CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROHPAM RELEASE AS8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence Office of Strategic Research
CONTRIBUTION TOOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN 6ENERAL PURPOSE FORCES SUPPLEMENT
ESTIMATED SOVIET EXPEHOITURES FOR THE CEKEfiAL PURPOSE FORCES
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for the General Purpose Forces
Activities and force levels estimated for Soviet general purpose forces9 imply expenditures ofillion rubles (equivalent to4 billion dollars in US costust underercent of total Soviet defense and space spending. This represents an increase of nearlyercent in spending for general purpose forcesthe result of increases in the ground forces. Projections of general purpose forces to3 indicate
Note; This supplement presents the expenditureof the estimates and projections ofpurpose forces contained in the OSH to9 .
With the exception of expenditures for research, development., test, and evaluationllcosts related lo the generat purpose mission are reflected in these expenditure implications.
These expenditures do not include thoseballistic missile submarine forces, which arein expenditures for strategic
Ruble values are given in new rubles established by the Soviet currency reformanuary1 and are in constanti> prices* Dollar values are given in constant8 prices. Detailed statisticsiscussion of the measurement of the estimates are presented at Annex,
that this level of expenditures will be maintained or slightly increased.
Although expenditures for general purpose forces are estimated to incroaao throughout the, they declinehare of total defense and space spending and3 are expected to account for onlyercent of the total. During the same periodspending for space and military research, test, and evaluation increases sizablyhare of the total while tho strategic forces' share remains fairly constant.
In theround forces are expected to account for aboutercent of total general purpose forces expenditures and naval forces for aboutercent. Tactical aviation and military transport aviation each are estimated to account forercent.
9 ground forces expenditures are estimated toillion rublesillion dollars). The troop callup at the time of the invasion8 resultedlight increase in outlays. The buildup along the Sino-soviet border, which began hasreater effect over time. The rise in expenditures during the Sixties is expected to continuehen it is currently anticipated that the border buildup will be leveling off.
Tactical air force expenditures9 aretoillion5 billionxpenditures have declined4 and are expected to continue to do so , the projected introduction into the force of two new tactical fighter aircraft will raise outlays again.
Extensive construction and conversion programs estimated to be under way for the Soviet generalnaval forces imply on outlay ofillion rubles0 billion dollars) teady rise which began These programs are mostly directed toward the highest priority task of
the Soviet Navy--countering the US ballistic missile submarine force. Although these programs are expected to continue at leastlight decline in naval expenditures is anticipated due to thedecline in spending for naval aviation.
Spending for military transport aviation9 is estimated toillionollars). Investment expenditures have declined slightly4 as the Soviets haveelatively low level of procurement spending fortransports and for helicopters. imultaneous decline in the number of light transport aircraft has enabled the Soviets to keep operating costs generally stable for military transport aviationhole. In the Seventies it is expected that the Soviets will be spending more for the procurement of larger aircraft such as the The total Soviet airlift capacity is projected to be continually improving4 through
Soviet military manpower in the general purpose forces will probablyillion9 and may stabilize at about this level This is an increase ofen Most of the increase has been caused by developments in the groundSino-Soviet border buildup and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
I. Total Expenditures for General Purpose Forces
Activities nnd force levels estimated for Soviet general purpose forces9 imply expenditures ofillionillionust underercent of total defense and spaceExpenditures have increased nearlyercent from4 levelilliondollars).
During the, expenditures areto remain relatively stable withlight increaseilliondollars)0illiondollars) or ground forces are estimated to account for almost two-thirds of the increase in total general purpose forces spending during the. opposite page) shows estimated expenditures by element for the
The rate of growth in estimated expenditures for general purpose forcos for theas less than that for total Soviet defense and spaceand the general purpose forces' share of the total has declined slightly. It is expected that this trend will continue, and3 the share will amount to aboutercent.
The ground forces are estimated to account for about half of general purpose forces expenditures during the. The nava) forces are expected to account for aboutercent andair forces and transport aviation each areto receive aboutercent.
esource category basis, operating (such as outlays for pay and allowances, spare parts, and expendables like food and POL) for slightly more than half the total expen-
ditures this figure is expected to have increased to nearlyercent. Figuren pageresents the resource category breakdown for the"'four elements of the general purpose forces.
The rise in the share of the total devoted to operating costs results both from increases in the cost of operating increasingly sophisticatedand from increased personnel expenditures, which are expected to rise nearlyercent during the period as the estimated manpower required by the postulated forces increases byen.
II. Mission Elements
A. Ground Forces
Expenditures for the ground forces9 are estimated toillionillion dollars). This0 percent increase over expenditures During the, spending for the ground forces grew steadily, and the ground forces' share of rising total military and space spendingairly constantercent. Ground force expenditureshare of general purpose forces expenditures were onercent4 toercent
The troop callup at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia8 has resultedlight increase in outlays, but the buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, which has been going onasreater effect over time. There are more thanivisions, most of which were formerly at low strength or in cadre status, now being maintained at or developed toward combat strength along the Sino-Soviet border and in Czechoslovakia. Further,ore divisions are estimated to be in the current Soviet order of battle this year than4esult both of the buildup andecentof the evidence on the size of the ground forces.
This increase in the number and combatof divisions has contributed substantially to the increase in spending for the ground forces, which has grownillion6 billion dollars) arge part of this increase resulted from additional expenditures for procurement of tanks (up nearlymmunition (upnd tactical missiles and rockets ercent).
Estimated expenditures for procurement of tactical nuclear weapons during this period have been fairly constant butignificantillion nobles2illion dollars).
Expenditures for the ground forces aretoeakillionillion dollars)t which time it isthat the border buildup will be leveling off. Expenditures are estimated to decline slightly from that pointillion9 billion dollars) in This will result from an expected decline in investment primarily due to reducedfor procurement of ground force weapons. expenditures, which have increased, are expected to continue to rise and to partially offset the decline in investment spending.
B. Tactical Air Forces
Expenditures9 for the Tactical Air Forces (TAF) are estimated toillion5 billionlmostercent of the total for general purpose forces. Thisecline of nearlyercent in spendinghen TAF expendituresillion8 billion dollars).
nvestment expenditures have dropped steadily and9 areillion4 billion dollars). Annual operatinghave increased during tho same period and are estimated to beillion rubles 1
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billion dollars) this year, aboutercent more thon4 expenditures. The higher operating expenditures result both from increases in theof aircraft deployed and from the greaterof the newer aircraft. The increase in the estimated number of aircraft results in part from new evidence and in part from the buildup of TAF units along the Sino-Soviet border.
AF expenditures are expected to drop below thoseo lessillion3 billion dollars). Procurement offighters is expectod to decline and, althougheconnaissance aircraft production will continueverall procurement costs are expected to drop.
Procurement expenditures arc expected to show significant increasess theersion of the Foxbat asprojectod to reach series production rates. Investment expenditures are exoected toillion9 billion dollars) he highest
The operating costs associated with the newer, moro advanced aircraft will be significantly greater than those required for the older models and these costs are expected to maintain their current level in the Seventies in spite of the declining number ofdeployed.
C. Naval Forces
Soviet expenditures for general, purpose naval forces9 are estimated toillion0 billionboutercent of spending for general purpose forces.* This is the highest
" Spending for ballistic missile submarines is not
considered here as it it included in ernmnditurea
for strategic attack forces
estimated outlay since the middle Fifties and reflects the emphasis or. the highest priority task of theNavy--countering the US ballistic missileforce. Projected construction and conversion programs for several classes of guided missile ships, an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) escort, and five classes of attack submarines contribute to this high level.
The distribution of estimated spending among the elements of the naval forces9icture of relative emphasis within the navy:
ships and coastal defense ercent
Estimated spending has increased graduallyillion2 billion dollars)4 to the present level0 billion dollars). During this period, the estimated naval expenditureselatively constant share of the rising total defense and space spending--slightly lessll naval force elements except the submarine element had slightly increased spending. The submarine element, while dropping slightly, has still maintained an annual levelillion4 billion dollars).
eak9 Soviet naval expenditures are expected to decline slightlyillion9 billion dollars) in This results almost entirely from an expected reduction in spending for naval aviation ofillionollars). The other force elements are expected either to increase slightly or to maintain theirlevels of spending through
Tho share of naval spending allocated to major surface ships has risen fromercent4 to
aboutercenthis share is expected to continue to increase in the early Seventies to aboutercent of total naval spending inof continuing modernization of the surface fleet.
Soviet fleet modernization is being achieved through both conversion and construction (see Figureelow).
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he Soviets undertook conversion of the Kotlin class destroyer to SAM units. 8 they did the same with the Krupnyy class, and9 the Soviets began conversion of tho Svcrdlov class cruiser to carry guided missiles. These relatively low-cost
conversion programs, which are expected to continue through, should add increased flexibility to surface fleet operations.
Construction programs are more costly than conversion programs. In thehewere constructing six classes of major surfaceKynda, CLGH Kresta, DLG Kashin, PCE Mirka, PCE Petya, and the CLG Moskva. The CLGM Kynda and PCE Mirka programs were completed5espectively. The remaining programs are still under way.
In addition to the continuation of these four programs, it is estimated that the Soviets beganof two new classes of ships thisrobable guided missile destroyerruiser class. The armament of the cruiser is as yet unidentified, but all new Soviet surface combatants are designed to have an ASW capability and every major surface2 is also equipped with SAM armaments which would facilitate ASW operations at sea without air cover.
Expenditures for construction and conversion programs are expected to average7 billion dollars) annually forompared with an average of5 billion dollars) during the.
The projected construction of the two new classes of major surface ships has resulted in total expenditures ofillion rubles more 6 billion dollars) for thehan was forecast in last year's contribution.
Annual spending for tho submarine force is estimated to have declined slightlyeak ofillion rubles5 billion dollars). Since this occurrederiod whenspending for all naval forces was increasing, the submarine share of the total declined measurably.
from nearlyercento aboutercent
This decline resulted from the completion
of theF,lass submarine construction.
Nuclear powered attack submarines offer the greatest promise for ASW, and the Soviets'programs indicato that they share this view. 8 the decline in expenditures leveled off asgrew for three now construction programs, the nuclearlasses and the probably diesellass attack submarine. Intwo more submarine classes are projected and are estimated to reach full production in the early Seventies. Expenditures for general purposeprograms arc expected to increase slightly from9 level and3 absorb approximatelyorcent of naval spending.
Most of the submarine expenditures during the periodre expected to be for these new classes of submarines. It is projected that3 the Soviets will have nearlyore new attackdeployed than Almost three-fourths of these new submarines will probably be nuclear . TotaJ expenditures for procurement of thoue systems areto beillion3 billion dollars) for this period. This level of spending is about four-fifths that estimated foroflass ballistic missile submarine during the same period.
Naval aviation is estimated to have received an increasing share of total naval outlays4hare ofercentovol ofillion0 billion dollars) this year. Rising expenditures for aircraft procurement are primarily responsible.
It is estimated that procurement of theeconnaissance aircraft will end this year and that of tho Mail Expenditures for naval aviation are expected to decline sharply during the Seventies
when relatively less spending is forecast forof theelicoptor and the Mayaircraft. Expenditures arc expected to dropillionS billion dollars)heir lowest point during the entire period. ew aircraft in the early Seventies, however, could alter this projection.
Spending for naval joint support is estimated to have increased froro lessillion1 billion dollars)4 toillion rubles2 billion dollars) This rise is due to increased procurement of coastal defenseauxiliary craft, electronic equipment, andweapons. These expenditures are expected toat9 level through the Seventies.
D. Military Transport Aviation
Spending for military transport aviation9 is estimated toillionboutercent of the totalfor the general purpose forces. This percentage has been the same6 and is expected to remain at this level (These expenditures cover all military transports and helicopters except those used in an ASH role.)
During thehe Sovietsto increase tha number of medium transports and the number of helicopters while operational light transports declined. The procurement of thesehas proceededelatively low .level andexpenditures are estimated to have declined slightly. By phasing out large numbers of the smaller aircraft, the Soviets haveairly stable level of operating costs. Spending for transport aviation is expected to remain nearly constant2 and tolight rise
The Soviets recognize the importanceell-equipped airlift force. Projected procurement programs concentrate more on heavy transports such as thehan on medium transports. The Soviets
also are expected to continue their interest in It is anticipated that increasedwill account for most of the rise in spending
The result of the spending throughout the period hasignificant improvement in Soviet airlift capability. 4 airlift capacity of high performance (jet and turboprop) aircraft, measured in millions of pounds, has increased morend3 is expected to have increased by anotherercent over this year's capacity. (The measure used is basic load to maximum ranges. Tlie increase would be even greater if measured in terms of heavier loads to shorter ranges.)
II. Manpcawcr Implications
Manpower utilized by Soviet general purpose forces increased from lessillion men4illion9 and will probably stabilize at about that level Throughouteriod, these forces are expected to consistently absorb aboutercent of overall Soviet military personnel strength even though general purposedecline somewhatroportion of the rising defenso and space total.
Requirements of the ground forces havu been the major factor underlying the high demand for general purpose forces personnel. The size of the ground forcesillion men4 toillion Over the same period, growth in tha manpower required for tactical aviation and the navy accounted for an0 men.
0 the slight increase in personnelfor the ground forces will be largely offset by the decline in tactical aviation manpower. qualitative improvements in new generation aircraftigher level of manning perfewer aircraft are being deployed and the rapid plwiscout of older models resultsecline
in total TAF requirements. Moreover, the Soviet pro-gran to augment and increase the availability of some low-strength ground force divisions in conjunction with the buildup of forces near the Chinese border isto be leveling off at that time.
The Soviets increased the allocation of manpower to their general purpose naval forces fromen4 to9 as the numbers of deployed submarines, surface ships, and naval aircraft grew steadily. This upward trend is expected to level off3 aten.
The manpower required for submarines will beconstant,0 menttack submarine manpower requirements remain stable as the new classes of nuclear submarines offset the phasing out of diesel powered submarines.
The surface combatant force (both major and minor surface ship elements) will remain at about itssi2e,ising number of complex missile carry-
Manpower for the Soviet naval air force increased0 men4eflecting theof more combat and reconnaissance aircraft into the four fleet areas. No significant changes in the level of manpower assigned to the naval air arm will occurowever, as about the same number of personnel released by the attrition of bombers will be required to man the new antisubmarine aircraft.
Manpower requirements for military transporthave fluctuated within narrow limits4 and are estimated to be It is expected that these requirements will increase3 as the Soviets upgrade theirof high performance transport aircraft.
IV. Compariiton of US andpnnditurcs, 9
Although there are conceptual difficulties involved in estimating the dollar costs of Soviot programs as if they were built and paid for in the US, dollardoasis for examining relative levels of effort.
stimated dollar-equivalent outlays by the USSR will amount to onlyillion dollars for general purpose forces, while the US is spending overillion dollars. The economic costs of Vietnamignificant portion of the absolute difference in comparable expenditure levels.
uble basis, Soviet expenditures forpurpose forces are aboutercent of total defense and space expenditures USthis year are expected to account for almostercent of conceptually similar sponding.
The USSR spent, on the average, the equivalent of aboutillionear overeriod (in8 prices), while USaveraged aboutillion dollars annually (in current prices). Comparable annual Sovietfor these forces .increased by almostercent4 The corresponding US increase was overercont.
Prior to the Vietnam conflict, US outlays for general purpose forces accounted forhird of total defense and space spending, an average of about IB billionear. If Vietnam spending were excluded from the comparison, US spending would probably still be larger than Soviet spending but not significantly so.
Details Underlying Measurement of Soviet General Purpose Force Expenditures
Because there are major differences between price structures in the US and the USSR, expenditures for tho general purpose forces are presented in both rubles and dollars. Ruble valuca are themeasure of the total military program mix and of the expenditure implications as they appear to the Soviets. Dollar-equivalent values reflect the general size of the Soviet forces as if they had beenin the US. Theyasis for comparison with US programs.
The estimated and projected force levels in this supplement are OSR's judgments of the single most representative projection of forces within ranges estimated in tho basic OSR contributions. These single points have been identified solely for costing purposes, and the same level of confidonce should not be attached to the forces thus projected as to the ranges contained in tho basic OSR contributions.
The validity of the expenditure estimateson the validity of the statement of the forces, the accuracy of the price data, and tho time frame of the estimate. The expenditures implied by past and current programs are basedairly firm physical data base and aro not subject to the.samu broad range of uncertainty that applies to thodata. The continuing review of the size and technical characteristics of the forces will result in revisions as now information is received andSoviet force goals become more evident.
Values are in constant price terms. Allchanges reflect program changes and not changos in prices over time. The ruble values have beenat5 prices. Dollar values express equivalent costs in the US in8 prices.
The expenditure data in the tables are expressed in billions to two decimal places* This level ofmakes it possible to follow small movements in the underlying physical data. The uncertainties are such that no other significance should be attached to the second decimal place.
Estimated Numbers of Selected Equipment Items and Manpower in the Soviet General Purpose Forces3
and very light utility
The deployment figures in
purpose Of deriving the single-valued expenditure series presented. These data fall within ranges of the estimates appearing in the basic contributions. They should not be interpreted as being an equally reliable but more precise statement of the forces.