Created: 1/5/1970

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible




ruftCTlOH* ft TOP I


Target Analysis .-

Cover, Air Support


No Date


Psy War.


loir, atfrfiaai**. illl* t

Photostat of study

Subject: Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an




Hypothetical case history describing the power playfe* or pressures required to overthrow an unfriendly

.. historical staff source


ready ud others far fron being developed at ths tins required, Also, ltjaportant to recognlie,thet the prenature denlapejent of certain factors night prejudice the tialng or the operations thereby loeing their effeetlveaess. Dpoa consideration of ths caycho-lOEical temparement of the people In thla hypothetical situation. It will he aasumed, ee In noat natlonalltiee, that thay are eapahle of being highly aroused under proper atlmniBtlon but ara not capable of sustaining tola atata of mind for aay extended period of tine, TOLb nwusption, when weighed againat tha strategical concept for

that the;antl-CDamnnlet population should not be aroused prematurely

of development without regard to the exeat tine required to bc the objective* of each Btagw* In thla manner, byl objectives by etegas. It la possible to encore tba orderly dei

d. Initiate defection activities.

Commence monitoring target's military como circuits.

' t. Initiate formalization of and training of paranllitary forces,

g. Commence implementation of communications plana.

n. Eatabllah control over friendly propaganda assets propagating theses to discredit tbe target regime and encourage patience and hope among anti-Communists.

Initiate action toward establishment of a

Develop psychological pressures in border countries againat target regime.

k. Prepare logistical and air support plana.

1. Prepare detailed operational plana for stage Throe.


paraaiiitary cadre training andinto teams.

clandestine radio facilities and

Exploit friendly propaganda media to develop antagonism against target regime, fan passive will to resist.

psychological economic pressure, developpressures*

internationaloog Westerntargot regimo, accentuate psychological pressurescountries.

distribution and organisationalfriendly pay-war media.

. g. Develop andolitical philosophy for theomething to bs FOR.

Prepare plansrovisional government to replace target regie*.

final plans in detail for an all-outstrength and determination, "tage Plvo.

Stage Fivei D Dayay)

a. assuming target has not capitulated and force isthen the pro pared sabotage plan would be Implemented* special squads would carry out elimination of key target personnel assignments. ,

imultaneously with above, air supply drops would be completed to partisan teams not otherwise supplied.

completion of Initial air supply toshock teams would bo in place on respective targetsattack plans.

clandestine radio would cover tbe aboveby initiating Its prepared notional broadcasts,strength and reportingefections, etc.

planned elimination of the target'sof landllnea by tho sabotage teams should forcethe military radio system which would then result in theof the Intrusion/deception radio unit indestroying or deceiving this military systeci,

f The pay-war media would implement its tactical psy-war teams and carry out assigned tasks.

c- Intelligence collection offorts would be concentrated on tactical and psychological intelligence.

h. Defection plan for forcing an internal coup d'etit would be pressed with greatest effort aided by all the internal and external pressures set in notion at this time.

1* Air striking power would be readied for deployment against tactical and strategical target* of greatest peyeno-physie Impact.

External, international propaganda in friendly Western notions would be accentuated In favor of anti-Communist forces.

tha assessment of potential friendly assets It Is possible towhet mechanisms or assets are required and froa what Indigenous source these assets might be expected to be developed. Theseresources vould undoubtedly Include both those affiliated in some raviner with the Exile Committee and those previously developed by the field stations. In any event It would be possible to define each mechanism ln terms, purpose, objective, requirements, estimated cost, responsible staff officer, and American cut-oat. For any desired Esohanisa widen does not have readilypotential, indigenous personnel available at the moment, It should be establishedequirement to be met. Each mechanism should be Identified in theJ foregoing manner, classifiedTask" anderial deeirnatlon for reference, ate. If certain assets are already established as approved projects and are required to support this special operation, the Task Force headquarters should have authority to re-define euch assets or projects in terms of specific tasks as above. This system provides an easy method of clearly defining all mechanisms or functions required to support the operation as wall as providing means of budgetdisbursing and accounting for funds, compartmentation,of responsibility and exercise of control and other advantages. The following may provide examples of sooe specific tasks which vould be required to support this operation:

T-l: levelop Internal psychological intelligencenet*

t-2i Develop external, tactical intelligence net intocountry*

t-3i Establish paramilitary fiold headquarters In Country a.

T-Ui Establish covert paramilitary cadre training schoolin Country P.

stablish covertraining school in Countryt Develop psy-var teams in target country.

T-7i Develop external pay-war teams inirected at target country. (Also separate task for

evelop clandestine radio team for. Country 9tasks for teams usine overt facilities inB and '.


T-9i Develop clandestine radio facilities ineparate task for an emergency facility of

Oi Develop radio monitoring taam for intrusion/deception of target's military colonels. Country B.

T-lli Develop plan for convoking an international anti-Communist conferenceearby country outside of regional coiKand.

Develop rignUr/bcober contingency capability for basing In Country B.

. i Dsvelop Independent defection plan for target cduntry.

. ' '

T-lJi. Dralop an indigenous creative writing staff for production of propaganda material*



Proceeding from tbe foregoing developments and attempting to translate Uio concept of strategy in terms of tactics, tbe latter may ba defined broadly as follows I

Defectioni It most be assumed that the Exile Committee, feeing composed of know conspirators, would have little if any opportunity of attempting the defect Ion of the President or key personalities around him. pecial effort should be made to establishn tact for this purpose. The Task designed for thle purpose would have the broad mission of defecting the President iff not, tolique around ths President which could be defected in place to bs ready to establish an Internal coup d'etat at the right moment. In addition to this separate defection effort, every possible means of exploiting tba Exile Committee's opportunities for defecting military units should bo carried out oo asystematic basis. The defection of tha President and his means of power, tbe armed forces, should constitute tbe first and most Important tactical objective. Success in defecting these elements could mean tha differenceloodless couprolonged civil war.

PIvisloni Tbs target's greatest strength lies in its unity of purpoee, discipline and control of tha powers of government.

Epsctflc bloclado forcon


broad baala for continuing propaganda attacks from abroad. The respective field atatlona ahould covertly aupport the formation of these local committees, utilising them as media for theof themes against the target regime.

Tactical Pny-*ar Teamsi During the course of developing control and effectiveness of friendly psy-war assets or media In the target country and Coonnd C, attention ahould be devoted to tbe establishment of specific tactical psy-war teama for each target garrison. These teams should cods 1st of about ten able-bodied, aggressive individuals possessing the capability of seising local broadcast atatlona and printing presses in their assigned target trea and converting thom to support the partisan attack. They should be trained ln ths use of armm, attack and dafence tactics as well as in thalr specialties ln the propaganda fluid. They should accompany shook teama wherever such are to ba employed. In other cases whero tho target garrisons would be attacked only by partisans in the immedlats area, the tactical pey-var teams should be formed either from indigenous personnel In the area or thoso Infiltrated prior to tho attack. Once in possessionocal broadcast station, newspaper or other printing faculties, the team should mako defensive preparations and immediately commence propagating inflamxatoryagainat the regime, using completely notional themes depicting great success, defection In other areas, etc.


. Psychological Intelligence. Dtiliilng existing sources,acts. Informants endeach field station in the"regional command, particularly the target station, shouldapid reporting system undor the direction of tho Task Forcewhereby current overt and covart Information may bs reportedaily basis. Ths purpose of this typo of reporting is twofold. Cne. to monitor the target and the peopleally basis.onse, to provide Intimate details essential in psychoanalysing tho situationaala for operational decisions' and two to provide the steady flow of intimate information required for the Intensive pey-var program envisioned to keep material timely and accurate and to providefor exploitation by timely handling. In thla Instance it la assumed that the situation permite toe use of daily diplomatic air mail, unescorted. All material would bo forwardedovermailing addroea accessible to the Task Force Headquarters. Being subject to technical surveillance by the Comeunlats, ell Information ahould be prepared es ln tho case of on International news service bulletinover designation. These bulletins should not be classified oven though they aay contain informationconrTdan-tlal" nature if adequately disguised through thn useode system.


ji Toe two most vitalf Security in this

operation are> First, to preserve tne controlling factor of

denial" and second to protect the operation from tba

enemy or counterespionags. Tne preservation of plausible dsnlal

bs notional but all-prevailing, and every action or counter-

action must be weighed for conformance thereto* It is assumedin this instsncs Is limited to retaining tbe officialof the U. S, Government from all responsibility for ths covert/

clan des tine support of ths operations envisioned herein. Protection of ths operation from ths enemy would normally involvs both security and coon tore apionagej however, owing to ths peculiar characteristics of this operation, ths two functionsbe combined and tamedsecurity." In this manner almost identical requirements for preserving'dsnlal snd protecting tha operation become concentrated on one staff element. ecurity Officer supported by an adequate staff should be assigned to the operation during the planning phase snd should be cognisant of all facets of the operation at all times. In this manner tne Security Officer would be able to review all plans

ensure denial and protection, and should have authority to check

on any phase of the operation to ensure that no weak or dangerous

or situations exist. The Security Officer should be the

and the law, and his ability to contribute to tbo opera-

tional security of tho over nil effort would be in proportion to the extent that he Is knowledge ablo of proposed plane or actions before thay are consummated. Ths following are examples of specific respon-

of the Security Officer.

Cover i The cover plan for tbe operation should be established by the Security Officer who should than supervise its implementation. This plan, as mentioned above, would first involve too cover for the Task Force Headquarters, and second the cover for dealing with tha Exile Comlttee. All ramifications of tdese covers must be checked constantly and many of the functions conducted by theafe mail boxus, safe houses, couriers, telephones, vehicles, personal covers, protective surveillance in tne United etates, entries and departures of indigenous persons, et cstira.

Operationsi One of tho basic assumptions in thishistory "was that tho targetelatively superior>and security system which had successfully exposed or blocked

mora than thirty previous attempts to overthrow the governmentOiving full weight to this assumption, lt logically follows that very careful consideration should be provided for the security of all operations Involving foreign and/or Indigenous Individuals. apid provisional security clearance procedure'should be established


tightening of tbo vice by too above action should beto enable the key defector to effect his coup withinuling military group and declare himself the head of the govcrn-ment. With tbe key defector ln thie position, lt should thenelatively oasy matter toease-fireinal political solution between two controlled agents.


v The actual peace negotiations should be handled by tbo Diplomatic Serviceatter of good offices. The armed forces created during this operation ahould constitute tho necessary armed strength to con-pel compllanco vith consolidation orders. If the psychological propo- ': ganda employed up to this moment has contained sufficient allowance ,to enable tbe army to save face, lt should not.be too difficult to enlist Its cooperation in ridding the country of Communism andtha breaches in.order eventually to restore peace and

democracy* Ths danger of the Communistsounterattack .

hould be borne In mind at allowever, as the objectefecting the army was to gain Its support, rapid follow-through ln forming an antt-Communist government should remove this menace.


This attempt toealistic case history'ituation necessitated the adoption of eony arbitrary assumptions. -'Therefore any analysis of the case must proceed on the basis ofing the assumptions In two classes I Those vhlch described the; as being valldf and those which vers made to describe actions or .

'..Blons as subject to cxnolnatici. Leaving the examination ofo the reader, the conclusions shall be confined toof intention in preparing this study.

.he target vaa conjectured as difficult in order to provide an example of how to cope withituation in terms of progressive pressure. It ie geoerally beyond tbo ability of any particular group of persons, regardless of their intellectual superiority, to determine definitely that tba creation of this pressure or that combination of pressures vouldpecific objoctive. The physical factors Involved in any given situation may be determined with reasonable Thus, military science ls lneasonably accurate sub- i Joct. iaychic fnctorn, on the other hand, require an application of he science of psychology, which ls one of the youngest and moot 1st- ' recise of allhis eharmeteriatlo of psychology accounts for the Inability of the planning group to prepare precise plans for the achievement of the objective in this case. Given only the general j

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: