The WEEKLY REVIEW. Issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. Itincludes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topicsmore comprehensive treatment and therefore publishedas Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.
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THE WEEK IN
NO RESULT APPARENT FROMHOU EN-LAI
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There is no indication that the meeting in Peking oneptember resulted in any significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chinese behavior suggests the contrary.
No Result Apparent Fromhou En-lai Meeting
is no indication that the meeting in Peking betweenPremier Kosygin and Chinese Premier Chou En-laiesulted in any significant improvement in Sino-Soviet Chinese behavior suggests the contrary. It seems almost certain that the hastily arranged meeting occurred at Sovietperhaps with the Northacting as intermediary.
Kosygin probably used the occasion to emphasize thewith which Moscow views the present border confrontation and to underscore Soviet determination to react forcefully to any Chinese provocations. At the same time he probably reiterated Soviet willingness to hold talks on the border problem and may haveto keep China underon this issue by indicating that the situation was getting out of control.
resentation would have served several Soviet It would have dramatized to the Chinese at an authoritative and personal level the grave view Moscow takes of what it regards as provocations against the USSR. The Soviets probably believe that Peking is willing to accept aof the present level of border conflict unless it can be convinced that Moscow is prepared to take harsh measures. At the same time, the Soviets are clearly unhappy about the tendency of much of the Communist movement and the
rest of the world to apportion blame equally in the dispute.
The Soviets see themselvesisadvantage because many of their enemies and allies believe they can take advantage ofpreoccupation with the Moscow probably hopes that Kosygin's dramatic visit will serve to show that it is seeking todifferences peacefully. The Soviets have refrained fromagainst Peking since theprobably to underscore their stance as the party willing to moderate the dispute, and perhaps also to emphasize to China their willingness to take some of the heat out of the situation.
Kosygin's cold reception in Peking and the terse Chineseon the meeting were clearly designed to avoid the impression of formal Sino-Soviet discussions. The Chinese were probablyto talk directly with Kosygin, but may have been unwilling to bear the onus for refusing to meet,in light of HO Chi Minn's last testament appealing for unity between the two parties. In the Chinese are undoubtedly concerned over the possibilityerious escalation of theand may have seen somein sounding out Soviet
It is too early to tell whether Peking will respondositive fashion to the Soviet initiative. On the propaganda
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however, Peking isan air of implacable hostility. Oneptember China made aattempt to portray the USSR as the aggressive party in the dispute by calling attention to the possibility of an atomicby "sociallear allusion to recent public speculationossible Soviet pre-emptive strike against China. The statement is partlogan for this year's National Day celebrationsctober and
is likely to aggravate tensions between Moscow and Peking further.
The Soviet stand-down inis unlikely to last much longer in the face of thestream of invective from china's behavior couldthe Soviets to re-enter the propaganda battle with the renewed claim that Moscow had sought to temper the dispute but isto defend itself against Peking's "aggressive" intentions.
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