governments would probably fear that they were headingeriod of heightenedmarked by brinkmanship over Berlin and other pressurethat the possibility of nuclear war was increasing.

echnological level, an accelerated arms race would compound the difficulties faced by France and Britain in keeping their deterrent forces At this point, we believe that various NATO governments would begin to give serious consideration to other approaches to East-West relations and national security. De Gaulle's arguments that the US wasthe cold war and that new escalation wasthe chances of hot war would find considerable resonance.

There would be serious explorations of European defense cooperation outside NATO, of an independent European nuclear force, or of unilateral accommodations with the USSR. These explorations would faceobstacles in the form of intra-European rivalries and continuing major differences with Moscow, and they might well come to nothing. But they would,inimum, leave deep divisionsNATO.

The European governments probably would be more concerned in the eventharp reduction inUS strategic forces, bringing with it reduced confidence in US will and ability touclear umbrella over NATO. The reaction would be strongest should the US appear to be adopting US Forceoals. It probably wouldood ofand resignation to learn that the US nowthe deactivation of half the Minuteman force, the run-down of2 force to less than half the present level, and the forgoing of all the new generation of offensive systems except Poseidon.

This mood woulderiod of anxious questioning about the credibility of past US analyses and the wisdom of the new US course. No matter what Washington said in announcing these decisions, its allies would initially believe that the US had chosen to bank on Soviet reciprocity or, failing that,to look exclusively to its own security. The Germans and others would be deeply concerned that the nuclear deterrent waa being dangerously weakened. Such options as independent accommodations with the USSRuropean nuclear force would receiveattention.

In the end, however, the eventual NATO reaction would depend upon the Soviet response to the usand the resulting strategic relationship. If our NATO allies did consider the relative strategicof the West considerably weakened, the obstacles to their following the options mentioned above, plus reassurances by the US of its continued intention and capability to defend Western Europe, might still bringesigned acceptance of the US decision and an attempt to maintain the Alliance more or less intact. Doubts concerning the US will and capability to respond to threats to European security, however, undoubtedly would remain.

Many Europeans would probably also be suspicious about the ultimate implications of the USrms control package, with its provisions for the eventual phaseout of all aircraft and land-based missiles in favorimited Poseidon deployment and extensive ABM city defenses. They would be doubtful both about the USSR's willingness to keep its side of the bargain and about US willingness, even with ABMs deployed, touclear exchange with the USSR, and would probably seek increased assurance against the threat posed by theR/IRBMs targeted against Western Europe and by Soviet conventional forces.

Potential Nuclear Powers

A change in US strategic posture would itself probablyegligible effect on the military policies and force goals of Israel, which is already

topjbcret

committed to assuring its own defense against the Arabs (probably including the achievementuclear capability) and looks to the US more toource of military hardwareuffer against conventional Soviet intervention in support of the Arabs than touclear umbrella against the Soviets. nilateral reduction in the scale of tha US strategic effort might raise some Israeli fears of becoming more vulnerable to Soviet nuclear blackmail but the net effect would probably only be to confirm the Israelis in their present military policies.

India's feelings regarding US strategic forces are mixed. On the one hand, itong record of oppositionuildup of the arms race and has been an active participant in international arms control discussions. On the other hand, it has been Interested in obtaining nuclear guarantees from the US (and the USSR)eans of responding to the Chinese nuclear program and its potential for blackmail of India without the necessity or proceedinguclear program of its own. On the whole, the Indians would probably applaud any moveeduction in strategic weapons expenditures, especially anyattained through mutual agreement between the US and the USSR. Should US strategic force reductions be such as to bring into question US will and ability to protect India against Chinese nuclear threats, however, Indian incentives to go aheaduclear program would increase.

Japan's military policy is predicated on the assumption that under the US-Japanese treaty0 the US will bear the principal burden of deterring or if necessary repelling aggression against Japan and that Japan's own self-defense forces would playupplementary role in any major conflict. Although there have been strong legal, emotional, and political inhibitionsajor buildup ofmilitary strength especially in the nuclear field, these may be diminishing. Japan obviously has the skills and resources to build nuclear weapons and missiles and may be reluctant to foreclose the option to do so.

-

As with NATO, the continued viability of present Japanese policies will depend primarily on how the US maintains and deploys its conventional forces barring drastic changes in the US strategic posture. arked unilateral reduction in the US strategic effort would raise questions about the extent to which the Japanese were still being protected by the US nuclear umbrella, and would be most likely to cause aof Japanese strategic policy and possibly ato develop nuclear weapons. utual reduction of US and Soviet strategic force levels, on the other hand, would possibly encourage the Japanese to continue along the present path, assuming no sharp decrease of the US conventional military presence in Northeast Asia and the Pacific. An acceleration of US (and Soviet) strategic programs would probably not of itself greatly affect Japanese military policy.

Sweden's primary military concern is with counter-balancing the potential Soviet air, missile, and ground threat without stirring up the Soviets or otherwise jeopardizing Sweden's traditional roleeutral. Hence, Swedish military policy is likely to be less affected by what the US may do than by changes in the Soviet posture. harp unilateral reduction in the US strategic effort might stimulate Swedish interest in developing nuclear weapons of its own if it appeared toeneral weakening of the US stance. utual reduction of US and Soviet strategic forces would probably tend to lessen Swedish interest in nuclear weapons.

On the whole, it appears most unlikely that West Germany would seek to develop an independent nuclear capability in the light of the sustained legal, political and military pressures it would confront before its nuclear capability could

materialize.

Representative Soviet Strategic Reaction Threats

Soviet Strategic Force Package 1

This set of forces represents what we believe would be the minimum level of effort that thewould be likely to devote to their strategic capabilities in. It would allow the USSR to attain two basic strategicandunder the condition that the US did not markedly improve its present force levels.

Maintenance of stability in the US-USSR strategic relationship would be an essential condition if the USSR were to follow this course of action. Thewould not attempt to make major improvements in their damage limiting capabilities, because they would realize that any such improvements wouldcut into the US assured destructionand probably stimulate an offsetting response. They would rely on their existing defensivereinforced by the intangible benefits that would accrue from greater strategic stability.

The Soviets would have to be confident that they possessed accurate knowledge of the future USthreat to maintain confidence in the credibility of their deterrent. The required degree of confidence probably could be achieved only by arms limitation agreements. Formal negotiations and agreement also would be used by the Soviets to achieve theof demonstrating equal power status with the US.

to

If the Soviets were confident that future US strategic capabilities would not increasethen existing levels of Soviet hard site ICBM deployment might be considered adequate, and SS-7 and

aunchers might even be phased out.lass submarine program might be concluded well short of equality with the US Polaris force. Some programs to improve the survivability of the Soviet strike forces could be expected, but expensive qualitativesuch as MXRVs and mobile missiles could be

Soviet Strategic Forcend 3

These packages generally correspond to the low and high projections of Soviet strategic forcesin existing national intelligence. Theya range of Soviet effort considered to be likely if the US force posture previously planned forere carried out. On the basis of that US force posture, an overall Soviet effort toward the high end of the range would reflect conservative judgments on the part of Sovietelatively heavy weighting of the "equality" objective.

For Packagehe mix of the offensive strike force is improved overylass submarine deployment which approaches the size of the US Polaris program. Qualitativeto existing forces such as MIRVsmall ABM program are added to provide some additionallimiting capability. The Soviets would retain the option to deploy mobile missiles to replace the second-generation ICBM systems.

For Packageoth enlarged and qualitatively improved strategic forces arelassittle larger than Polaris could ba expected, and both land-based and sea-based missiles wouldbe upgradedIRV capability. More stress would be placed on defensive systems, withizable ABM force of6 and Mobile missiles would probably be deployed. In the event that the Soviets chose not to deploy MIRVs, deployment of current ICBM systems would be extended to accomplish the same end.

Soviet Strategic Forcecxa-'e- i ar.d 5

Forceoth represent greater levels of effort than required for the high force levels projected in existing national intelligence.

epresents what we believe is the maximum effort that the USSR would devote tocapabilities in. Package 4an intermediate level of effort, with special attention being paid to qualitative improvements in the future.

As used here, maximum effort approaches, but does not include, the case of mobilizing the entire nation and completely converting the economyartime basis. It is highly unlikely that the USSR would take such drastic action unless it becamethat the US was preparingull-scale nuclear war with the USSR. Technological and economicproductionwould make it very difficult, but not impossible, for the Soviets to achieve all of the programs in these force packages.

Forceoth imply little concern on the part of the Soviets for the stability of the strategic relationship. Force structure decisions would be based almost exclusively on enhancing the size and quality of the forces. For Forcespecially, every feasible measure would be taken to improve strategic capabilities and the principal constraint placed on development and deployment of weapons systems would be technological. Maximum effort would be devotedrograms.

Defensive systems would be stressedery large national ABM deployment would probably be undertaken. Bothlass submarine program and current ICBM programs would be extended andthrough major qualitativesuperhardening. MIRVs would be deployed wherever practicable and the Soviets might alsoew manned strategic aircraft.

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APPENDIX B

Simulation of the Soviets' View of Their Assure?"Destruction Capabilities

Introduction

As part of the overall US-USSR strategicanalysis we have exaxined likely Soviet views of trends in the assured destruction capabilities of alternative Soviet forces against specific US options* Simulation analysis was performed with the Arsenal Exchange Model.* We used conservative assumptions which we believe the Soviet military planner would be likely to make in his calculations. Theused are set forth in detail in the next section-

We cannot say conclusively that the Sovietscomputer-assisted simulation studies, although references to such studies in the Soviet military press indicate that they probably do. We can say, on the basis of the Soviet literature and from the rfay they build their forces, that the factors which they consider important in calculating the balance ofthey actually perform the analysisvery similar to those considered by US planners in their strategic interaction studies. These factors include the number of weapons available to each side, theiras reliability,size, andwell as targetand the relationship of targeting strategy to the objectives sought.

If our intelligence on Soviet weapons and targets is reasonably accurate, we believe that Soviet planners

Computer-assisted simu actiononvenient wa ber of alternative force sensitivity analysis with assumptions about weapons targeting strategies, and such, it is an aid to ana methodology.

Note: This Appendixiss ion to theetail by the Interagency of the specialised nature lation of strategic farge num-ttructuree and conducting explicit variations in characteristics, targets, strategic objectives. ysis, and not an estimating

i independent CIAas not considered in

Working Group because

of the analysis.

would see the general trends in their assuredcapabilities as moving in the sameas presented in this Appendix, whether or not they were elaborately calculatedomputer. They almost certainly would not obtain numerical values identical to those we have derived, however, even if our intelligence is perfect. Some Soviet militarydifferent assumptions and methods of anelysis--probably would assess the threat to their retaliatory force as less than the levels we calculate. Others might assess it as greater.

We do not know what weight the Soviet decision makers would give to such studies, but we believe they would take them into consideration, particularly if theyotential radical shift in the strategic relationship.

Assumptions

Soviet assured destruction capability was measured in terras of the number of fatalities that surviving Soviet strategic forces could inflict on US citiesS first strike against Soviet strategic weapons.

The following assumptions were used in developing the initial attack phase of this scenario.

US sea-based andforces are launched in afirst strike against Sovietand ICBM sites. (Medium- andballistic missiles andbombers are excluded from themissiles are allocated to targets so as

to reduce Soviet retaliatory capabilityinimum.

heavy bombers areten bases at the time.

Soviet missiles or bombersbefore the US strike.

submarines are attacked by

US ASW forces. Ninety percent of the USSR's new Polaris-type submarines that are on

station survive. Because of advances in US ASW capabilities, overeclining percentage of other on-station submarines are assumed to survive and launch their missiles.

e. All US weapons and penetration aids operate at design accuracy,and effectiveness.

For the simulated retaliatory strike by theit was assumed that:

Soviets allocate theirforces to inflict theof fatalities on US urban

j

percent of thethat survive the US attack.NORAD and reach theirpoints.

i

percent of Sovietare on station forLevels, and 3. Inixty percent are assumed to be lass submarinesincluded in the simulation becauseassumed toifferent mission.)

Analysis of Force Interactions

Soviet ForceNIPP-Hi) was first tested against US Force, II-A, II-B, III-A, III-B, IV-A,. Other selectedof Soviet and US forces were also run in cases where the Soviet retaliatory capability of Forceorces showed significant The results of these simulations are shown in, on.

The data8 were then generalized into four broad ranges of US urban fatalities and plotted on the US/Soviet force matrix shown in, on.

In our analysis we have assumed that surviving Soviet missiles could be optimally retargeted. This

-

Trends in Soviet Assured Destruction Copability at Various Levels of Response to US Force Categories"

(US FATALITIES IN PERCENT OF URBAN POPULATION)

1

FORCE CATEGORY SOVIET FORCE PACKAGE

IV A

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(US FATALITIES IN PERCENT OF URBAN POPULATION) US FORCE CATEGORY

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imputes to the Soviets the ability to assess rapidly how many of their weapons survive, to calculate an optimal allocation of surviving warheads to US cities, and to retarget as necessary. If this ability iscommunications failure or retargeting limitations in the Soviet miasiles--the effectiveness of the Soviet retaliation might be seen by the Soviets as less then we calculate.

If, on the other hand, the Soviets believe their ICBM eilos are harder than we estimate, if their SLBM on-station rate is planned to be greater, or if missile and bomber alert forces are planned, the Soviets might not view their deterrent force to be quite as vulnerable as that shown.

For these reasons we have examined broad ranges of US fatalities for the various years, rather than the single valued outputs of the model. hows the results plottedB, to illustrate the results of our interaction analysis on theyear of projected US and Soviet force levels.

The results shown here are greatly influenced by design criteria assumed for the Soviet foroei. That is, the Soviets build forces not only to deter but to defend the USSR if deterrence fails, and in our construction of future options, this past practice is projected onto future Soviet forces.

In the extreme cases, however, where Soviet assured destruction is calculated to become lessf the US urban population, the Soviet response threat could be restructured to minimize itsthe same level of total strategicif some of the projected defensive systems were not deployed.

We examined this computationally only in oneResponsegainst US ForceIII-A. In this case we used the ArsenalModel routine for force optimizing under fixed budget constraints.

With the Soviet force at Forceptimized for retaliation against US Force Categoryssured destruction8 improvedfrom aboutercent to overercent cf US urban population killed.

a

IRV system wasnot to be effective in thescenario since itSoviet RVs for the US If this system were to befor second strike scenarios,alert rates,heavy terminal defenses, etc.,to be adopted to ensureheavy attacks.

ppear to beassured destruction weaponscan be deployed in large nubmerscheaply. Large deploymentthe US counterforce attack withlarger target system than thethus improving Soviet forceby sheer numbers.

the cost-effectivethe model selected terminalfixed ICBMsood assuredstrategy. Deployment of areanumbers sufficient to counter thepen-aidtoo costly to

Expenditure Implications of Representative Soviet. Strategic Reaction Tr.reats

Surr.fiary

A comparison of expenditure levels for the five projected Soviet Force Packages foreriod illustrates the range of economies oroutlays implied by various strategic postures.

Depending upon the extent of the quantitative and qualitative improvements pursued, the strategic forces require average outlays as lowillion dollars or as high asillion dollars annually. These levels of expenditurewith average spending foreriodillion dollars annuallyase Casefrom present national intelligence projections of Soviet military forcesevel intermediate between NIPP-Hi and NIPP-Lo.

Costs of Alternative Soviet Strategic Forces, Average Annual Data/

6 Dollars

Case b/

1

2

3

4

5

Components may not add to totals shown because of rounding.

b. Average annual cost.

Sote: Thia Appendix ie an independent CIAto the report. It was not aoneidered in detail by the Interagency Working Group because of the specialized nature of the analysis.

C-l

If the Soviets chose to limit the number of their future programs and reduce the size of their current deployment, as in Packagehe result would be an expenditure reduction ofillion dollars annually.

As the force options move toward increased deployment as well as more technical improvements (MIRVs, MRVs,or both new and old systems, hard choices must be made by Soviet leaders. oint eventually may be reached where anyin strategic security can be gained only at considerable expense to the nation's economic viability.

The most extreme case, as presented in Packagemplies an increase in average annualof aboutillion dollars over the Base Case. This amount, in ruble terms, is roughly equal to the recent annual increments to total investment in the Soviet economy.

It should be noted, however, thatollars represents only the costs of hardware and related operation and maintenance. An additional substantial amount would be necessary to fund theffort which the advanced weaponsofould require, but which cannot be cos ted.

Other force options fall somewhere between the above extremes depending upon the level ofand quantitative improvements which are

Comparability Considerations

In costing the alternative Soviet Force Packages postulated forn attempt was made to provide data as comparable as possible to that available on the alternative US forces. To achieve thisoutlays for nuclear weapons expenditures for theorces have been excluded from the data discussed in this Appendix. (The nuclear weapons costs are, however, shown in the tables at the end of the Appendix.) Support costs were accounted for as far as possible,reakout of all support costs from command and general support was not possibli

C-2

TOEssM

The expenditure data for the Base Case arefrom the series of military NIEs and thecontributions to the NIEs. For costingingle-valued representative statement of the forces was chosen from the NIE range of forces.

Detailed tabular information of the six force options is provided at the end of this Appendix. Included in the detailed tables are expenditures for nuclear weapons outlays associated with theorces, and for the Soviet strategic peripheral forces. Because RID expenditures for the Soviet forces cannot currently be allocated to weaponor mission, they are not shown in the table.

All the tabular data are expressed in billions of dollars to two decimal places. evel of detail of this nature makes it possible to gain some perception of small movements in the underlyingdata, the uncertainties are such that theof data rest only on general magnitude and trends.

Soviet Force Package 1

Large and sustained decreases in totalcould be anticpated if the Soviets adapted their forces to achieve relative comparability with the US "defense emphasis" posture. The forces as postulated in Sovietmply significanteconomies, amounting to an annual average ofillion dollars less than Base Case While expenditures for this set of forces areercent of the Base Case figureshey would represent onlyercent of the comparable level of outlays for the Base Case

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The table below shows the economies that would be realized if the Soviets adoptedimited level of effort.

Annual Expenditures6

trategic Force

Package 1

Base Case

Difference

Total Attack

Other

As expenditures for strategic forces decrease under this Soviet option, an increasing proportion of total outlays is for the strategic defense mission. Byore thanercent of the strategic forcewould be for the operation and maintenance of strategic defensive systems;6 moreould be for SAMs alone. This option alsothat outlays for attack forces decline both in absolute terms andercentage of total strategic forces.

Soviet Force Package 2

The forces which make upould cost the USSRillionear less over tha next ten years than would the forces which areprojected for the Soviets in the Base Case. The reduction should be almost evenly divided between strategic attack and strategic defensene billion dollar reduction in average annual costs in each mission as shown below.

25

Peak military expenditures for theorces would occurs opposed1 for the Base Case. As compared with Packageheexpenditures inverage

6 Dollars

Base Case

Package 2

71 72

75

billion dollars more per year. Expenditures for SAM systems would constitute the largest singleelement in both the offensive and defensive forces, because of the large number of SAMs deployed and the resulting high operating costs.

Soviet Force Package 3

Average annual expenditures implied inmountillion dollars above the Base Case.

average annual expenditures (billion ilii dollars)

trategic

package 3

base case

difference

the difference in expenditures in the two cases would be due principally to the larger expenditures allocated for strategic defense in package 3.

the impact of spending for abhs and sams|in the. estimated expenditures3 peak34 billion dollarswith those of the base case,illion

6 dollars

75

7?

70 71

25

Pacta

case

77 78

the major reason for the difference would be greater yearly spending for sams and abms inompared with that of the base case. anticipated sam expenditures increase aboutercent and abm spending doubles over the base case estimates.

average expenditures for strategic attack would be about equal to those for the base case.

Soviet Force Package 4

Soviet Forceould require outlays averagingillion dollars per year above those of the Base Case. This increased level of expenditures is the result of higher outlays both for ICBMs in the strategic attack forces, and for SAMs and ABMs in the strategic defense forces.

Expenditures foreak3 amounting8 billion dollars as compared to the Base Caseeakillion dollars is reached

75

77

02oviet Force Package 5

BUI6 Dollars 2

1*

Case

75 76

Only if Soviet leaders became convinced that the US was preparingull-scale nuclear war with the USSR would they be likely to make the sacrifices

required to produce and deploy the forces postulated in Package 5. onfiguration of Soviet forces would require enormous expenditures as welledirection of the Soviet economyear wartime system of priorities.

The achievement of the outlined posture would necessitate moreoubling of the average annual expenditures (see below) for the strategic forces in the next ten years when compared with those of the Base Case.

Average AnnualDollars)

Strategic

5

Case

As can be seen in the following graph the greatest single annual difference would occurhen expenditures would reachillion dollars, or approximately throe times those presently projected in the Base Case for that year. Most of thisis accounted for by the increases which would come about in Soviet defensive forces, but offensive forces would alsoustantial increase in funding.

6 Dollars

25|

Package^ ^

Case

70 71 72 73

75 75 77 7o

In addition to tha costs imposed by theof hardware and the expansion of the military services, anundoubtedly significant-cost would be incurred for research and development of the advanced systems whichnvisions.osts have risen rapidly as more sophisticated weapons systems have come into the Soviet military inventory.

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