Created: 9/9/1969

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Soviet Strategic Attack Forces

L 1




Al'lcol 9 September 9



The following intelligence organizations participated In tha preparation af this estimate

Central Intelligence Agency ond the inielligence orgonliolroni ol 'no Depart-me-Oi ol Stale and Detente, iho Af C. ond the NSA.


U. Gen. ft E. Cwhmon,SMC, Ihe Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Mf, George C. Donney,he Acting Director of Intelligence ond Detoarch,meet of State

It. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, tire. Director. Defame Intelligence Agency

Vice Adm Nool Goykr, the Director, Nolionol Security Agency

Mr.rawn.ho Aieslant General Manage. Atomic Energy Cora-


Mr. William C. Sullivan, "he AwUlant Direcior. Federalot InveiHgailon, rha tvbrict being oWiideurisdk>lon.


TTi'n n'BUi* il iihIiiii in!oima-ion offecting Ihc National Defense of the Untiedtho meaning nlhTili lf|. theor revelotlon of which in any manner to| rrnHP'tj






MEMORAhJDIJM FOR: Recipients of

Extreme Sensitivity of,

"Soviet Strategic Attack: Forces"

Disseminationuse be carefully limited because of Uie extreme sensitivity of the information therein.

In thisish to stress that there be absolutely no reproduction of this Estimate, and that no revelation of its existence be made ro unauthorized persons.

Richard Helms Director












New 12

Fuiure Force Leveli and Composition17


Ballistic Missile Submarine80

Present Status 20

Weapons System22

Future Force levels and

Bomber Forces



Future Force Levels and 24




Recent 28

Future MRBM/IRBM Development* 26

Futurevels and Composition 27

C Diesel-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarines

D. Medium Romber/Tanler Forces 30

Present 30

Aircraft and Xlissiles in

Future Force Level* and Composition




TABLE II: Strategic Missile Systems for Peripheral Operations TABLE III: Sub*narine-UuQcl>cd Balliitic Missile Systems TABLE IV: Bomber aod Tanker Aircraft TABLE V: Air-tc-Surfaco Missile Systems

APPENDIX I: Views of MaJorCeneral Jammle M. Philpott, thc Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, on hardness of Soviet ICBM silos.




To estimate the strength and capabilities of Soviet strategic attack forces throughnd to estimate general trends in those forces over the nexlears.


Our estimates of Soviet military capabilities are organized on lines which lhe intelligence community and users of the estimates have for some years found useful. This organization is in terms of the mission to be performed rather thanm in is Ir alive subordination. Thus, for example, the elements of the strategic attack forces are variously subordinated, the pertinent missiles to the Strategic Rocket Forces, the bombersong Range Aviation, and the missileto the navy. This method of treating Soviet forces is basically the same as that being used by DOD in US military planning, although there are differences in detail. Moreover, wilhin thc category ofattack forces, which is thc subject matter of this estimate, we have been accustomed to distinguish between forces forand those for peripheral atiack.

It should be recognized, however, that this organization is somewhat arbitrary. The line of distinction between the various categories isuzzy one. and is becoming rnore so. For example, cruise missile submarines (which we deal with as general purpose forcecan, if the occasion warrants, be used to attack strategic targets near enemy coasis. Strategic ballistic missiles can be employed in sup-


port of theater force operations. And fighter bombers or missiles of less than MRBM range are plainly suitable for attacking strategic targets in Eurasia.

Similarly, as shifts in the international situation occur orar progresses, the assignmenteaponarticular category can lose validity. The need of the hour dictates that any weapon system that can fruitfully be brought to bearpecific target should be used. Thus, today's strategic weapon may be tomorrow's tactical one; witness thc only combat use toave thus far been put Accordingly, though we continue to treat the various Soviet weapon systems within' the categories already established, it must be recognized that any given system may have other uses as well.


Soviel Sfralegic Policy

several years, the primary objectives of Soviethave evidently been toore formidable deterrentovercome thc US lead in capabilities for intercontinentalwhile the Soviets remain inferiorumbershey have overtaken the US in numbers ofICBM launchers. Current programs will bring furtherin die USSR's strategic position, already the mostthe postwar period. But the Soviets face in the future achanged and complicated by projected improvementsfoices and by the threatostile China with an emerging

can make only the most general conclusions as to theSoviet strategic policy over theear period of thisthe absence of an arms control agreement, Moscow willcontinue to strengthen its strategic forces, giving 6rstin the recent past to the forces for intercontinental attack anddefense. Although we have no direct evidence of Sovietwe believe that the Soviets will seekinimum something



that they can regard as rough parity with tlic US; it is equally possible that they will seek some measure of superiority.'

force* for Intercontinental Attack

Soviets have built forces for intercontinental attackinflicting heavy damage on the US even if the US were toMost of the ICBMs and all of the submarine-launchedare best suited for attacks on soft targets. Thes thewith the combination of payload and accuracy to attackeffectively, but in its present numbers with singlecould attack no moremalt percent of the US ICBMUSSR's capability to attack hard targets, however, is likelyconsiderably over the nextears. The Soviets willICBMs of greater accuracy. They are now testingvehicles on therid though the purpose of these testswe believe the Soviets will introduceapable ofhard targets. If the multiple re-entry vehicle tests arethe developmentimple MKV.ystem could reachthis year. If on the other hand they arc aimed at thea MIRV system designed to attack Min uie man silos asparagraphf the text, IOC could not be achieved beforeA highly accurate MIRV system or one employing moreRVs probably could not be developedlthoughmight be delayed until as late as thes.

In the recent past, the Soviets have sought tostrategic positionapid buildup in the numbers ofIn the strategic situation that is emerging, qualitativethose related to accuracy, survivability,limitation, and the ability to penetrateMoreover, thc number of launchers will probably become

1 Pur lhe view* ot Mr.enney.cting Direcior of Intelligence end Research, Department of State; Vice Adm. Noel Cnylcr. thc Director, National Security Agency; anden. Jammie M. Philpott, the AsO-tanitan. In tell igc nor. USAF, see their footnotes to

'See tlie Clossary for definition of MRV and MlflV. In this estimate, the woriD "multiple re-entry vehicles" include both MRVs snd MIRVs.


ror SEcafct-

less significant in Soviet calculations than the numbers and kinds of re-entry vehicles. Considering current deployment activity and the probable phase out of olderoviet ICBM force ofaunchers appears toinimum. Depending upon itsand thc extent to which it is supplemented by other weapons,orce could in our view be consonantoviet policy aimed either at rough parity or at some margin of advantage. Other factors, however, such as concern foroviet decision not to deployubstantial delay in Soviet MIRVry for superiority, or even the momentum of military programs could push these figures upward by some hundreds of launcheri. We cannot now estimate the maximum size of the force which might result from such pressures.1

Weapons. There have been extensive-flight teststhink are related to developmentractionaletroflred depressed trajectory ICBM, ordual system to perform both missions. We have observede still think the chances are better thansome version of the system will be deployed. Until ourmore conclusive, however, we cannotonfident estimatethe type of system being developed, when it could becomeor how it might be deployed.

Ballistic Missile Sub' ballistic missUe submarine continues; some fiveare now in commission. In addition, the Soviets may. submarine-launched ballistic missile. Wc continuethat thc Soviets areuclear-powered ballisticforce which will be roughly comparable to the USby the.

' For livef Mr. George C. Deooey.ctinn Director ot Intelligence and Bciearch. Department of SUte; Rear Adm. Daniel F. BerKin. fo, the Acting Director. DefonteAgency; Brig. Cen. DcWIIt C. Arrnrtrong, III. for theChkf of Stall forDepartment, of thc Army; Bear Aani. Frederick J.he Auutant Chief of Naval Operation! (tntrllig

the Auiitont Chief of StaH, Intelligence. USAF. *ee their footnote! to pangrnoh

Bombers. The Sovicis still haveand tankers in operation. We have no evidence that anybeing produced for Long Range AviRtfon, and weunlikelyew heavy bomber will enter service. Hence,the heavy bomber force will probably be largely deactivated.4

Forces for Peripheral Operations

strategic forces for peripheral operations consistof MRBMs. IRBMs, medium bombers, andmissile submarines. In addition, the Soviets aresome short-range ballistic missiles and some ICBMsin Eurasia. These forces are arrayed for thc most partand in massiveemphasis that willThe conflict with China, howcyer.has posed newfor strategic forces. These can be met to some extent byexisting systemsombers andut there willbe some additional deployment of strategic missiles against China.

L Within thc period of this estimate, the MRBMs and IRBMs now in service will probably be completely replaced. Our evidence of new missile development is scanty and inconclusive,m solid-prorrellant missileissile of longer range (upeem the likeliest possibilities. Wc project an MRBM/IRBM force ofaunchers, supplemented by additional short-range missiles and ICBMs. The medium bomber force will probably decline from its present level oft seems highly unlikely that any new diesei-powered ballistic missile submarine will be built.

' Foe lhe view* ol Msi. Cen. lammie M. Philpott. theChief o( Staff.SAF. see hi* footnote* to paragraphs

'For the vtcwi of Mai. Cen. Jammlc M. Philpott. lhc Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. tee his footnote to Section IU D.





The primary objectives of Soviet strategic policy evidently have been toore formidable deterrent and to narrow and eventually to Overcome the US lead in capabilities for intercootiDental atiack. These goals were prob-ably set in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, when the US enjoyed such superiority as to put thc USSRolitical and psychological disadvantage. At that time, Soviet leaders probably calculated that forces poised against Europe were adequate for any likely contingency and that the smoldering dispute with China posed no new requirementstrengthening of the border guard. Thus, the forces for intercontinental attack and for strategic defense could be given first priority.

esult, the Soviets haveonsiderable change in thcsituation. There can be no doubt today concerning the credibility of the Soviet deterrent. And while thc Soviets remain inferior in total numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles, they have overtaken the US'in numbers of operational ICBM launchers, Thus, in only five or six years, the Soviets have emergedtrategic situation which they evidently considered threatening to their security and damaging to their prestige.

The political situation has changed even more drastically over thc past several years. Relations with China have deteriorated to the point that major hostilities could occur. It is dear that the Sonets now regard Chinaajor threat to the USSR, and they apparently see this threat as active,and of long duration, Thc Soviet military buildup in the Sino-Soviet border area has primarily involved the theater forces, but there have been somedevelopments in the strategic forces. Substantial Soviet forces will almost certainly be stationed on the eastern frontier for the foreseeable future.

At Ihe same time, the Soviets probably sec no diminution of their military requirements in other areas. Indeed, in Europe, where Soviet troops still occupy Czechoslovakia, the requirement for theater forces has ifgrown. And although the danger of war with theparticular,S surprisein the Soviet view probably receded, the US remains Ihe USSR's most formidable opponent. It constitutes thc principal obstacle to the growth of Soviet influence in world affairs, and it alone has the military power to severely damage the USSR. In short, the Soviets only five years ago faced two major military problems: the strategic capabilities of the West and thc security of Eastern Europe. Now thereostile China with an emerging nuclear capability.

nder thc present leadership, military expenditures have continued to rise, primarily as the result of the continuing development and deployment of stra-



legic forces, which account for about halt of the total military expenditures. This increase plus increased allocations for thc consumer arc squeezingmbility to invest in the future growth of the economy. Now. events ia thc Far Hast and in Europe have posed new military requirements. Thus the perennial problem of resource alloc*boo has sharpened, and promises to sharpen further.

hough economic oonsideraljoni almost certainly were among tliereasons for tbe Soviet expression of willingness to discuss arms control with tho US. strategic considerations must have been equally compelling. In view of US plans for improvements to its strategic forces, the SovieUrccognizoarge sustained effort would be necessary to maintain the relative position thoy have now achieved. They may abo reason thatmodest increases io their strategic forces would not significantly enhance Soviet security while large increases wouldS response. Moscow's willingness to discuss strategic arms control piobably reflects the view that it has attained or is in the process of attaining an acceptable strategicwith the US. Moreover, Moscow may believe lhat even if an agreement could not be reached, negotiations would have the effect of damping down the arms race, perhapsonsiderable time.

Fuluro Goals

In the absence of an arms control agreement, the SovieU will abnost certainly continue to strengthen their strategic forces. As in the past, we have no direct evidence concerning Soviet goals for their intercontinental atUck forces In Ihe future- Furthermore, wt doubt lhat the Soviets themselves have set precise goals for the nextears. In the past, their strategic programs have moved in waves rather thanteady progression, and force goals have obviously been modified as the situation changed. The present site andof Ihese forces, deployment programs now underway, and Itftl)all provide useful indications for the near term.onsideration of thc factors that will shape these foiees over the longerpolicyUS actions, economic constraints, technologicalonly to the most general conclusions as tu the future course of Soviet policy.

The development of US strategic capabilities will probably be the most important single factor affecting Soviet decisions on force goals. The SovieU. for example, are surely concerned that projected improvements in USPoseidon. Minuteman III, andeiode their relative strategic position, and they must be considering how best to counter them. Their decisions will in turn affect developments on the US side. We cannot predict with any accuracy the end result of this interaction between US and Soviet strategic piograms over the nextears.



strategic forces built lo (Into fumUh some insighl into Sovietpolicy and objectives. The Soviet forces for intercontinental attackpiimarily for deterrence and, of course, foruclear warshould fail. They have Important darriage-linuting capabilities,of the ICBMs and all of the submaiine-Uunched ballistic missilesbest suited for attacks on soft targets. The sire of the forces forattack, however, considerably eicccdj that which the SovieU wouldthink necessary to deter the US from deliberate attack.

Political and psychological factors must have weighed heavily In setting thc force goals for current programs. An Important objective of their strategic policy has been something that the Soviets could regard as rough partly with tho US. We believe it will continue to be their minimum objective. Ihis docs not mean parity in each category of weapons; tbey are making no apparent effort, for example, to match the US In heavy bombers. We bellevo that in assessing the strategic balance the Soviets would go beyond numbers to consider qualitative differences in weapon systems and thc interplay between offensive and defensive forces.

If forces on both sides could be maintained at somethiDg like present levels,olicy might be attractive to the Soviets. It would be less costly than the strategic buildup of recent years, and could free resources for other pressing requirements. But, if the arms race should escalate sharply,of parity could prove very costly. Considering their other militaryil Is conceivable that in this situation the Soviets would settlearge assured destruction capability. Por the foreseeablehowever, we believe that tbey would be prepared to continue the arms competition with the US.

We do not attempt to estimate how far the Soviets might carry abuildup over the neatears. In evaluating future US sUatcgtcthey may concludeontinuation of their effort! on the current scale will be essential merely to avoid retrogressing from their present relative position. But there are undoubtedly pressures in Moscowtrategio policy aimed not merely at parity but at superiority over thegoes without saying that the marshals, and indeed the political leaders as well, would like toubstantial edge. Should they aim at superiority, it seems reasonable to suppose that their programs might still be limitedesire to slop short of forces lhat wouldS reaction. But they might either miscalculate or ignore the costs and risks involved in an indefinite continuation ofaims buildups. In any case, it seems bkcly that their programs willcease to consist primarily of the deployment of additional launchers, and instead will emphasize developments such as MIBVs. and qualitative improve-


mcnls such as survivability, capacity to penetrate defenses, andcapabilities."


forces to be discussed in this section are ICDMs, nuclear-poweredmissile submarines, and heavy bombers. Development of theseins. Deployment, however, was relatively limited untilwhen more effective and less expensiveICBMsavailable. Since that time, the buildup ofhas proceeded rapidly.


Thend theonstitute the backbone of lhe' Soviet ICBM. force. Although thes deployed in far larger numbers, lheanuch heavier payload, and is more accurate. Both systems arein hardened single-silo launchers, tben groups ofnd then groups of six. The olderndrc deployed in soft launch positions or in hardened triple-silo sites. All of the above systems use liquid-propellants. Thc newest Soviet ICBM. thc solid-propellants deployed inmall number of sdos af one of the SS Soviet ICBM complexes.

Our estimate of the numbers of operational launchers in tbe Soviet ICBM Force over thc next two years appears in fhe following table. Thc spreads shown in

' Mr. Ceorgc C. Denney.cting Director of tolelligenoe and Research. Department of State, considers that the general thrust of this paperurther stsiemcnl on the future Sovicluildup and thattatement should be made, lie believes that tbe SovieU would face ureal difficulties In any attempt to achieve ilrstcjlc superiority of such an order as to significantly alter the strategSc balance. In pailkular. tie does not see how they would bo able within the period of this estimate toapability tourprise attack against the US with assurance that die USSR would not itself receive damage it would regard asFor one thing, the cost of such an undertaking along wiih all their other mllhary comroil-ineoU would be enonnous. More Important. It would be estrcmel) difficult if not impossible for ihem to develop and deploy the combination of offensive and defensive forces nccesssry to counter successfully the vnrious elements of US strategic lorces as they develop. FlnaDy. even ifroject were economically and technically feasible Uie SovieU would face the prospect that thc US would detect snd match Or over.ii.lch their efforts.

dm. Noel Cavlcr. tho Director. National Seturity Agency, snd Mat. Cen. lainmSe M. Khilpou. the Assistant Oiief of Stall. Intelligent, USAF.hat it is more likely than not that the Soviets are seeking some measure ol superiority. The massiveffort and the pace of their deployment support Ui is vk-w. Son* visible nipeiiottty would provide the SovieU with advantaee in political affairs and greater leverage in crisis ccmfrontattont. They do not, however, believe the Soviets are seeking li* capability to limit any US nttne* to tolerable levels, as this capability is not feasible.


Ihc numbers ofndaunchers9 reflect our uncertainly as to the length of time required for launchers to becomoonce they are externally complete.



(Triple Silo)*






have in llw perl estimated lhat thru* lilts were designed to re main completely opetablc when eaposcd lo overpressures on lha ordersi. Studies aie now underway to dot* mi ine lhe most piobuble oveipictsures required lo tender them Inoparable. For the position of Maj. Cen.hil pott, the Assistant Chief of StaS.SAF, see.

ciiimatc Out thereilo at each of thendouipleies which tencsiew mining facility snd Is nor part of any group in dw men-pan.he SovietsompUied launchers and aboulther* under ronitru<tion at Tyontam and FVaetaa whichasaodaCa wiut ICBM de-vglapHWM and uoop training.bnliave that moat of thc above launched could be readied lo fire at tha US. We are unable to malt any valid estimate of tho lane requited to icady ihem, their reaction llmas, or the availability of mm.In for ihem.

ertain features characterise the Soviet ICBM forcehole: (a) the payload capacity Is high, primarily because of the large size of thob) all Soviet ICBMs have re-entry vehicles (RVs) with low ballistic cocfEcionts and large radar cross sections; the shape makes them less accurate and moreto detection and interception, but facilitates the design and packaging of nuclear weapons, and may make them more adaptable to hardening against the radiation effects of the ABMs attacking them, (c) the Sovieis probably do not plan toecond missile from hard launchers, but we believe that soft launchersefire capability, and are equipped with an average of two missiles per launcher, (d) we believe that Soviet operational ICBMs do not yet carry multiple re-entry vehicles although they are under development.*

"In ihll estunile, the words "multiple re-entry vehicles" include both MRVi and Ml RVs. See the Clouary definitions of MRV and MIRV.

IV. ThcS-S,nd lhcith its lighter payload0 pounds) have all been tested to ranges adequate to attack targets throughout the US from present deployment complexes. Theod tbearrying its heavy payload0 pouodj) have not. All these mbsiles, save for there estimated to have CEPs. or greater and are hence more suitable for use agaiast relatively soft targets.

s tested todate. the solid-propellaotasayloada range-his is insufficienttargets in the US from the ICBM complex where tbeso rangesame payload would be. sufBcieot to cover targetsa line extending from southern Oregon to Raleigh, North Carolina.not know what the maximum range of theay be.^

nly thehicharge yield as well as being the mostthe Soviet totercontinental missiles, is capable of effective attack onRecent analysis

suggests that the accuracy of theas been improvede previously estimated that the CEP of theell somewherepan. depending upoo the guidance technique employed. We now estimate that ils CEP lies toward the low side of this spread whatever guidance is employed."

hoith its heavy payload has been fired into the Pacificistance. These firings, however, took advantage of the earths rotation; on the same trajectories, but Bred north toward the US, thc range would be only. At this range only those missiles In the nearest

E.oviet ICBMs are normallyBred in an easterly direction. Thus the earth's rotation Increases the distance that the missile covers. The termh" ts used to define the rangeissile without the eflecls of ihe earth'*ehicle Bredrajectory over the pole wouldange about equal to the "non. rotaoOg-eatlh" rsnxe. Except where otherwise noted, the range figures in thu estimatel.E.

"Renr Adm. Daniel E. Bergtn. for the Actiiig Director. Defense Intelligence Agency; Brig. Cen. DeWHt C. Armstrong. III. for the AisiiUnt Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of Ihe Army; Rear Adm. Frederick J. HarlGnscr, II, ihe Asjislsnl Chief ofepartment of the Navy; and Maj. Cen. Jammie M. Philpott, the Assistant Chief of Staff.SAF. estimate that the CEP of theystem for present deployment it about. whatever guidance it employed. They believe that further improvements to guidance systems alone couldEP of. for the.


top occffcr

deployment complex could reach die US (except Alaska) and even they could reach only to the extreme northwestern comer ol" the country.

seems implausible that thc Soviets would develop an ICBM withso heavy that it could not reach important targets in the US. By

Tthcith heavy payload wouldjn. This would enable missiles launched from the deployment complex nearest the US to reachine extending roughly Irom San Fran-Cisco to Boston, within which lie five of the six US Minuteman complexes. With heavy warheads, however, mostould not reach that far. Finally

he range couldbe increased toll of tho Minuteman complexes fall within that range from at least oneomplex. Because of thc uncertainty in performance which would be.Involved wc doubt. however, that the Soviets would plan to use the missile in this" mariner without Bight' '

New Deve/bpmenfs

Soviets will almost certainly take steps to reduce the vulnerabilityre-entry vehiclesspecially in the light of the US decisionABMs. They are capable of developing warheads hardenedkill techniques. (

could have exoatmospheric penetrationear or so after thc initiation of flighterminal decoy program would probablyear or two more. We believe the Soviets would test these aids to ICBM range, and that we could identifyear or two before IOC

refinement in the CEP of ICBMs could be achieved byto guidance systems alone (perhaps down tom. forHowever, to achieve very high accuracy (on the order

"Bear Adm.o, ihe Acting Direclor. Defense Intelligence Agency,ssistant Chief ofntelligence. USAF. believe that theheavy) coe-Bgu.ed fo, operationalange capability up m.e, operational range could be achieved^

is feasible wtth no appreciable degradation of reliability.^

do not believe lhal the Soviets

would deploy itewively if ihey had doubt about iFreaching important targets in lhe US.

"Fo, the view, of Heat Adm. Daniel E. Bergin. fo, <heffueeneeg. III.the Chief of Slaff fo, Intelhgrnce Deputmeat of the Army; Reare.hli J. Harlfinger. II. the Assistant Chief ofperation,epartment of theJ. Ceo. lammie M. Ph.lpoti. Ac As.islnnt Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. see tlteir footnote lo

theould need new guidance systems and new RVs; wo do not believe they could make these improvementse are confident that we would detect and Identify their efforts to Improve accuracy during flight tests, although we probably could not determine the precise accuracy achieved.

Recentirings suggests that tho Soviets are either modifying this missile orariant of it.

urther data must

be collected and analyzed before wo oan better understand what is Involved.

A most Important Soviet development is already underof multiple re-entry vehicles. These RVs may be either Individually targeted (MIRV) or notssuming do arms limitation agreement to thc contrary, we believe that within the neat few years the Soviets will deploy. MIRVs. The evidence at present does notonfident estimate of the characteristics and capabilities of tbe systems which might be deployed, and especially of whether they mayapability against widely-separated targets, or only against those which arc fairly close together. In.the following paragraphs the evidence is discussed, and van owl options open to the Soviets are set forth.

Sincehe Soviets have conducted seven tests of theeavy payload containing throe separate RVs; the latest lest was onay tliis year. We believe that each RV weighedounds and couldarhead(7

In all seven tests the RVssimple ballistic trajectories, that is. they were not independently guided after separation from the carrier.

hese tests haveimple MRV. and it may be that this is all that they were intended .to achieve. When this line of development was initiated, which must have been several years ago. the Soviets were aware of the US development ol MRVs for the Polaris system and of tbe Nike-Zeus ABMimple MRV would have been an effective answer to tho Nike-Zeus, whichmall warhead and depended on the physical destruction of ils RV target. As lime went on. thc Soviets probablyeneral understanding of the planned Sentinel ABM system, but may not have understood the Spartan missile's different method ol

I If they did understand the Spartan's kill capability, they may have decided To go ahead with the system under development and try to improve ils capability for penetralion by hardening lhc warheads.

2fl. As tested to date, this MHV system would confront the Sprint element of tho US ABM system with three separate targets. It seems unlikely that the

RVj can be sufficiently hardened to present Ihe Spartan with the samebut in any case the defenders would have to judge whether any incoming objects that suivived had been neutralized. Exceptossible counter to ABM. however, thc system as demonstrated does not Improve Sovietto attack individual targets. In general, an ICBM so equipped would be no more effectiveoft target than oneingle large payload, and it would be less effectiveingle-hardimple MRV system of this type could reach IOC late this year.

n alternative system can be postulated and related to the currenttestwith sufficient flexibility so that variations in thepattern of the RVs would allow each to be targeted against closely spaced individual. Minuteman silos. In considering this possibilitY thc following points are pertinent:

a.echanism within the

ICBM itself is more sophisticated than necessary if this development were only toimple MRV. In this hyr>othesized system, variations in the size and shape of the impact paTtem could be achlevcdf"

jjto create the variety of patterns needed to target anyportion of the Minutemano that each Individual RV would impact within the required distance of the particular Minuteman silo which was its target.

b. The orientation of the impact pattern must also be capable of change to achieve Independent targeting. To do this the payload must be oriented properly either before launch or during powered Bight, prior to release of the RVs,f


c We behove that the Soviets would want toapability to varyshape, and orientation of the impact pattern, and that we willtesting if it occurs. The question Ihcn arises: were iho veryinintentional and

part of the tests, or were (hey random,^

3 On this point opinions differ. If the variations were intentional, this would indicate that the test series was indeed pointing toward development of the Independently targeted system we have hy-potheslzed in this paragraph; if they were not Intentional, the system would best bo interpretedimple MRV.

If the Sovicis are in fact aiming for the system postulated in theparagraph, it could reach IOC in0 at thc earliest. Further testing would certainly be required to develop the flexibility in spread and dispersal pattern needed forystem, and we probably would be able to Identify such testing if it occurred. At present, however, we cannot estimate withwhether the Soviets areystem of this typeimple MRV."

If this program is directed onlyimple MRV. it probably will be followed by developmentIRV system capable of attaching hard targets. This follow-on system mightighly accurate onearger number of warheadsomewhat less accurate system which wouldmall number of larger warheads. Neither system would be likely to reach IOC

Although tlie system described in paragraphould have the advantage of three independently targeted warheads, it would have no better accuracy than thend its reliability would be somewhat less. If ft is deployed^ we believe that the Soviets would try to improve Us performance significantly. They'might still follow itew system of the kind described In the previous paragraph. If so, the new system would probably not reach IOC before the.

As to new ICDMs, tbe only detected flight tests which could relate to one are theSoviets tested five of these missiles from Plesetsk betweenS andwo. to the Kamchatka Peninsula and three failed. After this rather poorno more were tested until this summer, when the missile wasflown three times to Kamchatka. Thc first stage propellant isbut thc second stage clearly employs liquid ptopellants. There is apparently enough propellant in tlie second stage to By the missile on the order. With that range, thc system could not reach thc US from present ICBM deployment complexes, thus it is possible that it will have an

"Rear Adas. Daniel E. neigln, lor th* Acting Director, Dofrnie Intelligence Agency; Rear Adm Frederick J. MailRnger. II. lhe Anislant Chiel of Naval Operations (Intelligence),of the Navy, anden. Jammie M. Phllpott, the AuUtant Chief ofntelligence. USAF. believe lhat although there are itill unresolvedssues, the lystera postulated id paragraphffers the inoien of the nature of the weapon lyitem under test because ofoUowtnr

issals Is Use high-accuracy ICBM system of the Soviet Union.

tbc observed Sightleat attempt ben made to nuiu. theU uie

use of multiple wai he* OS Independently targeted would muluply theof boosters, while lhe limitation to only three RVi sliTt piovidci suSciendyin esdi RV to be ellecUve against bard targets;

footprintomparable with the lilo spacing In the Mlnulemanthe specific variations requited have not been demonstrated


IRBM role. But until more evidence becomes available on the But stage, we cannotalid estimate of the maximum range of tho system. We believe that another year Or yearalf of flight testing will be required before the system can reach IOC, and we should be able to determine its characteristics and thus its mission before it reaches that stage.

When" was published last fall, wc estimated that the Soviets wereew large, llquld-propcllant ICBMollow on to thchich could he ready for deployment ineriod. We estimated that it couldndare considered it tho besr candidate toophisticated reentry systemTwe continue to believe lhatevelopment is likely bui. since no tests have been detected to date, IOC will probably not be readied2 or later.

e estimated that the Soviets would seek to improve the quality of their ICBM force by modifying thehich they may now be doing. And we held that tbeyew. smalLUquid- propellant ICBMew. small, solid-propellant ICBM. Recentrelate to thc former syslem, and possible Soviet dissatisfaction with (lieay lead to developmentew solid-propellant missile. Thus, both of these small follow-on systems remain as possible developments. We have no evidence that Ihe Soviets willobile version of thes estimated last year, and now consider it unlikely that they will do so

n. we noted that'Soviet planners might consider an attempt touclear pindown of US missile forces. This tactic might offerus partoliberale surprise or pre-emptive attack on the US.the manifold uncertainties involved In such an attack, however, we believe that tbc Soviet leaders could have no assurance that thc USSR would not receive unacceptable damage in return. We have no evidence concerning Soviet intentions lo use this tactic Nevertheless, in an effort to optimize their damage-limiting capability under the various circumstances inuclear war might erupt, the Soviets may Include this lactic In their planning for thc employment of their strategic forces.

n sum. our evidence oo new ICBM development is scanty andNevertheless, over the nexlears the Soviets surely will bring new ICBMs into service. We continue to believe that they willarge, liquid-fueled systemollow-on to thend that it could reach IOC as earlyn addition, they will probably develop at least one new, smalla liquid- or solid propellantfor mobile as well as fixed dqiloyment. It could reach IOC2If the

"See NIKa, "Soviet Siratcefc AttackLLATA,


on ICBM it could reach IOC somewhatf, however,ecent tests of modincatiotis to there aimed at improving that system's capabilities, thc developmentmall follow on ICBM will probably come later In the period of this estimate.

Future Force levels ond Composition

Oar evidence provides little basisonfident estimate of Soviet ICBM force levels beyond the neat few years. It is almost certain that the Sovietshave not fixed on definite goab for their strategic forces for tho period of this estimate, and even their intermediate goals may be altered by events. Their decisions will, of course, be heavily influenced by developments on the USABM and MIRVthey will involve not only ICBMs but the whole mix of strategic offensive aod defensive forces. The number of launchers will probably become less significant in Soviet calculations than the numbers and kinds of re-entry vehicles. Their decisions as to numbers of ICBM launchers will be affected by the nature and extent of qualitativeto their own force-

We estimate that when all launchers under construction are completed and all groups filled out, the Soviets will haveperational ICBM launchers. There will probably be some additionalndeployment, but these programs have now been underway for about five years, and may not continue beyond thc next year or so. Moreover, thc Soviets will probably deactivate most or all oflder launchers during the period of this estimate Allowing for Ihe phase out of these older launchers and some additionalndaunchers appears toinimum force.

ossible that the Soviets will stabilize the ICBM force near this level If they are seeking rough strategic parity, they might consider that by building an ICBM force somewhat larger tlian that of the US they compensate for their inferiority in manned bombers and (for the next several years at least) In ballistic missile submarines. Or they might reasonorce of this size, together with developments In their other forces, would provide some margin of advantage over the US, without being so latge as to set off another wave of US deployment. In cllher case they would continue to make qualitative improvements In tho force which would probably include MIRVs, and perhaps the retrofit of new systems into existing launchers.

There are several factors, however, that could push the number of ICBM launchers well beyond this level. Concern for survivability of the force could lead to additional deployment of ICBMs both in dispersed silos and In mobile launchers.oviet decision not to deploy MIRVsubstantial delay in MIRV development could also lead to much larger numbers. Andoviet altempt toubstantial strategic advantage or even tho iheer


momentum of military programs could have (ho same effect. Thus, tlie ICBM force could grow by some hundreds of launchers; we cannot now estimate the maximum size it might

nless therehange in the deployment patterns observed thus far, the force will be composed primarily of small ICBMs suitable cliicfly for attacks on cities and other soft targets. The inventory of small ICBM siloss and) is now three times as large as the total for thend if present trends continue the proportion of smaller missiles will increase. The mega tonnage of thcorce, however, is probably much greater, and tbe number ofpotentially usable against hard targets would increase significantly if any sizable proportion of theorce were given MIRVs. Because thcoreensive system, its deployment to date has cost about the same as tho much largereployment;he equivalent of aboutillion.

C. Space

t the time of our List estimate, the Soviets were conducting an intensive flight test program of thehich employs the basicCBM booster. Betweennd the latest test were

"Pioieetsoni ol Soviet strategic forces will bo mid* In forthcoming National Intelligence httjectJoru foe Manning

" Mi. Ccorge C. DestiMr.cting Director ol Intelligence and Heseairh. Opaicr.eM ol State, acknowledges tho fenoui difficulties In estimating an upper hlnli foi Soviet ICHM deploy, menl but conitden itthat tbe Intelligence ccoimuroty address tha crueiOon. TW. ha disaguft only with theern* nt that we cannot now esornate thehxh the Soviet ICBM force might reach. He believer that the most important lactois ln determining lhe client of the Soviet build-up of ICBMi will be how they regaid oo-going itiategic programs of tbe US and th*luch bob countries tarn lo new types of weapons, *apccissly ABMi and MIRVi. The Soviets will of couise attempt to snive atcombination ol their own strategic focces which will appear most advantageous to them in iht light of these snd many other considerations ecoooo-.ic. poJitscal. and piychological. CossWdsrUsg all tbeie Iscters. he believe!rotection0 ICBMieasonable rittmste of tbe upper limit that the Soviets might resell within tbe period of this estimateustained effort whichIRV programollow-on ICBM. This is not an estimate of Sovietudgmem of the upperof th* range withm which the Soviet ICBM force Lt Hely to fall.

"Rest Adm.ergMi, for th* Acting Director.ielli gene* Agency; Brig. Cc- DeWjti C.. for (he Annum Chief of Stall for InttBigenre, Depart ment of Ihe Anny; Rear Adm. Fiederiek J. llftilfingcr, II. the Asiiitmit Chiel of Nnval Optra-tsonsepartment of theanden. lammi* M. Phtlpott, th* Assiitant Chief of Staff.SAF. recocnis* the uncertainties in making kmg-tenn rstimalea of Soviet ICBM goals, but do not believe they are any gresler than those relating to long, terml othei itiiitegie systems They consider it essential lo estimate th* most probable Soviet ICBM force levels They believe that the most WraJy Soviet force goal duiusg (he period ol tho estimate will beaunchen. The aclua) number within thu range will depend on Ihe number of MIRVs which are deployed.

tested; fiveepressed ICBM trajectory from Tyuratam to Kamchatka or the Pacific. The otherests were intended to be orbital flights to be brought down in thc USSR prior to completing their 6rst full revolution of the earth;f these were successful. In all thc successful tests, the deboost stage and the RV were reoriented late in the flight and tbc deboost stage ignited, causing the RV to Impact short of thc point it would have reached had itrue ballistic


The goal of this test program is still not dear. The vehicles tested have not demonstrated the ability to fly over the North Pole and attack the US on thc initial orbit; if the system were to be deployed at the three westcmroost SS-9and flown over the South Pole, it could reach only tho eastern third of the US.eduction in-the observed payloadodification of theooster capability would be required for the system to achieve full coverage of 'he US over cither pole. We have noi detected tests aimed atsuchand bslieve that Wc would have done so if they hud been nwrfc. Wc estimate that the Soviets will undertake further testing and troop training firings if the system is deployed as a

It thc goaletrofired depressed trajectory ICBM, we do notood explanation for the number of tests in the fractional orbit mode. These tests may, however, have enabled the Soviets to observe the retrofire andphase while the system was coming back into the USSR. It is possible, therefore, that thc Soviets have tested the system enough to deploy itetrofired depressed trafectory ICBM should they choose to do so.Q

lead us to believe that thes not yet operationaletrofired depressed^ trajectory ICBM.

The Soviets may be trying toual purpose weapon which could perform either of the above missions, both of which could degrade US early warning and the value of US anti-missile defenses. It is also possible that the Soviets are developing this systemurpose not yet dear to us. Thconth interval since thc last test has prevented us frometterthan we had whenas published. Wc think the chances are better than even that theill be deployed. However, in light of our uncertainties, wC cannot estimate the type of system being developed, its probable IOC date, and how or in what numbers it will be deployed.

In this and other space systems that they are developing, the Soviets arc working with hardware and space technology which could be used as the basis

ultiple orbit bombardment systemut wc believe that the Soviets are unlikely to developystem and deploy it in space duringecause:

It would not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of effectiveness, reliability, vulnerability, average life, and susceptibility to loss of control from accident or countermeasures.

The Soviet leaders would almost certainly recognize that deployment ofystem in violation of thc outer space treaty would entail serious political consequences.

They would also have lo be concerned that it wouldtrong new stimulus lo US military programs.

However, the continued development of nuclear technology and space projects will yield technology applicableODS. In the unlikely event that the USSR decides to push ahead, we believe^that we'couldOBS some-lime during the lest program of lhe complete system, which would peobablv extend over atear.

D. Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarino Force Presort! Status

ur estimate of the strength and composition of the Soviet nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force Over lhc neat two years is as follows:

oersuXM |



' The Soviets abo have both nuclear and dioael-powered submarines Itlod with iruue mUaile-S. Although these ship) Lave the primary minion of countering naval Itmrt.aircraft cartar* uil> forces, theweied porDcn (aboutmetrt) of this force an rfcutkular has larnbilitin to attach rtiakgSc land targets lying near the US coast aa wed as in areas peripheral lo the USSR. The use of the tm is*f forceualrgle role would complicate the US defensive problem and In iMppleiiicoHng the SI.BM force could add to the weight ofnuclear attach. Crime misiile (ubniarirxt will Iw ditcussed in the forthcomingCapa-bullies of Soviel ami Eail European General Purpotc Kotces."

In addition, Ihe Soviets haveII class submarine which has been fitted with six lubes. The Soviets may be usingII as some sortest bed; we do not believe that it will become the patternuture conversion oflass or thc prototypeew clnss.


lass carries (hen.issile, bui conversion toI. with the.. is virtually complete.lass Is fitted with thc submerged-Uunchedissile, which we estimateangem. We estimate thai since thc launching of thelass submarine at Severodvinsk in the late summeright more have come down the wuys,as the (abledoubt that all are yet In commission. We believe that construction has started at Komsomolsk also. Severodvinsk is estimated to benits per year; we estimate that by late Ihis year or early neat year. Komsomolsk will be producingear.

ince the last estimate, there have been two patrols each in the Atlantic and Pacificclass submarines, as compared to none during the previous year. This probably reflects the return to operational status of submarines which had been undergoing modification- We have recently detected for the first time the deploymentlass submarines Into the Atlantic. No ballistic missile submarines have ever been detected in the Mediterranean. .

7 the Soviets experimented with open ocean support andol both nuclear and diesel submarines,ariety of auxiliary and support vessels.I cruise-missile submarine remained at sea for about six months. In the summer9 thc Soviets again carriedimitedand replenishment operation in thc Western Atlantic io connection with thc naval visit to Cuba. Should this support concept be put Into regular practice, it could servo, to some extent at least,ubstitute for distant land-basedfacilities. This would substantially increase the time ballistic missilecould remain on station and might permit more of die force to be continuously on patrol, thus complicating US problems of anti-submarine defense.

he SovieU would, of course, find it helpful to have access to some kind of facilities in the vicinity of the US for use in supporting submarines on far-distant patrol. The only such possibility at present is Cuba. They would recognize that any attempt to use Cuba for this purpose would alarm the US. which might regard itiolation of the Kennedy Khrushchev understanding. The recent Soviet naval visit to the Caribbean was probably parteneral Soviet plan to exlend thc area of fleet operations orpecific response to US naval excursions into the Black Sea. It could also haveest of US reactionsisible Soviet naval presence in the area. (For additional discussion on thisnrngraphf NIECuba. Castro, and the Course of (heECRET)

henlass becomes operational in some numbers, the Soviets may establishcontinuous or. station pattern for ballistic missile submarines.of the luck of forward bases aivd the operational limitations of thc force.

TOP stew-*



however, the Soviets probably could keep no more lhan aboutercent of their SSBNs continuously on-station in potential missile launch areashe US. Alternatively, they may putew submarines (say Eve percent of the force) on palrol and keep the rest inaters. In this case, essentially allercent of tbebe sent to seaime of emergency or tension. Civen an extended time of tension, some of the units in overhaul or conversion could be made available and perhaps SS percent of the force could be deployed

Weopons Syslem Development

expect the Soviets to continue research and development ofmissiles. In fact, the firstew series may have reached thephase; onissile probably launched from the Nenoksatest center near Severodvinsk flew slightly. andon Kamchatka. (Thc longest previous flightoviet navalwas that of thef"


evidence indicates that the new missile is larger than thee the Sawfly. which the Soviets paraded7 and which theya naval missile. It may be intended forlass, but retrofitrequire considerable modification of the submarine. We have noconcerning lhc developmentultiple reentry vehicle systemIn addition lo new submarine construction, the Soviets areto improve the capabilities and performance of current types withnoise reduction, speed, diving depth, and navigational accuracy.

future force Levels andon

continue to believe that the Sovieis areallistic missileforce which will be roughly comparable lo the US Polaris fleets. The Soviets might define such comparability in terms ofPolaris-type submarines, in terms ol numbers of submarine missilein terms of launchers thataintained continuously on station.that the Soviets wouldorce of fromoubmarinesew class, together withlass units, as meeting these

Admadfin*,'. II.cJ Navall-UcV. soefc, a, thrdeohMM.lrO RV, t. MIRV.ib,


E.omber Force

Present Status

ur estimate of the strength of the Long Range Aviation (LRA) heavy bomber/tanker element for the neat two years is as follows;



omeabout half those assigned toas tankers and we believe that they will not be convertedomber role. Tlie other ha if of (lie Bison force and about lialf of the Bears are equipped to accept aerial refueling. Refueled Bears could attack targets in the US directly from their home bases. Bears not equipped for aerial refueling would have to be staged through Arctic bases in order to'achieve good.coverage of-the US On two-waye Bison would require both Arctic staging and aerial refueling.

Aerial refueling continues tooutine part of heavy bomber training; mghts lo points off the North American coast, first noted inave apparently become routine also. Thi* year wc have noted an overflight of Shemyaissionoint just off Newfoundland, which probably involved thc use of tankers staged through lhe Arctic to refuel bombers operatingase in southern USSR.

Wc continue to believe th,it the Soviets would commit virtually their entire force of heavy bombers and tankers in an aircraft attack against the US (excepthe number of aircraft to reach US defenses would depend on how many received aerial refueling and how many were staged through the Arctic-

Atrcrofl Development

e have no evidence indicatingollow-on heavy bomber is under development. Given the growth in Soviet ballistic missile capabilities we still consider it unlikely that the Soviets willollow-on heavy bomber into LRA during the period of this estimate. If they undertook to develop one, we

-The Soviets could, if tliey elected lo do m. increue the weight of an attack against the US byortion of the medium-bomber loice on range (one-way) patterns, base utiliution. and air refueling limitations, as well as the sire ot rhe ICBM and subuuulne missile forces,believe )Uih use of the medium bomber is most unlikely.iscussion of medium bomber* tee Section III D.

TOP SlXftflT-


believe lhat we would delect the program and identify the aircraft three to four year* before it became operational."

Future force Levels and Composition

ven the newest of the heavy bombers will be at leastears old and we have no evidence that heavy bombers are currently being produced for LIU. Thus, we esUmate that by thche strength of the heavy bomber force will be on the orderisons and Bears; most of thc Bisons will probably be tankers. By the end of thc period, thc force will have declined some-what further and will probably be largely deactivated.*'


Tlic forces to be discussed under this heading arc the medium bomber clement of LRA, the MRBM/IRBM force, and thc diesei-powered ballistic-missileetopmcil, of these forceshc immediate postwar ptsrfod. Jet medium bombers and ballistic missiles entered service in the mid- tos; by theeployment was essentially complete. Soviet capa-bilities for peripheral operations have since been improved, but in general there has been little change over the past several years in the size and composition of the forces involved,

The forces for peripheral operations are arrayed for thc most part against Europe and in massive strength. One reason for this is probably the traditional Russian concern with Europe. Another is that numbers (or as Khrushchev said "duplication- andnhance survivability. And. finally, at the time these forces were deployed, thc Soviets probably hoped to deter the US by holding Europe hostage until they could develop signiBcant capabilities for inter-tonlinenlal attack.

It now seems likely that the Soviets alsoeed for sizable strategic forces against China. By Its size and nature, the buildup against China indicates that lhe Soviets are preparingariety of contingencies, includingr. nnd they are probably including some elements of the Strategic Rocket Forces

-Mai. Cen. lammle M. Philpolt. the Asiiitant Chiel of Stall. InWlllipMic,he USSR will act toredibleh,cslhe USdditional intercontinental bombers will be inUoduecd into LRA. Tho mostandidate wouldibe an improved version ol the Bear, perhap,onEe, range sK-toWae*t couldo enter LRA in thelternatively, ao tntlltly mw jntefconHTWnUwld be Introduced somewhat later.

"Maj. Cen. Jamnii* M. Philpott. tho Assistant Chiel ol SfH. Intelligence. USAF. believe, the Soviet,the advantage,l.ed strategic attacknd that Iheyeavy bomber force at about Uie current level throughout the lOTCs.


(SRP) ivnd LRA in their contingency planning for operations against China. But. while there are indicationstrategic buildup against China, we are not able to assess its full extent.

B. Land-Based Strategiche force of land-based strategic missile, for use against peripheral targets


jnome are deployed in soft sites; others are in groups of three

^"rnlssile system,

the Seaboardover some strategic targets; wc believe that this system carries heith an estimated range. We estimate the number of launchers now operational to be as follows:

So" '

(IRBM) . - jB .

ScaMsaud (Mobil.) "

n,ata e-win completely operableexposed to over-pressure* on lhe orderii

' With iu esUmated rang, c4nlikely tothan llmiiod useo!o:he ^lubtr, forforces. (See paragraph

In addition, there are indications that an ICBM. theill be used at leastimited extent in an IRBM role.

boutercent ofndre deployed against Europeide

I Finl'nd 10 Black Sea. The remainder are

Seated for the most part in the Far Eastew sites scattered in the Caucasus and in south-central Siberia. Thc Soviets have deployed the Scalcboard

OTdef' ^

aftf h7 and can ,eRtehours

,ftei the first launch. It is possible thatard sites alsoefire capabilily.

Even tf they do. the time required to ready lhc silos fo, refire would almost ccr-

ta.nly preclude their rouse In conjunction with even the late stages of an initial

g- Wcninwiy .hat harditesetire capability.

top sccscr-

role and status of Ihe fixed field positions located at or nearcomplexes remain unclear.

balance, we believe that these positions do not figure prominently in overall Soviet strategic planning.

ttecenf Developments

We estimate that there haslight reduction in the total number of MRBM/IRBM launchers during thc past year. Tests of theCBM last year to greatly reduceduggest an intention to use It In peripheral operations and we believe that some arc now being deployed th an IRBM role.

The Soviets have long claimed that Scaleboudstrategic' weapon, and that it is subordinate to tba SRF. They are probably deploying some Scale-boards ui both eastern and western USSR. These aeployrrsents seemission of front support astrategic mission. Thus, the Scaleboard appears to be suitable bothtrategic role and for support of theater forces.**

future MRBM/IRBM Devoiopmonl

At the time of thc last estimate, the evidence indicated that thc Soviets were developing solid-propellant missiles of Mil IIM and IRBM range. Tliey hadolid-propellant MRBM (designatedt Kapustin Yarange of. This evidence, togelher with testing of the solid-pro-pellantCBM, suggested that lha Soviets weseamily of solid-propellant missiles which would use various staging combinations to fiy theirranges. TheRBM was made up buically of the upper two stages of thee estimated that the first and third stages of theould be used for an IRBM ofm. range, and further thatissile could probably be carried by thc Scrooge TEL. Thus, we estimated lhat thc Soviets wouldew MRBMew IRBM using solid ptopellants. and deploy them in both fixed and mobile launchers.

Over thc past year, we have seen little progress toward these estimated goals- Theas not been tesl fired sincend wc have de-fected no testsolid-propelhtnl missile of IRBM range. Thus, the Soviets may have encountered problems in the development of solid-propellant strategic missiles. They appear to havestrong intciest in such missiles, however, and thc magnitude of their Investment in solid propellant production facilities, which

NIPUm he''">ferOWlng

. Soviet snd East Ku.onenn Purpose Fo.ees"

TOP scene*

is great and growing, suggest, that they will push ahead. We have no present basis, however, (or firm estimates as to what they will do in this area.

They might still proceed with the development of theRBM.tbcy have no doubt derived some of the required data from tests of thodditional teats of theould probably be required before It become operational If tilings resume soon, the system could reach IOCobilo mode by" It could probably be retrofitted Intoilos byr reach IOC in new silos by tho latter half1 if construction starts soon.

The Soviets also still have the option of developing an IRBM from the first and trtird stages of thee have no indication, however, that they intend to do so.ystem probably could not reach IOC.

c cannot judge whether the Soviets will develop new liquid.-propelled missile for use in peripheral operations. The only known candidate/"

Jias been test-firedange. II. however, is evidentlyconsiderably greater range and may prove toew ICBM (see

Future Force levels and Composition

For at least the next two to three yeais, the lorce of land-based strategic missiles for peripheral operations will continue lo consist primarily ofnd SS-5s. Even li the Soviets were to resume active development of follow-onit would be some time before they could enter service in substantial num. ben. We continue to believe, however, that within thc nextears the SSAi Udill be phased out and replaced. Just what systems will replace them is more doubtful than appeared last year, as the above paragraphs on newdevelopment indicate.

We believe that deployment of the Scalcboard against strategic targets will be limited, because at iu estimated range. it can reachmall number of strategic targets from within the USSR. The best presentfor new deployment is probably theRBM. and we expect It to be deployed in substantial numbers. The evidence indicates that it will probably first appearobile configuration We believe, however,ubstantia] number will also be deployed ind sites whichigher level of readiness, quick reaction, and greater reliability.

As for longer range systems, the available evidence indicates that some .nlditional SSlIs will be deployed for use against peripheral strategic taigcls.

he Soviets have beenmobile TEI. vehicle which the/ claimapellsnt missile. In7 they dHplayed the missile (Scampi cairled In (he TEL, which wewo Uie*d propellant missile compabWe with our aiseisinent of the SS-U



i In-as demonstrated flexibility in range and its deployment would In-crease the suivfvability of the force, but we doubt that the Soviets would settle on an ICBM system developed in theo serveollow-on IRBM ins- lis deploymentew role would indicate that the Sovietsequirement for more long-range missiles for peripheral operations. Concern with China and its growing strategic capabilities probably reinforces this requirement, and while theould be developed to cover many strategic targets in China, tho Soviets would probablyonger range system which could cover virtually all of that country from sites farther from the Sino-Soviet border.

c therefore continue to bebevo that tlteill be replaced by abut we cannot confidently suggest what it will be. One possibility issolid-propellant missile ofm range based on the first andot theanother possibility. Still another

ore flexible system, either solid- or liquid-fueled, whoso range could be variedpan of.ystem would provide greater targetike number of MRBMs and IRBMs, and it could

be realigned to adjust to changes in the international situation and the military


urely technical standpoint, lhe Soviets could reach IOCollow-on IRBM in the nest two or three years, but tlse probable deplcytnent of thoeripheral attack role, together with lack of evidence ofow missile, suggests lhat thc Sovieis do not expect to have aIRBM available within Ihc next few years. We consider it unlikely thai one will enter service beforeeriod.

Last year, we estimated the sire of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM force in the mid- tos ataunchers. The upper side of this projection assumed replacement of the present forceue-for-one bails; the lowerthat the development of new systems with greater 8cxibility andwould reduce Soviet (cquirernents. However, tbe developments which we then foresaw have not materialized, and the present uidications of future trends in the force arc to some orient contradictory. Therefore, we have little basis for an estimate of Soviet force goals fors. beyond general political and strategic considerations.

The political and strategic situation has changed markedly since thc present force was deployed. The buildup of Soviet forces for intercontinental attRck has weakened the force of the "hostage Europe" concept. Moreover, hardened, dispersed silos and mobile deployment offer greater prospects of survivability lhan do large numbers of soft sites. We believe. Ihcrefore. that when thc present force ofnds replaced, the number of Mill)Mi and IRBMs deployed against Europe will be reduced.



conflict wiili Clilna poses new requirements for strategicme, however, fewer strategic targets in China than in Europe, andcan be met to some extent by retargeting existing systems,of tbe ICBM force. Moreover, the Soviets may hope for some sort ofor military solution that would obviate the needizable newstrategic missiles. Nevertheless, there will probably be some additional(or redeployment) of strategic missiles against China. Although wethe possibility that it will beargo scale, it will almostreach thc level of the piesent deployment against Europe.

size of thc MRBM/IRBM force which the Soviets build to meetwill depend In Urge part on the characteristics of any newthat are introduced. The Soviets might consider that mobilecould be shifted to meet changes in the threat would reduce theThe same consideration would applyMoreover, such follow-on systems, either mobile or fixed, wouldsurvivability than thend thehus alio reducing the

onsidering thc wide vaiiatlons possible in the force-mix, the various courses from which the Soviets could choose lo meet their requirements, and our uncertainty as to what extent the Scateboard and theill be deployed for peripheral strategic operations, we are less confident lhan before concerning the future size of the Soviet MRBM/IRBM force This uncertainty leads us now to project an MftBM/IIIBM force falling somewhereangeaunchers for lhc mid- tos; it will probablyigher proportion of longer range lystcms than it does at piesent. In addition there will probably be some additional deployment of the Scalehoard and thcgainst peripheral strategic targels.

C. Diesel-Powered Bollislic Missile Submarines

ur estimate of the strength and composition of the Soviet diesel-powered ballistic missile submarine force throughs as follows;





Seeo tlie tabic in (Uracrsphor our views concerning the Soviet .mise missile tubmailn? force.


The CM class, armed with the.issile, is being convertedIs, which carry. submerged launchedf alls are converted, the changeover could probably not be completedeanwhile, at any given time, up to si* oflass arc in the process of conversion or overhaul and hence noturther improved missile forlass is possible, but we think unlikely.Uss submarines axe old and have been relatively inactive of late; they will probably be phased out of the force

hc level of out-of-area operationslass submarines remains low, probably due in part to the conversion program. Dlcsel-poweied submarines have much less endurance than nuclear ones and are more susceptible toby acoustic systems. Primarily for the first reason, we believelass submarines operating in thc Atlantic would probably be targeted for the most part against Europe and island bases. Those operating in the' Pacific wouldbe used against Alaska, Hawaii, Asia, and other targets in the Pacificew may now be committed agalftst targets in the northwest US, perhaps at an interim measure until more nuclear-powered types become available. It seems highly unlikely that any new diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines will be built.

D. Medium Bomber/Tankerresent Status

c estimate the strength of the medium bomber/tanker element of LRA throughs follows:



Badger production ceasedut the number of Badgers in service has not decreased as rapidly as we expected, and this reduction has been offset by the introduction of about the same number of Blinders. Production of Blinders during the past year probably has been no more than three per month.

Mai. Cen. Jainmic M. Philpott. lhc Assistant Chief of Stall. Intelligence. USAF. considers lhat this lection seriously underestimates the pitsenl and future manned aircraft thteat to live US. tie continues to believe that in an all-out nucleat assault against North America the So. lets wouldarge force of Badgers for itlacks on live US, even though this would mean one-way missions for most ot ihem. Additionally, hu believes that the Soviets will deploynew or unproved bomber with intercontinental capabilities tv maintain thu life of the medium bomber force atiriralt in the. This wouldapability to attack targets simultaneously in both North America andontingency that may well be anticipated in view of the hostility of Coniiinmiit China towards the Soviet Union.


he nutnber of aircraft, both Badger and Blinder, equipped to carry ASMs increased during Ihe postS0 Badgers and aboutlinders are now estimated to be so equipped- The Badger carries thenissile. whichange on the orderraining with that missile is observed regularly. The Blinder is equipped with the supersonicange on lhe order. but there has been little evidence of training with that missiie, perhaps because of problems with the system. We estimate thatew. if any, additional bomber units will be equipped to carry ASMs. Weto believe lhat medium bombers are intended primarily for use in Eurasia, and do not figure prominently in Soviet plans for attack against North America.1*

Aircraft and Missiles in Development

ho Soviets initially experienced technical difficulties in bringing the Blinder to operational status, but these appear to have been solved. Despite tbe shortcomings of the Bunder, the Soviets may now see no neodollow-on medium bomber. If they doeed, Ihey could, using thc technology gained in developing their vaiiable-geornerry-wing 6ghlers.ew supersonic-dash medium bomber having better speed, altitude, and radius of action than Ihcecent report strongly suggests that such an aircraft has already leached the prototype Stage.

c estimate that the Soviets areew ASM whichange ofruise speed of about Macht may be intended lor the Badger or for the Bear but it almost ceitainly has not reached IOC.

Future Force levels and Composition

hc Chinese threat may reinforce Moscow's view thai itontinuing requirement for aircraft to conduct strategic operations in peripheral areas. Moreover, for political reasons thc Soviets may be reluctant to rely solely on strategic forces that have no conventional capability. These requirements could be met to some extent by redeployment of LRA. Even so. the Soviets may wish to maintain their medium bomber forces at higher levels than the evidence now suggests. They could do so by continuing production of the Blinder or bya follow-on medium bomber.

owever, available evidence poinlt>ecline in lhe overall medium bomber strength of LRA. due principallyeduction in thc obsolescent Badger force. We estimate that by tbc end of thc period thc medium bomber force will compriseircraft, the majority of which will be Blinders.**

A few squadrons of Badk"ci> mifht. however, br oied io allark target* in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Iceland.

" If Use Sovietsew medium bonbei of the type desnibedragnph III. iHeea figures would be considerably higher, perhaps on lhe vrdcr.

-TOf _

TOP cccncT


Date the first opeiational utlfi ii trained and equippedew missiles and laundiera.


Air-to-Surfacerange between hunching aircraft and target at the time of mluile launch.

Surface-to-Surfaoorange under operational conditions with warhead weight Indicated. In thc care of ballistic missile* the maximum range figures disregard the effect of the earth's rotation.


C^cxilar Error Probability (CEP)-Thc radiusircle centered on the intended target, within whichercent of the arriving missile warheads are expected lo fall.



FOBS is used toystem deployed on the ground, targeted prior launch, and Uunched with intent to attack. Its opceatsceial and control requirements would be Uke those for an ICBM except for the needehicle toarhead into an orbital trajectory and dcorbit It on targetehicle would be targeted to altack prior to completion of tlte initial orbit.


MOBS is used toystem that could be developed aod stored oo the ground or deployed in space, could be launched into orbit with no immediate comrmtmcot to attack, targeted after launch, or retargeted as necessary. It would require command and control links between ground control centers and orbit-ing veludes; hence it would be much more complex Ihan cither an ICBMOBS.


D1CBM is used to designate an ICBM system which is launched oouch lower apogee than one launchedormal ICBMOther ballistic missiles can also be fired on depressed trajectories.


Re-entry Vehiclepartissile designed to re-enter the earth's atmosphere in the tenninal portion of its trajectory.


Multiple RVsayload package consisting of two or more RVs. The individual RVs arc dispersed (but not independent:ty-targctcd orin order to confuse enemy radars, to aid penetration, and/or to increase kill area.

Multiple Independently-targeted RVpayload consisting ofr more RVs each of which is independently targeted.

Maneuverable RVRV which has the capability to maneuver during free flight or re-entry.

Warheadweight of the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism.

RVweight includes that of thc warhead, necessary shielding aod structure, and internal penetration aids that may be present, and any other neces-sary or desired components.

Payloadweight of that part of the missile above the last

technique whereby thc RV is deorbited or is de boos ted outormal ballistic trajectory.


Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM).

Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)jn.


Weaponpercentage of the alert missiles that willwithinEPs of their targets. This is the product of launchwarhead

Alertpercentage of the operational missile force that Is rrsaintalned at normal readiness condition.

percentage of the operational missile force that wfllin the target area. This is the product of Alert Rate and Weapon '

Reactionrequired to proceedeadiness condition to launch.

Retirerequired toecond missile from thc same





Minimum Operational Haiige-NRE-

f 1 T 1


(See pnttt*para IS)

Re-eniry Vehicle Weight Ob")

Warhead Weight (Iba).

Warhead Yield

Accuracy C "3

e operationalof differentwith different roaiimuro ran gee.

We estimate lhat the CEP of theos toward tha lo- tide ot tills spread.

See footnote of oinent to





8 Late

Mali mum Operationalm).

Ite-enlry Vehicle Weigh!" "1 *]

Warhead Welghl J J

Warhwid Yield







lU-anU, Vehicle Welghl n

Warhead Weight L J.

Warhead Yield

SraWm Aeeureey J

Launch Submargad

Wo caninute lhal tharuiae ouauk earned by Sovietarhead yieldinguaad agauiai land large u, lisCEP

woulda. Wo Mtirnate iu lilelj operational range





Radiuaf Range (am)0 II) bombload


0 Ib bombload

'. .

b bomUoad

one refuel

IU bombload

one refuel



one refuel


ooe reluaf

Two AS-*






RangeSpeed (inaeh)'al Altitude

0 (Dwctcir.^)


Warhead Yield


Carrier Aircn.ftf Number of MBadger/a

Views of Major Ceneral Jammie M. Philpolt, thc Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, on hardness of Soviet ICBM silos.

'-'.SI- "ii- *

si .. d

The judgment that Soviet ICBM silos have been designed to remain completely operable when exposed to overpressures oo the ordersi does not provide quantitative hardness values essential to measure tbe eflecQ'vcness of US weapon systems. The present Judgment describes that level of overpressure at which essentially all silos suroiue. What Is required is an estimate- of tbe probable overpressure at whichercentroup of similar launch facilities will be rendered inoperable. Basedeview and analysis of available data, the most probable hardness of deployed Soviet ICBMstimated as Follows:


Basedne megaton weapon.



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Original document.

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