SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES (NIE 11-3-69)

Created: 10/2/1969

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Soviet Strategic Defenses

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

AWTIZE0

OIRECTOR OF CENTRA! INTELUGENCE

Cwcwiwd in byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Al iftdkotad9

Authenticated*

Page*

- SECRETARY/UfilB

N?

TOP GLXRCT

The following intelligence organizations, participated in tho preparation ol thii estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agamy ond th. inielligence organ! laKoni ol lh* Deport ment! of Stole ond De'rnio. iho AEC. ond the NSA.

Concurriog.-

wrvnon. Jr_ USMC. iho Oopviy Director ot Central Intelligence Mr.ha Aciing tWacftX ol iracAgence end Reteonh. D.

I of IM

It, Cam DoooW V.he DaajOBK, DVeme Intelligence Agency

Vice Attn. Noel Gayier.Director. Not*ool Security Ageocy

Mr.rown,ha AuiHonl General Monoger, Atornk Energy Corn-minion

Abstaining;

Mr. WiHEom C. Sullivan, iho Aiiiilonr Dlroclor, Federal Bihbuu of Invnitlgotlon Ihe vubject being ouitide of hii jwriidiclion.

CONTENTS

PROBLEM

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

I. SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE POUCY II. AIR DEFENSE

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A. forces Tlirougli

Air Surveillance and Control Systems

Intercept on

Surface-to-Air Missile J

IS Capabilities Through

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Agufrul tlie Medium- and High-Altitude Threat

Against tke Low-Altitude Threat

Againit thc Standoff Threal

In An Electronic Counter-measure Environment

Future Capability

C. Forces Through

MI MISSILE DEFENSE

Warning

Moscow System (ABM-1)

Other Missile Systems

C Development and Future .

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System Development

Other Possible Devefcjpments .

ABM Deployment

IV. SPACE SUBVEIU.ANCETT SATE LI JTE DEFENSE

V. CIVIL DEFENSE ..

Cfttf-

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic air and missile defense forces throughnd to estimate general trends in those forces over the nextears."

CONCLUSIONS

the postwar period the USSR hai devoted ato strategic defense. This effort can be attributed primarilythe and diversity of US strategic atiack forces, although forthe Sovieis must consider the threat posed by thirdChins.

A'u Defense

Soviets have deployed inormidable system ofwhich is very effective against subsonic andat medium and high altitudes. The system is lesshigher performance aircraft and standoff weapons, it hasno capability against penetration beloweeta few, limited areas.

present, the major effort is directed against the Uircathigh-performance aircraft and standoff weapons. Tneonsiderable improvement over older systems inrange, velocity, and firepower, is being deployedarrieraround the European USSR and for point defense of selected

mk, uW lurfH mats*W*in th. USSRMm Europe. TU Soviet .Mih it, (mpLutJon, for Fohri. wiD be ducuned b, ft*

targets. Tliere arc aboulperationalomplexes and wc believe thatomplexes will be operationaln addition, the Soviets arc deploying supersonic, high-altitude interceptors. Tliey have an airborne warning and control syslcm (AWACS) in limited operation. This system, whnn used in coastal areas and with long-range interceptors, could greatly cxlcnd thc area in which incoming aircraft could be engaged.

cope with low-allitude attack the Soviets haveinterceptors wiih improved capabilities, and they areto deploy therimarily along thc Black Sea andapproaches. More advanced radars, SAMs, AAMs, andsuited for low-altitude defense will probably beprimary limitation on low-altitude defense, however, isand control. Through thc dense deployment of new radars,have improved tracking capabilitiesew areaseet and even below, bul wc do not expect themsuch deployment to large areas of tlic USSR.

Ballistic Mittilo Defense *

missile early warning and initial tracking wouldbe provided by large, phased-array dual Hen House radars.operational in the northern USSR arc intended primarily tolaunched from thc US. Tliey also provide some coveragePolaris threat from the north and northwest. The Sovietstalce steps to provide additional early warningICBMs, against Polaris, and against the Chinese missile threat.

Moscow ABM systemnder deployincnthas achieved some operational capability. Apparently thewill deploy only about half as manyaunchers asplanned. Thc launch sites still under constructionlie Soviets aro probably also making somein the ABM-1.

M.j. Ceo. John F. Fretind. Acdn* let lhe AiibUnt Chiel of SUIT for Intelligence. Dep.it-menl ot (lie Army,.tiiM M. Plillpotl. (he Aiii.Unl Chief of SUB. Intelligence, USAF. eomider (Jul (hit lection uraJereiUriutei the Soviel mUOIc deleo* (ABM) capability. Pot their vlew^foocnol* on

C. Our analysis of thc Moscow system indicates that, as presently deployed, it willimited defense of thc Moscow area, but that it has some weaknesses. It appears to have little ability lo handle such sophisticated threats as long chaS clouds and certain othetaids; the small number of launchers and the apparent limitations of thc fire control radars make die system highly susceptible toand exhaustion. Ils capability to deal with nuclear blackout is probably not high, and none of the system components appear to be hardened to withstand the effects of nuclear bursts. Finally, thcsystem is primarily an anti-ICBM system; it provides long-range radar coverage ofart of thc multidirectional Polaris threat

beheve lhat lhe Soviets areollow-onLike the Moscow system, it will probably be designedexoatmospheric intercept; it could becomeeriod. We have no evidence that the Soviets area short-range intercept system comparable to the USihey do, it would probably not begin to enter service before

still have no evidence of ABM deployment outside thearea; any extension of ABM defenses will probably awaitof thc system now under development The logicalin any future deployment would be to augment the defensesThe extent of deployment beyond Moscow willupon economic as well as technicalational defense systemcale sufficient to copefull US missile threat does not appear toeasible coursefor the USSR within thc period of this estimate Wethe Soviets will deciderogram that would providelor thc most important target areas in the USSR. Some partdefense would probably be deployed against Communistoilier third country threats.

Anti-satellite Capabilities

J. With existing radars and missiles armed with nuclear warheads, the Soviets could almost certainly destroy or neutralize current US satellites in near earth orbits during an early phase of their mission.

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imited capacity to intercept US satellites,ully operational

Wilh terminal guidance, they could probablyon-nuclearto neutralize satellites. During the last year we have seenthat the Soviets may beo-orbital anti-satellite system. Neither inspection nor destruction operations have beenidentified, but the activity observed seems more applicable an anti-satellite mission than any other. This system now probably

capability is not likelyISCUSSION

I. SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE POLICY

oviet strategic defense forces have gone through several stages ofsince World War II. Through the'i tlte Soviets attempted to counter tlie large US strategic bomber force with large numbers of airradars and interceptor aircraft, reinforced at Moscow with Urge numbers of surface-to-air missiless the US force obtained higher perforrnance intercontinenul bombers, tbe Soviets In the1 developed and deployednterceptors and extended SAM defenses throughout the country. When thc US, In the face of this extensive defense, began practicing low-altitude peoe-Uation tactics, thc Soviets began in thos deploying thc Firebarand lheoth possessing better capabilities for fow-altitude intercept than earlier systems. Trie US deploymenttandoff capability wiihmissilesas followed by Soviel deployment of the Fiddler interceptor and tbeystem and development of the Foxbat inlorocptor, all of which have greater ranges than earlier systems.

n their efforts toefease in being against an immediate threat, the Soviets have generallyystem quite early in the development cycle, using available technology, rather than wait for the development of more advanced bul unproven techniques. These systems have then gcncially been modified and improved during the period of deployment. In some cases, however, deployment has been canceled early in die program ellher because tlic system proved relatively ineffective oretter one was in tbe offing When an improved system has been deployed, older ones are not rapidly retired or re-placed. The Soviets tend lo have extensive defenses deployed in depth, usually with considerable redundancy. This redundancy may give the defensesreater capability than analysis of each weapon system alone would indicate.

3 Soviet military planners undoubtedly estimate that the three major element* of US strategic altackASMs. inlcrconiinentalnd submarine-launched ballistic missilesmore sophisticated and formidable wiih thc incorporation of improvements:

multipleS

new aircraft. ASM i. aerodynamic and ballistic penetration aids, and pendently-targeted re-entry vehiclesoreover, lhe weight of aattack would be increased somewhat by (be strategic forcei of Britain and France. Fot the period o' this estimate, the US and its allies will continue to pose the principal stralegic threat lo the USSR.

l is difficulteasure lhe degree of tension whirh exists between the Sovicl Union and Communis! China but it has become apparent that Soviet mili tary pUnncrs must be concerned with the emerging Chinese strategic ihrcal. Tlie Soviels arc continuing lo strengthen lhcir defense posture along lhe Chinese border. The Soviets appear lo be pacing Iheir defensive poslureis Chinaate which they believe matches lhe Chinese offensive capability. Thus, we do not anticipate any major defensive shift within the nexl few years.

he Soviets probably judge that the massive air defense forces Ihey have built and are building will provide an effective counter to Ihe medium* and high-attitude bomber throat, bul that the problem of low-altitude defense is not ye( satisfactorily solved. The moil critical requirement of Soviel stralegic defease, and the one most difficult to meet despite moreecade of effort, however, is defense against ballistic missiles. The nature and extent of furtlier anti-ballistic missilo (ABM) developmenl and depigment is almost certainly one of the major questions of Soviet militaiy pohcy.

oviet decisions as to how best to meet tbe strategic dtreat of theill bc affected not only by thc Soviet view of the threat and the pace of technological development, but also by the constraints of economics. The present Soviet leadership haseneral disposition to accommodate militaryand miliury expenditures have continued to rise. Moreover, within tlie military establishment strategic defense has longavored position. We estimate that Ihe Soviet strategic defense effort is larger, bolh in absolute terms andhare of the local mihtary budget, than that of the US.9 for (fw stralegic defense mission arc eslimaledillion rubles, aboutercent of the total outlays for defense and space. For the near term, al least, expenditures for strategic defense will probably lie maintained at tlic present level, while military expenditureshole continue to rise. The trend for thc longer term will depend heavily upon Soviet decisions concerning ABMthe most costly single military program oo theand the related question of strategic arms control. We have not considered the effects of any arms limitation agreement in this estimate

II. AIR DEFENSE

oviet strategic air defense foice* are suboidinale to the PVO Strany (Anti-air Defense of Ihene of thc major Soviet commands. They are com-poied of three major eUments, which carry out air surveillance, interceptor, and

SAM operation, TW forcer arc deployed throughout the USSReographical divisions and snrrdivisions linked by multiple communication, channels. Wc believe that the major division, areir defense districts (ADDs) which are subd.vidcdomeir dc.emsc roneslthough most of the latter are further divided into sectors fo. aireillancc purposes,control over all three functional elements olefense forces is almost certainly eaercised primarily at the ADZ level

n addition to Ihe lo.ee* directly assigned to it. the PVO Strany abo exercises operational conlrolefense element, of the general purposeuch times a, those elements are required for chlensc of ihcn Eastern Europe, air defense of the Soviet forces rests with the local air defenseefense of each Warsaw Pact country Is thc responsibility of thai country. Both, however, co-operate with tho PVO Slnmy in the USSR and in effectestward extension of Soviet air defense. Wiih Soviet assistance Mongol* has established an air defense syslem which probably is also closely co-orUnated with the PVO Strany. We believe that cooperation between the air surveillance systems cf the USSR aod Communist China bas ceased.

he command, control, and communicatrOrii network of PVO Stranyigh degree of redundancy. flexibility, and reliability. We believe that the semi-automaticsurveillance reporting system inoodoeed overears in ha, been extended further throughout thc USSR, to thc Croups of Soviet Force, andumber of other Warsaw Pact countries. We estimate that some three-fourths of the ADZ, now employ this system in varying degree, and that it will

"Cincluded in

uring the past year the Soviets haveumber of passive air defense measure, aimed at improving thc survivability of their ai- defense forces both in the USSR and Easternlie interceptor force these have included camouflage, dispersal, and construction of tenement* aod hardened

shelters.

A. Forces ThrotiQh

Air SoryciWanco and Control System*

he present Soviet early warning (EW) systems can detect aircraft at altitudes well above the combat ceiling of any cu.rcnl o, planned US or NATO combat aircrafl. We continue to estimate that thereadar sites improved data and further analysis lead us to believe, however, that there are

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fcuropein Oncral Puifxnr Komi*

dividual radars instead ofstimated weviously Coverage ii particularly dense wtn ol ihc Urals. Soviet sues are supplemented byites coolaining0 radars in Ihe Warsaw Pactastern Europe. The density of radar coverage improve, ihc likd.hood ofand frequency diver si Beat ion also piov.des delense against electronic counter-measuresn addition the Soviets have an Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) in limited operalion. which will extend iheir radar coverage.

c believe lhat radar surveillance ships subordinate lo the Soviet Nnvy on ouasion provide rada, tracking data lo PVO Strany facilities. Although these ships ue not routinely deployed, we believe that dala from such vessels could bc made available lo air defense centers as needed.

Inleiceplars

ighter Aviatioo of Air Defense (IAPVO) has the primary mission of air defense of the homeland. We estimate theand cornpontion of IAPVO over the neil few yens as followi:

ESTIMATED INTERCEPTOR FORCE LEVELS

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MODELS

MODELS

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In addition, there areighters in Soviet Tactical Aviationn ihe East European countries of the Warsaw Pact, most ofircraft were dengned as interceplors andf Ihem are in fighter regimentsrimary mission of air defense of the theater forces.

boutercent of the Soviet Interceptor force in IAPVO is still made up of subsonic or low-supersonic models introduced7 or earlier which have little capability0 feet. Mosl of ihese are day fighters limited to atlack rangesalf-mile or less. Someercent of lhe force consuls of the Fishpol.ll-weather interceptors Introduced4 most of these are armed will, air-to-air missiles (AAMs) having ranges. and capable of tail attack only.

Ii The remainder of the force is made up of new all-weather interceptor,Fiddler, aod Flagonhave entered servicehose

nrc capable oi ipceds of from Hbou(rh 9

he combal ceilings of these aircrafl range00nap-up technique with the new AAMi. tbey are capable oftargets at much higher altitudes. Hie Firebar i> deployed primarily for defense against low-altitude penetrations and can perform cllective all-weatherfrom both head on and tail attacks al altitudes down touel. Tlie Fiddlerombat radiusm. and can carry out attacks from any angle Used in conjunction with an AWAC syslem the Fiddler could provide an improved defense against the standoff threat. Thes the fattest Soviet interceptor in service; designed for point defense, it providesreaction time and intercept capability against supersonic targets at medium and high altitudes.

ew interceptor, tlie Foibat, Is one of the most advanced aircraft of its kind in the world. It has an estimated maximum speed of about Machceiling of0upersonic combat radiusegree attack capability. We believe that Foibat is now in series production, and that it will enter service next year.

Surface-to-Air Missiles

IS. Tiicystem, deployed more thanears agoouble ring around Moscow is still operational Under normal conditions, the Sovieiskeep onlyercent ofauncheritate of readiness. In lime of crisis, however, wc believe0 percent of tlie launchers could be made operationally ready. There ore indications that nuclear warheads are available at someites and that tlie systemuclear option.

IS. Thes thc most widely deployed SAM in the USSR. While additionalites were identified during the past year in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, we believe the deployment of the system was essentially complete by the ende estimate (hat there arc nowperational sitesunchers each in thc USSR, and thai there arenoccupied sites which are probably intended to provide alternate or supplementary positions during periods of emergency. Most of tlie OperaUonal sites arc occupied by PVO Stranybutre probably manned by the air defense troops of thc ground forces. We bcliovc that Soviet ground forces havedditionalattalions in garrison in the USSR and someeployed in Eastern Europe. The air defenses of the East European countries includeites manned bv national

it* initial employment, llieasera) mode)have progressively increased it, maximum eriectlve range, improvedand minimum Intercept altitude capabilities, and given it betterand electronic counter -conn tame us uie (ECCM) capabilities Inare indications that sometcs Isave nuclear as well asavailable.

estimate that in the past year, deployment of the kow-altitudecontinued at an average rnte ol five starts per month There arcperationalites nnd somenoccupied liter. Thehas been primarily along the Black Sea and Baltic Seasonic has probably occurred in the Soviet Far East- Thereeployment into Eastern Europe during the past year. Wethat deployment of theill continue lor at least two more years.

eployment of theong-range SAM system has continued during the past year. We estimate that there arc now tomeomplexes, of whichre operational. The system is being deployedarrier defense around the European USSR and for point defense of selected targets. We believe that most If not all of Ihe identified compleies will be operational by

heouldudear warhead capability, but we have no evidence lhat such Is the case. We believe that thes equippedoming guidance system, androximity fusing system. This manner of guidance wouldigh probability of killonventional warhead.

B. Copobilities Through

Against Ihe AWivm- ond High-Ahftudo Threat

oviet air defensesormidable capability under all weatheragainst subsonic and low-supersonic (lew than Mach IS) aircraftto penetrate al medium and high altitudes to principal target areas. Moreover. Soviet ca[>abilities against higher performance targets are beingby Ihe inUoducDon of new interceptor, and lliender optimum conditions, where detection and tracking ii limited only by tlve radar boriroo, the Soviet ground-based EW systeman. from Soviet borders. Under normal operating conditioni detection and tracking at medium and high altitude is virtually assured oul loan. The detection range of the ground-based EW system is progressively reduced against aircraft penetrating ataltitudes, primarily because of linc-of-siglJ LrrdUtions.

lie Soviets have continued testing of their AWACS that could considerably extend their coverage over the sea approaches to the USSR. This system uses the Mossodified Cleat transport)latform for long-range radar surveillance and for the data processing and communication, for interceptor conlrol. We

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estimate that0 1Heats have beenmodified Additional Cleats mayconvertedave beenut we have no evidence lhat this

it being done. Other transport aiicraft could alio be modified for the AWAC system.

resent AWACS aircraft normally operate. from the coastline of the USSH. and it may be that the system will be operationally employed in this manner. Such operations would provide overlapping coverage between shore radars and the AWACS radar (whichange of, facilitating control of the interceptor aircraft and extending the range at which aircraft using, the sea approaches could be detected. Tlie area and frequency of search would, of course, be limited by thc number of AWACSavailable; extensive deployment of the system would denyarge extent undetected low-altitude penetrations over the sea approaches. We believe the Fiddler, Fuebar. and Foibat wiU be employed with AWACS aircraft. We believe that lhc system could handle as many as eight or nine interceptorsime.

Soviet interceptor force has good eapabililies against subsonicaircraft at altitudes0 feeL Its capabilitiesat night or in adverse weather cooditioos, by attacks at lowerby standoS attacks, and by attacks using decoys and ECM. Presentintercept capabilities against maneuvering supersonic targets Hyingof over Machand at altitudes0 feet remain marginalarc being improved with the continuing deployment of Flagoo AFurther improvement will be realized with deployment of Foibat.

SAM systems provide good medium- and high-altitudesubsonic and low-supersonic aircraft and ASMs under all-weatherTlieonsiderable improvement over older systemsof range, velocity, and firepower. We estimate that it is capable ofaircraft and ASMs traveling at speeds up to aboutndeet The maximum effective range of this system itthe order of. for ASMsan. for aircraft. We believewarheads are available at somendites, and they mayprovided for die SA-S; such warheads, of course, greatly increase

Against fhe low-Altitude Throat

tlie Soviets are well awarr of thc low-altitude penetrationtheir nlr defenses, Soviet efforti over the past year have again resultedimprovements but not in any fundamental solution to the problem. InSoviet efforts, the primary limitation in low-altitude defense continues toand control. The capabilities of the Soviet air defenses toaircraft or ASMs flying at low altitudes decline with thc altitude, andlow altitudes are limited by the line-of-sight ol ground radars and byofarget and interceptor through ground clutter. Cenerally.

TOP fiF-THFT

In Eastern Europe, the western USSR, and lhc approaches Iu major military -industrial centers, lhe air surveillanceapable ofon-linuom track on aircraft flying down toeel. In areas of less dense coverage. Soviet radars are unlikely lo bc able to accomplish continuous track-ingoot.

he Soviets have continued the deployment of radars on towers which improves line of-sight coverage of targets at very low altitudes. These radars have some capabibly to detect moving targets againsi ground clutter. Tliey areestern USSB and Eastern Europe. Where deployment isdense, tracking capability i> probably somewhateet; ineningrad area il may bc as loweet. Future deployment of this sort will probably be limited to likely approach corridors, we do not expect them to extend such deploymenl to large areas ol the USSH.

n recent yean we have detected improvements in the AI radarsby Soviet fighters. These improvements provide some capabililyround clutter environment.nterceptors (Firebar) in IAPVO probably now have an intercept capability in all weather conditions downeet over favorable terrain (and somewhat lower overn clear daylight the older model inter oeptoes, still opera bona! in large numbers, would also bc used for low altitude area intercept ur-der visual conditions against slower aircraft. Aldiough we believe the Soviets are workingook-down capability for iheir interceptors, we do not expect an operaUonal capability before

mproved guidance radars and in some cases their emplacement on mounds have given tlicystem of thc type deployed in theapability down toeet. In addition, analysis of the SA-3has led us to believe thai under favorable circumstances including optimum acquisition this system can intercept lircrafi aleetangem. Depending on lhe actual conditions of wcadier, site-masking, elevation of the fire-controleed and reflective area of thc target, the minimum altitude could be as loweet at rangesan. We have no technical evidence concerning thc low-altilude capabilities of Ibe SA-5system, but doubt that it is suitable for use at low altitudes.

Agairttt the Standoff Threat

iddler. Flagon A, and Firebar presently have some capability lo inter-cept ASMs but lo do so, tliey require precise ground control. Ooly Fiddler lias the range capability at present to intercept the ASM carriers before they come within ASM range of Soviet borders. Tlie deployment of die Foxbat interceptor along with lhc already operational Fiddler, together wiih AWACS aircraft and possibly with picket ship EW and CCI. will extend Ihe areas in which ASM

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carrier aircraft can bc engaged as much as several hundred miles farther from critical target areas. Thc SAM barrier defenses will cause the attackers to face an increasing volume of defensive fire as they approach their objectives. Tlieange of. will greatly increase the probability of intercept of supersonic aircraft at medium and high altitudes. Should the ASM earners successfully launch their missiles, theystem is probably capable of intercepting incoming ASMs at medium and high altitudes at distances as great ashile theould do so at ranges-

present air defense deployment besl protects tlic Soviets againstthreat directed at European USSR from the north and northwest.apparently more vulnerable from the south, but arc improving theirFiddler deployment andoint defense of military-industrialwill improve defense in the central and eastern USSR. We believeSoviets wiU bc able to provide thc entire European USSR with goodcurrent ASMs at medium and high altitude within the next few years.

In An Electronic Covntermcaivrc Environment

The use of ECM can appreciably degrade the performance of air defenses, The Sovietsreat deal in in ECM environment Even olderarc known to have some ECCM capability. Newer types such as Fiddler use more sophisticated measures and are probably immune to jamming by most current western AI jammers. There is evidence that new higher frequencyand) AI radars have been introduced in Tactical Aviation; this change may also have been made in the IAPVO- We believe that the new Soviet interceptors now being deployed are equipped with infrared and semiactive missiles and with data link for CCf. both of which improve their capability in an ECM environment.

All Soviet SAM systems arc designed to operate in an ECM environment. Virtually alln the USSR have been provided with improved fire control radarand)etter ECCM capability. About half theattalions are now equipped with tho latest variant which probably provides even better ECCM capability and slighdy greater range. Wc expectndystems to incorporate similar improvements.

Future Capability

planners almost certainlyiverse aerodynarnic threatand NATO forces to continue well into. Tliey probably seeducat ranging from low-altilude subsonic speeds up totand an ASM threat at supersonic speeds and at both high andTliey probably consider tliat thc deployment of the Fiddler-MossFlagon A, the Foabst. and theill deal reasonably well with the

^OP-SFCRFT-

n and high-altitude threat posed by both aircraft and ASMs. Out they must bc coneurned about the requirements (or adequate au defenseCOO feet Wc believe that they will continue tu exert major eHorts inn an attempt lo meet thutncnt.

tchaticc on close CCI is the main limitation on llseirdelcnse capabilities. This approach requires the controller toan almost continuous track on both attacking aircrafl and intctceplori.lo maintain thc track, ground radars muit be closely lpaeed. whichobservedmall areas of the USSK. Moreover,argetargets is involved, short identification and evaluation time pose arapid communication and dala processing which is probably beyondof die system. We expect the further Soviet developmenl oftechniques specifically designed to handle low-altitude penetration inbut we foresee little Sovicl improvement in ground-based conlinuouscapability at low altitude for large areas of the USSR.

improvement in low-altitude intercept capability could he achievedairborne look-down radar than can both distinguish and trackagainst ground clutter togetherompatible AAM. Newprobablyimited ground duller suppression capabilily,liue loo;-down capability. There are some indications that lite Sovietsa radar with an airborne overland look-down capability and aAAM. bul wc have not detected such systems, and believe,they would not be operationalhe firs! interceptorthese capabilities will probably be the Foabat; however. Foxbat ishave an AI radar and an AAM of existing types when initially deployed

n order to utilize interccptois most cffidcntly against low altitude targets, tlie Soviets would need an AWACS radar capable of detecting targets against ground clutter. Although we do not know the state of development ofystem in the USSR, the Soviets could deploy an operational system in the. Tlie SovieU could also develop and deploy an advanced all-weatherruise interceptor with llie range of Fiddlerook down shoot down capabiLty; however, to date,rogram has not been detected. Wc doubt thai such an interceptor could become operational.

C. Forces Throurjh

lthough lhe capability of new air defense radars will increase, the need for low-altitude coverage will coniinue to require much overlapping, and the number of radar sites will probably remain substantially at the present level. As new radars with grcaier reliability and frequency divcrsilic-tion arc inuo-duced, however, die need for redundancy at each site will decline. Older radars

will probably be pruned oul faster than new unci aie introduced, and the number of radars will gradually decline over thedecade

he Scvied have in tbe part kept larger nomberi of the older model in tercepton in service longer than we expected. moreover, tension on the Sino-Soviei border may encourage this practice. Even so. as new intaccplors arc being deployed in increasing numbers, the need for extremely large numbers of aircraft for strategic defense should diminish. Wc estimate that the numbers

of Interceptors in IAPVO will decline to about three-fourihs of the present level5 and to between one-half and two thirds of the present level

The overall capability of the force will improve during tho next decade even

though there is this decline in the number of aircraft.

he current inventory of SAM systems in thc USSR provides good medium-and high-altitude defenses against both aircraft and ASMs. Improvements In thc low-attilude capabilities of current SAM systems have probably approached thc limits of these systems. To further improve low-altitude SAM capabilities, the Soviets would probably have toew system with technology specifically tailored to this purpose and deploy itew purely low-allitude SAM system sliould possess notetter low-altitude capability than tho presentystem but provide increased range capability at low altitudes. Such acou'd probably be deployed in thes,upplement rather thaneplacement (ox the existingystem. To date, however, there is oo evidenceoviei development program lor any new tow-altitude strategic SAM system, although there is continuing testing and development of tactical SAMs.

We believe the Soviets will continue to deploy theo as to provide forward defenses oo the likely approaches to ihe industrial heartland of thc European USSR,ocal defense of key targets and selected majoi cities throughout (he USSR, llased on this deployment concept, we estimate thatomplexes will be operationalf the Soviets should decide todeployment of thenotheromplexes might lie operational

The continued introduction of higher peifonnance interceptors and SAMs, together widi the rapid data transmission requirements of low altitude intercept, will impose increasing burdens on Soviet air defense communications command and control system. We believe the Soviets will extend the CCI and SAMdata system to all ADZs. We would expect further Soviet attempts to improve the capacity, flexibility, nnd security of air defense command and control communications. Improved data systems would significantly increase Soviet target handling capability and these are probably being deployed or incorporated into the air defense system. The addition of such multiple sensor control and rapid updating of tracking dala would be consistent with llie introduction of higher performance weapons und automatic control systems.

P s

lhc newer fighters continue to enter thc interceptor force, wea control system sufficiently sophisticated toegree of "handsconfiol will be deployed on thcnd latera system would permit these interceptors to operateontrolledallowing close coordination of inlciccpto. and SAM operations.continue to have no evidence ofoviet system,

III. MISSILE DEFENSE '

believe that PVO Strany also has tho mission of defense againsimissiles and space vehicles, but wc have little information on commandThere isentral conlrol agency for ballistic missileits location is not known. Possible locations include tlie Dog House radarNaro Fominsk and thc hardened command post at Monino, both near Moscow.

A. Early Warning

missile early warning and initial tracking would probably beby large phased array dual Hen House radars. Two of these, oneon the Kola Peninsula and the other at Skrunda In Latvia, areprimarily to cover ICBMs launched from the US against targets inUSSR. They also provide some coverage of thc Polaris threat fromand northwest, but coverage in thc direction of thc Mediterranean isThe Soviets will probably take steps to provide additional earlyagainst (CBMs, against Polaris, and against the Chinese missile threat.

' Mii. Cen. John F. Freund, Acting for the Assistant Chief of Stall for InteUigence,of (hend Maf. Cen. Jarnmie M. PhilpoW, the Assiit.nt Chief of Stafi. Intelligence. USAF, consider Out thb rection underestimates lhe Soviet motile defense (ABM) capability. They believe the slate of available evidence is rucri thai an ABM role cannot be excluded to. theTallinn) ryitern.

Because of lhe continuine unccrtaintiei in the development end deployment of lite system, lhe following minion and eapabililies nvuit be conildered:

it highly probable lhe ryitem war developed lo provide an atrnoiphericcapability againit medium- and high-altitude aircraft, air-to-iurtaceballistic missiles, and nbowine-launchcd ballUUchisii believed to be consistent with both the aoalyrli of presently observedand available evidence on ABM tefline.

is possible the ryitem also wai designed to enable exoaUnosphericinlcicepli, in which mode theould be dependent upon eatemalsuch as the Hen Mouse/Dog House type radars or some other long-rangecentralized command and control lyilem, and the use of nudear warheads.available neither confirms nor denier tlie eiislence or InterrelationshipscleirjenlsQ

is also possible lhat lheould perform endoilmosphcric Interceptlarger ItVi or ItVi accompanied hy tankage. In Ihiioming syslem endfuriog lyitein for llieould increase its cffcctivcnc&t.

.rcat.

Hen House

etection range

jigainst missiles launclied Irom thc US toward most targets in thc western USSH. There are some indications, however, Ihai suchigh degree of accuracy could not be achieved for large numbers of targets simultaneously. Moreover, the Hen House radars would probably be highly susceptible to blackoutuclear attack. These characteristics, together with the fad that these radars are solt and vulnerable, indicate that their primary (unction is toallistic missile attack. Thus, it is not likely that thc Soviets would rely on these radars for critical acquisilton and tracking informationissile attack was underway.

he Moscow Systom (ABM-1)

SO. Deployment of the launch sites (or the Moscow AltM syslemnderways probably ncaring completion. We believe that threearc now operational and lhat the fourth will be next year. Each complex basr-launchers. Thus, tbeystem wil!ola! ofubstantial cutback from thc level originally planned.

he primary acquisition and target tracking function for thc ABM-1is performed by the Dog House, another large, phascd-array radar. The Dog House Is less susceptible to nudear blackout than the Hen House, and its location within thc Moscow defenses gives it some protection against directattack. (2

It will probably be used lo control the assignment of targets to thc launch complexes.

The Dog House will provide radar coverage in two opposite directions. Thc northwest face is oriented toward the US ICBM threat; die southeast face, toward the Indian Ocean, Thc northwest face is probably operational now, and thc southeast face probably will bee believe lhat thc Sovicls areanother large phased-array radar near Moscow, probably to supplement the Dog House coverage.

The Ere control element of the Moscow system consistsarge radar and two small radars deployedroupryhere are two such groups at each of thc four launch complexes. We believe that the large Try Add radar is the final targe! tracker and that the two small radars track and control the interceptor missiles. The large radar receives its acquisitionfrom the Dog House^"

believe thai il can track only one, or aiery few targetsime, li may have some limited capabilily lo acquire targets. Each small Try Add radar can probably conirol only one interceptor missileime. Thus ihe systemhole, with ils eighl Try Add groups, could cope withmall number ol targets simultaneously.

Thc Moscow systemaximum effective slam range ol. II employs the Calosh interceptor missile which is launchedanister. The system i* apparently designed loefire capabilily: reload lime isabout IS minutes.

Wc coniinue to believe that thc Moscow system is intended forintercepthermonuclear warhead. Recent analysis suggests lhal thc Calosh warhead maymaller yieldIn cither case, however, the Dog House at its operating frequency would be susceptible to tlvc nuclear blackout effects and thcys'em would be dependent upon the Try Add and tlie Dog House radars with reduced

3

5V. Thc foregoing analysis of Ihe Moscow system indicates that, asdeployed, il willimited defense of tlie Moscow area, but that it has some weaknesses. It appears to have little ability to handle suchthreats as long chaff clouds and certain other penetration aids; the small number of launchers and thc apparent limitations of the Try Add radar make the system highly susceptible to saturation and exhaustion. Its capability to deal with nuclear blackout is probably not high, and none of the system components appear to bc hardened to withstand the effects of nuclear bursts. Finally, Ihe Moscow system is primarily an anti-ICBM system; it provides long-range radar coverage ofart of the multidirectional Polaris threat.

Other Missile Syttcms

c still have no evidence of ABM deployment outside thc Moscow area. Evidence acquired during Ihc past year lias reinforced our judgment that the

ong-range SAM system and that It is liiglily unlikely to have any present ABM

t would bc possible lo ildapl or convert SAMs, MRBMs, IRBMs. or even ICBMs lo an ABM role, although this would derogate Iron, or negate their effectiveness in their primary role. To weld large numbers into an ABM system, however, would be another matter. The main problem would bc command and control, especially the provision of timely acquisition and tracking data. The Hen House and Dog House radars remain thc only ones available for Ihe latter function. The vulnerabilities of thc Hen Houses have already been described, and additional requirements would be placed on the Dog House, busy with tho demands of lhe Moscowystem. Moreover, any command and control system which would be theoretically adequate would be exceedingly intricate and costly, and its reliability under operaUonal conditions would at best be questionable. For these reasons we think it highly unlikely that the Soviets would find it advantageous toignificant ABM capability based on any of Ihese missile systems.'

C. Developmenl and Future Deployment

System Developmenl

Current development activity will probably bring some improvement in thenhe Soviets began testing an interceptor missile that isodification of the Calosh; it could bo available as early as next year. Other elements of the system presently deployed at Moscow may bowe doubt that they will be replaced.

Wc believe that the Soviets areollow-on ABM system, building upon their experience will, thc Moscow system and its technology. Such evidence as we have indicates that thc new system, will, like thec designed for long-range exoatmosphcric intercept. Presumably, this development is aimed primarily at overcoming principal shortcomings of Ihe Moscow system:

' IX Cen. Donald V. Bennett, the Director. Defense Intelligence Agency, agrees tint evidence acquired during the past yes, lupportj use judgment that theong-range SAM system. Allhough he believes the system is unlikely toresent ABM capability, he emphasiies that the state of available evidence does not permit cjdudmg this rjoislbaily.

' For the views of Maj. Cen. John F. Freund, Acting for the Assistant Chief of Staff tor Intelligence, Department ot lite Army, and Maj. Cen. lamrnie M. Fhilpotf. rhe Assistant Chief of StaB. Intelligence. USAF, lee their lootnote to Section III,

' Maj. Cen. lohn F. Freund, Acting for the AuUutH Chief of SuD (or Intelligence,of the Army, and Maj. Cen. Jatmnie M. Philpett, the Aisiit.nl Chief of StaS.USAF. believe this paragraph does not accurately evaluate the possible rate of SAMi in an ABM role. They believe that It Is possible (he Soviets would optual ABM/SAM system, even if this provided only marginalspecially io view of the factollow-ono theould not become operationalt tlie earliest. For their views on theee the footnote to Section III,

TOP- SECRCT

il* limited target- hand ling capacity and it, coil. Such iAIIM system could become operationally

Other Possible Onvefopmerifs

C2 Wu have no evidence thai thc Soviets arehoit-rangcsystemarable to thc US Splint. Wc have not detected anyigh-acceleration missile that is required for such aintercept. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviets willsee thc need to supplement their long-range defenses with such apoint defcnie Deployment o( such a. system could begin in thethat it would

probably enter service later.

e have no evidence now of an operational over-llie-horizon detection (OHD) system for detection of missile launches, and we cannot tell when or even if the Soviets couldufficiently reliable system to warrant deployment. Thc Soviets may also now be developing space borne systems (such as infrared launch detection seniors) which could be used in support of tlieii strategic defense force!

ABM Deployment

ecause of its inherent weaknesses. Il seems io us highly unlikely that there will be any further deployment of then iu present form. Any follow-on lystem the Soviets deploy will probablyreater tar get-handling capability. It is unlikely that there will be any large-scale deploymenterminal intercept system within the nextears.

he logical first step in any future ABM deployment would be tothe defenses of Moscow. The eitent of ABM deployment beyond Moscow will depend heavily upon economic as well at technicalational defense systemcale Sufficient to cope with the full US missile threat docs not appear toeasible course of action for thc USSH over the nextears. Programmed Improvements if- US forces and the potential threal fiom China, however, have almost certainly added to the alreadypressures to provide defenses for key targethc US decision lowith AIIM deployment has probably also strengthened these arguments. We IxliCve that llie result is likely toompromise, and that the Soviets will deciderogram lhat would provide tornr defenseost mi|ioM la'gel areas in the USSB.

easure of Soviet capabilities and willingnessommit resources, wc have examined major weapon programs of the pail Ior crumple, were thc Soviets loigh priority ABM deploy mem program to which they Hhttfllined resourcesate cumparahle to the most vigorous progiarm of the

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past, they would expend over an eight-year periodillion rubles {the equivalent of aboutf construction beganeployment program based on the follow-on ABM system under development would provideaunchers by thc end o( the period of this estimate. Ihis would be sufficient to provide some defense for most of thc western USSRew other critical target areas. The Soviets are capable ofarger number over tlic nextears, but considering economic and technical factors, as well as their other military requirements, wc think it unlikely lhat they will do so. Toward lhc end oferiod they may begin to supplement their long-range defenseshort-range, terminal intercept system.

IV. SPACE SURVEILLANCE AND ANII-SATELLITf: DEFENSE

he Soviets have been building an elaborate space surveillance system based upon Hen House radars. When completed this surveillance system will provide virtually horizon-to-horizon coverage. It will provide thc Soviets with the capability for rapidly detecting and determining the orbits of virtually all satellites crossing the USSR. These radars will probably be capable ofand tracking out toear-earth orbiting satellite.etection range would bcby radar horizon to. Thc system is apparently not deployed so as to achieve first orbit detection of all new objects, but most high inclination satellites would be detected on early passes over the USSR. If, as appears likely, (he Individual radars are netted so that (racking data can be integrated, the Hen House/Dog House network will be able to provide extremely accurate prediction of satellite position aflcr several tracking passes, which would permit intercept attempts.

sing existing radars and missiles, the Soviets could nowimited anti-satellite capability; they could almost certainly destroy or neutralize US satellites tn near-earth orbit during an early phase of theirafter the first few orbits but before the end of the first day. For die direct ascent mode, the most likely interceptor against satellites in near-earth orbits would be the modified Caloslt. Equippeduclear warhead, it wouldigh kill probability. With its terminal guidance it could probablyon-nucleartoatellite. Against higher altitude satellites (out to, thc Soviets could use currently operational ballistic missiles or space launcliers as interceptors; armed with nuclear warheads, these wouldigh kill probability. The Soviets, however, arc probably concerned primarily with satellites in near-earth orbit.

he Soviets may bco-orbital anti-satellite system. Sinceliey have launched severalie satellites. This program

'The piotonged (ll-year)rocurement program, which weal through several phases of equipment modification, cost marginally more; In llie first eight yean ol" Iu deployment. It cost less than four billion rubles.

TOP

couldumber of objectives, bui one- phase (involving, andwai apparently directed towardapabilityon-eo operating or passive target. Neither inspection nor destruction activity wai tpccincally identified. Nevertheless, ihii operation, which in- luded closeigh relative velocity. MM more applicable to an arMi-satellile miuion lhan any other. With currently operational radars and the maneuverable satellite system, lhe Soviets could probably perform selected intercepts of US satellites now,ully operational capability for inspection orwould noi be likelyfapalMlityovici objective, we would expect to see further testing.

The Soviet ability to interfere wiih sntellilcsin highly elliptical orbits or at synchronouss much more limited. The Soviets can probably acquire and track such satelliles by using their deep (pace tracking facilities.ossible that the Soviets could neutralize ot destroy such satellitesuclear weapon, but such aciion wouldostly and complex space operation. We believe, therefore, lhal If the Soviets seek to interfere with tlie operation of satellites in highly elliptical orbits or at synchronous altitudes, they wiD use some other means.

Soviet technical capabilities arc such that they could develop and deploy during the nextears any of several types of anti-satellite system) If they chose to do so. They could develop andround-based missile system similar to the currcnl Moscow system; In fact, any further deploymentong-range ABM system could be adapted for use in an anti-satellite role. They could be exploring techniquessing lasers or electronic interference) for theneutralization of satelliles. These techniques might utilize mechanisms on the ground, in the air. or in spaoe.

We believe, however, that tbc Soviets would realize that any use of anti-saleliitc systems in peacetime would risk opening their own military support sysiems lo retaliation. Tbey probably would attempt to retaliate against our satellites if ihey believed that we were interfering with theirs. It Is also possible that they would aitempt to neutralize US military support systems li thoy thought that war with the US was imminent, lint they would probably judge that Mich action would be regarded by the US us partore general attack, and we doubt that they would undertake such an effort prior to the initiation of hostilities.

V. CIVIL DEFENSE

Sovietsthen- civil defense program as an Integral part ofdefense effort. This program is controlled by the Council olthc Chief of Civiloviet marshal, whoorps ofmilitaiy staff officers for the day-to-day operation and co-ordinationprogram. Sluff officers are assigned to all levels of Ihe Soviet Government. All

or most o! these staff officers are active duty military personnel; operational civil defense units are manned largely by civilians.

key part of the civil defense effort is training. Selected personnelfor roles as commanders, specialists, and instructors in (he civilTlie general population is instructed in weapons effects, aod inrecovery, and shelter construction teduiiques. No other countryits people as thoroughly on the effects of nuclear, biological, andweapons. Soviet citizen? now are engaged in the sbtth compulsory civilinstruction programnd civil defense has become ain elementary and secondary schools throughout the country.also participating in compulsory training. An extensive network oftrains leaders for civil defense duties. The effect of all thisbe measured, but its pervasiveness has probably conditioned most ofto follow orders and take self-help measures in an emergency.

The Soviet concept of civil defense calls for mass evacuation of urban areas before an attack. Blast-resistant shelter is scarce and Is-considered tooto buildarge scale, although some shelter construction IsThe concept of evacuation presupposes adequate advance warningeriod of rising tension or non-nuclear war. Key personnel and workers on shift fn Important Industries and services would, however, remain In place, and Soviet civil defense officials have claimed that some hardened shelters are being provided for them. The evacuees would disperse Into the countryside by every means of transport available. Extensive plans have been made to handle the logistics of this operation and some evacuation and dispersal exercises of limited scope and participation have been reported. However, while the Soviets do have the capability toortion of their urban populationhort period of time, the feasibility of an expeditious wholesale evacuationquestionable. Transportation couldarticularly acute problem because of competing military needs and Inadequate facilities. Even if the urban dwellers were successfully evacuated, thc problems of providing fallout shelter, food, and medical services for them would remain. Soviet civil defense htcraturemuch attention to techniques for building earth-covered trendies,tliat the Soviets intend to rely heavily on this land of last-mlnutc preparation. There Is little evidence that materials have been stockpiled in thc countryside for shelter construction.

Rural participation in the Soviet civil defense program has long lagged behind that of the cities and industrial enterprises, However, over the past two years the Soviets have stepped up dieir efforts to improve thc civil defenseand capabilities of the rural population.8ll rural rayons have been required to establish demonstration courses And metliodological centers fot civil defense training. During this same period, there hasarked increase in rural civil defense propaganda, seminars, baihing sessions.

and practical caerc-iies. These activitiei have covered aid lo urbanreparation of fallout shelter, and protection o( wiier supplies, crops, andfrom (lie citedi of nudeat attack.

ivil defense preparedness are being advocated by high levels of llie parly, government, and the military, and there seems to have been some increase in the amount of resources being made available. In addition, civil defense stab's appear to be eierting greater pressures on local admirsistralors and factory and farm managers lo force Ihem to act on their legal lesponsi Dili lies for planning shelter spaces, securing stocks of emergency supplies and equipment, and for organizing and equipping operational units Some lootdiagging. however, continues in implementing civil defense measures in industry and rural areas, and among the general public civil defense encounters little enthusiasm.the unusual public endorsement of civil defense elloits by Brezhnev atd Party Congressenewed emphasis on civil defense. Since then. Ihere haseneral rise in the level of dvil defense activity in the USSR.

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