BREZHNEV'S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

Created: 12/5/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Brezhnev's Struggle for Dominance

ex to

eonid Brezhnev: The Han and His Power)

59

BREZHNEV'S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE

ANNEX-JO CAESAR XXXVlI (Leonid Brezhnev: Thc Man and His Power)

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

Thisout and analyzes

in detail the evidence concerning Brezhnev's nodus operandi in achieving and consolidating power in the Soviet hierarchy.

The Annex is published for those who might desire to pursue tbe subject in some depth. The analysis and conclusions found in this Annex are consistent with the basic study, but, unlike that study, the Annex has not been coordinated or reviewed in detail by other offices-

BREZHNEV'S STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE ANNEX TO

(Leonid Brezhnev: The Han and His Power)

Contents

INTRODUCTION

MAIN ARENA: THE PARTY

Adversity for

to the

5

arty

Among the Seniors: Shelepin's

Emergence as "Second" Secretary25

THE COMPETITION WITH PREMIER

A. laim to "Number

B- ein on

THE DRIVE FOR MILITARY AND POLICE

A. Uneven Relationsivided

is. Dominating the Security

INTRODUCTION

Brezhnev has decided advantages over other Soviet leaders by virtue of his supreme party position. As de facto chairman of the Politburo, the General Secretary can and doesover'its operation and exert aInfluence on the direction of policy. As chief of the party Secretariat, he isetter position than any other leader to manipulate the executive machinery for personalthrough appointments of clients to key posts in the party and state apparatus. Finally, as the man in control of the military hierarchy and police forces, the General Secretary can call on the organizations of coercion for self-protection in the name of regime security. Nevertheless, the lesson of Khrushchev's removal was that none of these powers can be taken for granted. To maintain hiseneral Secretary must strive for dominance over his colleagues and, at the same time, not appear to threaten the survival of the oligarchy; otherwise, he falls prey to his political rivals.

This study is concerned with how Brezhnev has perceived his position within the oligarchy and maneuvered to consolidate his personal power. It examines his efforts to this end in three arenas of political action: the party Secretariat, the party-government duumvirate, and the amorphous military-security complex. The mostBrezhnev has appeared to recognize it asbeen the Secretariat, where senior secretaries Podgornyy and Shelepin seemed to wield more actual power in the first months after Khrushchev's fall than the General Secretary himself. The paper follows Brezhnev's struggle for dominance over his secretarial rivals,with his first tenuous moves within tho Centralapparatus inontinuing with histhrust for recognition during mostndthe breakthrough in December that year with Podgornyy's transfer from the Secretariat. It examines Brezhnev's use of indirect methods to neutralize Shelepinhreat

in that body. Finally, it traces Brezhnev'sKirilenko as "second inringingto the Secretariat after

Another important area of potential danger to the General Secretary is his shared-power relationship with Premier Kosygin. Because this subject has been treated fairly exhaustively elsewhere, the study focuses on the essentials of this aspect of Brezhnev'son his effort to gain and hold the preeminent position in the duumvirate.

Finally, this study investigates Brezhnev's method of dealing with the regime's two biggest instruments ofmilitary and the security organizations. It covers the highlights of his variable fortunesilitary organization that is divided roughly into two groupings: the advocates of conventional armamentslexible-response strategy whom Brezhnev apparently has favored, and the proponents of an overwhelming missile-oriented deterrent force. The paper concludesiscussion of Brezhnev's conspicuously successful drive to consolidate an already strong influence within the securityKGB andamong their party watchdogs.

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" V' '9

THE MAIN ARENA: THE PARTY SECRETARIAT

ike'Khrushchev before him, was bound toealthy respect for the political threat which his senior secretarial1colleagues, particularly his "second inould pose. At the tine ofouster, the Secretariat included three full members of the Politburo in addition to Brezhnev: econd in command" by virtue of his responsibility for partyuslov, and Kirilenko. From the outset, Podgornyy must have figured in Brezhnev'sas the one to watch. avored member of Khrushchev's leadership, Podgornyy had had an opportunity totrong power base within the party, and his past political views were somewhat at odds with Brezhnev's. Thus, the potential for rivalry between the two leaders was already high. Suslov, despite^continuous membership on the Secretariat7 and consequent prestige andamong party functionaries, had specialized in foreign Communistviews being quite close to Brezhnev's, judging by the publicseemed to lack the ambition to bid for the top party post. Kirilenko, the industrial watchdog with whom Brezhnev had worked closely throughout most of their careers, appeared to present the least immediate cause for concern, since much of his political base was also Brezhnev's- The balance within the Secretariat was. therefore, inherently unstable, and maneuvering for political power in that body would occur in its most concentrated form.

Early Adversity for Brezhnev

Podgornyy showed his hand early, Justone month after Khrushchev's ouster, in monopolizing the first Central Committee plenum without the deposed leader. The plenum, onovember, heard Podgornyy deliver the only reportreunification of the party as it existed beforesplit it into industrial and Brezhnev did not speak at the plenum at all. Thus, as spokesman for the new regime, Podgornyy

garnered the credit -for overturning one of the mostactions of the bid regime.

nfluence at. ,the plenum, also wasin .the tersonriol actions'-which it approved. By far the most important .of these ^was the promotion of Party Secretary Shelepin to fuli'membershlp in thethus increasing the number.of senior secretaries udder Brezhnev to four. Shelepin's addition to the elite group of party administrators complicated Bre.zhnev.'s position considerably. Brezhnev was not extremely popular within the party at the lower levels, and Shelepin had the reputationrilliant young "comer."* Moreover Shelepin's responsibility in the Secretariat forof the "administrativethe security forces, tho legal apparatus, and thehad made:igure to reckon with, and his promotion had the effect of seriously impinging on Brezhnev's authority, in these areas in the Politburo. Taken together,and Shelepineal threat to Brezhnev's position.**

reports during the first months of the regime took the line that Brezhnev and Kosygin were caretakers and would soon be replaced. One | claimed that Brezhnev had agreed to servo as party chief only one year. While unconfirmed, this report would tend to explain the organizational stalemate of Brezhnev until the late summer

oalition between Podgornyy and Shelepin was moreheoretical possibility, considering theof Shelepin's rise. His spectacular leaps up the party ladder in theere due, no doubt, to Khrushchev's boosting, but they coincided with similar support from Khrushchev for Podgornyy anderiod of adversity for Brezhnev. Two close associates ofChurayevominated party personnel matters during this period, when Khrushchev was looking for new bdood to replace the old in the body politic. Thus, "Young Turks" like Shelepin and Demichev

(footnote continued on page 5)

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In fact,1'the common denominator in the careers of officials whom the November plenum promoted was anassociation with Podgornyy orthan with any other top leader. Thus Podgornyy's close Ukrainian associate, Petr Shelest, advancedvfrom candidate to full member of the Politburo.- Party Secretary Demichev received the rank of Politburo candidate .member. Eightower level formed somethingixed bag but included such known or presumed associates of Podgornyy and Shelepin as V. Ye... Lutak,. Masherov.* In any case, Brezhnev'sin the personnel actions of the plenum was slight.

An important action which the November plenumthe appointment. Rumyantsev as editor-in-chief of Pratfda, also traced to the influence of Podgornyy. Rumyantsev had been associated with Podgornyy in the Ukrainian partynd duringmonth stint as editor of Pravda the newspaper's editorial line most closely reflected" the views of Podgornyy. It should be noted, however, that Rumyantsev also worked for several

(footnote continued from page 4)

joined Podgornyy in giving Khrushchev his strongestagainst political opposition, while more senior, orthodox leaders like Brezhnev and Suslov withheldorumber of controversial issues. (However,5 Shelepinore conservative position and, as this study shows, did not hesitate to sacrifice some of Podgornyy's politicalr-supporters.)

. Zhigalin. Konotop, have had no known direct ties with Podgornyy or Shelepin, but each has aPodgornyy's bailiwick of Khar'kov: Zhigalinupreme Soviet deputyhar'kov constituency, and Konotop graduated from an institute there. The political associations of the other. Popov. Sizov, are unclear."

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years with Suslovarty theoretician, specializing in foreign Communist relations during the latter part of Khrushchev's rule.*.

The November plenum approved the dismissal. Polyakov, as party secretary and chief of the Central Committee Department of Agriculture, thus creating two openings in the apparatus. Brezhnev apparently made use of his prerogative.as party boss to appoint Fedor Kulakov to head the Agriculture Department. The circumstances surrounding the posting of Kulakov, who worked closely with politburo member Polyanskiy duringnd probably owed his rise to him, are notonceivably, Polyanskiy recommended that Brezhnev appoint Kulakov before the November plenum in order to smooth the way for the release of Polyakov from the Secretariat. On the other hand, they could have tried and failed at the plenum to win Kulakov's acceptance in both theand the secretariat posts; the plenum might have approved the first position for Kulakov but reservedon tho second. Or Brezhnev may simply have waited until after the plenum had approved the partybefore making any appointments. In any case, Kulakov failed to win election to the Secretariat at theike his patron, Deputy Premier Polyanskiy, he marked time politically until the following September, when Brezhnev stook on firmer ground.

In another high-level personnel action, Brezhnev's first deputy for agriculture on the RSFSR Bureau, Politburo

^TheT fact that Rumyantsev was one of Brezhnev's first victims in the fallhen the latter had consolidated his position, indicated that no love was lost between the two-

**Soviet biographic sources indicate only that iteffective sometime in Noveraber-

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candidato member Leonid:Yefremov, went to Stavropol' in early December to take over as party chief in place of the transferred Kulakov.* It' was unclear who among the top leaders had the closest 'ties to Yefremov andsuffered most directly'from this manifest demotion. Yefremov's promotion to deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau inarticularly zealous defense of Khrushchev's policies in November, may have been'due to tbe Influence. Titov and: ultimately to Podgornyy (the Podgornyy-Titov relationship isbelow). In any case, Brezhnev's attitude toward the ardent Khrushchev supporter could well have been Yefremov had come under attack Just after the4 plenum in Sel'skayaentralnewspaper which has usually reflected the views of Polyanskiy. It is conceivable that Brezhnev connived with Polyanskiy to get rid of Yefremov. In any case, Brezhnev did noteplacement for him as deputy chairman of the bureau. Politburo member Voronov, who wasember of the RSFSR Bureau, may have blocked such an appointment, being denied it himself.**

Responding to the Challengers

In contrast to his inconspicuous role at the4 plenum, Brezhnev was prominent at the agricultural

was one of several personnel changes in December which were to figure in later maneuvering as Brezhnev consolidated his position. See ahead, pp

**In one respect, the entire issue of the RSFSR Bureau was tangential to the power equation, since of the top leaders only Kirilenko functioned full-time on it after Yefremov departed. Brezhnev never appeared in public activities of the bureau and was not even identified as chairman until Julyonly after he began vigorously to assert himself against Podgornyy and Shelepin

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plenum in Ho opened the plenum, delivered the report, andlosing speech after discussion by Central Committee members." On",three occasions he interrupted speakers (as Khrushchev used to doisplay of authority) with his personal judgments, and he was elected to chair the. commission for drawing up the plenum's, formal decree. At the same time, however, Podgornyy's position of "second in command" was reflected in his presiding at .each session of the plenum.* It is also noteworthy that the fact of Brezhnev's dominance at the plenum was only revealed in the stenographic record, which was signed to the pressugust and did not appear until September.

Despite his prominent role at the plenum, Brezhnev made few if any organizational gains from its decisions. The transfer of Ustinov and the entire defense-industry complex from the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers to the Secretariat seemed to have the effect of making him accountable to Brezhnev rather than Kosygln. However, this move did not percoptibly improve Brezhnev's positionis the senior secretaries. The plenum's approval of the dismissal of Party Secretary Il'ichev served the interest primarily of Suslov, whom Khrushchev had tried to undercut through Il'ichev. It became apparent soon after the March plenum that Domichev had assumed Il'ichev's secretarial responsibilities for ideological matters, and although Brezhnev probably viewed Domichevrustworthy subordinate, the move did not detract from theinfluence Shelepin had in the propaganda apparatus.**

*in the past, the number two man usually had presided for the first session only, and the honor of presiding over subsequent sessions was shared by other Politburo members.

propaganda apparatus had been staffedumber of Shelepin's former associates, especially from the Komsomol. Inhese included the heads of TASS, Novosti Press Agency, Trud, and the governmentfor Radio and Television, the Press, and Cultural

(footnote continued on page 9)

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Moreover, the other major personnel action which the March plenum approved, while outside tho Secretariat, alsoto the political advantage of Shelepin: this was the promotion of Klrill Hazurov to full membership on the Politburo and his advancement, over the: head of the senior deputy premier Polyanskiy, to first deputy premier.*

... Itevertheless/ clear that by march the balance of power had shifted somehow in Brezhnev's favor. The power relationships which had been taking shape in the Secretariat in5 were manifested in aof policy lines in open debatesariety of issues, but notably economic policy and Stalin's place in history. In general terms, the debatesplit among policymakers between "moderates" who favored aof Khrushchevian policies and "neo-Stalinists" whoeturn to more orthodoxy in party policy. In Khrushchev's time and through mostodgornyyeading spokesman for the moderate line, while Shelepin and Suslovore orthodox position. Brezhnev apparently determined early that the balance within the leadership, in the reaction against Khrushchev's policies, would tendonsolidation of the more

7footnote continued' from page 8)

Relations With Foreign Countries. Within the Centralapparatus they dominated the RSFSR Agitpropin addition, one was RSFSR deputy premier forquestions, and two others held the positions of Minister and Deputy Minister of Culture RSFSR. Although Demichev replaced the headsarge percentage of the propaganda positions byost of these Shelepin associates remained. Thus, despite some additions of Brezhnev and Suslov proteges to these postsemichev's restaffing did not perceptibly reduce Shelepin's strong influence in tbe public media.

*Mazurov had worked closely with Shelepinumber of years in the Komsomol, and the relationship between them could date even to, when they were involved in wartime partisan activities*

orthodox forces, and although heautious position on most issues, his statementsasically neo-Stalinist approach.

The first strong indication that Podgornyy'sposition might be or come in question had appeared in an obscure argument in the Central Committee economic weekly, Ekonomicheskaya Gazcta, involving Podgornyy's former bailiwick Khar'kov. TKe lead editorial of the weekly for5 criticized the partyin- Khar'kov for poor economic work,ajor article by Brezhnev's political. Shcherbitskiy, in the same issue praised the economic record in Dneprod-zerzhinsk, which was Brezhnev's birthplace and political stronghold. Tho implication of tho articles was that priority would be given to the heavy-industrial sector, which the Dneprodzerzhinsk area represented and Brezhnev had favored, at the expense of light industry andgoods, which Podgornyy had championed and Khar'kov symbolized.*

signs of Podgornyy's growing politicalsurfaced soon thereafter, notably when Suslov and even Mikoyan in public speeches in May rejected thepriorities advocated byew days earlier.entral Committee decree in July singled out Khar kovriticism of Khrushchev's open door policy in party admissions. Tho criticism applied especially. Churayev. Titov, who used the policy tothe older and more orthodox members of the party leadership, including Brezhnev and Suslov. The<decree was additionally adverse to Podgornyy since he was the party secretary responsible5 for'organizational matters. The decree symbolized Brezhnev's break from his past association with the Khar'kovite Churayev, who inad been an apparent supporter of Brezhnev and the then Politburo member Aristov. It also was an implied slap at Shelepin and other newcomers whom Churayev and

ltov had promoted in thehen Khrushchev was looking for more loyal political support.

tJ. -, The most serious political setback for Podgornyy, however, came with the April transfer of his fellowand. Tltov, to the post of KazakhCommittee second secretary. Thislearfor Titov, who would consequently lose his position on the Secretariat and, equally important, his post aschief of the Party Organs Department. Podgornyy remained nominally "second in command" but lacked Titov's support in the Secretariat and apparatus, which became an arena for maneuvering between Brezhnev and Shelepin. Although one of Titov's deputies, Ivan Ryazanov, soon departed for "the periphery"elatively minor state post, Podgornyyoothold in the department through Titov's first deputy, Petr Pigalev-*

The circumstances surrounding Titov's shift suggest that itower play by Brezhnev which, as in the compromise appointment of Kulakov in November, was intended to bypass the normal decisionmaking machinery for such high-levelCentral Committee plenum. The ground work had been laid in December for Titov's eventual replace ment, although there was no direct evidence of a design on Brezhnev's part toaito the March plenum. Thus, Ivan Kapitonov was brought to Moscow from the provinces to head the Central Committee'sfor RSFSR Party Organs, one of the first moves,

*Titov's positions remained vacant until Ivan Kapitonov was officially confirmed in them in5 at the same plenum which abolished Shelepin's Party-StateCommittee and transferred Shelepin to full-time work in the Secretariat. Pigalev himself remained in theuntilarty Congress, when he became chiefepartment of Podgornyy's Supreme Soviet Presidiumgood exampleoviet leader looking after his own. The removal of Titov, Pigalev, and Ryazanov from the Party Organs Department signaled an end to the era of itsby Shelepin and Podgornyy.

incidentally, to foreshadowna return to favor of officials who bad suffered political setbacks underlso in. Skryabln was removed as Rostov party chief and placed "at the disposal of the Centralis position being assumed by the second secretary of the Kazakh Central Committee, Mikhailgainst this background, tho belated transfer of Titov to Kazakhstan, less than two weeks after the March plenum, bore the signs of an administrative decision on the part of the Politburo or the General Secretary himself. Nevertheless, Kapitonov vasconfirmed in Tltov's secretariat and departmental positions until Podgornyy's "election" to the presidency in

Since Tltov's removal did not immediately resolve the deadlock in the Secretariat, uneasy maneuvering Il'ichev's and Tltov's secretarial responsibilities for Ideological matters and party organization wererespectively, to Demlchev and (probably) Rudakov. This indicated that Brezhnev intended to continue, for

Moscow Oblast First Secretary Kapitonov had been exiled to Ivanovoime when the then' "second inleksey Kirichenko, as well as Brezhnev and others, were losing ground to such rivals as Kozlov and Podgornyy. Kapitonov's return probably was due to the patronage of Brezhnev, Suslov, andKirilcnko.

hadlose associate of both Brezhnev and Kirilcnko in the Ukrainian party organization and was well placed for advancement; however, be has notin any prominent position and failed of Central Committee reelection atarty CongrCKs in Like Kapitonov, Solomentsev appeared to owe his allegiance primarily to Brezhnev and Suslov.

the time being at any rate, to cultivate the support of certain of the younger generation of secretaries most closely associated with the rise of Shelepin'-*

In addition, Brezhnev began in the summer5 to make extensive changes in the Central Committeeespecially where Podgornyy or Shelepin had had supervisory responsibilities. Not all the changesin the displacement of their proteges, but several close associates of Brezhnev took command of Important departments- Brezhnev's influence in the moves was particularly clear regarding the two departments most directly involved in administering internal Central CommitteeGeneral Department and theof Affairs. Konstantin Chernenko became chief of the General Department officially in July, having served0 as chief of Brezhnev's secretariat on the Supreme Soviet Presidium and (probably) of Brezhnev's personal staff on the Central Committee Secretariat. In the Administration of Affairs, Georgiy Pavlov. Chernyayev as chief, perhaps in July when Chernyayev last appeared in this role. Pavlov had studied and worked with Brezhnev*in Dneprodzerzhinsk inndmaintained political ties later; for example, heparty chief in an RSFSR oblast soon after Brezhnev's position on the Secretariat and Politburo improved in the showdown with the "anti-party group'! Brezhnev apparently was satisfied with the personnel in the Central Committee departments involved in defense-related and security work, since they were virtually untouched. Most

for years had supervised heavy industry, and the evidence that he took on Titov's duties in party organization is tenuous. In April, Rudakovzech delegation which had been in the Soviet UnionCPSU experience in party organizational matters. In July, heurkmen Central Committee plenum which discussed the recruitment, assignment, and training of leading party officials.

of their, chiefs had been since then the sane posts, where they may have been supervised or evenby Brezhnev.

During the summerrezhnev and Suslovtried to prevent Shelepin from increasing his influence over the propaganda media. In late June, three of Shelepin's cronies from his. Mikbaylov,umored to be leading candidates to fill the vacancy of Izvestiya chief editor which.transfer to <the Agitprop Department created. By this account, the final decision was pending Demlchev's return from vacation in mid-July, but as it turnedecision was announced only at the end of September, when Lev Tolkunov wasto the Izvestiya post from the Bloc Department (in which he had risen to prominence under Suslov andess than two weeks earlier, Pravda's editor-in-chief Rumyantsev had been replaced in the wake of aarticle espousing the moderate line- Rumyantsev's replacement, Mikhail Zimyanin, appeared toompromise candidate, having career ties with Shelepin,Mazurov, and Suslov among the Politburo members.

By the end of summer, numerous rumors circulating in Moscow suggested that the "talented" Shelepin was about to take overassive and incompetent Brezhnevajor upheaval of tbe top leadership. The origin of these rumors was usually obscure, although some traced to dubious sources of thc KGB or to elements hostile, to the Soviet regime. Many nay have been purely speculative opinions basedrojection of Shelepin's meteoric career. In any case, thc only tangible indicator that he might, in fact, have been bidding for the supreme party post at that time was the publication of several articles in the specialized press favoring an upgrading of Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee. These articleshreat to the party controlsignifi cantly atrophied from Khrushchev'sarguing that the party-state control apparatus should coordinate the efforts of all organizations involved in "control" activity, rather than serve in tandem with the party controlas the regulations stipulated. Whatever the actual

circumstances surrounding the rumored Shelepin takeoverremain unclear" to thisPlac?Iaent oi proteges in the Centralradicted the characterization ofassive figure-

In this highly fluid .situation, when Shelepinto be pressing for .advantage, Brezhney^becameassertive in establishing.the authority'of'the General Secretary. Early in September, Brezhnev went alone to Poland for .his fourth round of talks with Gomulka since Khrushchev's ouster; Kosygin had chaperoned him the first three times- The stenographic account.of- the March Central Committee plenum, which showed Brezhnevery favorable light, appeared at the same time (it had been signed to the pressugust, after an apparent delay in passing the censor, since it had been set in typeune). 5 Yearbook of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia, which contained the first identification of Brezhnev as chairman of the RSFSR Bureau, was available about two weeks later, on the eveentral Committee plenum at which Brezhnev would further consolidate his position.

The outcome of the September Central Committee plenum and the Supreme Soviet session which immediately followed the plenum indicated that Brezhnev was able finally to surmount the earlier observed obstacles to consolidation. The plenum approved the election of Agriculture Department Chief Kulakov to the Secretariat, filling the vacancy that had existed almost one year- It also formallyTitov as party secretary for organizationalwithout, however,eplacement. It probably also confirmed the appointments of Zimyanin and Tolkunov as chief editors of Pravda and Izvestiya, although this was not offically announced, and approved thechanges which the Supreme Soviet session was to ratify. The most important of the session's appointments was the promotion of Polyanskiy to first deputy premier, presumablyhift in the leadership in Brezhnev's favor. One of Brezhnev's oldest and closest associates from the Ukraine, Nikolay Tikhonov, was among the three new deputy premiers whom the session appointed. Lessbut still significant as indicators of Brezhnev's

increased stature in the party.leadership, were the plenum' .confirmation of him as Jhe.main'rapporteur toarty Congress si^'months liter,.arid-theof himember bf the Supreme Soviet Presidium.*

One of the minor personnel changes at the session fitarger scheme of maneuvering between Brezhnev and Podgornyy. This was the* naming'bie'Ukralnian Premier Kazanets to the post of Minister of"Ferrous Metallurgy, which opened the door to the appointmento the Ukrainian premiership, the position he had lost to Kazanets Although it was Khrushchev who had attacked Shcherbitskiy at that time and probably insisted on his transfer to the lesser position of oblast party boss in Dnepropetrovsk, Podgornyy had seemed to be the main beneficiary of3 move among the members of the Politburo and Secretariat-** It seemed clear, at any rate, that Shcherbitskiy looked to Brezhnev for support The fact that Shcherbitskiy found refuge in Brezhnev's bailiwick of Dnepropetrovsk may have been more than symboli

position on the state Presidium, as well as the elevation of his adopted ally Polyanskiy to first deputy premier, may have increased Brezhnev's leverage on the government side sufficiently to allow setting up the shifts of Podgornyy and Shelepin, discussed below. The published decision to holdongress in6 marked the start of jockeying for Centralat both high and low levels.

**Kazanets, prior to displacing Shcherbitskiy, had been Podgornyy's second secretary. Another Ukrainian party leader who rose to prominence under Podgornyy andgave him political support, Petr Shelest, became Ukrainian first secretary. Shelest did not achieve the status of full Politburo member that traditionally went with the top Ukrainian party post, perhaps becausealready held several votes on the body. Thus, the candidate membership slot which Shcherbitskiy had held went to Shelest rather than to Kazanets.

of their past-career association. Shcherbitskiy, who has been an outspoken advocate of Brezhnev's policies, regained his candidate' membership oh the Politburo at the first opportunity after reappointment asthe sane5 Central Committee plenum that eased Podgornyy into the relatively toothless presidency. By contrast, Kazanets haddue to Brezhnev'sachieve Politburo status even after Shelest's advance in4 hadacancy at the candidate level.

The5 Breakthrough

The5 Central Committee plenumajor breakthrough for Brezhnev in his drive for total control of the Secretariat, It abolished Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee in circumstancesubber-stamp approvalait accompli. Thus Brezhnev delivered an informationalather than the normal report for discussionnd the plenum communique listed no one as having spoken on it. Regarding personnel natters, the plenum approved the appointment of Kapitonov as party secretary (and chief of the Party-Organizational Work Department) and reelectedandidate member of the Politburo.

A Supreme Soviet session subsequently tidied up the organizational picture, of which the plenum'sof the Party-State Control Committee had been only one part. Podgornyy's replacement of theMikoyan, whose departure from theumber of sources had predicted sinceeant giving up his "second in command" position on the Secretariat.*

not officially relieved of his secretarial duties untilarty Congress the following April, Podgornyy had ceased to function in this capacity after becoming president.

Shelepin, having been deprived, of the post of Party-State Control Committee chairman;.was released as deputy premierull-time in the Secretariat, assuming Podgornyy's number two slot. The session also confirmed the earlier appointment, dating to IS Kovember, of Mikhail Yefremoveputy premier.'* However, despite the overall gain for Brezhnev, Shelepin's! assumption of the "second insecretarial duties placed him in an improvedtoarger base of political support.

Dominatingarty Congress

Brezhnev went intoarty Congressosition of relative strength, with Suslov and Shelepin the only senior secretaries servingull-time capacity. By the end of the congress, when Podgornyy had beenreleased and Kirilenko added to the Secretariat, Brezhnev's position appeared even stronger. The Congress, like the5 Central Committee plenum, was Brezhnev's show. He opened it, delivered the main report, and received the. highest protocol honors at every opportunity. He received tho title of General Secretary (which only Stalin before him had held) rather than the less prestigious "First Secretary." At the close of the congress,announced his own "unanimous" election as General Secretary and Politburo memberlenum of the newly chosen Central Committee, as well as the composition of

'*Yefremov's appointment, so soon after extensiveat the deputy premier level in October, had suggested high-level maneuvering. His infrequent public appearances have indicated his involvement in administering certain sensitive areas of industry and transport, security, etc. Thus, he appears to havo taken up some or all theduties that Shelepin had; this would indicate that the December shifts in responsibilities in the Secretariat had been decided in late October or early November.

the rest of the Politburo'and the Secretariat inorder-Brezhnev's list of the top leaders was out of alphabetical order and" presumably represented the pecking order- The stenographic record of the congress, which gave also the officially approved registration of appiause (not necessarily accurately reflecting actualhowed that Brezhnev ranked Suslov higher than either Shelepin or Kirilenko in both the secretariat and the Politburo:

General Secretary of the Central Committee, and member of the Politburo: Brezhnev (stormy,

long unabating applause)-

Members of the Politburo:

Kosygin (stormy, prolonged applause);

Podgornyy (stormy, prolonged applause);

Suslov (stormy, prolonged applause);

Voronov (applause);

Kirilenko (applause);

Shelepin (applause);

Mazurov (applause);

Polyanskiy (applause);

Shelestnd

Pcl'she (applause).

Candidate members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee:

Demichevrishinzhavanadzeashidovstinovhcherbitskiyunayevasherov (applause).

. Secretaries of the Central Committee:*

Suslov .

.

Demlchev.

. Ustinov

An early sign of Suslov's high rank in thehad appeared at the beginning of the congress, in his presiding at the firstfunctionassociated with the "second in command." His status thusurther boost from the fact that inlist, Shelepin ranked higher than Kirilenko in the Secretariat but lower in the Politburo. This treatment ofithe long-time specialist in international Communist affairsis the two organizational strongmen on the Secretariat served to heighten Brezhnev's prominence by placing the General Secretary an extra step above the senior secretary (or secretaries) in line for control of personnel assignments.

Ferment Among the Senior Secretaries: Shelepin's Isolation

Kirilenko's addition to the Secretariat, whichfrom the abolition of the Bureau for the RSFSR and transfer of its functions and personnel to the central apparatus,eshuffling of portfolios within the Secretariat. In the immediate post-congress period, Shelepin devoted more and more time to supervising party work in light industry and consumer goods (duties which Podgornyy had had also but which were secondary to his party organizational assignment). The activities of Suslov and Kirilenko throughout most6 betrayed nothing

I

'Individual applause for secretaries was not registered in the stenographic record.

very new about their responsibilities but seemed tothat the two continued their previous involvement in, respectively, foreign Communist relations, and RSFSR industry. Conceivably,.Brezhnev had not proposed or achieved Politburo agreementSecond in command" at this time. Brezhnev apparently did notay out of the deadlock among the senior secretaries for some time, during which the rivals for undisputed second place Jockeyed inconclusively for position.

Brezhnev and Kirilenko may have joined forces against Shelepin in late6 to forestall theof Vadlm Tikunov as chief of the newly centralized militia. Tikunov, most closely associated with Shelepin, Mazurov, and Demichev in the past, hadhoo-in for the post. As the top militia official before thewas announced onuly, Tikunov hadajor crime campaign during5 and6 and had won Kosygin's public support for increased anti-crime measures- Nevertheless,ugust session of the Supreme Soviet, in ratifying the establishment of the new militia ministry, failed to appoint Tikunov its head. After almost two months' delay, the position went to Nikolay Shchelokov, whose career in the Ukraine and Moldavia must have brought him to the attention ofand Kirilenko. Tikunov discreetly faded :into the woodwork.

The appointment of Mikhail Solomcntscv in6 as chief of the Central Committee's lleavy Industry Department in place of the deceased Secretary Rudakov was symbolic of the standstill in the Secretariat- Solomentsev had appeared closer to Suslov than to Brezhnev and Brezhnev may have had doubts about Solomentsev's loyaltiesurge of Brezhnev's protege Kunayev in Kazakhstan resulted in the promotion of Solomentsev in the new Kazakh regime. Also, Solomentsevlose associate of Brezhnev and. Skryabin, as Rostov party chief inuslov presided over

the move-* Another indication that Brezhnev and Kirilenko may have been at odds with Solomentsev was' the September

givenecree of the RSFSRBrezhnev.andcriticizedleadership, and thus Implicitly Solomentsev,an "overemphasis" on heavy industrialthis background, Solomentsev's election to thein Decembermonth after hisas chief of the Heavy Industrythat Suslov and others had prevailed inat least on this issue at this time.

Brezhnev gave every indication throughout most of

7 of being relatively satisfiedposition of preeminence in the Secretariat. success in placing his protege Shchelokov in thepost at Shelepin's expense may havetoecond blow at his main rival'sin the security forces. It is even conceivablesince taking over the militia, hadevidence against his counterpart in theand saw inay to help Brezhnevof Shelepin's clients- Semichastnyy wasany forewarning on

Brezhnev could not have moved against Semichastnyy, of course, without cause. Several reports on the switch gave inefficiency or incompetence as the main cause of his remova1.

for example, reported that

RumanianDA lea expressed the view to-some colleagues that the primary reasons were Semichastnyy's lack of success in foreign intelligence and| bitcd the defection of Stalin'spKfro-Svetlana ATTiluyeva, as one failure.

was placed "at the disposal of the Centralowever, he dropped out of sight and failed to.lbe reelected to that body atarty Congress.

of Sovetskaya Rossiya for eptember-

reportedTyimilar

explanation of tbe action, claiming that Semichastnyy bore the responsibility for Svetlana's Refection and that he was closely associated with Yur iy,ighly, placedntf siderations, which Brezhnev could have ignored if histoward Semichastnyy had been^favorable, may have provided the excuse for Brezhnev's political move against him. The trend of Andropov's subsequent administration of the KGB, however, tends to support the hypothesis that these faults were viewed seriously by him. Nevertheless, political considerations played an important, perhaps the decisive, role.

u partywas ine result of an investigation into the activitieslique

surrounding Shelepin. Semichastnyy and others, had implied, were engaged in factionaluu luc KGB's efficiency "sank greatly" under Semichastnyy because "responsibility to the clique took precedence over other responsibilit ies."

The choice of Party Secretary Andropov, who hadull decade in the Central Committee's Blocto take over the KGBompromise. He had worked closely with Brezhnev in the. Secretariat and especially since6 had given his boss strongin the renewed drive for an international communist conference. However, he had also worked many years with Suslov and may have owed his earlier entrance into the Secretariat2 to him-* Andropov also had been personally close to Shelepin in the past. This past tie may have softened the blow for Shelepin but could not compensate fully for tho loss of his own protege, The latter became first deputy premier in :the Ukraine, not the worst possible fate, since it might permit

is known of Andropov's relationship with Suslov, however, and it is possible that Khrushchev deliberately promoted Andropov2ounterweight to Suslov.

retention of his Central Committee membership. hird

first deputy premier thus was created in the Ukraine, under Shcherbitskiy; at least two of them, Semichastnyy and Nikolay Sobol*have independent political support and the potential for1 causing trouble for Shcherbitskiy (and thus for his presumed patron, Brezhnev).

The7 Central Committee plenum approved Andropov's release ex post facto from his secretarial position and prconoted" him to the Politburoandidate member. However, it named no successor to take up his duties in supervising relations with the ruling Communist parties. This inaction at first appeared toormal delay in filling the sudden vacancy rather than serious disagreementeplacement. Two juniorhowever, finally succeeded him in the Central Committee posts after almost one year; thisand the division of his responsibilities suggested political compromise.

The Semichastnyy affair apparently did not sit well with an Important echelon of theyoung supporters of Shelepin. eading representative of this group, Moscow party chief Yegorychev, attacked Brezhnev's leadership at the June plenum, which had been calledtamp of approval on the regime's military and diplomatic effort during the Arab-Israeli conflict. The events and issues surrounding the plenum are relevant to'Brezhnev's overall position and are treated elsewhere. The important point regarding power relations among the senior secretaries is that the disciplinary action taken against Brezhnev's critic, Yegorychev,hain of events ending in Shelepin's ouster from the Secretariat. Brezhnev began his power play with typical indirection, transferring Yegorychevinisterial post andthe "election" of Politburo candidate member Grishin as Moscow party boss in lateew days after the Central Committee plenum had ended- In July, Shelepin was installed in Grishin's place as chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, virtually the lowest post carrying Politburo membership. (In fact, Grishin wasolitburo candidate, and Shelepin couldbe downgraded at the next party congress if he

stays in thehelepin's official dismissal from, the Secretariat at the7 Central Committee plenumoregone conclusion. /

Kirllenko's Emergence as "Second" Secretary.

After sidetracking. Shelepin, Brezhnev had only two senior secretaries to contendand Kirilenko. Signs that Kirilenko supervised the Department of Party-Organizational Work suggested that, despite- the fact that Suslov supervised Shelepin's installation as trade unionirilenko may have become::Brezhnev's "second in command" by that time. In fact, he may have had party-organizational responsibilities since just after arty Congress. At that time, his long-time subordinate from the Central Committee apparatusfor appointments to RSFSR industrialoronovskiy, became deputy and then first deputy to Kapitonov.

The official who finally, inicked up Andropov's secretariat portfolio for supervising the Bloc Department was Konstantinoung auto designer turned party administrator; from Gor'kiy. Katushev rose rapidly in the Gor'kiy party organization apparently due to Kirllenko's influence in the RSFSR Bureau. He probably also owed something of his career to the. Yefremov, whom he replaced as Gor'kiy party chief in Brezhnev has registered approval of Katushev in several ways, notably in his unusual appearance at the provincial party plenum which ratified the Yefremov-Katushev shift- Despite Katushev's youthfulness, there is nothing in his background to suggest past political

that occasion, Suslov revealed how low Shelepin had fallen in the consensus of his Politburo colleagues, expressing their hope that he would prove toworthy" leader of thc trade unions.

association with Shelepin; much less did he. haveable ties with Suslov or Andropov, since he had virtually no. experience in foreign affairs, prior toember of tho Brezhnevis assignment to tbis area bore all the signs of an attempt by Brezhnev and Kirilenko torusted party administrator in a- position to ensure the implementation of the -General Secretary's daily decisions in Bloc affairs.*

Brezhnev's apparent success lri easing Podgornyy and Shelepin from the Secretariat and placing Klrile_nko in: charge of cadres was reflected in thefive Central Committee candidatesilitary or RSFSR background to full membership at the8 plenum. They replaced deceased leaders whose background, incidentally, suggested ties mainly with Shelepin,and Mazurov. There have been few changes inpositions with Central Committee status since Kirilenko has taken charge, but in most cases they have reinforced this trend.

other position as chief of the Blocwent to Konstantin Rusakov, one of Andropov'sdeputies He first appeared in public as chief almost two weeks before the April plenum that electedecretary. This would suggest that Rusakov was in line for both posts but lost out to Katushevast minute move at the plenum.

THE COMPETITION WITH PREMIER'

- " .

j

One of "iBrezhnev*s'main concerns) secondary to establishing organizati,onal supremacy in the Secretariat, has been to achieve and- maintain his preeminence over Kosygin. The4 Central Committee plenum decreed it "inexpedient" that the top party and government posts be held by one person In the future, and thisof party and- government functions has figuredin proofs'of the regime's "collegiality.he dual arrangement, granting ostensibly equal authority to the General Secretary and the government premier, was never very workable, however, and soon gave way to thehierarchy with the party chief in the topmost place.

laim to "Number One" ' ;

The first signs that Brezhnev might have serious thoughts about establishing preeminence over hiscounterpart appeared in In contrast to the full play the Soviet press gave to Brezhnev's plenum report on agricultural questions, Kosygln's speech to planning officials six days earlier was reported onlyelay of several weeks, receiving limitedin the specialized publications Planovoye Khozyaystvo and Ekonomlcheskaya Gazeta. Such treatment, needless to

propaganda never mentions the other, more significant aspect of high-levelinterlocking of the two ruling bureaucracies through the mechanism of the Politburo, where Brezhnev Is de facto chairman. Moreover, the precariousness of the duumvirate, which deriveseluctance to define the position of the General Secretary, is suggested in the wordwhich in Soviet usageemporary or tactical measure rather than an immutable orlaw.

say, did not support tbe. image of; collectivity-which the regime had been attempting to foster. Another cut at Kosygln's "equal" status occurred in protocol arrangements when the two leaders went to Poland in early April toa frlcndShlp ,pact, Despite reports arsaw as earlyhat Kosygin; was accompanying Brezhnev to the signing ceremony, the first TASS announcementarch did not. mention Kosygin; it did reveal, however, that Brezhnev would head the .delegation.. This prominence contrasted with earlierince the two leaders had gone to Poland in4 ands members of a, team, with neither, singled out as ahead.

The5 Central Committee plenum, which met toeform of the system of planning and Industrial management, should have been Kosygln's show. Instead, ltbalanced" affair. It heard Kosygin describe his compromise version of economic reform in the main report and Brezhnev present the party's taskseparate speech. In the abridged official version of his speech, Brezhnev proposed several institutional checks on the government within the framework of generallyparty control. Heecond speech on schedulingarty Congress for six months later. The plenum decree confirmed Brezhnev as the main rapporteur to the congress for the Central Committee, while Kosygin was named toeport onconomic plan.

umber of ups and downs, relations between Brezhnev and Kosygin remainedairly even keel forear after the5 plenum, during which time the press gave each roughly equal treatment. this changed in early6 to the detriment of Kosygin. Especially noticeable was the prominentgivenpeech Brezhnev made at an award ceremony in Georgiaovember; byew column inches were devoted to Kosygln's activities the same day in Donetsk, where hearty-economic aktiv Other speeches by Kosygin atovemberin Krlvoy Hog6 November all-union seminar of trade union leaders in Moscow, fornever

been published. Kosygiu'continued to stay in theinailing'even to speak at the Supreme Soviet session which approved7 plan and budget. Brezhnev, 'on the other'hand, received themilitary order onh birthdaye end of the session (which according to one report was delayed toitting occasion for theEarlier in the month, Kirilenko hadaboo-of collectivity by praising Brezhnev's personal qualitiesartime political leader.* Whatever the reasons for Kosygin's eclipse inrezhnev took advantage of his own ascendancy in their relationship to exert more vigorous leadership of the collective.

ein on Kosygin

rezhnev hasatchfultoward Kosyginillingness to accommodate him on some policy issues. While he has remained the dominant of the two, Brezhnev has boon careful toather taut rein on Kosygin in order tounaway in his prestige and authority. It was probably Brezhnev, for example, who in7 was responsible for the contretemps in Pravda's handlingtatement Kosygin had made while in London on Moscow's willingness tonegotiations on limiting strategic arms, including defensive weapons- The journalist whose articlethe sensitive statement (not previously aired in the domestic media) reportedlyeprimand, and Pravda took the unusual step of denying the validity of the Such an action could only have reflected the of the Secretariat, and presumably of the General Secretary himself.

violation of the unwritten rule againstglorification, at least in Brezhnev's case, has not been repeated in any significant way since then-

Dosplteiinumerous Indications and reports ofattempts to restrain Kosygin, the two leaders can fine! coaun cause much of thc time. Brezhnev probably has recognized the value of working with Kosygin as much asaking advantage of the premier's prestige ' and intellectual abilities. In general, Brezhnev has seemed to want to build on his own authority without appearing tohreat tohreat also to the other leaders of the oligarchy.

THE DRIVE. FOR MILITARY AND POLICE SUPPORT

An important factor in Brezhnev's assumption of powerecessary condition of his continued rule hashe support of two main instruments of power in the Sovietsecurity police (KGB) and militia (MVD, formerlynd the military (Ministry ofhrough their, benign influence, Brezhnev achievedouster,aximum of efficiencyinimum of danger to the plotters. hile after the coup, however, his bold over them was tenuous due to the strong influence Shelepin exerted.

Uneven Relationsivided Military

Brezhnev courted the military from the veryredressing the abuses which the armed forces had suffered at Khrushchev's hands, ne consistentlyigh priority for defense in budgetary policy. he stopped dictating doctrine to the military and encouraged military professionalism. esult,one-sided emphasis on strategic rocket forces gave wayore balanced policy, with greater attention than before to conventional forceslexible response strategy. olicy probably had the supportajority of the military and civilian leadership.

Relations between Brezhnev and the militaryurn for the worse, however, after th? death of Defense Minister Malinovskiy in late Malinovskiy's

first deputy, Marshal Grechko, was associated with the

Ukrainian "clique" which Khrushchev had brought intoPodgornyy, Polyanskiy, andwas therefore on an inside track for thethat at least

some Politburo members backed the Secretariat's armaments administrator Dmitriy Ustinov for the post, presumably

In order toost-conscious approach to questions of force structure. It is conceivable that Kosygln, who

in February had revealed an interest in opening negotiations

31

with. on strategic arms limitations, persuaded Brezhnev to nominate Ustinov. Inajority of the Politburo could have seen an advantage inivilian who could find "hidden reserves" in the military budget and thus free capital for other" sectors of the economy.

T nprorco nan: oremuuw uau prupuseu usnnuv >n

Hi* 1TTJ

ft the entire Politburo, but the military("the Sovietad insisted on aMilitary man, and the Politburo ultimatelyin and appointed Grechko.

Grechko's relations with Brezhnev were not good;t-tempt to install Ustinov may have been permanentlyin this regard.

Brezhnev appeared to be under strong pressure from the military at the7 plenum, where'Moscow party boss Yegorychev attacked Brezhnev's diplomatic approach to the Middle East crisis. Apparently, the actions Brezhnev undertook in April and May against the interest of the military (the attempt toivilian Minister of Defense) and the younger party militants (the removal of Semichastnyy as KGB chairman) caused the two-groups to Join forces in challenging the ruling groupajority within it on tho issue of slackness in its defense posture. Although Brezhnev's report at the June plenum was not published in theecret Soviet document revealed that itefense of the regime's diplomatic effort to settle the crisis by peaceful means-Thus, Brezhnev was quoted as saying that the regime avoided loud threats and sabre-rattling because "the.and their allies well understood that the Soviet Union consistently comes outtable peace in the Near Bastf necessary will resolutely come to the defense of the victims of aggression." The quotation, which appeared several months after the fact, probably was^ selected to indicate the nature of Yegorychev's criticism and Brezhnev's answer.

.All reports on the. subject were -in^agreement that Yegorychev hadougher Soviet military posture.

| Soviet officials who' dealt withEast problemsPSU report* An asserting that Yegorychev had complained at the plenum of military unpreparedness and had claimed that the regime failed to react decisively because the Soviet Armyl prepared. This line of argument would have appealed to at least some of the high command, since it suggested the inadequacy of measures taken by the civilian-dominated Defense It may also have reflected some stock-takingby the efficiently planned and executed Israeli military operations.

An elaborate but garbled version of the Yegorychev incident that made the rounds in Moscow tended to confirm the essential points of the alleged CPSU report. to this account, Yegorychev's speech contained statistics backing up his charge that Moscow was inadequately defendedissile attack. Brezhnev reportedly interrupted Yegorychev to ask when he had lastession of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District, to which Yegorychev replied "never." Brezhnev then requested an intermission and convened the Politburo; Shelepin is said to have defended Yegorychev there. Back at the general party mooting, Brezhnev accused Yegorychev of revealing state secrets-Brezhnev's reaction to the criticism was to deny the charge while undertaking to correct the criticized situation. Several measures were taken in addition to Yegorychev's demotion onune, including military exercises and changes in alert procedures- The Soviet military press reported that Crishin, who was Identifiedember of the Military Council of the Moscow PVO (Air Defense) Military District, had spokeneeting of the PVO council onommending the fine work of the district's "rocket gunners, airmen, and personnel of signals units" but warning against It would appear, therefore, that Brezhnev decided to preempt the position which the young militants and, presumably, the missile-force advocates in thehad adopted.

An additional factor which may havo raised thoback and,ime, complicated Brezhnev'swas the party's (that is, thc Politburo majority's) attempt to-relax the. strong -defense-or ion ted posture of tho Soviet Union through, cancellation of the traditional parade of military might on May Day. The decision to change this posture, although Implemented only ineportedly had. been under discussion for several years, and may have been the subject of intensified debate in the springhen the regime was hinting at its interest in arms limitations-talks andivilian Minister of Defense. Final resolution of the debatethat there has been some Improvement in army-party relations after the two-year period of strain, witha strengthening of Brezhnev's position.

Brezhnev still does not have the support of the entire military, however- The high command is divided according to tbe self-interest of the various armswith its backing of Brezhnev similarlyong-time proponent of conventional warfare and weapons, represents those elements of the highwhich the post-Khrushchev regime (that is, Brezhnev) has favored. On the other hand, two Sovietr r' " _^ j

reportedly told^Czecboslovah counterparts

hat the "missiletended to side withpolitical opposition in the belief that any change in thc top leadership could only result in an improvement in their owncoming to the fore again-*

same report assorted; that the high command (apparently united) has been pushing for greaterfrom party leadership and has proposed the formationCouncil of marshals" which would have the power to make military decisions in an emergency without prior consent from the Politburo. Allmembers were said to opposeouncil, which presumably would supplant Brezhnev's Defense Council-

Dominating the

,In contrast to his fluctuating .fortunes in dealing with the military, Brezhnevelatively .firm grip on tho KGB and laVD.. Just astenuous control over the military has reflected the continued strength of his opponents witfein.the Politburo, his stea.tfy consolidation of. influence cwi,th' the security establishment has reflected the gradual reduction in Shelepin's real power Another reason for Brezhnev's success in making organizational inroads in the KGB and MVD probably has been his good footing in the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs, which supervises their activities. In addition, Brezhnev apparently has avoided taking any actions that would antagonize the professional corps of these organizations.

On the contrary, under Brezhnev's aegis they have enjoyed

greater prestige and material support. In any case, the key to the use of these organizations as Instruments of power lies in the political administrators who supervise their work, and in this respect Brezhnev has ensured that the men in charge are as trustworthy as can be expected in the Soviet scheme of things.

The frontal attack on Shelepin's entrenchedin the security forces and militia followed several minor skirmishes and rear guard actions. Prior toTikunov from the top MVD post in6 andfrom the KGB inrezhnev had taken important steps to strengthen his hold on the party and government apparatus which supervised their work. However, he was forced at first to share influence in thiswith Shelepin, since the two of them together had controlled the security forces prior to Khrushchev's ouster. . Mironov, chief of the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs, died in an airew days after the ouster, Brezhnev and Shelepin both lost the servicesong-time associate. Mironov had risen from within the KGB after (or about simultaneously with) Shelepin's appointment as its chief, to the Central Committee department position, where he became Shelepin's nominal supervisor. His rise might have been due to the

influence of Brezhnev, with whom he had worked in Mironov contlnued'in/his Central CommitteeShelepinarty secretary in charge ofhe is presumed to have played an- ill supportingand She lepln, dux ingof'the coup against"Khrushchev. easurestandoff in this area aYter'Khrushchev's removal,to the deceased Mi'rohbv appeared duringwhen Shelepin profobly supervisedtofor two yearswhen Brezhnev apparently had directit- ;

Brezhnev nevertheless began to undercut Shelepin's influence in the "administrative" organs as earlye probably was influential in bringing about Kosygln's choice of Polyanskiy over Shelepin to fill the vacancy of first deputy premier which had resulted from Ustinov's transfer to the Secretariat in March. who had concentrated almost exclusively onmatters, may have assumed the additionalfor overseeing the administration of security affairs on the government side. This was suggested by the circumstances surrounding the subsequent promotion of Polyanskiy's. Yefremov, to deputy premier and*the transfer of Shelepin from his deputy premier post in the government to full time work in the Secretariat.

Brezhnev worked with Kirilenko in the Secretariat and with Polyanskiy in the government to strengthen his hold on the security forces afterarty Congress By that time, Shelepin already had lost his secretarial responsibility for security affairs andwas counting on Kosygin and Demichev to support Tikunov's candidacy for the head post in the reorganized militia. The appointment of Brezhnev's client, Nikolay Shchelokov, to the post in6 revealed that Shelepin's forces had dwindledecided minority.

The assignment of Andropov as KGB chief inas, of course, an essential move to strengthen Brezhnev's position. Prior tohen Brezhnev began the renewed drive to hold the international communist conference,

Andropov had appeared close to Shelepin. Whatever his political ties (Including some tondropovhad supported the General Secretary from the start. Moreover, Shelepin's gradual political decline through Brezhnev's maneuverings presumably did little to enhance the Andropov-Shelepin relationship. At the time of Andropov's appointment to the KGB.

t

[reported the opinion of, Rumanian Party Secretary 1 (whose primary responsibility was for relations with foreign Communist parties) that Andropov was loyal to and trusted by Brezhnev.

I, when queried about relations oetween Andropov ano Shelepin shortly after Semichastnyy's removal, confirmed that the two men once had been close but no longer were. In any case, Brezhnev's substitution of Andropov for Semichastnyy appeared calculated toeightened rivalry between the former associates.

Andropov probably had Brezhnev's full backing for the organizational changes he introduced in the KGB soon after taking over. The main emphasis of thewas an expansion of the counterintelligence effort. The changes began at the very top, with the addition. Tsvigun, an experienced CI professional with tenuous career ties to Brezhnev,econd first deputy to Andropov. The other first deputy. Zakharov, remains active despite the fact that he served as chief of the 9th (Guards) Directorate when Shelepin headed the KGB, and moved up to KGB deputy chairman under Semichastnyy.

Brezhnev's influence in the KGB personnel changes were especially clear in the case. Tsinev, who by at least8 had taken on major responsibilities, almost certainly as chief, in the Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence and counterespionage).* Brezhnev's

*Tslnev probably' had been directorate chief for some time. His press article in7 on broad aspects of counterintelligence, together with his identificationolonel general, suggested that he had suchthen. It is even possible that he assumed the vacancy of KGB deputy chairman that was created. Bannikoveputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court in October-

association with Tsinev dates back as early as, when Tsinev served in military counterintelligence in Berlin,ubordinate. Mironov, the then chief of the KGBMilitary Counterintelligence) Directorate who later served Brezhnev well in the coup against Khru-

Brezhnev, wno iu February lybbleaving '

KaZakUStan toember of Khrushchev's Secretariat ath Party Congress, planned to getn Moscow with former associates from the Ukraine, including specifically Tsinev and Mironov. Insinev learned that Brezhnev was "making every effort" to secure Tsinev's transfer back to Moscow. Other Brezhnev associates with whom Tsinev had personal contacts at the time. Shchelokov (now MVD. Lapin (now TASSikhonov (presumed to be Nikolay Tikhonov, now USSR deputy premier). The careers of these officialsood example of the importance of personal ties and political patronage in thc Soviet system* and of the kind of support Brezhnev has in high party and government places. *

Control over the security forces through the Central Committee apparatus apparently remains in Brezhnev's hands, despite conflicting indications since Andropov became KGB chief that Kirilenko, Suslov, or Ustinov might have some supervisory responsibilities. The occasional publicof Kirilenko and Suslov in this area would seem

*The recent identification of Viktor Chebrikov as KGB deputy chairman indicates the continuing influence which the Ukrainian "clique" around Brezhnev has in the security organizations. Chebrikov had been second secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk party organization untilhen the Ukrainian press announced his departureew post "outside the Ukraine." The absence of publicity for him until his identification as deputy chairman of the KGB in9 suggests that he has been servingesser capacity within that organization in the interim.

to be examples of their deputizing for Brezhnev. The frequent involvement of Ustinov in security affairsis due to the nature of his work, which is in the administration of the highly-sensitive defense and space Industry. It is unlikely thatandidate member of the Politburo he would oversee an area of activity, one part of which is headed by his peer on that body (that is, KGB Chairman Andropov). However, his known activities indicate he maypecial responsibilityf military affairs.

Brezhnev's influence in the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee apparently remains as strong as when his Ukrainian. Mironov, ran it. The promotion of Mironov's long-time deputy, Nikolay Savinkin, to head the department in8 apparently indicated he was being compensated for services rendered to Brezhnev- Furthermore, Savinkin's replacement as first deputy head of the department, Nikolay Petrovich Mal'shakov, could be an associate of Brezhnev; however, the evidence to this effect is tenuous, in part due to an almost complete lack of information of Mal'shakov.

had been chairman of the Penza OblastCommittee from5 until his appointment as Savinkin's first deputy in Several highwith known ties toKulakov and Central Committee department. Chernenkoerved several years in Penza, although their careers did not overlap with Mai'shakov!s.ikolay Petrovich Mal'shakov was identified5 list of military awardseniorlieutenant of the naval forces; if this is the same Mal'shakov, then conceivably he hadeading position in that servicehen Brezhnev became chief of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of the Navy.

Original document.

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