NIE 13-3-70 - COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Created: 6/11/1970

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10

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Communist Chinas General Purpose and Air Defense Forces

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CoMwrrW in If thm

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Aa Inatotd irntrUof

0

SEGRET

N?

334

following intulligtnm organization! porlicipofd In tho preparation of this ostimatti

Tho ControlAgency and th* Irrtelllgence. ofOr StoW and DefontO, Ond tbt MSA.

i .

Concurring,

If. Gen. R. E. Cvtnmen,SMC. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Dr. Roy S. Clint, tho Director of Inftlllatnet ond Rtteoreh, Deporbntnt of Sioit

ll. Gen. Donald V. Wnnttt, The Director, Detente tnttlllgenct Agency

Dr. Lout* W. Tordello. for Iht Dir-cfor. Notional Seci/nry Agency

Dr. Chariot H. Itkho'dl, for th* Awiitant Genorol Manager, Atomic Energy Coir.

Abstaining)

Mr.. Cregar, lot tho AnVcn- lo me Director, rodtral Bureau of got Ion, the wbjoer being ovttidt of hb |uritdiciion.

infllirlninlhiilliiu Iho Nemof

within mo mooning of rhj

Ion of which hi any manner to an unaulhofl

, Iho trait*

CONTENTS

Aw

THE

CONCLUSIONS

I. THE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY AND THE CULTURAL

REVOLUTION

Extent oi the

Impact on TreJnlng and

UL THE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMY

Diipoiitioo of Force* end Defensive

Manpower and

Military Equipment

hinese

Air and Air Def erne

Naval

UL OUTLOOKM

Combat ReadlneU and14

PoUcy, Doctrine, and Strategy15

ANNEX: STATUS OF FORCES ANDW

Tbe HighW

20

COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES

the problem

To uses* the strength, capabilities, and disposition of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces with particular reference to the impact of domestic political developments and Sino-Soviet tensions

CONCLUSIONS

years have now been expended in Communistto strengthen and modernize its armed forces. Peking'swillingness toarge share of its resources tohas yielded some creditable results. At the same time,the effort has been beset by difficulties caused byand political policies and by the ambivalencemilitary doctrine and the requirements for building amilitary force.

upheavals of the Cultural Revolution interferred withtraining and degraded the combat capabilities and readinessChinese Armed Forces. But the extent of this degradationdegree of its persistence up to the present time is inand INR believe that the level of training is still well shortin the army because of continued heavy involvement Inactivities and that progress in extricating the People'sArmy (PLA) from these tasks will be slow. dia and NSA. onhand, believe that training fn the army8 and that any residual degradation in combateffectiveness isiscussion of the evidence on theseissue is contained In paragraphs

G. The deteriorating course of Sino-Soviet relations, which fl at deprived China of extensive military assistance and then in recent

-wan.

yean led to ao ornnious buildup of military forces and pressure against China, hai added another dimension to Chinas defense problem. Althougheaction has so far been cautious and limited inthe Soviet buildup is almost certainlyajor impact on Chinese military planning.

its problems, the PLA has the capability fora formidable defense of the mainland. Its principal strengthtbe size of the ground forces (about two and one-half million)fighting potential as an Infantry force. Although China'sis basically defensive, its forces could overwhelm itsSoutheast Asia or Korea if not opposedodern outsideas It Is demonstrating in Indochina, Peking can provideto insurgent groups across its southern borders.

conventional combatodern opponent,branch of the PLA would have critical weaknesses. Armybelieved to be seriously deficient in motorized transport andthe air defense system probably lacks an adequateand data processing capability and could notlarge-scale, sophisticated air attack; and China's navy, whilestill little moreoastal defense force.

estimated, current and projected production programsfor many years, provide sufficient quantities of the variousweapons and equipment needed to remedy materielto raise tbe PLA to modem combat standards. But the Chinesealmost certainly will continue to do so undera fairly broad range ofalong the following lines:

Ground Foreea. Although the army is deficient In firepower and mobility and seems to have made less progress in modernization than might have been expected, the firepower of Chinese combat units is increasing. Already well supplied with small arms, ground units are receiving more tanks and artillery.

Airll elements of Chinas air defense apparently have been improved. Command and control capabilities have probablymore and better radars have been deployed at an increasing rate, androduction probably has recovered from the Cultural PuTVolution. SAM deployment, however, has been proceeding slowly

have ctuifd tome pulling tad hauling over priorihich In rum would help explain some of tbe anomalies which can br eeen In China'i military ettabUthrnent today. In anyha effort to poliricizt. tbe military *ai intensified in the mill andOOi and oubninated tn the official derignatton of Lin Plao aa Mao's successor and tba PLA'i takingentral role In tbe Cultural Revolution

i. THI PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION finW of m* /movement

he PLA'* irrvc4veroeTrt in the political and aoclal upheaval brought on by the Cultural Revolution6nd It haa become Increasingly apparent that thii btvoJverrwnt wa* greater in the flnt twont or io than we earner believed. A* tbe authority of the party and government apparatus declined, tbe PLA was called upon first to maintain general order and stability, then to anume the role of peacemaker and arbiter between factionalnd finally tou dm hip of the so-called Revolutionary Committee* which now control government organirationi, business and industrialndhroughout China. In the proces* the PLAide variety of administrative, security, and propaganda functions which extended deeply into almost every aspect of Chinese society.

ver the past few years maior elements of at leastf China'srmies were moved -way from their home base* for reason* relating to the political problem* or disturbance* of the time. In most Instance* these move* wererotational tn nature and did not resultet shift of forces. Moat of these unitsheir new areas and some at least are widely dispersed carrying out political and administrativeimilar use Is being made of many other PLA units which remain closer to their home garrisons.7 to the present approximatelyercent cf Chinese ground force units have been identified as participating at one time or another In these non-military activities. The actual total may be considerably higher.

he PLA hasictim as well as an instrument of the CulturalThe purge at tbe higher leveb of the PLA was particulnjly heavy In the earlier stages, Some of those purged apparently favored ^constructing China'* Armed Foreea along conventional and ptofeaiiorialnd ran afoul of Mao's ideaighly polifidred military establishment Difference* aboover priorities and programs for developing China's economic andstrength, issue* which had been exacerbated by the damaging effects of Mao's disastrous Creat Leap Forward and bis handling of Sino-Sovi'-ther PLA figure* seem to have been brought downesult of factional struggles that developed In the course of the Cultural Revolution rather than because of past policy eUifcrtrtoa*.

n any case, about half of tbe top military leadenhip was purged. The Military Affairs Committee, the highest official body responsible for military planoiug, lost almost half of its standing members and was reorganized. The

SKUT

"SKMT

General Staff Department, whkh Is responsible for coordinatingimilar level of casualties. Commaf the armored forces, tba railway corps and apparently th? artillery corps were purged, as were the political cooimlaamn of the air force, navy, and railway corps. Tbe casualty list at the top was split about evenly between military professionals and political specialists.

There waseavy toll at the military region and military district levels. At these levels It was mostly political officers wbo fell.ew notable exceptions, purges and factional activity were limited at the army level and barlow.

Nonetheless, the PLA bas emergedore powerful political force despite tbe buffeting It has received. Nine of theull and alternate members of tbe Politburo chosen It the Ninth Party Congress In9 were PLA members. Militaryow are tbe top men or hold powerful positions In nearly all of the Revolutionary Committees governing Chinas majorareas. The military Is prominent in municipal and county governments as well. In addition, the PLA Is still tbt only effective nation-wide Instrument of control available to Peking;esult the PLA isignificant if not crerjcrniruuit role In tba political reorganization and party rebuilding that lacarried forward. Tho PLA Is thustrong position toIts power at local levels and probably at the national level as well Despite this enhanced political position, all the available evidence shows that regional conurianders are responsive on military matters to national authorities.

Impocf on Tra'nfpy ond* Morale

/"raining. As indicatedarge number of army units have been identified with nor,-military activities. Tbe key questions are, of course, the numbers of personnel from these units who were, and who continue to be. actively Involved in such duties and the extent to which these personnel and (heir unlnvorved con trades have participated in meaningful military training. The evidence on these points Is neither clear nor firm and It Is subject to widely ranging interpretation. These interprets lions, in rum, are central to Judgments concerning the current combat readiness and effectiveness of the PLA.

The basic problem is that our data base on training in the PLA hu always been limited. In particular, we have never been able to follow tho activitiesufficient number of army units to establish the extent and nature of normal training patterns, This deficiency applies In some degree to all the services, but most severely to the army.

major portion of evidence available consists of the following:

from Individuals entering Hong Kong and letters frommainland whichixed picture of PLA activity:

continuing mass of Chinese press and radio reporting detailingof Chinese Army units and Individuals fn propaganda and

*8ECHL

political work, and In fldrnLnlsrrifive tasks throughout the govt-nmcnt. the economy, and tba school system

LosiraJ'y. bSe growing Soviet threat ibould havaapidof PLA rsartoiusel from Cultural Revolution tasks at least inhe PLA to concentrate on corn bat re* diners. DIA and NSA believe that the evidence oa the resumption of training8 Indicates that this did happen, probablyonsiderable extent. Moreover, DIA and NSA do not find rropa-ganda references to PLA involvement In ncm-military activities to be persuasive eMdence of tbe actual numbers of troops involved and the time expended In such activities.

ADembers agree that training In tbe Chinese Air Force and Navy probablv Is at normal levels (which are low by US or Sovietut the continued and constant references In tho news media to army Involvement In admlnlstritive and propaganda tasks lead CIA and INR to believe that the level of army training is still well short of normaL

These are differences of degree and tbey cannot be quantified in any meaningful way on the basis of present evidence. Thus, DIA and NSA cmphaiire indicators of the resumption of training; CIA and INR emphasize Indicators of the continued involvement of the army In non-military activities.

IS. Morale. Morale and discipline must have been adversely affected by the disruption and divisfvrnesa that the Cultural Revolution brought to Chinese societyhole.rme PLA leaders appeared divided at various levels and Its personnel were subjected to physical abuse from factional groups.attach against many senior officers could only have added to the overall problem. To some extent morale probably continues to suffer. Although there has been time to repair the worst of tbe dainage caused by the purge oflevel military officials, PLA commanders down to tbe military region level are probably (till operatingense and uncertain political environment. Top level civilian leaders areonsiderable degree still preoccupied with internal political problems. Duo to this condition we believe that overall policy guidance and military planning ii still subject to some uncertainty and delay.'

Lt Caw. Donald V. BerawH,irector, Defensenc* Agency, note* thai Ibe but known major military puree occunod ever two yean ago sad Bay military posloona bow appear to ba tautd by capable efftcort loyal ts tho contra]Under mach drcognrtancea, aat waaanaMi to coociad* thai PLA cefketi an no looser opseatlaf ordu tbo abnormal itraoi aad oncertaiihich charactarbed the Cbltural PaWuSuBua.

Although tho Bjovaninout It ondoubtedry coneomad wttholtncal pro Warm, tho Mlional dtftnao pregnant daacrfbed In fwcoenuggest thai Cnhwat military planning It timely, parpotoful, and Us dayJ.

Vko Adas. Not. Caykv, Ih* Director. National Security Agency; Mai Cam.cCbrlrOan, tha AaaMant Chief of Staff for Intel^genee, Department of tike Army; Cpt WiXbani N. Hatch, for th* Aaatotanr Chief of Naval Opera Hoc*epartment ef Iho Navy, and Brig. Con. Edward RatkovVh, for the Aaasrtant Chief of Staff,Unllod Stawt Asr Poreo, abo lean In But footnote.

"Seem

II. THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMYpoirtJon of fortwt ond DaretiefVe MtOJWM

rom the outset Chlneteunlit miliury policy haa been to provide Brat of all for the defense of the mainland. Until recent yean, at least. Peking viewed tbe US as ib ^rindpal enemy. The positioning of large ground forces opposite Taiwan and adjacent to Korea, and strenuous efforts to build up air defenses in east China and toapability to defend coastal waters alloncern about the potential of US military power.

US intervention tn South Vietnam and tbe bombing of the North5 caused Peking to emphasize the development of air defenses along tbe southern border and to strengthen naval forces In the area from Canton south. While there has been no significant strengthening cf ground forces in southariety of reports Indicate that the Chinese are busy improving and expanding rail and road nets, and establishing military storage facilities in areas near the borders cf North Vietnam, Laos, andesser extent, Burma.

We are not certain what to make of this construction activity. Some of tho road and rail work can be explained as necessary to economic development and political consolidation in the remote and sometimes turbulent border regions. The activity may alsoeneral concern for defense against foreign aggression, although It seems doubtful that Peking would expect more than minor harassment* In this area. Some of the roadoes, however, lead to tbe borders of Laos andtbe case ofoad construction continues across the border. These roads do, of course, enhance Chineseto support Insurgency or to project their own forces Into mainlandAsia.

Sincebe USSR has been steadily building up its military strength along the Sino-Soviet border. In tbe springerious borderoccurred along the Usiurl River, and In tho ensuing months there wero further border lnddenbi and Moscowsychological campaign that raised the specter cf some sort of major Soviet attack against China.Peking now regards tbe USSR as atoequal of tbe US as China's enemy. Indeed, the Chinese probably now view the Soviets as the more immediate and direct threat

Although It Is clear that Peking was aware of the Soviet buildup soon after It began, Chinese military reactions downt least, were cautious and limited In scope.8 they began to extend and improve their air defense warning system along their northern frontier, but notrash basts. There were no significant movements of major ground force units toward the Sino-Soviet frontier. In fact the major portion of two armies were moved out of Manchuria to deal with problems connected with the Cultural Revolutlo.i, and the vast areas of Slnkiang and Inner Mongolia continue to be very thinly manned with regular forces,odest reinforcement of these areas.

lthough tha events6 clearly heightened Peking's cemtvrn. Chinese military reaction apparently has continued to be cautious and primarilyIn character.nner Mongolia was divided among the Shenyang, Pekingancbou Militaryn action which provides firmerand control over tha northern borderyment of radars In the area bu been increased. Tho reported increase In the level of training, particu-tarty among air and naval units. Is almost certainly linked with Sino-Sovfet tensions. Along with these military preparations, Peking bastrident "war preparations" campaign which Includes new efforts to Increase Industrial and agricultural production and to disperse populationall industriallongstanding goals of the regime. The campaign alsoation-wide program of air raid shelter cot struct! on and food storage foruse.

nart from their purely military aspects, these activities dearly serve the regimes economic and social goals and help unify the countryong period of Internal turmoil Tbey also serve to put thelon on notice tbat China is prepared, if it must, to fight.

Other Defensive Measures. The Chinese have longrogram for placing some of their military and military related facilities unJerground. Some naval bases now under construction are being provided with undergroundsome of which are reported to be protected berthings for submarines and smaller craft Construction now underway at some airfields could provideangers fot part of China's Jet fighter force,

A general pattern nf bagging in would make sense in terms of passiveagain it sir or naval bombardment, particularly In viewthe vulnerabilities of China's active defenses against such attacks. The logic behind theof tbe huge earth-mounded structures, which have been reported in east China, is leulausible explanation for these facilities Is that tbey are designed to provide defensive strong points for Important strategic and political centers, Thla function would fit with the extensive work being done to build cove and runnel strong points along the coast where the terrain favors such defenses. But the tactical utility of the large moundsodem, mobile enemy invader is open to question and we are not yet confident that wethe reasoning which lies behind their constnxtion. Some measure of their Importance to Peking is evident, however, in the sacrifice of good agricultural land In aurt China

Monpower and Conscription

eking for the third time In four years altered tbe lengthfor new recruits In Ihe PLA, The terms of service lo the army,air force were increased to thrjt, four and five yean respectively.to longer terms of service probablyesire to raise tbe levelmanpower In the services.

:

WML

PLA evidently assumed control over Public Security Force*7 took over the paramilitary Production and Construction Corp*some Increased military training may have been conductedorganirations, particularly among PCC units located In border arras.last few years tome additional but very basic training also may haveto certain militia units. While we doubt that this training hasto make these organisations effective front line adjuncts of thedoeadily available source of organised manpower thatused In defensive and delaying actions along the Soviet border,

Military Equipmtnt Programi

Tbe limitations of China's scientific, technical, managerial, and Industrial capabilities and the disruptive effects of Maoist political and economic policW of the past decode are highly visible In the programs for production ofmilitary hardware. In terms of design and developn.ent, the high priority given to nuclear weapons systems seem* to have absorbed much of the available talent. With few exceptions, the Chinese appear to hove done little original design work on conventionalonsequence, most of the.'r production of military hardwareased on Soviet equipment and production technology acquired prior

We see no early end to the bind on BAD resources despite the high priority on such resource* that military pt "grams will continue to enfoy. Some additional time may be necessary to overcome the adverse effect; of factionalism and political disputes which good cv*<lence show* developed during the Cultural Revolution In the National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission. In any event, there hasour year disruption of scientific and technical education and thereet no signesumption of surh educationound basisroad scale.

Military production, even where design and otherroblems have been solved, haa In many cases fallen below levels that we would have considered desirable from Peking's point of view and within their capabilities. This has been due, in port, to the economic disruptions of tho Creat Leapears ago and more recently to the Cultural Revolution. For example, It Isthat fighter aircraft production dropped significantly, and various source*ecline in naval shipbuilding during the same period. Although tbere la little direct evidence, It Is likely 'hat some other type* of military production also declined because of the Cultural Revolution.

ww The particular disruptions of iho Cultural Revolution have now been largely overcome; indeed it appears that military production0 on an overall basis will equal the previous highonetheless, we do not yet see an end to tbe longstanding uneven pattern of military procurement These patterns are not entirely explained by economic disruptions and we are somewhat puzzled by the ordering of priori tk* if, as we believe likely, resources and plant facilities

areremium. For example, the Chinete Army ia being supplied with tanks froa domestic production; bet ^formation at hand indicates tSt the army Is receivingery few of tbe other types ofand supporting equipment required by an armored force. China produce* trucks, yet tbe army probably la woafuDy short of wheeled transport No effort haa yet been Men toedium sire tram port aircraft which China badly needs, not only for domestic economic reasons, but also to support both air and ground operations.of patrol vassals continue*ubstantial rataime when tbe principal threat to China would seem to be overland from the USSR. In rum, we are not certainirm overall authority is providing corsUnuous and coherent direction to China's military production program.*

The CAfnesermy

' Ltonald V. Biaastt, th*afaaee Ina>tlf mce Afswcy.tapro-deat tr coadode that th* oiled *xaatpfcM la CUaa's sndltary pfoeufenstat ratssrns rr fleet thebacDoa ofoveralln vssw of the tnwfusssnceack of Information on ChlnsMoncepts aad Pektna'i aaeratrnent of tha threat (Sacf tn*hina's ernphassi on air and coastal cWanae weapons appears conatttant with bar stVltfM situation.

Vies Ada. Nessl CayW. tba Dsractor. Nactonal SacssrRv Asvocyiass. Jos-pa A. MeChrutlan, Um AaiWaat OtJ of Stiff forI>pa*trn*nt ol tha Amy; Capt. Waiiam N. Hatch, for taaChMf nf Naval Operationsrpartnent o* tha Navyi and Bruj. Ceo- Edward lUtkovich, for tha Assistant Chssf of Staff, Innlllffrnca, UnitedAir Force, also Sato In this footnote.

China's principal military strength still lie* in tbe *ize cf tbe army and Its fighting potential as an Infantry force- The numerical strength of the Chinese Communist Army (CCA) cannot be estimated with confidence on the bail* of current data,igure of about two and one-half million is probably accurate within plus or minus IS percent. This strength has not changed substantially over the past decade. The overall deployment of the army has also remained substantially the same with the bulk of tbe ground forces still deployedile-wide band est ending from southern Manchuria southward along tbe coast to the borders of Vietnam.

Considering its Importance, tbe CCA probably has made less progress in modernization than might have been expected. Detailed study of aerialof army Installation* In tha Shenyang Military Region shows that up to tbe time of the last overflights the manning and equipment level* of units varied widely. More significantly, the- great majority of units In the armies of the Shenyang Military Region appeared to be seriously deficient In mobility andheavy ortlKety, trucks and other wheeled vehicles, armor and armor supportUS or Soviet standards. Even by tbe standards that we have estimated for the Chinese TOAE, they werely deficient in mobility and had shortening* In firepower. (See paragraphsf Annex for further findings of thisost Importantly, we do not believe that production rates of these Item* of equipment could by now have made

up these deficiencies'gnfflcant degree. Thus It Is moit probable (hat they oootlnue to exist. In addition, we believe that because of their strategic location, the Shenyang armies should have had at least an average claim to new and additional equipment; thus it is likely that similar equipment shortages ore common among Chinese armies elsewhere.

In addition, tho army's involvement In Internal affairs raises seriousconcerning the ability of Its commindert to assemble divisions quickly and coordinate their activities effectively. This factor and tKndpmcnt deficiencies make It appear that the Chinese Army Is mucheady and effective force than we previously fudged It to be and less able than we had thought to engage In conventional combat against modem opposition. Even though military training has moved forward In the pastt still seems probable that the Chinese might encounter coruddcTable difficulty in quickly projecting luge forces towardthreatened border areas or even of concentrating and maneuvering ground forces effectively within their own regional bases.1

Little effort seems to have been expended In developing more oroticfor tbe ground forces. Although the Chinese probably have the required skills and technology toactical ballistic missile, there is no Information which Indicates that the Chinese are working onystem. This being the case. It Is unlikely that the Chinese couldactical missile much before the, if Indeed they have current plans to developystem. Evenmall chemical warfare research program apparently exists, there Is no evidence that China has committed Important resources tohemical or biological warfare program. Military training emphasizes the defensive aspects of chemical warfare.

Air and Air Defense Forces

* Lt Gen. Donald V. Bennett the Director.InteJbseoce Agency, does not believe that thelavolrrment tn internal afhai tSstsa ss so great aa to signiiicenOy dofjade Its rnffUary arnstOVawios. aa previously indicated tn paragraph IS. Consequently. Use PLA'i bob. military actrviUM are net, constfntfleant Impediment to tho assemblage andof large nornben of around forces.

The analysis of th* Shenyang photographythat the Chinee* Infantry divisions probably are seriously deficient In motor transport by Wee tarn standard* and by the requirements ofmabMl TOAKe. In -ctual practice, these deftdencie* would be mitigatedon-stderabl* clegro* by th* employment of civilian transporUtion brigades and th* capabilities ot theIndependent motor transportation regiments, units not covered tn the study.

Deficiencies tn *tr tmnsesortauon limit China's capabilities to effect rapid military buildup In remoteut ta thoee areas where Chine would meat likely ensemble Urge Bombers ofand highway networksc*ruate for the rapid eaecsitton of thee* bu'ldupa.

Vke Adas. Noel Cnylrr, the Director, National Security Agency, MeJ. Can.iOr.iw tbe Aaatrtant Chief of Staff for Inerihginee. Department ot the Annyi Capt William N. Hatch, for the! of Naval Operationsh* Navy, and Brig. Can, Edward rUtkuvlch, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. United States Airlso join In this footnote,

elements of China's air defense apparently have been Improvedpastnontht, and training activity probably increased somewhat during

adar production evidently hai rufferrd little from the Cultural Revolution and more and better rsdars have been deployed at an lncreailrig rate, extending and filling tn high- aad medium-altitude detection capabilities, particularly along China'i rxvthern border. It ii probable thatroduction haifrom tbe Cultural Revolution aodignificant number were added to the operational force hut year. Although it may increase somewhatbe overall rate of SAM depkryrnent hai been very low.

espito tbeae Improvements, the air defenie system stillimited capability for dWeottug low-altitude penetrations. It is also believed to Buffererious communications and data processing deficiency. In th? eventarge-icale air attack using ECM. thli deficiency could be expected to severely degrade air situation reporting and fighter control. As tbe number of attacking aircraftthe system would rapidly become saturated and henceMoreover, It is likely tbatew of the Mlg-lOs In China have an all-weather capability, and probably no more thenercent of China's total Jet fighter force hasapability.lg-lOsowcapability, but the handful ofeceived from the Soviet Union are the only aircraft with morearginal capability for engaging other aircraft In lupersonic flight.

we are ucreaxingly uncertain about Chinese plans fortheut note that the Chinese have had eight years now to study, copy, or make design modifications to theiven them by the Soviets. It would appear, therefore, that the Chinese either have experienced great difficulties tn reproducing this aircraft (which appears to be tbe most likely case) or tbat tbey have decided to bypass then the hopes ofa more advanced interceptor of their own design. If the latter is the case, such an aircraft probably would not be available In quantity for at least five years.

There is some evidence tbat an aircraft of native design based on then produced In China. We are unable to predict whether such an aircraft might be used In an Interceptor or ground attack role, or possibly both. In any event If this aircraft Is in production, we believe It will bo several years before ft could be available In substantial numbers?'

e now believe that production of tho Soviet designedet medium bomber began at the Yenliang Airframe Plantomeombers could have been produced by now. Tbe production rate could Increase gradually andevel ofonth bynitial operationalof this aircraft probably has begun. It is hkcly tbat the Chinese willtherimarilyelivery vehicle for nuclear weapons.

lthough little la known of the Chinese doctrine on AAA employment, tbeyizeable AAA force which has benefitted from combat experience in North Vietnam. This force seems to be deployed primarily in eastern China, extending from the North Korean border southward down the coast and along

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"seeaci

the borders with countries In Southeast Asia. It Is probably deployed in point defense sum) to protect selected target trees against attack. The Chinese AAA force will probably fain In effectiveness with deployment of additional weapons and continued training

SAM units have been activated much more slowly than we expected and there are now about SS units In theleryments averaged about four per yearnd the deployment pattern nowetter defenseew important strategic targets. Nevertheless, theorce will not add significantly to Chinas overall sir defense capability for some time to come. SAMs and AAA if located together would maximize the effectiveness of these sir defense weapon system

Three hu been no significant change In the tactical strike and air support capabilities of the Chinese Communist Air Force for many years.re still tbe only (et bombers which the Chinese have In any quantity) and their few ground attack fighter divisions are equipped withL-lOs. PurtaSasea of transport aircraft from tbe USSR have only marginally Improved the airlift and airborne assault capability, and any Improvement over the next few yean is likely to depend almost entirely on such purchases. The Chinese probably haveimited capability for the employment of ECM la support of offensive missions.

!.

Naval forces

The composition, deployment, and operations of the Chinese Communist naval forces all indicate that their primary mission continues to be coastal defense. Although naval strength la increufng, the navy is now capable only of providing adequate defense against small surface forces intruding Into coastal waters. Its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability is minimal by modem standards and limited to areas adfacent to naval bases where surface ships ore readily available. Virtually no priority hu yet been given to Improving the capabilities of the naval air force or to construction of ships which would improve China's very limited seagoing amphibious capability.

With few exceptions, naval shipbuilding programs probably recovered fully9 from the Cultural Revolution. Coastal patrol craft. Including missile boats, ore being turned out at an Increasing rate. Constructionlass submarines now average about twoear and an additional shipyard probably has begun submarine construction. Old destroyers received years ago from the USSR are being converted to carry cruise missiles. China hu also begun toew class of destroyer which may be basedodified design of the Soviet Kotlln. Particularly In view of the conversion of tho older destroyers, wo think It likely these new ships will also bo equipped with cruise mini lea- It appeanreater emphasis is now being placed on programs which will provide Larger, longer range ships capable of extended patrols. In addition, shipyard expansion currently under way indicates that the Chinese may be planning additional naval programs,

hineselrfmie cruise missile program hu tlrvfluped very slowly. Two SAMLET site* were constructed In thet opposite due* of the entrance to the Po Hai Coif. No additional lite* have been IdWiti-fiod and tbere I* oo evidence which Indicates that this weapon has beenat any of the many coastal defensehich have been observed. It I* possible, therefore, that ihr Chinese have been working on an alternative syi-tern,odification of tbe *tyi cruise missile which tbey areproducing

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III. OUTLOOK

Combcrf rHod/noss ond CopobifhVei

s indicated above, the Cultural Revolution degraded Chinese military capabilities in term* of readiness, morale and discipline. Tho resumption of trainingore regular scale which wc believe occurred In mld-lOCSserved to overcome some of three deficiencies. This progress ihould coo-tin ue If the current mood of moderation in Peking persists during the months ahead. But the process of extricating the PLA, particularly tbe army, from it* involvement In non-military activities will be difficult and slow, especially since Peking continues to be beset by political problems and Is making only very slow progress In rebuilding tbe party ud In accomplishing other organizational refonns. Hrighrened tensions between China and the Soviet Union during the past year seem to have had some sobering Influenoo on Peking, but not enough to jolt tbe Chlneee leadership into any crash effort to Improve tbe army'sreadiness. Thus, though developments seem to be tending toward returning tho entire PLAora normal footing, much of the time and energy, at least of army personnel, Is likely to continue to be diverted by non-military activity and political stress for the next few years.*

rojected production programi will not, for many years, provide sufficient quantities of the various type* of weapon* and equipment needed to remedy serious materiel deficiencies and to raise the PLA to modern combat standards. As the process of modernization goes forward, the Chinese will face steeply rising economic costs. Not only will outlays for equipment Increase, but as more equiprr-nt reaches tbe field, operations and maintenance costs will go up Furthermore, although Industrial production seem* to be reoc ering from the

'U Cm Donald V. Banna tt iha Dure tor, DefenseAgency, believes thai the reauerpbou of training8 has allowed sufficient time h) overcome meal of tb* Culture] RavoJurtoo-trerpired deflchmcsse tn readiness, moral* and trainoreover,is Opinion that theormal postal*onsiderable erpendtruns of time andin aon-muitary sctretbee. but th*ot expected to rubrUmtlally- Impair combat readiness tn th* future.

Vloa Adas. Noel Caviar, thaJoncJ Security 'Mat Can.cCbrtstiaa. th* Aasarlant Chief of Staff for InleDigeota.heilliam N. Hatch, for the Assonant Chief of Naval OperaOoraepartment of th* Navyi and Brig. Gen. Edward lUttovieh, for th* Anfctanl Chtsf of Staff, Intelligence. United States Asr force, also Join as this footnote.

dismpcion Inflicted by tb* Cultural Revolution, tbe prospects for vigorous expan-lion and growth are not bright And aa tbe Chineae attempt to move ahead with original weapons RAD there willurther stretching of scarce scientific and technical resources. The army will continue to be deficient in firepower and rmbilfry at leastor will China be able to develop within tbat tune frame an air defense system that would be able to copeajor air attack. Naval construction programs, altbough they will provide more and better ships In the future, cannot soon be sufficient to alter tbe fact that tbe navy has the capability only for coasts' defense against small intruding surface forcea and an ASW capability only in the vicinity of naval bases.

these important weaknesses and short-comings, the PLA hasdefensive capability. This strength together with the sheerChina's population and territory wouldround war against Chinaformidable proposition evenreat power. The PLA could easilysituation likely to arise oo the Sine* Indian frontier or anything theunassisted, could mount against the mainland, And, of course,could overrun their neighbors in Southeast Asia or Korea In aattach If not faced with oppositionodern outside power.as It ll demonatrating in Indochina and with Its logistical preparationsChina, Peking Is in an excellent position to meddle in insurgi nciessituations across Its southern border.

Policy, Docrr/ne, and Strahtgy

military programs and force dispositions continue to reflectconcern for defense. Even their emerging nuclear capabilityInto this generally defensive posture, when viewedeterrent againstenemy. Maoist military doctrine teaches respect for the enemyneed to avoid direct encounters with superior forces; thli basicto guide Chinese military policies today.

Political urjcertamties in China and Sino-Soviet tension, however, greatly complicate tho process of making judgments regarding future decisions in Peking on military policy. One thing tbat seems almost certain Is that the military sector will retain Ib high priority in the allocation of resources. But, as we Indicated above, tho Chineseong way to go In filling out and modernizing tho equipment of the general purpose and air defense forces, and only gradual Improvement across the wide range of requirements will be possible. Competition from strategic missile and nuclear weapon programs, which have tho highest priority of all, adds to the problem

Mao, though he concedes the need for modem equipment and formilitary skills, la clearly more interested In the continuing poUtidraMon of the PLA and In using It as the exempler and Instrument for bringing about the Ideological remodeling he seeks for all of Chineae society. Military professionals, an the other hand, are likely to be more cenefmed with correcting China'sweaknesses and dealing with China's many pressing practical problems.

While It li evident that the PLA has enhanced IU portion for iitfluenclngmal policy, tbe extent to which fta representatives areexert thisot so clear. About all that can be laid with much confidence li that tbe designing of policies and program! for building andodern,military establishment wiH be difficult as long asn the scene.

ino-Sovirt antagonism should provide the PLAowerful argument for Its case in general. It could also lead to revisions In Peking's set of mililaryexample. Improving the equipment and firepower of the ground forcee might get more attention, while naval programs might be curtailed. The chances ofhift might Increase if Peking also saw the US as altering Ib stance in Asia. But this Is only speculation, and it Is equally possible that Peking, caught up in Its own Internal problems, does not yet see its way clearly for devising new poUciee.

he basic restraint and caution Peking seems to be showing In the face of the Soviet buildup on the border probablyoncern not to make military movementscale that might provoke or alarm the Soviets.ore important reason the Chinese have not made Important ground force deploy-men ts In the herder areas ia simply that they areirtue of necessity; the Chinese do not intend to push their armies up tn the border where the Soviet forces would hava the sbarter hVee of communica Hons and could use theirsuperiority in firepower and nubility to the greatest advantage. In the caseoviet cross border probe, the Chinese probably would react with whatever forces were locally available, but would not be easily provoked Into sending large reinforcementa to tbe frontier. In the eventarge-scale invasion attempt by tho USSR, Chinese strategy appears to call for harassing and delaying action" and even of puttingtrenuous defense of selected strategic areas. In tbt maun, however, the Chineae still appear to be willing to give up territory if necessary and toaoist Peoples War deep In China.

t should be stressed, however, that Chinese concerns and preparations art not focused only against the Soviets. Military forces, especially air, have been strengthened In the southern border areas, and defensive positions have been constructed there and along China's coastline aa wall Peking's propaganda tells the Chinese people to prepare against attack not only from the USSR but also from tbe US.

j

STATUS Of FORCES AND TRENDS

Introduction jj !

ornumber of reasons we know considerably leu about tbe doctrine, strategy,dning, and capabl -lilts of tba People's Liberation Army (PLA) than we do about those of tlie Soviet Armed Forces. Wa have had ampleto observe Soviet units In Eastern Europe and evaluate at first band their activities, equipment levels, readiness posture, and ao on. On occasion, it has even been possible to observe military units active inside the USSR itself. The Soviets have also conducted several large-scale military exercises which have enabled us toetter feeling for their overall capabilities ond tbe application of their doctrine and strategy. Conversely, the Chinese have made It extremely difficultoreigner to get anythinguperficial glimpse of the PLA, and tbere is little evidence from which to derive Judgments relative to strategy, tactics, or actual combat capabilitlus.

I Tbe Soviet Union has permitted publics Honarge amount of material dealing with military doctrine and strategy. China, on the other band, hasvery little on this subject. In addition, there has been scene penetration Into high military levels in tbe Soviet Union and acquisition of documents such as the Penkovsky papers have provided considerable information.

1 Finally, the Soviet Armed Forces, because theyreater threat to the US, have bad flnt claim on US analyticalhorough analytical effort has only begun k> be applied to Chinese ground force units and it will be some time before we eru as confident of our Judgments about many aspects of tbe Chinos* Communist Army (CCA) as we now are about similar aspects of uV Red Army,

The High Command

4 The Ministry of National Defensender tbe policy control of the Military Affairs Committee of the Party Central Committer. Is the senior military authority. The chief staff components of the MND are Its three generaltbe General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and tbe General Rear Services Department. Most combat arms and services, such as the air force, navy, armor, artillery, and selected supporting organizations, are represented at tha MND level by separate Headquarters, Howover, there is no separate headquarters for the Infantry forces, which are apparently con* trolled directly by the MND.

purpoaes, mainland China It divided into militaryare divided Into subordinate districts. Tbe number of Militaryrecently been reduced fromorhe InnerRegion has been divided among the Shenyang, Peking, andThough tbe evidence is (era clear, the Tibet Military Region maysubordinated to the Chengtu Military Region. These are territorial rat!operational commands and in most cases conform to provincial boundaries.

' '

Army

main field command organisation of the CCA, Is the army, ofarehere is nothing in the CCA analogous to the Sovietor tankypical Chinese army at full strength wouldrtillery regiment,nti-aircraft artillery (AAA)would numbern addition to units subordinateythereumber of separate combat, combat service, andunits assigned to tbe headquarters of military regions.

estimate that at full strength tbe standard Infantry0 officers and men. Its principal combat elements3 infantryrtillery regimentank/assault gunaddition to the standard Infantry division, the Chinese have bghtuse in mourrtainous and other difficult terrain. These type units aretbe standard division but do not have the tank/assault gun regiment,with lighter artillery, and have leas organic vehicular transport.

8 Continuing analysis has strengthened our confidence that tbe CCA hasombat0 Infantry,order defense/military Internalrmored,t the reglrnental level, however, analysis has always been more problematical.esult, we cannot estimate with high confidenceength of tbe CCA We believe, however,igure of two and one-half million la probably accurate within phis orSee

ur overall understanding with respect to tbe CCA has been advanced in recent months by tbe exploitation of aerial photography acquired2 of CCA injtaJstioos in tbe Shenyang Military Region. This analysis could not, of course, provide tbe final answers on personnel strengths, equipment levels, state of training or combat readiness. But It does provide highly useful data from which extrapolations can be maJe concerning some significant current aspects of tbeImportantly tbe status of major equipment levels ir CCA units. Some flrtdings of this analysis are set forth below,

C'ganlforlonanning

a. Although all the armios of the Shenyang Military Region had threedivisions, there were variations resulting from the addition of rear service, AAA, or infantry units and the tbeenoe uf suiiki artillery, Infantry, and tank/

d-Ki 'a*

' i |

ESTIMATED NVMUR OF ARMY UNITS AND OVERALL STRENGTH

..or mat;

m

Coanbat

J rfaatry

S3 BD/MI5twV! . ' irbcene'IflWi .

3 Cavaey

Ccanbat Support M

IS PMd ArtBaary

AAA

Support 11

'

W fl.rl.pmJ.uO 63

5 Cavalry

Comb*Jwr.tr, m

Engir-rr

u.-Sienal

AaO-CW

Oraanic to MHilary bflori or Amy Hr.dqu.rtwi U

IS FkU AstsTaary . AA

Service Support lUatnantt [iKbpaaotertj 34

otoriihvay:

TOTAL STRENCTH IN PERSONNEL]IH nutlfan *

-CAF, bat for oW parpoa. of tea. paper ladeded

*Tmk fajwa could vary by SlSraduat bonaasa* of varlfytog urJH already laaadimited numberf^rormad oom.

assault jun regiments normally organic to army headquarters or the iu Inordinateor the mta* part, tbeae variation! appeared to result from variations in the minion of pai Ocular divisions.

housing capacity wa* aoenewhat sen than the estimatedstrength itandard for particular types of units. There were exceptionsFor example, one tank, and assault gun regiment in most armiescapacity, possibly to bouse an armor training battalion.

increases were observed In the bousing capacity of theincreases occurred mainlyquarters, tank and assault gun,units. 1

Infantry

d. Shenyang's ajmie* had fewer infantry regiment* than expected. The great majority of these units appeared to be seriously deficient in wheeled vehicles even by estimated Chinese TOetE standards.ew regiments had storago capacity for their estimated standard number of wheeledost had far less than thi* standard. Vehicles were observed infrequently at most infantry units,airly large number of regiments were observed without any wheeled vehicles being sighted

a. Antitank guns were Identified atmall number of tbe regiments observed, and only occasionally at these. Thi* suggests that most Chineseregiments even now do not contain the heavy weapons battalion with nine antitank gun* previous'y estimated as standard. In *ome armies, at least, the mortar and recoUless rifle companies which were previously part of this heavy weapons battalion probably still exist, possibly attached to regimental bead-quarter* as separate companies.

f Little in the way of special vehicles and equipment was observed at in* fan try divisions.

examples of efforts to increase the strength of Infantryobserved. During the period of coverage there were only smallbarracks and vehicle storage capacityew infantry units.

artillery regiments were Identified than believed required ooof the standard TOorE. Most of those Identified, however, appearedclose to their quota of artilleryut none of tbe army-levelobserved to have the heavier0 mm and above} calledthe TO&E. Instead, they were equipped with the sameelow) found with division-level artillery regiments. Tracked primeidentified withegiment

he armor strength of the Shenyang armies was contained In the tank and aaiaul: gun regiments of their infantry divisions. Afinoit all observed had such regiments. Of these, the majority had tbe normal three regiments.

Armor

j. Almost all of the regiments had storage capacity for doae to or over the estimated standard ofracked vehicles. These substantial capacities for tracked vehicle storage may noteliable indication of actual holdings In many cases, however. Of the regiments observed with armor, most had low armor counts and the others generally had relatively high armor counts. Theseshowed little correlation with storage capaHty for tracked vehicle*.

It There wereew tenuous Indication* that equipment levels at tank and assault gun regirncrrts had been Increasing. Regiment* may have been grad-

"SrOTtB-

uiily upgrading their armor inventory by replacing vintage4 tanks with rhlnnaa or Soviet versions of the4 tank. This exchange could have been oocurring at one regimentime bat based on productioncould not have resulted even by now In much. If any, net increase in annos holdings.

o new army equipment such as the Chinese counterpart of th* Soviet PT-T1 was observed with Shenyang tank and assault gun regiments. Major Items of armor support equipment such as fuel trucks, armored reconnaissanceand armor recovery vehicles were observed so rarely that It is doubtful that iheir allocation was standard. Wheeled tank transporters and armor vehicles with external fuel tanks were never observed. As wrs the Ctse with armor,estimates suggest that not holdings of this equipment can have increased very little.

Air Support and Airborne Assault Capabiliri'es

Tho Chinese have no separate tactical air command, and wo have no information enrtcernlng PLA doctrine on the use of aircraftlose support role. At present any tactical strike or ground support mission would fallonr son the Chinese Ccsnmunlst Air Force (CCAF) arid Chinese Communist Naval Air Forcend the few fighterIn the CCAF, which have ground attack as their primary mission. The remainder of the operational fighter force is assigned to air defense, with ground attackecondary role.

The Chinese have an extremely limited airborne assault capability. Tho principal limitation on the employment of Chinese airborne forces Is the small size of the- Chinese air transport fleet which consists largely of light transportsew medium transports. The medium transports IncludeN-lS/Cubs purehased from the Soviet Union, which are the only rear extraction aircraft In the Chinese Inventory, Fiveoko light transports, purchased from the USSR constitute the only notable addition to the Inventory in theears. We have no evidence that the Chinese are preparing toedium or heavy trarisoort During peacetime anderiod of no moreays,ruuimum daily total0irlift capability of tbe Chinese military transport force augmented byercent of the ctvil air fleet Is estimated to beuBy supplied and equipped troops. For supplies only, tbe theoretical dairy maximum Isons. Similarly calculated, the dallyift capability la estimated to he0 fully equipped and supplied troopsons of supplies alone. It Is unlikely, however, that this optimum capability could be achieved.

CCAF exercises Its administrative and operational controltactical air districtsimited number of air elements assignedHeadquarters CCAF. Although there Is no "Air Defense Command* In the

US or Soviettatf ekneot of CCAF Headcraarters coordinates and cootrob all air dcfcriea operations. Including thoao Involving air control and wrarrdag, AAA, SAMi. and tighten luppllrd from th* CCAF and CCNAF.

Tba CCAF and CCNAF, numberen and are equipped with0 aircraft of whichre subordinate to tbe CCNAF. (See TABLE II for estimated number, of mdttaty aircraft In cnpcrationalhe largest active operational unit In the CCAF is the Air Divirion, with each division consistingegiments.

Tbe present strength of the Jet light bomber force ii, Tbe number of sorties flown per month by tbe averageilot Is probably adequate to maintain proficiency. Moreover, tho fact tha" many pilots have been flying these same aircraft for up toears would probably provide the bomber force with sufficient experience to conduct medium- or low-altitude bombing mlssioni. At loast half of the force is probably equipped for radar bombing.

Tbe strength of tbe fighter force l< estimated to have Increased byircraft during tbe pastonths. This increase Is based upon continuing production ef Mig-lOr, The force size will continue to increase as morere producince the phasing out of the older Mlg-lSs androbahly Is proceeding slowly.esrjments currently bave aboutircraft per unit and fighter mglments aboutircraft.

SKftEI

lthough information li limited, we estimate that no more thaner-cent ol China, fighter force It equipped with airborne Intercept equipment. The large majority of tbeae arehe Soviets may have provided the Chineseimited number of heat-seekingype AAMs when they delivered the Mlg-Sls, and the Chlnose possibly are producing some of these miitiles and perhaps beam-rider missiles as weLL

The extensive air surveillance and control network is comprised ofadar sites withadars.7 the deployment of new radars (including some new models of Chinese design) has increased- Quaunprovement of China's air defense radar network probably will continuo toigh priority.

Although radar deployment generally was widely dispersed,8uildup of new radars probably occurred In areas adjacent to the Sino-Soviet and Slno-Mongoltan borders. The net effect of this buildup would be to provide considerably Increased long-range high- and medium-altitude early warning and ground control Intercept coverage in northern China. Radarprobably was also increased about strategic areas throughout China. Despite the recent improvements, China's air defense radar network continues to have significant weaknesses. It apparently lacks an operational advanced data tram-mis'! on system and thus would have to rely upon manual morse and voiceLow altitude and surface search coverage remain far from adequate, and defense against electronic countermeasures still Is limited.

Tbe anti-aircraft forces Include aboutir force AAA dlvbkmsrmy AAA divisions which ore more lightly gunned These AAA divisions are operationally subordinate to the CCAF District Headquarters In the area ia which they are located. AAA defenses are distributed along the entire East Coast from Hainan Island to tho Korean border, and heavy concentration; of AAA defend Important coastal airfields opposite Taiwan. Other sitmificant AAAare located near tbe North Vietnamese border. Selected airfields, urban complexes, military Installations, and production areas throughout China can alio be eapected to be defended by tbeae weapons.

In addition to their conventional AAA, the Chineseimited SAM capability. The Chinese practice of moving units about mokes it difficult to determine the fixe of the force, but we believe there are aboutAM battalions currently In the field. There should also be additional SAM equipmentr training facilities. Production and deployment rates have remained low since the Inception of the4 units per year. Whether the Chinese intend to step up tho pace of SAM deployment depends In pert on theirof the present equipment. It Is possible that they are working on further re fir em en ts or improvements In the system, In any event. It seems likely that the SAM force will fall well shortnitsnd the air defense system will continue to rely primarily on fighter aircraft

SI. The emphasis In SAM employment Is behaved to have shifted from antl-reconnaUsance to defense of strategic targets. Most of Ihe new battalion, de-

em

ployed7 have beento key areas that already had tome SAM protection. Nevertheless, ftorno percentage of tbe SAM force will continue to be kept relatively mobile fn an effort to interdict and deter aerial reconnaiaunce and tb* intrusion of other aircraft

Novy

Administrative and operational control over the naval forces Is exercised through the headquarters of tbe Chinese Communist Navy (CCN) located in Peking. Orders from tbe Minister of Defense are passed to the navy's com' mander in chief via the General Staff. Three fleet area commands are directly subordinate to naval headquarters: the North Sea Fleet with headquarters in Tsingtao; the East Sea Fleet, with headquarters In Shanghai; and the South Sea Fleet, with headquarters in Chan-chlang (Fortmmediatelyto tbe three fleet headquarters are district and sector headquarters which are responsible for tbeir respective segments of the coastal area.

The CCN now includesmtroye. escorts, aboutydrofoil motor torpedo boats,uided missile patrol boats andther patrol craft. Personnel strength is estimated aten, of which0 arc In the naval air force. (See TABLE III for estimated numbers of naval combatants and support ships.)

Over the past year or so, the most significant changes In the composition of the Chinese naval forces have been the equipping of destroyers us the North Sea Fleet with missile launchers and the addition oflass submarines to the East Sea Fleet. The South Sea Fleet was further rtrengthencd by tbe additionourth Klangrian-csass destroyer escort, but compared with the North and East Sea Fleets, It continues to be weak In patrol escorts and does not yet have anyhere Is evidence, however, of continuing efforts to equalize fleet strengths, Including the number of submarines assigned to each.

Construction and expansion of naval facilities and shipyards continues, especially In the East and South Sea Fleet areas.

The CCN tea lift capability remain* negligible. Only about two plus Infantryroops) or one Infantry arid .one artilleryroops) could be transported at any given time and amphibious training receive* little attention. In port-to-port operations, passenger ships of thefleet could deliver up0 troops, There arecean-going cargoome of which probably could be ernployed In transporting troops or supplies. In addition, tn operations where the use of smaller ships and craft is feasible, theould employ literally thousands of junks for transporting troops and light equipment. The amphibious force Is aging and replacement will soon bo required If theapability Is to be maintained.

CCNAF I* predominantly an air defense force. It Includes atfighter regimentsf aboutighterset light bomber regirnentsfoircraft each. Some

of tb*rt usedtccryiaissance role. Naval operational fighters are primarily assigned to air defense. Altbough administratively controlled by CCNAF beadcniarters it Peking through tbe fleet headquarters, in their air defense role fighter units are operationally controlled by the CCAF. Tbe bomber regimen is are used for patrol and bombing activities in coastal areas and are controlled by tbe fleet headquarters. Atf tbeeglrnentsimited torpedo attach capability.

DJ

NAVAL COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS

CofcW MlaalW Deitroyor (DDCS-SSM cob')

rm Erjcart (DE) BaHimo Maaut Submarine

Subrnanna (SS)

Patrol Boats

ratrel Eacert (tt)

SobnatrtM Chasm* (PC)

Geided MUDUb patrol Boat (FTC/PTTG)

Motor Gunboat (PCM/PCH)

Torpedo Boa* (PT/PTH)

Mbaawovpan

FWr(MSF)

Caaatal (MSCVMSM)

Atantary (MSA)

AmphlbJoua Ship, and Craft

Laadtng Shtna.

Laaaaaat Craft (LCU/LCM/LCT)

Cargo Ship (AX/AEL)

Ueuld Carrier. AOL/AW)

*aTas(ATA;

Repair aad Sahara (AAL/ARS)

Submarine Auriliarias)

OtkarCraft

Thh war Mpiaasnti now eonatructlon and may eventually be ariasleaasnipped.

aaa.isss,hsa.

' About TO lofpedo boat,unbeata are equipped wtth hydrofoua.

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