LIN PIAO AND THE GREAT HELMSMAN

Created: 1/21/1970

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

PIAO AND THE GREAT HELMSMAN

(Reference Title: POLO XXXIX)

LIN PIAO AND THE GREAT HELMSMAN

MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

Lin Piao, nowears of age, has long been Maoavorite military leader. It was notowever, that heajor party leader, and he has been Mao's "closest comrade-in-arms" and designated successor as chairman of the party only Lin's unexpected rise to such eminence has evoked questions as to whether he should be taken seriouslyuccessor to Mao andrue Maoist.

For example, has Lin merely exploited Mao's vanity and the opportunities .provided by the Culturalfor his own purposes, or is he fully faithful to Mao and committed to Maoism? Was Mao's choice of Lin assudden and arbitrary decision which he may reverse, or was theulmination of years of growing confidence in Lintandard bearer for Maoist

This Intelligence Report gives theense of Lin's development and character and of hisover the years with Mao. It concludes that Linevoted Maoist, that he will probably take the helm from the Great Helmsman, and that he will attempt tothe revolutionary course that has been charted by Mao.

LIN PIAO AND THE GREAT HELMSMAN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Page

Lin's Support of

Lin's View of

Mao's Confidence in

Lin's Saturation in Mao's Thought

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ANNEX

The Rise to Power, 11

The "Best

The Designated

Purging and Relying on the

Lin and the PLA

Ttie Ninth Congress and After,

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LIN PIAO AND THE GREAT HELMSMAN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Lin's Support of Mao

The detailed record set forth at Annex is one of Lin Piao's dog-like devotion to Maoeriod of at leaatears- While the story of Lin's relations with Mao in the early yearsas beenonly recently and may be in part fabricated, the record ls solid5 to date. It shows Linwith Mao against three powerful forces: Mao's rivals for leadership of the party, Lin's peers ln the PLA.uccession of Soviet leaders-

Lin has given Mao important and sometimes crucial support against his rivals in the party many times: in the5 showdown which made Mao dominant In tbe party, in2 "rectification" campaign, in theby Peng Te-huaiuring the first stage of the challenge by Liu Shao-chl throughout the prolonged struggle for power with Liu's party apparatus in the, in the autumn5 aa theRevolution was emerging, in Mao's operationsPeking in the winter, and throughout the tumultuous events of spring and6 that ended with the purge of Liu and the smashing of the party apparatus. At each of these junctures, Lin risked his own position; he identified himself so completely with Mao that he would have been brought down if Mao had lost the battle.

Similarly, Lin has supported Mao against one or another group ln the Chinese Communist araed forces much of the time since atnd in the Cultural

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Revolution he has put heavy pressure on the PLAhole, thereby risking his own base of power. Lin supported Mao against military as well as party leaders in the showdown ofelped to purge the PLA in the "rectification"arried out the purgend took the lead in purging the chlef-of-staff and others in5 in order to clear the way for Mao's Cultural Revolution. During the Revolution, he has taken the lead inhas acted with Madame Mao and others inhalf of the central military leadership and many regional and provincial leaders. He has protected the young Maoist revolutionaries harassing the PLA while rebuking and punishing the PLAndB). He has soaked the PLA in Mao's thought and has consistently told his military comrades that the criterion for Judging them will be their loyalty to Mao and Mao'she has acted on that principle. He has repeatedly failed toMao to give the PLA the authority commensurate with its responsibilities or to help his military subordinates to understand Mao's opaquend he has conciliated the PLA only reluctantly and in periods of acute dependence on it.

Despite his obligations to and good relations with the Russians in the, Linthereafter supported Mao against the Soviet-oriented Chinese leaders, and9 has stood firm with Mao on the entire range of lssuos in dispute with Moscow. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin has spoken soabout theharsh and derisivethey appear to hate him almost as much as they do Mao. As in his handling of the PLA, he hasullbackin recent stages of thereat danger.

Lin's View of Himself

Lin's own definition of his relationship with Mao ls so extreme that it has sometimes been regardedjwical exploitation of the old man's insatiable

vanity. For more thanears Lin has been upholding Mao's "thought" and urging absolute faith in Mao, and in recent years he has praised Mao--in terms reminiscent of Stalin'salways correct, the greatest of all Communists, the supreme genius, the source of all light, the answer to every problem. Lin has abjured any body of thought of his own, or even any identity of his own, apart from that of Mao. He has presented himself as entirely Mao's instrument, the perfect servant,the distance between the law-giver and himself, doing his best to understand and carrying out with all his might what he could understand, while being preparedMao's servants above all must betake the responsibility for any action which Mao might later definemistake". In all of these respects, his record is much better.than that of his predecessor, Liu Shao-chi.

There isegree of rhetoric in Lin's statements of his feelings toward Mao, but the record does seem to support Lin's account of himself as awed, dazzled, and in bond entirely. He has proven his fidelity in the best possibleis, identifying.his own interest completely with Mao's, he has repeatedly risked his own position for Mao's sake, and has accepted the danger ofthe PLA and thethe future. He has indeed been Mao's "besthere seems very little chance that he will turn on Mao and refuse to carry out Mao's will to the best of his ability, or that he will try to hurry the old man into retirement or into the grave.

Mao's Confidence In Lin

The record also shows Mao to be responding to Lin's devotion by assigning Lin posts and tasks of increasing importance and trust. This has been true in the military field, in the political field, and in recent years across the entire rangearty leader's concern.

Lin's role in Ches not entirely clear, but there is no doubt that Mao chose Linurcial military role5 during the Long March. He gave Lin the commandarge part of the Chinese Communist forcesnd gave him discretion in using them. s soon as Lin was well enough to handle the Job, Mao gave him command of the best forces and assigned him the most important military mission, the contest for the Northeast. This won, he gave Lin the most Important role in taking the rest of China. hen Lin was disabled, Mao named him to the MAC, andoon after Lin had returned to action, Mao named him to the two most important military posts, Minister of Defense and Chief of the MAC.

Mao showed high confidence in Linolitical leader as earlyn naming hla to head the school which was to train all Chinese Communist military leaders. He demonstrated this confidence repeatedly2hen he usedback from thethe Soviet-oriented leaders inamed Lin to head the reorganized party school, sent Lin toto negotiate with the Nationalists, and named Lin as his successor as political officer and (again)of the military academy. hen Mao madeegional party first secretary as well as regional military commander, he was th* only person so honored. Lin was taken into the polltburo5 even when he was sick and out of action. Upon his return to limited duty Lin wasice-chairman of the partyember of the polltburo standing coamittee. When Lin was named to head the MAChis party organ for the control of the military establishment was subordinated only to Mao, not to the party apparatus-_

Mao may have begun to think of Lin as hisas early At that time Mao began to transfer his own base of power from the party apparatus to Lin's PLA, and to make the political work methods of the PLA and then the PLAhole the models for Chinese society For the next three years. Lin and the PLA werepresented as the best examples for every individual

ao took Lin into his

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confidence in planning the Cultural Revolution and the great purge which was central to it, took Lin with him to his headquarters outside Peking, and gave Lin therole in the first stage of the purge ine assigned Lin the main speech at the party conference of6 which officially launched the Culturaland at the party plenum of6 he revealed Lin to be his choice as his successor, again assigning him the main speech. He had Lin speak for him at the rallies of August and September which launched the Red Guards, and again assigned to Lin the main speech at the October work conference which revealed Mao's further plans for the Cultural Revolution- While Mao thenLin with Madame Mao for the next stage of the purge of the PLA, from7 Mao used the PLA as the main instrument; of the Cultural Revolution, and he did not hold Hnhe held otherleaders--for "mistakes" in handling massor for occasional acts of defiance by military leaders- Nor did he hold Linhe easily mightthe offenses of his proteges Hsiao Huand Yang Cheng-wu. On the contrary, the8 plenum proclaimed Lin's conduct in the Cultural Revolution as "entirelyndonstitution providing for him to succeed Mao without contest. At the Ninth Congress lnin was again assigned the main speech and was given several places ln the politburo for military men in whom he apparently had confidence- Mao took Lin with himesort for the summer, and again on National Day in October assigned hia the main speech.

Although Mao ls unstable, he will probably not change his mind about Lin. Lin might need to Improve hisis. install more of his owncertain central organs of the party in order to be secure against any attempt to prevent him fromMao, but it is doubtful that Mao's other lieutenants would defy the old man's will and block Lin's way. It is therefore likely that Lin will get his chance as the party's chairman.

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Lin's Saturation in Mao's Thought

With regard to Mao'she heart of the natterelief in something close to theof the party cadre, although not the perfectibility of mankind. There is toew, completely political, hypermotivated, selfless party worker who will direct Imperfect men in the buildingew Chinese society. This society will be egalitarian, austere, andtate of continuous revolution. That is, the party and the society will continue to purify themselves through class struggle, eries of Cultural Revolutions,disorders. This vision of the good societyarge, although perhaps diminishing, sector of society in labor camps and under.other duress. The party ls to direct and control "mass" action ln which the people participate ln the formulation of policies devised for the common good. The society is to be the model for allolitical hyperactive, economically prosperous, and militarily powerful moderninstrument for their liberation.

The new Chinese cadre is made possible by the availability of Mao's thought, embodied in Mao theman. who accepts deification not for himself, but on behalf of his "thought." Mao'sncalls first for unremitting politicalmainly the instillation of moral Incentives,the fanatical revolutionary will which works with all its might and fears "neither hardship norhis revolutionary will is to be produced in all cadres and ln the masses so far as possible. The "thought" calls for mobilization of the massesolossal scale, as ln the campaigns against counter-revolutionaries, the Leap Forward, the commune program, and most recently the Cultural Revolution.

The military doctrine of the emerging Maoist society is centered on "people'sothefensiveand as an offensive strategy. The defense-ln-depth concept holds that Chinese numerical superiority, high

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touclear attack and to entice an invader to his doom. Chinese offensive doctrine does not envisage taking high risks by invading other countries but rather encourages "people's wars" of the Chinese type, in which Communist-led forces rely mainly on their own efforts and are assisted as practicable by Peking

Mao's thought does not call for incessant,militancy, in which no allowance is made for the limitations of the human material and the refractoriness of the environment; it calls for an adjustment to reality as necessary. Mao has been able to retreat ln time to preserve, his own position and toopular revolt. But his bias is militant, calling for the utmost effortevolutionary line before any slackening is thus, in pra-ctice Mao's thought allowsetreat when the real worldetreat, usually long after theon-Maoist wouldetreat advisable.

thought" hastyle ofwhich is similar in some respects to Stalin's but is identlflably Mao's. Whether Mao's directives callevolutionaryombard thereriod of retreat ande must haveao's position is always the one correct position, the true Leftist center between the extremes of the Right and the Ultra-Left. Mao's directives are sometimeseople's communes arer "Those who attack the PLA will beut, when he is undecided about his policy, often vague (the PLA and mass organizations are tor the masses are to "take part" in party consolidation). The party cadre is always the man in the middle, between theMao and the childlike masses, held responsible for errors in understanding Mao's will or forin carrying it out. The failings of cadres are revealed by intensive and prolonged criticism; theandin error, like Liupurged, but most are redeemed by exhaustive self-criticism, repentance and reform. Every campaign, no matter how ruinous in some respects, is

prepares the ground for another campaign as soon as, in Mao's judgment, the people and the environment can stand it.

Lin Plao has been fully Identified with Mao'sonly in his formal speeches, which he has admitted he does cot write, but tn his informal talks and spontaneous remarks, which best reflect his true beliefs. By thes he had accepted Mao's "thought"oherent body of doctrine, and ln the years to come was to find it the only necessary doctrine.e was on rpcord as endorsing and defending Mao's radical domestic programs and the rationale for them, and Mao's application of his thought to theof the military establishment and the PLA's role ln Chinese life. By the ende had associated himself firmly with Mao's STrategic military concepts, and Mao's rejection of Soviet "revisionism." In the next few years he applied STresuously to the PLA Mao's methods of remaking men. 5 he spoke for theof "people's war" as bocn offensive and defensive doctrine in the mostms possible, and by6 he was callingn ideological revolution in China. In the course of thfc Cultural Revolution he has stated repeatedly his belief in Mao's visionew China, his faith ir.f aiming men on Mao's lines (in particular, ir. spiritual over materialis devotion fo "struggle" as "ne principle of all progress, and hiso accept any costs to makn Mao's vision actual.

Like Mao. Lin accepts rhu principle oftrategic retreatfcessary. while hailing previous advances and planning ano'..tier as soon as possible. 0 he wasreat in Mao's domestic campaigns, and was praising Mao's willingness to make it. Similarly, in tne co-jrsp of -lie Cultural Revolution he has Joined Mao inack from confrontations with the PLAbolef great dependence on it. And he hasautionscent months on the Sino-Soviet border dispute- his predisposition, like Mao's-is militant. Forcing che human material to

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an impression ot rigiaity^ He isnlike Mao, he does not smoke, drink, or ove lives muchommon soldier. Like Mao, from dogmatic positions, and is self-righteo punitive. While advocating persuasion, his to deliver lectures and give orders, sometim harshly than Mao himself. Like Mao, he cansin trouble.

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suspicious, and distrustful; he believes tha should be watched all tht time.

leak, reat, and

he speaks us and tendency is es more sometimes be

veryone

Mao is always right, Lin is always right. While he has proclaimed himself prepared to acceptfor "mistakes" as later defined by Mao, Mao has not in fact blamed him for anything, and Lin has held others sharply responsible, even though they had been given impossible tasks or opaque directives. Like Mao, he believes in spiritualputting cadre; through criticism and self-criticism again and again in an effort to redeem them- He himself has made self-critlclsms, although not in recent years. While he has shown some sympathy from time to time for hla military comrades, because of the problems they face, like Mao he believes ln the removal, confinement, or (sometimes) execution of those who cannot be redeemed, and he has joined Mao in conducting such purges.

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Despite his role as the successor, he hasenerally unsatisfactory source of guidance to hisand to the peoplehole. While thisis attributable in part to Mao's frequent failure to provide clear guidance, Lin too often simply offers Mao's "thought"ag to find the answerMao's thoughtivingr "Judge all cadres by their adherence to Mao's thought." Or he pointsiven direction but does not tell his audience how to getthe Left." Or he isputting all of the burden of inter ore tat. subordinates

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The evidence, in sum, is that Lin is what Maohim toreliable "revolutionary successor" who will do his best to carry on along Mao's lines. The evidence is not absolutely conclusive, because Lin has never operated apart from Mao, but what evidence we have points that way. To conclude otherwise would be to judge that Lin forears has been engaged in adeception.

This is not to say thatbe able to carry on for very long on Mao's lines. He is totally without Mao's charisma while possessingdefects of character. He lacks control of certain key portions of the structure of power while he hasalienated some of the military leaders on whom he will depend. Thus he might soon be deposed or at least forced to modify, substantially, Mao's policies. But he will beginrue Maoist radical.

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ANNEX

"In sailing the seas, depend upon thein making revolution, depend on Mao's thought."

to Lin Piao

The Rise to Power,

A student and protege of Chou En-lai's in thein Piao apparently took Mao Tse-tung as his man from the moment of meeting him Commandingunits during the establishment and defense of the Kiangsi Soviet, Lin employed the guerrilla tactics for which Mao is given credit. Lin is said to have agrjeed with Mao in those years on the principle of party domination of the military and to have stood with Mao against other elements of the party and military leadership who questioned Mao's policies. Early in the Long March, Lin was among Mao's supporters in the showdown with other party leaders which established Mao as the dominant figure, and Lin led the troops which were victorious in the most important engagement of the Long March, the breakthrough to the Northwest.

Evidence of Mao's confidence in Lin's political reliability appeared as earlyhen Mao namedwithhead the military academy in Yenan. Early in the Slno-Japanese war,'Lin'sforcesood Japanese division in the largest engagement the Communists fought during the war. Wounded then or inin was separated from Mao for four years while he was under treatment In the SSR. Lin got on very well with the Russians, but, on eturning to Yenane supported Mao strongly in the party "rectification"purge andat party leaders who were closer

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s evident in the assignments Mao gave him. Lin was an instructor in the "rectification" campaign;ith Mao, he headed the reorganized party school;, he was assigned, with Chou En-lai, to negotiate with the Chinese Nationalists in Chungking; 3 he was again made president, and.replaced Mao as political officer, of the Yenan military academy; and he was elected the sixth-ranking member of the central committee

5 Lin was sufficiently recovered fromto take command of the best of the Chinese Communist forcesrive into the Northeast. He again commanded brilliantly, and8 his forces occupied all of the Northeast. Again he got on well with the Russians, but his loyalty was still to Mao. Mao's confidence in Lin was expressed again during the Communists' drive into South Chinahen Lin became the only regional military commander to be named concurrently the regional party chief. Praised by the official party history above all other military leaders, Lin would probably have been named Minister of Defense9 if his health had By the end1 he appeared to be totally incapacitated, reportedly with tuberculosis- Although he apparently did not return to full-time activitye wasice-chairman of the party's Military Affairs Committee (MAC)nd named to the party politburo

Byhen he wasice-chairman of the partyember of the politburo standing(the most important partyin. stood higher in the central party leadership than did the then Minister of Defense and de facto chairman of the MAC, Peng Te-huai. By that time, capable of limited activity, Lin wasworking with Mao in asserting some of the doctrines and shaping some of the policies which were to proveto Moscow. In Lin's field, this entailed aof Soviet military doctrine and practice and the imposition of Mao's concepts from guerrilla days as the central.concepts of strategic doctrine. It also included assignment of major non-military tasks to the armed forces. In the summerroup led by Pengadvocated more orthodox programs of military and economic

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development and compromise in thehowdown. Lin stood firm with Mao. Peng was purged ln September and Mao named Lin Minister of Defense and de facto chief of the MAC with the task of getting the STlltary back into line. His newmade Lin the regime's dominant military man and one of the top five or six leaders of the party.

The "Best

On his appointment as Minister of Defense, Lin published his first major article. In it he made clear his identification with Mao, defending Mao's principles of army-building and army-party relations (especially party control and "pelitics innd pledging the PLA's "unconditional" allegiance to Mao personally. As Lin was to prove.in the Cultural Revolution, Lin's loyalty was to Mao personally, rather than to an abstract "party."

Early0 Lin Instructed the PLA to memorize the most important passages in Mao's works, "even though you do not understand them." (Lin was later, during the Cultural Revolution, toimilar order with respect to Mao's directives.) Lin at this time began to be described as Mao's "best pupil."

By0 Lin wasajor role in the campaign to defend Mao's abiding concepts and to relieve Mao of responsibility for the fiasco of the Great Leap Forward. One of Lin's contributionseview,inf some of Mao's writings, in which Lin defended Mao against domestic and foreign "revisionists." Inter alia, Lin endorsed the "paper tiger"the West would be afraid to use its nuclear weapons and therefore could be aggressivelythe concomitant article of faith that the Communists could attain power in many countries through "people's wars" of the Chinese type.

The strategy for preservingnfallibility

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campaign, in which heoctrine of the "four firsts" hailedcreative application" of Mao's thought. These "firsts" made politicalthe key to success, and made party cadres in the PLA fully responsible for transmitting Mao's policies to the "masses" and for Interpreting the response- In other words, Mao's policies were always correct, and failure could come only from stupidity, obstruction, or sabotage. This was to prove the rationale for the great purge of the party ln the Cultural Revolution.

During the retreat from the extremes of the Leap Forward and the commune program, Lin informed the troops correctly that Mao's doctrine and practice allowed for occasional retreats when forced by the real world to make them. He told them. Indeed, to study Mao's way of holding hard to reality. Andin himself showed an ability to take sensible steps to enhance the regime's military-preparedness and to restore PLAmeasures as giving priority to military training over non-military activities, increasing army rations, and improving the lot of servicemen's families. Suchto reality led some observers to think of Linpragmatic" leader.

He was,edicated Maoist. It was at that) that Lin compiled the selection offrom Mao's works that have since become famous as the Little Red Book.

In2 Liu Shao-chi, long Mao'sas his successor, reportedly criticized at asome basic Maoist policies which Mao and Lindefending. Lin reportedly stood firmly withmay soon thereafter have begun to think of Liu asreliable, of Linossible successor, andPLA as an alternative to the party as the realhis

In an2 party meeting, Mao reportedly expressed strong criticism of the way Liu Shao-chi's party apparatus had been conducting its work, while

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the "socialist education" campaign soon thereafter, Mao was applying to the Chinese society the extreme methods of political indoctrination perfected in the PLA under Lin And in3 Mao Issued his explicit call to "learn from theirecting all non-military organizations in China to emulate theoperational and ideological training methods of the PLA. Lin was out of sight for most of the period2ut apparentlyto the emulation campaign- By4 he was helping to establish military-type politicalin government organs, and was telling the PLA that it was hard but essential to understand Mao's thought.

In4 Mao made known his concern with the problem of "revolutloriarynd reportedly asserted that there were "conspirators" throughout the party apparatus. In other words, he declared hlato purgeevel then uncertain. He presumably felt able to do so because he nowolid base of support in Lin's PLA. Lin remained out of sight, reportedly sick, but the build-up of Lin in the Chinese press increased.

It was apparent in5 that party leaders had found renewed opposition in the PLA to the emphasis on "politics" and its expression in doctrine,and training. Lin, apparently recovered, returned to the news in the springnd his hand seemed visible in some of the measures takenbolition of ranks) against "bourgeois" military thought. The task of publicly refuting this opposition was at first left to some of Lin's deputies in the MAC who were later purged as part of the opposition, butong article of5 Lin came on strong as Mao's defender and exegete. He again stated his personalwith Mao's principles of army-building (especially the primacy ofnd of Mao's concept of "people war" (luring the enemy ln deep) for the defense of China-Lin also endorsed again the concept of "people's war" as an offensive doctrine, asserting that the developed areas of the world would eventually be encircled and _docu.:ia.tec bv..the under-developed areas, as his own forces

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had surrounded and captured the cities of Northeast China. Un may not have believed everything attributed to hia in this article, but he was willing to identify himself so completely with Mao that he would be doomed if Mao were to lose the coming showdown in the party. At about this time, Mao spoke of himself to visitorsilitary man who took other militaryhis lieutenants.

The Designated

Inn was among the few party leaders informed of Mao's plans for an offensive against his Lin's PLA newspaper took the lead in November in describing anas the symbol of all opposition.toa "poisonousnd Lin told the PLA that it must regard Mao's works as its "highest instructions" in everything. Lin went south with Mao to an East China sanctuary in late November, and he is now known to have taken the lead in December in summoning there the first group of leaders to be purged.

In6 Lin again told the PLA that Mao's works were supreme directives and that "everything he says is the truth." In February Lin began what was to be an ambivalent and difficult relationship with Madame Mao as another watchdog over the PLA. He invited the militant Madame toationaleurge of the PLA. in the same month, according to Lin himself, he moved troops into Peking to frustrate the plans ofconspirators. Throughout March and April, Lin wrote and spoke on the need for an ideological revolution; in May, Maoetter to Lin ordered the PLA toery great role" in this revolution, and revealed his concept of the new Chinese man as an omnicompetent -worker-peasant-soldier. Also in May Lin made the key speecharty conference which officially launched the Cultural Revolution and confirmedurge of the party and of the PLA was underway. Describing Mao as the greatest of all Communists, the man who "always

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understands" and is always right, Lin again threatened Mao's opponents, many of whom he knew to be present.

In the early summer, PLA cadres were used to guide and incite extremist students conducting the "revolution" in the schools. After Liu Shao-chi and others had fallen into Mao's trap by attempting to suppress this Maoistentral committee plenum met in August and under duress approved Mao's plans for an officialRevolution and Mao's choice of Lin Piao as "deputy supreme commander of the entire party." Again Lin made the main speech, showing himself to be identified absolutely with Mao, to think of himself entirely as Mao's instrument, and to be ready to take the blame for "mistakes" that were really Mao's. Lin called for all party cadres to be judged on the criteria of whether they were or were not avid students of Mao's thought, devoted to ideological-political work, and militant activists. He said again that there was much-ln Mao's lofty thought he could not understand, but that he would nevertheless carry out Mao's directives, asking for clarifying "instructions" on everything but recognizing that he would inevitably make "mistakes" for which he must accept the This line socn appeared ln simplified form as an exhortation to thecarry out Mao's policies "whether we understand them or not."

In the same week, Lin told PLA leaders that the PLA was to be Judged by the same harsh standards applied to the party. In yet another speech, he associatedemphatically with Mao's long-range vision ofmen'snd of developing productivity by this means rather than by providing material incentive. He said he recognized opposition to this approach, and made clear that he was also prepared to use force if necessary. On another occasion Lin defined political power as primarily the "power to suppress."

Lin spoke for Mao at the mid-August rally which unveiled the Red Guards as an instrument for attacking the party apparatus, and spoke again at the next two rallies. Lin was militant on all three occasions, telling the

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for discovering Mao's opponents, whoa they were then to strike down. By aid-September, Lin was telling ailitary audiences that Mao's works shouldercent" of Communist classics, and that Mao was the world's "supreme genius" and the greatest man known to history. Calling on military schools to purge themselves, he-again presented Mao's thought as the only beacon needed for such an exercise. Events were soon to prove that such guidance was insufficient.

Purging and Relying on the PLA,

Inin made further preparationsarge-scale purge of the PLA. AC directive ordered PLA cadres who encountered statements or actionsMao's thought to report the event to higher levels, no Batter how highly-placed the offender waa. At tbe samepecial group was set up to conduct this purge, andto please Mao--named or accepted Madaae Mao as the dominant figure of this group. Lin at this time,praised the accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution in intensifying Mao-study, exposing Mao's opponents, revolutionizing Chinese society on Mao's lines, and producing reliable "revolutionary successors."

Lin ln late October again Bade the aaln speechod-level party aeeting- Speaking authoritatively and without apology as Mao's first lieutenant, Lin again praised the Cultural Revolution and the role of violence in it, and outlined Mao's plans for continuing tbe Lin again stated strongly his identification with Mao's longer- tern objective ofew,party cadre toew Chinese society.

In November, the militant Madame Mao began, towhether Lin's PLA was "loyal" to Mao, and Lin allowed her to take the public lead at this time in purging the LA. She began by attacking Lin's senior deputy on the MAC, and Lin soon joined in.** In the next few weeks Lin and the Madaae purged several high-ranking officers of the central ailitarythe chief of

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the PLA'a special group for the conduct of theseveral of the top officers of the regional military Most of these men had probably resisted theas charged, and Lin proved willing to sacrifice them even though some were old comrades.

In7 the PLA newspaper suggested strongly that the purge of the PLA stillong way to go in order to make it "truly loyal" to Mao. eek, however, Mao's recognition of the inability of the Red Guards to replace the existing party apparatus made it necessary to send the PLA into action as anof the Revolution and thus to postpone any further purge of it.

Onanuary the PLA was ordered to support the "genuine" leftists and was authorized to use force against force. In other words, the PLA was to install the young Maoists as the supervisors of new revolutionary organs of power (first callednd to restoreew days, Mao and Lin directed the modulation of the Cultural Revolution the PLA Itself, clearly to avoid further disruption in their essential power base.

Lin himself emphasized the task of supporting the Left, but he again, as with the Red Guards earlier, failed to provide clear guidance. In practice, the PLA moved quickly to restore order and toe factoapparatus in the name of the Left. IrPFebruary, Peking calledew type of governing apparatus: theof "revolutionary committees" composed of PLAacceptable party cadres and representatives of mass organizations, which would act as provisional organs of power at all levels.

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By March, it was evident to Mao and Lin that the PLA had not, ln general, actedevolutionary force. Lin himself apparently went on an inspection tour in March, and concluded that the PLA was mishandling the young revolutionaries- In late March he again toldaudiences that great disorder was necessary to bring down Mao's opponents and produce reliablend_that authority was being..withdrawn from theI

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units were to act only on orders from above- This was the first of several times in the Cultural Revolution that Lin was to rebuke and restrict the PLA for taking conservative positions*

Lin at this time first expressed displeasure with compilations of passages from his speeches on the ground that they falsely gave an Impression that heody of thought apart from Mao's. He also admitted that hla health was bad and that neurological damage restricted his activity. Peking no longer admits this-

During the springeriod of greatly Increased disorder following the restriction of tbe PLA, Lin sometimes showed Home sympathy for the military men, but he continued to make clear that his first loyalty was to Mao. For example, he named to key positions some of his close military colleagues who had been denounced by radical Red Guard groups, and he defended others against Red Guard attacks, but he did not appoint or defendin Mao's disfavor. Similarly, he criticized the excesses of mass organizations as well as unauthorized actions by some military region leaders, and ln June he gave the PLA responsibility for putting an end to various Red Guard offenses; but if he attempted to induce Mao to give the PLA authority commensurate with thishe fAlled.

Lin and the PLA

Lin responded quickly and harshly, in7 and again in to two affronts to Mao by PLA leaders. In both periods, renewed violence by massand representations from PLA leaders caused Lin to moderate his threats to the PLA, but in both periods Lin made clear that heard, Maoist line in shaping up the military establishment and rebuilding the

The first affront came ineaat ions around China to settle

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local arguments. The Wuhan commander refused to accept instructions sent by Madame Mao and permitted certain mass organizations to beat and detain members of the The central leaders recalled and purged theofficers and called for the purge of anbad "handful" ln the PLA.

Linart of this tough response. peech to regional military leaders assembled in Peking in early August, he reiterated his favor for creativearned them against emulating the Wuhan commander, and called on all military leaders to admit and correct their mistakes. He told them that mass organizations would be classified not in terms of their attitude toward the PLA but solely on the basis of whether they supported Mao or not. He emphasized that the military were to getfrom central party'leaders, not act on their own. On the same day, Lin acted on Madame Mao's call to "arm the to give arms to selected masswhich might use them against the PLA.

Tn supplementary gestures of loyalty to Mao at that time, Lin ended press references to the "thought of Linurged one of his own longtime proteges (Hsiao Hua) who headed the General Political Department, and made Mao's daughter the acting editor of the PLA

As mass violence rapidly increased, Mao and Lin were forced to retreat. That is, they were forced to recognize again their dependence on the PLA, and they took measures calculated to please military leaders. They dropped Madameworst Xxiend ofAfrom the special group conducting-the "revolution" In the PLA. They formed another group to assist military units ln handling mass organizations, and named ato head it. They used Madame Mao to reverse and repudiate the line of late July and early August which had threatened the PLA with another large-scalehey gave theew directive authorizing it to use force against some kinds of offenses. And they purged some second-level civilian figures who had been heavily involyecL_ivjLth radical masA-JXTRanlzations which

By November, however, Mao had begun to worry againin springthe fate of his youngand Madame Mao made two speeches which were taken, not unreasonably, aaesumption of violence and of attacks on the PLA. Lin did not directly Incite the young militants, but during the winter he reminded the PLA that he endorsed Mao's advocacy of "struggle" in all aspects of life and that he would never let "personal friendships" stand in the way of the He also told three new political security organs set up by the MAC that their tasks were to saturate the PLA with Mao's thought and to investigate the PLA's leaders once again, as the central party leaders did not know whom they could trust. In this connection, Lin told another audience that they could trustall cadres should be placed under constant observation.

The second affront to Mao arising from the PLA came ln aae which is still puzzling, Yang Cheng-wu, Lin's chief-of-staff and the MAC-level supervisor of all political security organs in the PLA, was suddenly purgedrightist". The Immediate cause of his fall waa allegedly hla effort to arrest somepersons whom Madame Mao put under her protection. Lin was again quick to throw bis old comrades and proteges to the wolves when they had come into Mao's disfavor. Despite the overwhelming record of bis fidelity to Mao and of Mao's confidence in him, Un may have been worried about his own position. In the late March meeting which surfaced tbe affair, Lin diasociated himself from Yang and was obsequiously deferential to Madame Mao. Yang was replaced by another longtime protege of Lin's who, although representative of conservative military men, was regarded by both Mao and Lin as loyal.

Following the purge of Yang and two other senior officers charged as confederates, Lin was prominent ln the new offensive against the "rightists". With Madame Mao and others, he sharply criticized certain militaryra for conservative attitudesFtOwmrd mass organizations. Lin even returned to tbeiscredited since the previousthe needurther purge of the PLA.

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Again, however, as in7 andhe young revolutionaries of mass organizations went too far. By July, violence was so widespread, and the young were so scornful of directives, that Mao and Linpressed by PLAdown hard. Lin relayed the order to PLA commanders which permitted them to suppress and dismantle che most violent and disruptive of the mass organizations. Lin did not suffer, however, for having acted in generalrotector of mass organizations. That had been Mao's position too.

With the last of the provincial "revolutionary committees" formed rapidly, in orderly conditions, in August and September, Lin spoke for Mao on National Dayctober). He defined the main task of the next stage as that of carrying outthroughout China. Most important were theof the "revolutionaryhepurge of the loser levels of the party, and the rebuilding of the party ln accordance with Mao's call to "take in-new blood."

Later inentral committee plenumthat Mao's various guidelines and Lin'sthe course of the Cultural Revolution had beencorrect." out-Maoinglosses suffered in the Revolution as "very,and the gains as "very, very great." ew party constitution whichLin to become Mao's successor without antestifying both to Mao's continuing favor forto his lack of confidence that Lin could winthrough.

a*'i?

The Ninth Congress and9

the early monthsrior to the Ninth Party Congress, it became apparent that the Maoists in Peking were dissatisfied with the operations of the ^revolutionary committees" throughout China. The PLA

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these committees were being excessively coercive toward the mass organizations and insufficiently attentive to the rehabilitated party cadres. In other words, the military were mishandling both of the other components of the revolutionary committees, and the whole process of rebuilding the party was going badly.

The Ninth Congress in April was billed as afor "unity and victory." Mao opened the sessionpeech on the need for "unity." Lin, as the designated successor, made the main report, expressing confidence that the great majority could be unifiedandful of enemies. As Lin saw lt, however, the main practical problem was to ensure that theparty leadership at all levels was in the hands of true Maoists. It is uncertain whether Lin realized that his statement of the problemenewed emphasis on the role of revolutionary massat the expense of the PLA. The published report did not Indicate that be did. In fact, the reporthole was defensive, vague, and unhelpful,oor show for the successor.

The new central committee that emerged from the Congress was large and fairly representative of the new structure of power. It named Mao and Lin as its only officers andew polltburo. Theull (voting) members of the new polltburo seemed to fall into three groups: "Mao's" group of eight (including Lin aa the only militaryll of them people who had been closely associated throughout the Cultural Revolution and identified with itamilitary" group of six active military leadera, who could also be regarded as "Lin's" group because all six bad long been given special aigns of Lin's favor; and an "unaligned" group of seven government leaders and inactive elders around Chou En-lal. Although Mao's group and Lin'sgroup dominated the polltburo, therealance ln the polltburo in terms of predisposition to radical policies veraua predisposition to conservative ones, with some of Lin's proteges among the conservatives- The Maoist radicals hadarrow edge If any. The radicals did much better ln the polltburo standing com-

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It consists of four Maoist radicals (including Mao and Lin) and one relative moderate (Chou).

There was room for improvement in Lin's position with respect to central party organs. Tne politburohole was hardly an embodiment ofpart from differences in temperament between the civilian radicals and the military men, organizations dominated by the civilians had often been in actual conflict withdominated by the military, and there was bad feeling between them. The polltburo standing committee was dominated by radicals like Lin but Lin himself was the only Lin-man on it, and it was the standing committee that was to set up the rest of the central partyincluding the political security organs. It was uncertain whether Lln_could shape as he wished the party apparatus which he was to inherit.

After the Ninth Congress, to Judge from fragmentary "instructions" attributed to him, Lin began toole inolicy stated by Mao to the first plenum of tbe new central committee. In this late April speech, Mao in effect subverted the cause of "unity" by once again upgrading the role of revolutionary massdespite all the trouble they had got him into. Mao apparently asserted that conflicts among mass organizations and among the leaders of revolutionarycould be resolved by more politicalthat the PLA component dominating most of thecommittees should not use coercion against the civilian components, and that more representatives of mass organizations should be taken into the committees and into their party core groups-

While Mao and Lin were off togetheresort ine-emphasis on the role of the masses led again to an increase in factional violence and to the disruption of the revolutionary committees and the process of party-rebuilding. In August and September, Peking's concern-about the possibilityoviet attack apparently ledecision to authorize the PLA to use theforce to restore public order. However, the party press has since made clear that Mao and Lin remain deter-

in the revolutionary committees and their party core groups, despite the certainty of further disruption. In Lin'sational Day pronouncement, he again called for carrying the Cultural Revolution through to the end, and made clear that he remained committed to the full range of Mao's objectives.

Original document.

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