Created: 5/1/1970

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


Final Report of the Working Group




Copy No.


The Warsaw Pact Threat to


This is the final report of Workingf the Interagency Steering Committee for National Security Study nd II, devoted primarily to Warsaw Pact capabilities and composition,evision of the First Phase report (SRn the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO issued by the Working Group inart III, which considers contingencies in which Pact forces might be used, was issuedeparate report by the Working Group in April. Part IV estimates Pact military reactions to alternative US-NATO forceand strategies. ummary of this final report begins on page 5. At the end of the reporttatistical Annex,appended to the First Phase report, containing tables on Warsaw Pact force strengths.

Workingncludes representatives of the National Security Council Staff, the Department of State, the Office of theof Defense (Systemshe Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Securityhe Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The intelligence data and estimates in this report were provided by the CentralAgencyhe Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.



I. Strategy, Structure, and Posture

Warsaw Pact Mission

The Khrushchev Strategy

Military Posture

Warsaw Pact War

Nonnuclear Capability

Nuclear Warfare Capability in Europe-

Warsaw Pact

Warsaw Pact


XX, Composition of the

Ground Forces

Armies and

Categories of Readiness

Division Equipment

Armored Vehicles

Artillery Support

Airborne Forces

Amphibious Forces

Missile Support

Tactical Air Support and Theater Air

Frontal Aviation

Ground Attack

Transport Aviation and Helicoptars


Service Support of Theater Forces

Naval 8



Contents (continued)





Theater Forces Facing NATO

Possible Variations in the War Plan


III. Contingencies Leading toarsaw


Factors Inhibiting Soviet Initiation


The China

Theiddle East

Possible Contingencies

Eastern Europe

Miscalculation of Effects of Tension


Thoiddle East

All-Out Attack in the Central Region

Tho Case of Nuclear

Surprise Attack With Limited Objectivee

Capture of West

Invasion of Yugoslavia


Contents (continued)


IV. Warsaw Pact Reactions to Alternative

NATO Postures and Strategies

Factors Bearing on Soviet Planning for

Theater Forces

The Political

The Imperial

The Bureaucratic Factor

The Economic

Reactions to Alternative US and NATO

Force Structures and

Continuation of Present Situation

A Small Cut in US

A Larger

Nuclear Strategy .


Soviet Attitude Toward Use of Force Under Alternative US and NATO Force Structures


V. Statistical Annex


The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armed forces have four basic military missions on the continent of Europe

defend the USSR against overt and

direct military threats emanating from or through the continent of Europe

To bringavorable conclusion military conflicts which may occur

defend the territories of the Warsaw

Pact member states and to maintain the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe

support Soviet political policies in


The structure, deployment, and state of readiness of Soviet and Pact forces indicate that their mission does not presently include either territorialor the expansion of Soviet influence by military aggression.

Soviet forces, military doctrine, writings, and statements and the scenarios of military exercises all indicate that, once hostilities were under way, or appeared inevitable, Warsaw Pact forces would seek to take the initiative as early as possiblearge scale offensive campaign which would have as its objective the destruction of NATO's military forces and the occupation of Western Europe.

There is general agreement, both within the US Government and throughout the Alliance, on the main outlines of the Warsaw Pact threat. In general the Pact forces were designed for short duration combat in the wake of strategic nuclear exchange. Into their conventional artillery and other arms, they are equippedariety of nuclear-capable systems, including rockets, missiles, and tactical aircraft. The Soviets havetrategic


missilesedium bombers in the western USSR whose targets are in Western Europe. In addition, Soviet ballistic missile submarines in the Soviet Northern Fleet are,for the most part, also targeted against Western Europe. In recent years Soviet statements and Pact exercisesoncern for the possibility of conventional operations as well, and some steps are being taken to improve Soviet capabilities for nonnuclear war.

In the main area of possible conflict withopposite the CentralPactarge combat-ready force ofen inast German,olish, and 7 Czechoslovak)0 tanks supported byactical aircraft. The Pact employs amobilization system, under which reservists and trucks are to be taken from the civilian economy to bring reduced strength units up to combat strength. Successful execution of this plan could raise Pact strength in the Central Region up toercent of them0onventional artilleryombat aircraft, anduclear-capable tactical missile and rocket launchers. Complete mobilization, deployment, and integration of these forces would almost certainly take at least three weeks. This process would generate indications to Western intelligence, but anof ultimate Pact intentions would probably remain uncertain and might notonvincing bas for NATO mobilization.

In any crisis period which raised the possibility of war, the Pact wouldigh premium uponthe process of mobilization and reinforcement before hostilities began, yet it might be willing, under some circumstances, to attack earlier.

Some analysts believe that limitations in the Pact logistic system, such as low ammunition supply rates and insufficient transport, constitute significant weaknesses. These analysts also regard the Pact as vulnerable to an effective NATO antitank capability and to restrictions on Soviet lines of supply. Other analysts consider that the evidence on logistic


weaknesses is inconclusive and that reliance on civilian resources would notignificant

Some analysts doubt that East European forces would prove reliableariety of contingencies while others consider that the East Europeans would be reliable in most circumstances.

We haveumber of ways in which the Warsaw Pact might deliberately initiate hostilities, ranging from isolated attacks on NATO extremities through limited aggression in the Central Region to all-out attack on all NATO fronts. We conclude that, under the present East-West military relationship, the likelihoodeliberate Pact attack is very low. It is possible, however, that Pact-NATOmight develop in unintendedut of widespread revolts in Eastern Europe.

In considering how the Soviets might react to changes in NATO force structure and strategy, we note that Soviet planning is influenced not only by the basic military missions cited earlier, but also by economic constraintsertainresistance to change. In general, Soviet planning probably would not be highly reactive to changes on the NATO side.

If the US were to reaffirm roughly its present deployments and NATO strategy remained unaltered, the Pact would probably continue at the deliberate pace of recent years with modernization programs designed to improve both conventional and nuclear capabilities. Withdrawals on the order of ten percent of US forces in Europe would have aeffect. argeron the order ofin the view of some analysts, lead the Soviets to maintain or even step up the pace of their modernization programs in order toseful military advantage. Other analysts believe that the Soviets would probably take the opportunity to level off or reduce these programs in order to meet other military and civilian priorities.



Changes in NATO strategy to emphasize theater nuclear warfare or to reduceday norms for conventional capabilities would reduce theMoscow now perceives for improving Pactfor sustained nonnuclear combat. these changes would not materially affect Soviet force planning, which already restsoctrine which assumes nuclear war in the theater.

Implementation of the force structures andconsidered inrobably would notalter the Soviet belief that military adventures against or all-out attack upon NATO wouldighly dangerous course of action. This is true even in the case of us withdrawals downevel of,en in Europe. This case would still require the Soviets to reckonubstantial chance of nuclear retaliation. More important than US deployments, in the USSR's calculations on this matter, would be its interpretation of overall US behavior, and the inferences it would draw from this concerning US willingness to invoke its strategic power in extreme cases.


I. Strategy, Structure, and Posture

This section discusses the general considerations and factors which have shaped the Soviet strategy, military force structure, and posture in Europe and which probably will also influence the formation of future Soviet European strategies and forces. are provided on.

Warsaw Pact Mission

The Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armed forces have four basic military missions on the continent of Europe:

defend the USSR against overt and

direct military threats emanating from or through the continent of Europe

bringavorable conclusion

military conflicts which may occur

defend the territories of the War-

saw Pact member states and tothe Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe

support Soviet political policies

in Europe.

The structure, deployment, and state of readiness of Soviet and Pact forces indicate that their mission does not presently include either territorialor the expansion of Soviet influence by military aggression.

The Defense Intelligence Agency agrees generally vith the conclusion in the above paragraph that the Warsaw Pact mission does not now include either territorialor the expansion of Soviet influence by military means. It is essential to note, however, that the Soviet and Eastern European Pact forces are oapable of, and indeedprimarily for, the conduct of offensive military operations in the Central Region of SATOar occur for reasons other than deliberate Soviet aggression.


At the end of WorldII the USSB found itself with massive armed forces deep in Europe, with greater opportunity for the expansion of Russian influence there than had ever been possible under the tsars. At the beginning of the Fifties the Soviets had realized most of their objectives in Eastern Europe. Prospects for the expansion of Soviet power and influence elsewhere in Europe, however, had greatly diminished partly because of the nuclear monopoly held by the United States and partly because of an increased resolve on the part of the Western allies and the rapid recovery of Western Europe. The main objective remained, of course, the security of, the USSR, but now this security was more closely tied to the stability and security of Eastern Europe.

Inest Germany joined NATO. In response to this event, as well as toeans of furthering Soviet political and military objectives in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact came into being on ilitary alliance the Pactew means for Soviet control and coordination of bloc military capabilities in preparation for the execution of the new Soviet EuropeanKhrushchev nuclear strategy.

The Khrushchev Strategy

Around the end of the Fifties the Soviets began to see war in Europe as nuclear from the outset. The strategy of the Khrushchev era called for the rapid exploitation of the initiation of hostilities to achieve long-standing Soviet European objectives. To this strategy it made little difference by whom or how hostilities were initiated.

The Soviet ground and tactical air forces which evolved in the early Sixties from this doctrine and strategy were structured to maximize their capabilities for general war and advance swiftly across Western Europe in the aftermathuclear holocaust. The resulting forces had shortcomings forrotracted, large scale conventional war.

Soviet forces were structured on the conceptuick war obviated the need for heavy service support.


and the nuclear nature of the war and the fluidity of the battle required less conventional fire support from artillery and tactical aircraft. Instead of massed artillery and infantry, nuclear strikes were to create gaps in NATO's defenses and destroy its reserves. Large tank forces would then pass through these gaps and advance rapidly through Western Europe, bypassing or encircling any remaining NATO forces.

To fit their concepts, the Soviets accelerated the mechanization and streamlining process under way since World War II, discarding the infantry divisions, which had made up the bulk of their theater forces, and much of the massive artillery and tactical air support. Theyighly mobile force composed essentially of tanks supported by rockets and missiles with nuclear warheads. In addition the force had tactical aircraft with good mobility and dispersal characteristics but small payload capacities. By the early Sixties the reorganization was virtually complete*

At that point the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies couldeavily armored force of0 tanks opposite NATO's Central Region. In comparison with previous Soviet concepts this forceow infantry-to-tank ratio. The infantry that was retained was to be mounted in armored personnel carriers. There was little combat and logistical support.

The Soviet concept required the motorized infantry to keep pace with the tanks, but most of the armored personnel carriers available were deficient in mobility and protection for the infantry being transported, and even these were in short supply. Artillery forces lacked mobility, firepower, and armor for protectionluid tactical situation.

The Soviets evidently had concluded that tanks were the essential ingredient andelatively lowand artillery strength was acceptable. Except for units already deployed on the frontiers with NATO, the newly reorganized ground forces relied on mobilization from the civilian economy for most of their cargo trucks and much of the manpower needed to make them ready for combat.


Some Soviet military leaders began to question the established theater warfare doctrine in the light of the condition of mutual deterrence which was then emerging and US advocacy of the doctrine of flexible response. These Soviet military spokesmen generally agreed that the war with NATO would not necessarily be nuclear from the outset, but there wasdisagreement over the probable durationonnuclear phase of conflict.

Beginninghe Soviets accelerated the conversion of their East European satellites intomilitary allies. The East European armed forcesthose of Poland andbeing organized and equipped to conductmilitary operations under overall Soviet control. The Soviets probably believed that in the eventATO attack thesein the forward area and capable of quickbe relied on to fight effectively until the arrival of Soviet At the least the East Europeans, together with the Soviet forces in the forward area, could be counted on to take much of the edge off the initial combat effectiveness of NATO's forces.

Thus the aim of the Soviets was to build up the military potential of their allies and at the same time to realize substantial peacetime economies in their own forces. In this way they evidently expected to ensure the successful defense of their forward area positions while mobilizing and deploying the large reinforcements which they consider necessary to seize the initiative and complete the military occupation of Europe.

Military Posture .

Soviet military actions in Europe have, to date, been intended to preserve the status quo and test Western will and determination. The present Warsaw Pact force is certainly adequate to this task though the force remains postured for the execution of its basic military missions.



The Soviets, however, do notapparently have not sought to posture their theater forcesanner to provide themcapability toNATO by attacking without prior buildup. They have relied on strategic warningeriod ofinternational tension for the time to build up sufficient forces to neutralize NATO forces and occupy Western Europe. They have not provided their forces in the forward area with the kind of logistical support necessaryuccessful offensive across Western Europe. Soviet security depends heavily on large semiautonomous East European national armies whose reliability is uncertain, particularly if used a3 striking forcesoviet-led aggression.

The Defense Intelligence Agency agrees that Pact forces currently deployed in the forward area could not "overwhelm NATO"prior buildup. They do,ery formidable striking force. They could be used offensively either to gain limited objectives or to disrupt NATO forces in the Central Region and keep them "off balance" prior to commitmentarger bloc force with greater overall combat power. Such an option would most likely appeal to the Sovietsrisis situation where the advantages of taking direct action seemed to outweigh the disadvantages of forgoing deliberate pre-preparation of their forces.

DIA feels that definitive information is lacking on the order of battle and the function of Soviet combat service support. The extensive POL and ammunition storage facilities throughout Eastern Europe that the Soviete should be able to satisfactorily support the forces currently deptoyed.

DIA further believes that the Eastern European countries would be reliable in any


action where NATO, in particular West Germany, was the aggressor or in any action where the Warsaw Pact was on the offensive, at least in the early stagesuture conflict.

Despite the defensive nature of their overallposture in Europe, the Soviets' forces, military doctrine, writings, and statements and the scenarios of their military exercises all indicate that, once hostilities were under way, or appeared inevitable, the USSR would seek to take the initiative as early as possible- Soviet forces would thenarge scale offensive campaign which would have as itsthe destruction of NATO's military forces and the occupation of Western Europe.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feels that the Soviet posture in Eastern Europe contains substantial offensive capabilities. Therefore, the Soviet overall military posture cannot be described as either offensive or defensive.

Soviet strategic planning appears to be premised on an estimate that the Warsaw Pact holds the advantage in the balance of Warsaw Pact versus NATO theater force capabilities, Tlie Pact leaders apparently believe that, in the eventonflict in Europe, which may be conventional at the outset, NATO would resort to tactical nuclear weapons rather than suffer total defeat. Moreover, the Soviets apparently assumeurprise NATO-initiated military action, while theoretically possible, is unlikely; they assumeull NATO offensive against the Pact without strategic warning is militarily and politically unlikely. The Warsaw Pact force structure and strategy are posited on the assumption that any major NATO military action would be detected in time to permit reaction by Warsaw Pact forces, perhaps including some preemptive moves.

Warsaw Pact War Planning

Consideration of the organization and deployment of the Warsaw Pact forces, and of Warsaw Pactwritings and exercise scenarios, leads to the conclusion that the Soviets haveasic

- 14


plan for the conduct of war against NATO- The main variable in the execution of the plan, and the one which would govern the configuration in which Warsaw Pact forces would enter combat in the critical Central Region, is the timing of the onset of hostilities.

In general, the plan calls for the organization of five Warsaw Pact armytwo echelons* opposite NATO's Central Region. During the first ten days after the Pact initiated its buildup, only three fronts would actually be available for combat while the other two were being mobilized and moved forward from the western USSR. The three forward fronts wouldentral one made up from combat-ready Soviet and East German forces now located in Eastouthern front made up of Czechoslovak and Soviet forces now in Czechoslovakia,orthern front made up initially of Polish forces. The Soviet and East German forces are combat ready now. However, Polish and Czechoslovak armies and fronts require substantial mobilization.

The units of the two reinforcing fronts from the western USSR would have to be filled out with large numbers of civilian vehicles and reservists to achieve combat strength. Toapid reinforcement, Soviet plans provideiecemeal movement of these units as they become available. Some of the combat elements of the reinforcing fronts could arrive in Poland and Czechoslovakia in about five or six days and all of the divisions could probably arrive in

*"Echelon" has a special meaning in the Soviet view of military operations* Soviet doctrine envisages large groupings of troops deployed behind the front tine or first echelon units and not engaged in combat* This second echelon would be committed only after the first echelon forces had been substantially engaged by the enemy. To some extent the second echelon can be viewedeserve, but it isaneuverin force, often with predetermined objectives* The Soviet concept of echelons is applicable at all levels, inoludi army, front, and even theater*


about ten days. Most of the trucksubstantial amount of the personnel of the service supportat front and army level would have to be mobilized from the Soviet economy. It is estimated that the complete organization of these two fronts into forces prepared tooordinated offensive would almost certainly take at least three weeks.

When this Warsaw Pact force is assembled its five fronts would containercent of them0 tanks,onventional artilleryombat aircraft,uclear-capable tactical missile and rocket launchers.

By the end of the first weekuildup had begun the Soviets would probably beosition--if theybegin introducing more Soviet combat units into the northern and southern fronts. By this time, effective Soviet command and control could be imposed over all the fronts. Even ifdid not begin until the Soviets' reinforcement was completed, however, they would probably still keep many of the East European forces in the first echelon whilearge Soviet second echelon. This would tend to ensure the East Europeans'to the war since the bulk of Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak forces would be engaged while Soviet contingents were behind them. Moreover, it would preserve large Soviet uncommitted forces for use in the main Warsaw Pact westward offensive.

In addition to the forces assigned opposite the Central Region the Soviets wouldarge strategic reserve composed of forces from the Kiyev and Moscow Military Districts. The Soviets would probably commit these reserves should serious reverses occur in any area but would always first view such commitment in the light of the situation in the Central Region. In any case/ by definition the strategic reserve would be withheld from combat at the outset of hostilities and would be retainedentral location from which it could be quickly deployed to the important potential trouble spots or to exploit favorable opportunities,

especially in the Central Region. Soviet forces in Hungary could support operations in either the central area or in the south.




Much less is known about Soviet planning foroutside the Central Region. Should the Soviets elect to execute the above described buildup against NATO, they would probably also mobilize their forces opposite Scandinavia and the southern flank of NATO for contingencies in those areas.

On the southern flank only the Bulgarians are likely to contribute to offensive action. Supported by the Soviet theater forces from the Odessa Military District, they could launch an offensive against Greece and European Turkey. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet would be important to such an offensive. The fleetalanced force designed to maintain Soviet naval supremacy in the Black Sea and provide logistic support for the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean. This fleet could also support land operations and conduct amphibious assault operations in the Black Sea. Should the Soviets fail to secure the Black Sea exit, they would be unable to reinforce or support the Mediterranean Squadron quickly. In any combat situation with NATO, short of general nuclear war, the Soviet surface forces in the Mediterranean would lack air cover and have limited underway replenishment facilities. They would seek to attack Western naval forces, particularly aircraft carriers. In addition, the Soviet threat to Western naval forces and sea lines of communication would be enhanced by the difficulties of detecting Soviet submarines, and by the USSR'sof bringing more submarines into the Mediterranean from the Atlantic.

Undoubtedly, the territories controlling the entrances to the Baltic and Black seas are desirable prizes in Soviet eyes. Neither, however, would be essential to the success of the main campaign against the Central Region. An attack on the Turkish Straits, in particular, would tend to divert Soviet forces which might be needed as reserves for the main campaign, but would not be likely to draw substantial NATO forces away from the critical Central Region. In the case of eastern Turkey, the difficulty ofampaign, and the lack of important objectives, suggest that the Soviets would prefer tohreatening stance there with minimum forces in order to keep Turkish forces in place.


The Defense Intelligence Agenay feels that an attack on the Turkish Straits vould not tend to divert Soviet forces intended for the Central Region, The Warsaw Pact has Bulgarian, possibly Romanian, and Soviet forces from the Odessa Military District which could be employed in an attack in thie area. Soviet strategic reserves exist. The Soviet forces in Bungary and the Hungarian forces also could be used,

Soviet naval forces in the northajor threat to NATO control of the Atlantic. The Northern Fleet is the largest Soviet fleet and the only one of the three Soviet European fleets with unimpeded access to the^open ocean. In times of crisis the Soviets would seek to augment the Northern Fleet with units from the Baltic.

Despite the difficult terrain and climate of northernoviet attack there would be militarily feasible

an attack would be to take Norway out of NATO and preclude NATO use of Norwegian territory and, in the event of prolonged hostilities, to provide bases for Soviet naval and air operations.

If the Soviets planned an attack on Norway they might violate Finnish territoryeans ofand broadening the attack. However, to do so would risk involving both Finland and Sweden and entangling large Soviet forces in Scandinavia.

In the light of the cost weighed against the gains to be had inore reasonable Soviet course of action would seem to be to attempt to frighten Norway into inaction by threats rather than attacks. In anyuccessful campaign in the NATO Central Region would probably put the Sovietsosition to dictate the fate of Scandinavia without direct use of force.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feels that Norway ie the key to control of the sea and air routes used by Soviet air and naval forces to reach the Atlantic. Soviet occupation of Norway would provide ice-free naval bases for tactical operations against


northern Europe and would jeopardize NATO's ability to protect sea lines of communications in the Atlantic. Tn the light of thethat would accrue to the Soviets it is probable that they would carry out such an operation in the event of hostilities with NATO.

The Warsaw Pact planning provides few options with regard to the size of forces, axes of their employment, or the area of the conflict. Specifically, any action executed against any part of NATO for any objective runs the risk of triggering the full NATO response against the Warsaw Pact. In short, no matter how hostilities begin, the Soviets would attempt to develop their forces in accordance with the basic war plans.

Soviet and Warsaw Pact armed forces are militarily capable of conducting operations not involving the main force of either side. ecision to limit operations would not change the requirement to stand readyull scale NATO response against any or all of the Warsaw Pact area. esult, the basic Warsaw Pact force levels, structures, dispositions, or plans would not change substantially should an action occur, be threatened, or be planned on the flanks.

Nonnuclear Capability

"Flexible response" concepts have entered Soviet military doctrine during the past few years. force advocates who in the past have warned that any conflict with the West would inevitably and quickly escalateeneral nuclear war are now arguing that new conventional war options exist because of the growing strategic nuclear capability of the USSR-

The clearest evidence that Soviet thinking has gone beyond the talking stage and that somein practice of the strict nuclear war doctrine has already taken place comes from Warsaw Pact In recentumber of these have followed scenarios which assumed that the war beganATO conventional attack. Typically, Warsaw Pactforces would defeat this attack, whereupon NATO would resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.


Then the Warsaw Pact forces, reinforced from the USSR and using nuclear weapons, would launch athat would overrun Europe. Earlier exercises simply depicted an initial nuclear exchange after which surviving Soviet forces achieved victory.

Recent changes in the structure of Soviet forces are more tangible evidence of Soviet acceptance of the possibility of nonnuclear war. Field artillery in line divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) has been increased. In the motorized riflemm howitzers were added to the artillery regimentmm howitzers were added to each motorizedpercent increase in GSFG motorized rifle division artillery. In the tank divisions of GSFG,mm howitzers were added to the division artillery regimentmm howitzers were added to thepercent increase in tank division artillery. In both the motorized rifle and the tank divisions the number of multiple rocket launchers wasfromnd the FROG battalion of each division gained one launcher, raising the total number of divisional FROG launchers to 4.

Aside from these artillery increases, however, it is not evident that the Soviets are attempting totheir ground forces to improveustained nonnuclear war.

The Soviets have not increased their infantry strength facing NATO. In fact, the more recent trends in armored personnelthe development of theB and the tracked infantry combat vehicle, whichingle infantry squadow-silhouette, tracked, heavily armed, amphibious armored that Soviet thinking onorganization and tactics remains relatively unchanged since the early Sixties, with this new scale of equipment, infantry combat power willincrease, but the logistical and service support burdens imposed by these vehicles will increase as well.


The Soviets* greatest potential weakness incombat is logistic support. For example, although the Soviets have increased the number of artillery pieces they have not increased theirsupply rates, which are low by US standards.

Combat-strength Soviet line divisions carry three days' supplies for intensive combat, and Soviet field army mobile reserves amount to about two days*supplies per division. Soviet combat units then would be dependent for resupply on the rear services of the front. Most of the trucksubstantial number of personnel of the rear services organization called for in the basic plan must be mobilized. Major elements of the rear services were successfully mobilized and tested during8 Czechoslovak crisis, although the total rear services organization has not been comprehensively tested.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feels that definitive information is lacking on the order of battle and the function of Soviet combat service support. The extensive POL and ammunition storage facilities Eastern Europe indicate that the Soviets should be able to satisfactorily support the forces currently deployed.

DIA also believes that there is substantive intelligence available to draw the conclusion that the Soviets "have not increased their ammunition supply rates. "

The central and inescapable characteristic of the Soviet forces is their superiority in numbers of tanks. Evenuclear war, Soviet doctrinethe current order of battle would readilyconcentration of upanksreakthrough zoneide. onnuclear situation, the Soviets

might concentrate that number of tanks on even less frontage.

This reliance on armor has resultedow ratio of infantry to tanks in the Warsaw Pact forces, in pure numbers, the Soviets and their Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak allies could assemble0 medium and heavy tanks opposite NATO's central Region and back these up withore in strategic reserves (in the Moscow and Kiyev military districts). This would giveumericalin battle tanks over NATO on the ordero 1. On the other hand, after reinforcement, the Warsaw Pact forces in the Central Region and in the strategic reserve would have onlyiflemen, which is about the same as NATO has in the Central Region.

After being reorganizedhe Soviet Tactical Air Force emphasized qualitativein its air defense capabilities and put less emphasis on the development of nonnuclear ground attack capabilities. Most new aircraft (thend theere originally designed as interceptors. The use of these aircraft in the ground attack role is limited by their small payload capacities (no moreounds) and short combat radii. Therewer light bomber, which entered service in the early sixties, alsomall payload capacitynd it is out of production, with onlyeployed. Recently the Soviets have increased the survivability of the tactical air forces by constructing aircraft shelters and by addingissiles and antiaircraft guns for airfield defense.

Nuclear Warfare Capability in Europe

The Soviets now accept the possibilityarsaw Pact conflict can be fought solely with conventional weapons. The exercise scenarios probably reflect genuine contingency plans but the nonnuclear phase portrayed has notarsaw Pactof moreew days. The Soviets apparently do not believe that NATO would accept total defeat without resort to all available weapons.

The Soviets have equipped their theater forcesariety of nuclear-capable weapon systems, including rockets, missiles, and tactical aircraft. In addition, the Soviets havetrategic missiles located in the USSR whose targets are almost certainly in Western Europe. Soviet Long Range Aviationarge force of medium range bombers that would be used for strikes against Western Europe. The diesel powered ballistic missilein the Soviet Northern Fleet are alsoto be targeted for the most part against Western Europe. I '" idoes not indicate the targeting, target priorities, or command and control procedures which the Soviets would use in employing these strategic means of attack in support ofin Central or Eastern Europe. (See

Warsaw Pact Strengths

A major strength of the Warsaw Pact is itsto rapidly concentrate large, tank-heavy forces against NATO frontiers. In the main areas of possible conflict withthe CentralWarsaw Pactarge combat-ready force of someivisions with more0 tanks supported byactical aircraft.

In about three weeks the Warsaw Pact couldbuild up forces totaling aboutrmies consisting ofivisions against the various NATO frontiers-aboutf these armies against NATO's Central Region alone. These forces would give the Warsawank superiority over NATO of about three to one.

Valuable practice and training of Pact active and reserve personnel was provided by8 invasion of Czechoslovakia. During this operation some of the forces from five countries were ultimately deployed. Infrequent training exercises are conducted byof Pact forces in the forward areas geared tocontingency plans against NATO. Multinational Pact exercises are also conducted severalear.

Nearly all Soviet fighter bases in Eastern Europe have hardened shelters for all of their aircraft.

thereby increasing their chances for survival in the event of hostilities particularly in conventional war.

The Warsaw Pact fronts have strong organic tactical nuclear capability. In addition, the Soviets have the capability to support these fronts with MRBMs, IRBMs, and other strategic weapon systems. The Soviets also haveubmarines of all types for use in support of hostilities in Europe.

Warsaw Pact Weaknesses

Despite the overall numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces available for the Central Region, these forces have some weaknesses and potential vulnerabilities. Except for the Soviet and East German forces now deployed in the forward area, Warsaw Pact forces would require large numbers of reservists and civilian trucks to reach combat strength. These reservists, which would make up the bulk of the support forces as well as the infantry, generally lacked training in their wartime assignments prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the crisis,oviet divisions and someunits were built up to combat strength with reservists. Since the Czechoslovak crisis, however, there has been no indication of an effort to increase or improve Soviet reservist training. The civilian trucks lack many of the mechanical capabilities of military trucks and are less well maintained.

The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that the discussion given of reserve training is highly misleading. The Soviet and East European countries maintain very extensive premilitary, active duty, and reserve training programs. The great bulk of the fit young men serve two or three years of conscript duty in the active forces. More thanillion such men are returned to civilian life from the services each year. Any of those who had been released from service within the past year or two would be almost immediately effective in their militaryin the infantry and support oategories--upon mobilisation.

- 24 -


The amount of reserve refresher training given to men out of the service varies and probably diminishes as they grot? older. Many thousands of reserves receive some training with the active forces each year, however. On balance, the ready availability of very large numbers of suitably trained menact strength*eakness.

DIA further believes that the bulk of the Pact civilian trucks are comparable in basic characteristics to their military counterparts.

After mobilization, the infantry strength of the Warsaw Pact forces would be light and wouldarge proportion of reservists. More than half the infantry in the force lacks modern amphibious armored personnel carriersnd some divisions would have to substitute trucks for APCs.

Soviet tube artillery is towed rather than self-propelled; it is generally lighter in caliber than NATO artillery and is outranged by some. Soviet techniques for the employment of artillery are not up to those of the US. In Soviet artillery units theretrong tendency to rely on rigid prior planning, and they do not practice many of the modern techniques for the massing of fires.

Although the Warsaw Pact would haveimes as many artillery weapons as NATO, including roughly twice as many guns and howitzers, planned Warsaw Pact supply rates for artillery areittle more than one-third of NATO rates. Taking into account the weaknesses in Soviet artillery tactics and gunnery techniques, and the Soviets' low ammunition supply rates, it appears that NATO artillery would probably be capable ofreater overall volume of accurate artillery fire than Warsaw Pact artillery.


The Defense Intelligence Agency does not concur that all the views represented are Pact weaknesses. To do eo would force one to believe that the Soviets have not given careful thought to the manner in which they have organized and equipped their forces for any future combat. DIA alto believes that there is insufficient substantive intelligence available to draw the conclusion that the Soviets have not increased their ammunition supply rates.

The need toorce0 tanks planned for employment in the Central Region in intensive combat over great distances will surely tax the limitedcapability of the Pact. Warsaw Pact forces would be vulnerableombination of effective antiarmor warfare tactics, forces, and weapons and successful interdiction of the logistic system.

The Defense Intelligence Agency believes that the largo number of tanks in the Pact forcetrength,ource of Any logistics limitations are, inunction of the number of tanks to be This uould be accounted for inby the Soviets and it is unlikely that they intend to employ more tanks than they can effectively support. Further, even in the initial phaee of operations, all the tanke will not be engaged continuously in "intensiveut rather, at times, also at "average" or even "low" combat levels. Whether or not they range over "great distances" will depend on the logistics support available as well as combat success. DIA agrees that "Pact forces


would be vulnerableombination ofantiarmornd successfulof the logisticut thisulnerability that ie contingent upon uncertain NATO capabilities andact weakness.


The present posture of Warsaw Pact forces intended for employment against NATO is essentially defensive. This is evidenced by the structure, disposition, and state of readiness of Pact forces both in the forward areas and in the western USSR. However, Warsaw Pact tactical doctrine emphasizes offensive operations and, once hostilities began in the Central Region or appeared inevitable, the Soviets would probably attempt to seize the initiative as soon as possible andarge scale offensive.

The Defense Intelligence Agency feels that Warsaw Pact forces cannot be categorized as either offensive or defensive because the Soviet posture in Eastern Europe containsoffensive capabilities.

Without reinforcement, the forward elements of the Warsaw Pact forces are not capable of overwhelming NATO in the Central Region. To ensure success, the Soviets would probably judge it mandatory to complete the mobilization and assembly of the bulk of all five fronts in the forward area before launching an attack. This process would almost certainly take at least three weeks and be identified by NATO.

The Defense Intelligence Agency agrees that "without reinforaement, the forward elements of the Warsaw Pact are not capable of overwhelming NATO in the Centraln the full meaning of the termhe forward deployed Pact forces could, however, owerful attack, achieve significant penetration, and maintaintactical momentum until additional forces were brought up. This attack could occur with little or no prior detection by NATO.

Additionally, the Pact could increase the strength of the forces in the forward area withouteaction by the West by disguising their reinforcement in the form of an exerciee or they could prepare forces in the western edge of the USSR for rapid reinforcement with little chance of detection. Nevertheless, the Soviets could not have high confidence that their plans would go undetected or that they could overrun NATO without mobilization.

In the Soviet view, the forces of the Warsaw Pact are not intendedurprise general They are designed to resist any NATO military initiative while being reinforced, and to counterorce capable of neutralizing NATO military capabilities and securing the continent of Europe. The Pact forces are intended to execute this mission whatever the broader world military situation, which may or may not include general war.

To achieve their objectives, tho Sovietsasic war plan for the employment of Warsaw Pact

forces against NATO, This plan provides, afterand reinforcement, for employing five fronts against NATO's Central Region* Thisand capabilities of the Warsaw Pact do not exclude the possibility of soviet military operations in other areas. However, any such operations would have to take into account the major threat to the Warsaw Pact in the Central Region, This threatmajor shifts of Pact reinforcements from their designated areas of employment to other areas.

The Warsaw Pact has vulnerabilities, particularly in hostilities which extend beyond the period ofshort endurance for which the Pact forces are now configured. With its heavy dependence on tanks, the Pact would be vulnerable to an effective NATO antitank capability combined with restriction of Soviet lines of supply- The present posture of the Warsaw Pact necessitates the mobilization and movement of large reserves over great distances before they can be committed against NATO*

The Defense Intelligence Agency does not believe that the capabilities of Pact forces are of "short endurance* " Rather, their capabilities would grow steadily as they draw upon their extensive reserves of manpower and equipment and take advantage of their direct overland access to the battle area.

Moreover, the configuration of the present forces, which gives rise to the Judgment in the paragraph above, would be drastically altered with mobilization. In particular, the current "low" infantry-to-tank ratio and the relatively "limited" rear services (logistics) apparatus would be steadily overcome as these would be


DIA questions whether the "heavy dependence" of the Pact on tanks makes it vulnerable to antitank warfare. It aertainly cannot be presumed that the Paot would be lessif the attacking force contained less armor. Additionally, DIA believes that the degree of Paot vulnerability to SATO antitank and interdiction efforts is almost entirely dependent on SATO capabilities which are not disaueoed in this paper.



II. Composition of the Forces

This section discusses the organization, current dispositions, and peacetime combat readiness of the Warsaw Pact general purpose forces facing NATO. The ability of the US intelligence community to estimate the size and capability of these forces has greatly improved over the last three years. New informationariety of sources and improved methodology hasomprehensive reassessment of theand status of the Soviet ground and tactical air forces which constitute the bulk of the Warsaw Pact forces available for war in Europe.

Ground Forces

The Sovietsarge number of relatively small, heavily armored divisions at various levels of readiness. For the most part, divisions at the higher levels of readiness are subordinated to armies (in some cases to corps). In wartime these armies and corps would be incorporated into the so-called fronts. The combat power of Soviet ground forces isin the division reater extent than in Western forces, and the higher Soviet echelons have fewer combat and support units. In*general, the levels of service support are austere.


There is no evidence that the Soviets consider any of their present large theater force commands asterra apparently reserved for wartime artime front would consist of at least three ground armies (and/or corps)actical air army. It might also include one or more airborne divisions. In addition, fronts would contain such nondivisional support as artillery divisions ortactical missile units, air defense missile units, engineer units, and rear services.

The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) isront in being. Upon mobilization for operations in Europe, two fronts would probably be formed in the USSR's western military districts (MDs) for reinforcement opposite the Central Region of NATO, and one might be formed in the Odessa MD on the southern flank of NATO*

In wartime, the Soviets would probably establish theater level headquarters in areas involving more than one front and/or elements from several types ofe.g. theater forces, air defense forces, and strategic attack forces.

Armies and Corps

It is believed that in wartime Soviet ground forces would be deployed and fought primarily as armies or corps. There areoviet ground armies; it is expected that additional armies will be formed in the Sino-Soviet border area. Most of the armies within the USSR would require mobilization of army level support units prior to commitment. The armies in GSFG, however, are almost certainly combat ready as they now stand.

Soviet armies haveine divisions and additional supporting units. These armies areintended for commitment with their normally assigned division structure, but the Soviets have demonstrated that divisions can be readilyamong armies if necessary. Armies areof two types: the tank army, in which allajority of the divisions are tank divisions, and the combined-arms army, in which allajority of the divisions are motorized rifle divisions. Most armies now appear to be of the combined-arms type.

Soviet armies have rather light combat support. Typical of army level combat support units arc: an artillerycud missile brigaden air defense missile regiment;



a signal regiment; engineer bridging and assault river crossing units. The inclusion of such units in the various armies apparently depends upon wartime missions and peacetime readiness levels. For example, in GSFG one, possibly two, of the five armies lack an artillery brigade. The army troops of Soviet armies in the GSFG range0 men.

Thereozen or so Soviet corps headquarters. They do not represent an intermediate echelon between division and army headquarters. In most cases they function as small army headquarters. They have few nondivisional support units, sometimes none. Three of the five divisions now deployed in Czechoslovakia are subordinatedorps hcaquarters.


The Soviets nowotal of atine divisons of three different types: otorized rifle,ank,irborne. On the basis of theof forces, someivisions of this total are intended to confront NATO in the event hostilities began before Warsaw Pact mobilization.

Tho Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions are basically designed for combat of short durationuclear battlefield. Theyery high proportion of tanks to personnel, and when fully equipped with vehicles they have excellent tactical mobility. To achieve these characteristics the Soviets havestaying power to some extent. The divisions are apparently designed to fight until relieved by fresh divisions.

East European line divisions are generallyon the Soviet model, although there arevariations in some countries. In general, East European field armies do not exist as separate entities in peacetime, but East European ground forces conduct army level exercises, and some front level elements probably exist in peacetime. In wartime, armies would be formed during mobilization



from staff elements and units of the territorial

military commands. They would containo

5 divisions and combat and service support units,

and would be similar to the Soviet combined-aims armies.

Categories of Readiness

Soviet ground divisions vary widely in terms of peacetime personnel strength, levels of major items of equipment on hand, and modernity of equipment. They also vary as to the extent and type of training conducted. Available evidence on Soviet divisionseasonably firm basis for estimatinglevels and the extent of training activity. Information on personnel strengths is less complete. It is believed, however, that thereelationship between equipment and personnel levels.

Despite considerable variation, Soviet divisions fall into three general groupings consistent with the states of readiness described in Soviet military writings. Divisions stationed in areas where filler personnel and equipment are not readily available, such as those in Eastern Europe and some of those in the Sino-Soviet border area, probably have all or almost all of their equipment and personnel. The seven Soviet airborne divisions are probably equipped and manned at the same general levels. Theseare essentially combat ready as they stand. These are designated Category I.

Also designatedumber oflocated in the western USSR which can be readied for commitment very quickly. They are not manned and equipped at the same high levels as those described above, but can be fleshed out with specified local reservistsivilian vehicles and be made ready to moveay or two, thus meeting the criteriaigh state of readiness- These divisions haveoercent of their equipment on hand. Their personnel strengths probably range around two-thirds of the level found in divisions in the GSFG,

but with considerable variation among divisions. strengths would tend to be higher intank units and lower in motorized rifle units.

The second major grouping consists of divisions having aboutoercent of their equipment. Their personnel strengths vary considerably, probably ranging from about one-quarter to one-half of GSFG levels. These divisions could be filled up withaugmented with upivilian vehicles, and deployed within several dayseek. These are designated Category II.

There are some Soviet divisions with even less equipment than Category II divisions. They probably containen each, primarily an officer cadre and enlisted caretaker elements. They appear to be intended for later mobilization, and probably could not be equipped like other Soviet divisions without increased new production. These areCategory III or cadre divisions.

Few, if any, of the East European divisions are maintained at full strength during peacetime. The best of these would containoercent reservists after mobilization. Some of the lower-strength and newly activated units would requireo B0 percent reservists as fillers. Like the Soviets, the East Europeans would require significant numbers ofin order to form army and front level units.

Division Equipment

The Soviet motorized rifle division (MRD) at full strength has0 men andajor items of equipment. The equipmentediumrmored personnel carriersndrtillery pieces. The Soviet tank division at full strength hasenajor items of equipment,edium tanks,PCs, andrtillery pieces. Soviet airborne divisions haveenajor items of equipment.


A few tank divisions have previously been carried as "heavy tank divisions." These were smallerotorized rifle regiment) and contained heavy tanksnd Heavy tanks are still observed in some tank divisions, but it is not certain nowheavy tank division" existseparate type-Soviet divisions inside the USSR, with theof those along the Sino-Soviet border, are probably not as generously equipped with new model equipment as those in GSFG. There is, however, no apparent uniform distribution of new equipment. New models of armored vehicles have been detected in some divisions of each category,arpathian MOI division which participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia lacked antitank guided missiles and was short of APCs. (After it became part of the occupation force, these deficiencies werewo Category II divisions mobilized at the time of the invasion had few or no APCs. On the other hand, one division from the Baltic MD was fully equipped with the newest Soviet medium tank,

Armored Vehicles

By far the predominant feature of Soviet ground force equipment is the tank. The Soviets would require0 medium tanks to equip all categories of divisions fully. odest estimate of tanks not in divisions would raise this number toarge scale and continuous peacetime tank production would be necessary to meet these requirements and toodernization program. It is believed that the annual production45 model medium tanks8 was adequate tourrent inventory of0 of these tanks and to account for Soviet exports to other countries. The newest medium tank,as been producedore moderate pace; are probably now in inventory. The remaining requirementanks) appears to have been met at least to someby the use of older model tanks and assault guns. No large reserves of Soviet tanks are known to exist.


Soviet tactical doctrine calls for the mounting of all infantry in amphibious APCs, preferably on the basis of one perwould require0 vehicles. To equip all Soviet forces with APCs on the lesser scale evident in GSFG, the Soviets would require an inventory of0 such vehicles. Analysis indicates that there are0 APCs in the Soviet inventory, fewer than half of which are new amphibious modelsnd The rest are older modelndhich are essentially nonamphibious armored trucks with relatively poor cross-country mobility. Some APCs are found in divisions at all levels of readiness, but in generalivisions in the USSR probably have fewer APCs (and older models) than found in GSFG divisions. Many Category II divisions probably depend primarily on using mobilized civilian trucks for personnel carriers.

Artillery Support

A high density of tanks provides Soviet ground forces with very heavy direct fire support. Sovietto provide continuous indirect fire support are less impressive. One common Soviet practiceto compensate for this is the use of tanks to provide indirect fire support from defilade positions. The emphasis on tank fire is fully consistent with Soviet concepts of ground force operations in theenvironment.

Recent changes in Soviet artillery strength in the GSFG have resulted in an overall increasen the number of guns available. In addition, there haspercent increase in the number of multiple rocket launchers. These increases have probably also occurred in some of the forces along the Sino-Soviet border, but there is no evidence of them in other ground forces elsewhere in the USSR. Theseimprove the capabilities of the ground forces for conventional operations. All Soviet tube artillery is towed rather than self-propelled. It is generally lighter in caliber than NATO artillery and isby some.

Soviet techniques for the employment of artillery are not up to those of the OS. Theretrongfor Soviet artillery to rely on rigid prior planning. The Soviets do not practice many of the modern techniques for the massing of fires. Much of the recent increase in Soviet field artillery results from increased organic artillery in motorized infantry regiments.

Airborne Forces

The Soviets have seven airborne divisions, alldirect control of the Ministry of Defense. Fiveseven divisions are available for earlyNATO. These airborne divisions, which arecombat ready, haveenof equipment.

There are now as manyedium transports assigned to military transport units, of whichreubs. f the latter provide the main intertheater lift for theater forces and haveain mission the support of airborne troops. These could lift assault elements of twodivisions for airdropadius ofautical miles. Some Cubs have improved range and weight-carrying capabilities;f these could liftaratroops with supporting equipmentadius ofm,aximum rangem. In an emergency, this lift capability could be augmented by other military transport and by medium and long range aircraft in the Soviet Civil Air Fleet.

Only one East European member of the Warsawan airborne division. The Polish airborne division, however, is about two-thirds the sizeoviet airborne division and the Poles must rely on Soviet military air transports to lift the entire division at one time.

Czechoslovakia has-an airborne brigade subordinate to its Ministry of Defense,eparate Special Forces type airborne regimentto the Military Intelligence Section of the

General Staff. This regiment is intended for covert operations in enemy rear areas. Czechoslovakia has some organic airborne transports, but relies on Soviet transports to lift its entire brigade. Romania hasan Parachute Regiment; Bulgaria and East Germany eachingle battalion ofen and Hungary has an airborne training unit.

Amphibious Forces

There are currently0 men in the Soviet naval infantry, organized into brigade-size units, with two brigades located in the Baltic Fleet, two in the Black Sea Fleet, two in the Pacific Fleet, and one in the Northern Fleet. The naval infantry's missions are apparently to assist in seizing criticaland to conduct diversionary operations on the seaward flank. mall force of naval infantry has been present from time to time in the Mediterranean sincehey have conducted several landing exercises. The current small number of landing ships in each of the fleet areas restricts the landing force to battalion or brigade size.

Poland also has an amphibious landing force. This

force ofen consists of three regiments (two operational and one training) and one medium tank battalion, and one two-launcher FROG (free rocket over ground) section. Poland'solnocny class LSMs andCPs could transport about one regiment in an assault landing.

Missile Support

The general support tactical ballistic missile is the Scud, which is allocated to army and front echelons of organization. It is believed there are aboutcud brigades in the USSR and in the GSFG. In the GSFG, each army is believed to haveauncher brigade. There are probably two larger brigades {up toaunchers) subordinate to GSFG Headquarters. Ground forces in the USSR probably have about the same level of Scud support as in the



Soviet divisions deployed in Eastern Europe have FROG battalions probably with four launchers each.nd II divisions within the USSR areto have three FROG launchers) Category III divisions may have two launchers each.

Soviet ground commanders have long complained of the lackactical missile system with the range and mobility suited to the needs of the front. The Soviets haveissile, thehich can meet these needs: it is estimated to be capable ofound warheadangeautical miles. There is no evidence, however, that theissile is deployed with the ground forces.

Thes believed to be carried by thetransporter-erector-launcher. Scaleboard units are probably under the control of the Strategic Rocket Forces rather than the ground forces. It is likely, however, that Scaleboard would be used in support of theater operations if required. This is especially true in the Sino-Soviet border area, where Soviet ground forces cannot call upon the heavy missile support from medium-range ballistic missiles (HRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) available in the west. There may also be some mobile Shaddock cruise-missile units which could providefront level support.

The Soviets have conventional high explosivefor Frogs and Scuds, but there is littlaindicating the numbers of such warheads available or thair tactical use. These warheads probably now include some of the high fragmentation, improved conventional munitions type. This type of warhead for FROGs and Scuds would greatly improve their effectiveness for nonnuclear operations.

Tactical Air Support and Theater Air Defense

Frontal Aviation

The mission of the Soviet Tacticalcallod "Aviation of theto support the theater/front commander. The functions of Tactical


Aviation include air superiority operations, close air support and interdiction in conjunction with ground force operations, strikes against targets of strategic importance to the front, and air defense of the theater of operations* Tactical Aviation also provides reconnaissance support and operations, and some air transportation. The air elements to perform these functions are organized into tactical air armieshich in wartime are assigned to fronts.

Thedentified TAAs vary greatly in size and composition. The largest ish TAA, deployed in East Germany. It is estimated to haveombat aircraft,ercent fewer than last year. This reduction is due to last year's withdrawal of Brewer-equipped light bomber units to the USSR. ew air army has probably been created in the Trans-Baikal-Mongolia areat now containsombat aircraft. The other air armies in the Far East have been strengthened also. The additional aircraft were drawn primarily from reserves-

Tactical Aviation is now composed largely of fighter aircraft. It is estimated that there now areighters in regiments whose primary mission is air defensen regiments whose primary mission is ground attack. In addition, there areight bombers in strike units andighter and light bomber types in reconnaissance and strike reconnaissance units.

There are inlder model tactical aircraft collocated at Tactical Aviation bases. There is some evidence indicating that ground attack regiments haveighters instead of theurrently estimated. If so, this would indicate that about half of the collocated aircraft are in factto Tactical Aviation. The Soviets continue toeserve of older aircraft which has been used to equip new Tactical Aviation units along the Sino-Soviet border and for deliveries to other nations, particularly the Arab states. Some of these aircraft are believed to have gone to the Soviet air training establishment, which has been substantially increased.



There areighters and light bombers in Tactical Aviation whose primary function is toclose air support, air strike, and interdiction missions. The capabilities of this force were improved in recent years through reequipping of fighter units with theitter and light bomber units with therewer. However, this reequipment programear or so ago, leaving over half the ground attack/tactical strike force still equipped with the obsolescentrescos andeagles.

Both the Fresco and the Fitter were designed as interceptors. Their performance in ground attack roles is characterized by short combat radii and small payloads. Their design and rugged construction,make them well suited for operations fromor improvised airfields. Soviet tactical air doctrine indicates that ground attack fighters would be rather widely dispersed on unimproved fields and suitable highway sectionsilometers behind the front lines. Bomber and reconnaissance regiments would apparently beilometers behind the front lines.

The Soviet nuclear stockpile includes bombs for delivery by tactical aircraft. Soviet Tactical Aviation can deliver nuclear bombs with both fighters and light bombers. Ground attack fighter regiments are trained in sophisticated bombing techniques. The Soviets also have toxic chemical bombs available for tactical use and some aircrews specially trained for their delievery. There is no evidence of Soviet use of tactical aircraft for spray dissemination ofwarfare (CW) agents,apability to employ this technique cannot be ruled out. The Sovietsariety of conventional munitions for delivery by Tactical Aviation, including bombs,ounds.

Judged in the light of equipment, training, and normal operations. East European air forces are largely for national air defense. Ofombatalmost all are interceptors. The proportion of

new model aircraft in East European air forces hasfrom one-quarter last year to one-third now through the delivery of new fighters. Almost all aircraft delivered to the East Europeans during the past two years have been all-weatherishbed interceptors.

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria have ground attack air regiments, but only the Czechsignificant number of new model ground attack fighters The Poles have mostly older models in ground attack roles. The Bulgarians have two regiments of. All East European fighter regiments, however, are cross-trained, probably to about the same extent as Soviet tactical air units.

Transport Aviation and Helicopters

Soviet Tactical Aviation units provide light troop transport and utility support to the ground forces withight and medium transports such as Cab, Crate, and Camp andelicopters, primarily Hound and Hook. Most of the TAAs have one or more regiments equipped with helicopters. Over half the regiments haveoeavy andoedium helicopters.

The Soviets continue torowing appreciation for the tactical employment of armed helicopters, but there is no evidence that they haveelicopter intended specifically for armed missions. Light and medium helicopters have been observed armedariety of weapons such as machine guns, rockets, and antitank guided missiles.

Air Defense

Soviet theater force air defenses in Eastern Europe are coordinated with the national air defenses of the other Warsaw Pact countries and with the air defenses of the USSR. Air defenses of all theater forces would probably act in accordance with the general plans of the Soviet Commander of Air Defense until those forces were committed to ground operations. At that time, control would probably be maintained by the Deputies for Air Defense of the major force commanders.



During the past year, the Soviets have continued to exhibit major concern for improving their airposture in the forward area, particularly against low-altitude attack. The Soviets have approximatelyadar stations in Eastern Europe, and are continuing to deploy the tower-mounted Squat Eye radar at those stations. This radar, first observedsthe low-altitude surveillance and trackingdowneet. It is possible that where the terrain is suitable this capability isperhaps as loweet. rack-mounted air surveillance radar. Long Track, has also been deployed in Eastern Europe at Soviet radar stations. Data transmission systems for rapid reporting of tracking information and for ground control ofhave probably been widely deployed with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

There areast European radar stations. These stations are equipped with the same types of radars employed by Soviet forces. Each nationits own air warning and control system. It is not known how warning and control information isamong the several East European systems and those of the Soviet theater forces, but such coordination almost certainly exists.

0 the Soviets haveubstantial qualitative improvement in the air defense elements of Tactical Aviation. Most of the aircraft delivered to the force in recent years have been late model, all-weatherishbeds, which now constitute more thanercent of the aircraft in air defense Theightweight, ruggedly designed,ll-weather interceptor, can also perform the air superiority mission. This aircraft has operated for sustained periods from unimproved airfields. It has been produced in eight, possibly nine, variants. The latest variant, identified in East Germany, has improved payload capabilities and improved air intercept radar.

As in the case of tactical air support aircraft, Soviet tactical air defense fighters can theoretically

lying rate of four or five sorties per day.



The principal constraint on sortie rates is pilot fatigue and logistic support. The pilot-to-aircraft ratio in air defense regiments isohe logistic support at permanent improved airfields couldortie rateer day for atew days. Soviet tactical air defense aircraft were designed to operate under the austere conditionsattlefield environment. The sortie rates of units operating from unimproved airfields would probably be low.

Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have abouturface-to-air missile battalions. Anegiment, which usually consists of three battalions, is deployed with the Groups of Soviet Forces in Poland, Hungary, and probably Czechoslovakia. In East Germany there areegiments deployed for defense of GSFG. in the USSR, there are probablyodditionalattalions manned by airtroops of the ground forces. Theystem

deployed with theater forcesapability to

intercept targets

r rt * * 1 i ii i w nmmmw =

it isrimarily ror aerense or relatively static rear area installations, as it is not mobile enough to provide continuous support to maneuvering troops.

Theas been deployed in East Europe to provide low altitude point defense of Soviet tactical airfields in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Under favorable conditions, including optimum acquisition, this system can intercept aircraft ateetangem. Depending on the conditions of weather, site masking, elevation of the fireradar, speed and reflective area of the target, the minimum altitude could be as loweet at rangesm.

The Soviets are now deploying the track-mountedystem into the theater forces. Theas been identified at training sites in East Germany. Theange ofom and is believed to be able to engage targets down toeet at shorter ranges.

The Soviets rely heavily on light antiaircraft artillery (AAA) for air defense of ground forces.



They haveew radar-controlled,m weapon, which is carriedracked chassis that also mounts the AAA fire control radar Gun Dish. Both the Gun Dish and the Flap Wheel (usedm and lower caliber) operate inand. The older Fire Can radar is also still in use with AAA guns.

In addition to the improvement of their active defenses, the Soviets have, sincengagedrogram to improve the survivability of their forces, especially in Eastern Europe. Revetments and/or hard shelters have been constructed at Soviet radar, command and control, ground and airto protect those resources. Camouflaging has been identified at radar sites and airfields.

The Soviets have the capability to jambombsights and to screen headquartersconcentrations, and other critical targetswith air defense weapons systemsin the field.


Electronic counter-counter-

measures [ECCHJ capabilities probably have been

incorporated into the Gun Dish and Flap Wheel AAA


Use of electronic countermeasures (ECM) by the Soviets to protect their tactical aircraft has been of rather limited nature. Generally they usefitted ECM aircraft for protection of tactical strike light bombers against enemy ground-based radar and weapons; active noise jammers and chaff, including the rocket-fired variety constitute the bulk of their ECM equipment. The strike aircraft have ECM equipment designed to defend against enemy fighters. Thisincludes an AI radar threat-warning system and chaff dispensers, and possibly jammers. Ground attack fighters may have cannon shell chaff for use against ground-based fire control radars.

Service Support of Theater Forces

The Soviet system of supply and maintenance support was designed to support theater forces in the context



rief nuclear war. Mobile stocks of conventional ammunition and fuel at division and army level arefor about five days of combat. Little is known of the availability of supplies at front level. The Soviet resupply system down to front level remains heavily dependent on the railways. The Sovietsystem is apparently based in large part on minimum peacetime use of essential items of equipment. This equipment is retained as much as possible in covered storage, with wheeled vehicles often up on blocks, combat loaded. Unit maintenance organizations at all levels are small. The Soviet system would probably be adequaterief nuclear war, but it appears less well suited for major conventionalof long duration*

The rear services of the front are responsible for the resupply of tactical air armies as well as the ground armies. Supply levels at permanent bases of TAAs are probably adequate to support sustained combat by air units for about the same duration as is the case with groundabout five days. Resupply after this period would be restrictedby the limited availability of transport,fuel trucks and pipeline equipment, at both front and air army levels. The extensivesupport system which would be required forair operations from dispersed unimproved airfields does not appear to be available in Soviet forces in East Germany.

The general austerity of rear service support has been sharply criticized by Soviet logisticians over the past several years, and some efforts have been made to remedy the situation. The fuel supply system has been improved through the introduction of collapsible portable storage tanks and pipeline units. The carrying capacity of general purpose transport has been increased through the introduction of new heavy duty trucks with four-wheeled trailers. The logistics load on the railroads has been reduced somewhat by the introduction of tank transporters, and by the expansion of the capabilities of transport aviation.



Naval Forces

in recent years the Soviets have made increasing use of naval forces for political ends, most notably in the Mediterranean. With its growing capabilities for long-range operations, the Soviet Navy will be more in evidence in support of specific political objectives in areas vital to NATO interests. In addition, Soviet naval units actorce in being capable of reacting to Western naval forces.

The Soviet concept of general war requires flank support for land forces in Europe, and probably for the seizure of the Black Sea and Baltic Sea exits.

To fulfill naval responsibilities in the defense of the Soviet homeland, the Soviet Navytrong capability in the immediate offshore areas, and is gradually extending the distance at which it can effectively conduct operations. By fitting surface-to-air missiles in its larger ships it has enhanced its capability to operate beyond the range of shore based air cover.

The Soviets are deeply concerned with the threat posed by Western carrier strike forces, and are striving to improve their capabilities in this area by improving their early warning and reconnaissance capabilities and by introducing new sophisticated weapons systems in submarines and surface units. In the Mediterranean, where US carriers are deployed so as to be continually within strike range of the USSR, Soviet policy is to maintain missile armed submarines and/or surface ships within missile range of the US ships.

The Soviets are not now capable of countering the threat posed by NATO ballistic missile submarines. However, they are placing considerable emphasis on antisubmarine warfare.

Soviet capabilities against NATO sea lines ofare greatest in the Northeast Atlantic and the Mediterranean and the primary threat to these lines is posed by the Soviet submarine force. It is

estimated that approximately one-third of the torpedo attack and cruise missile submarines in the Northern Fleet, could be maintained continuously on station, although more could be at sea at any one time.

While the new Soviet ballistic missile submarines oflass will be targeted against the US, older classes of ballistic missile submarines will probably be assigned targets in Western Europe. In addition, cruise missile submarines could attack land targets in Western Europe, although their primary wartime mission is to seek out and destroy western naval forces.

East German and Polish naval capabilities continue to improve with the acquisition of more modernand the broadening of operational experience, while those of Romania and Bulgaria have lagged behind the other Warsaw Pact countries. Warsaw Pact interfleet coordination has increased, and East European navies arereater role in Pact naval operations.

Mediterranean Sea

4 the Soviets have maintained naval vessels in the Mediterranean. However, lacking adequate air cover, the Soviet squadron is not capable of conducting extended operations against the Western navies. At the outset of hostilities, the Soviets would attempt to destroy Western carrier striking forces, and seal off the Mediterranean from naval reinforcement. Should the Soviets succeed in providing air cover, they could attempt to seal off the southeastern Mediterranean basin.

Baltic Sea

Baltic Warsaw Pact naval forces, in particular the numerous guided missile patrol boats and the amphibious forces,hreat to NATO control of the Baltic Sea outlets, and are capable of offensive operations against NATO forces.

Black Sea

Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian naval forces are capable of supporting land operations against the


Turkish Straits and of conducting small-scale amphibious landings and other operations against the Turkish Black Sea coast.

Theater Forces Facing NATO

Soviet theater force strength in Europe isopposite the Central Region of NATO. In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the Soviets maintainombat-ready divisions andombat aircraft. The East Germans, Poles, and Czechs can provide an additionalull strength divisionsay or soobilization orderombat aircraft immediately.

The Soviets apparently consider remoteudden outbreak of hostilities requiring the Warsaw Pact to fight without reinforcement. They base their planning on the assumptioneriod of pre-hostilities tension and mobilization on both sides, andarge number of divisions in the border MDs of the USSR which can be mobilized and readied to move westward quickly. The East Europeans model their mobilization system after the Soviet example.

We have good evidence from documents and defectors about Warsaw Pact goals for the scope and speed of reinforcement in Central Europe. According to this evidence, the Warsaw Pact would seek to confront NATOarge force at the outset of hostilities. We have no direct evidence as to the total size oforce, but on the basis of availability of forces we believe it would probably consist ofrganized intor more armies and fiveajor Warsaw Pact goal has been to be able to assembleorce and have it prepared for combat in about two weeksobilization order. The Soviets and some of their East European allies have vigorously attempted to achieve this goal despite limitations on resources available and the political struggles in Eastern Europe. By8 they had come close to reaching that goal.

Prior to the Czechoslovakian crisisarsaw Pact planning probably called for the deploy-

ment of three key first echelon fronts opposite NATOatterew days. These fronts would have containedoviet andast European combat-ready divisions. The central front (the main effort)of GSFG and some East German formations would have been complete. The northern and southern fronts composed primarily of Polish and Czech forces would have lagged behind the central front in the readiness of army and front level support because of thefor mobilization. Within aboutays, up todditional divisions drawn from the USSR could have been assembled with minimum essential army and front level support in eastern Poland and Czechoslovakia. These forces would have constituted the two frontsecond strategic echelon. Tactical air reinforcement from the western USSR would require little if any mobilization, and could be deployed into Eastern Europeatter of hours.

The situation which has evolved since the invasion of Czechoslovakia has probably altered Warsaw Pact reinforcement planning with respect to the Czech front. For the near term, the Soviets probably do not count on the Czechs to form an effective andfront, although they have not disposed their divisions to take over Czech positions opposite NATO. The Soviet forces inthe Central Group of Forcesnot large enough toront; in particular, army and front level support is minimal and combat air supportof only aboutighters. udden military confrontation with NATO the Soviets would have to rely on the Czechs backed up by the CGF. If the Soviets were toerious military confrontation with NATO they would probably expedite the forward movement of the front from the Carpathian HD to reinforce or take over the southern sector.

In current circumstances, and with speed the primary requirement, the Warsaw Pact could in about two weeks assemble the key combat elements of five fronts (including the Czechs) opposingin the first echelon and two in the second. The complete integration of divisions into effective armies and fronts would require more time. ituation where offensive capability against NATO



(rather than maximum speed) was the primethe Soviets would almost certainly take at least three weeks to complete mobilization and forward deployment to concentration areas in Eastern Europe.

The Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR, evidently intend to begin deploying the ready portions of their fronts from the interiors of their countries before the whole force is completely mobilized. The leading elements of the two Soviet fronts from the western USSR are expected to arrive in central Poland and Czechoslovakia within three to six days after mobilization begins. The Soviets anticipate that the main elements of these two fronts could participate in combat operations within two weeks afteris ordered.

This plan shifts part of the burden of maintaining large combat-ready forces from the USSR to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Of greater importance,ombat-ready Warsaw Pact force in the forward area partially resolves the problem which has faced the Soviets since the rearming of the West Germans and the formation of NATO: how toefense of Central Europe with the Soviet forces there until reinforcements could be brought upiles from the western USSR. Reinforcement is stillnecessary toorce large enough to ensure seizing the initiative from NATO andounteroffensive.

Possible Variations in the War Plan

In Warsaw Pact exercises which have rehearsed the war plan, the Pact's actions always appear to beto either an outright attack by NATO forces or to some other NATO military actions which appear toATO attack. The exercise scenarios usually allowrief defensive phase during which the Pact completes mobilization and reinforcement, after which the Pact seizes the initiative and launches an offensive.

If the Soviets were to deliberatelyull scale attack on NATO, they would probably make fundamental changes in their contingency plan. In that scheme, the East Europeans provideercent of the first echelon forces. If the Soviets were toeliberate aggression, they would probably


not be willing to rely on Poland and East Germany to furnish soroportion of the striking force. They would almost certainly not depend on theArmy, which was seriously demoralized by the Soviet intervention of8 and by thepurges and manpower reductions. Rather, the Soviets would probably incorporate substantial Soviet combat elements into both the Czechoslovak and Polish fronts, and would probably impose direct Soviet command and control over all fronts. Even if hostilities did not begin before the Soviet reinforcement was completed, however, they would probably keep many of the East European forces in the first echelon whilearge Soviet second echelon. This would tend to ensure East European commitment to the war since the bulk of Polish, East German, and Czechoslovak forces would be engaged while Soviet contingents were behind them.

The Soviets would have to take into account that the massive mobilization and large troop movements whichcheme would necessitate prior towould greatly increase the likelihood of early detection by NATO of their reinforcement. They would probably assume that this would increase the riskreemptive NATO attack innuclear weapons weredeployment would be severely hampered.

The war plan outlined on pagesith minor variations, is the only one practiced in Warsaw Pact exercises. lan for initiating an unprovoked attack exists, it would probably not be rehearsed overtly. Major variations in theuse ofvariationsthe maximum initial use of Sovietmight appear in an exerciseisguised aggression scenario. This has apparently not happened in any of the exercises so far.


The Soviet conscription and reserve systemmore than adequate total numbers of relatively young reservists to flesh out all divisions. However, in the interests of speed of mobilization, the combat units draw their reservists from the civilianin the immediate vicinity of their peacetime



garrisons. These reservists are designated by name by the voyenkomats (local military committees). esult, quickly mobilized Soviet units would probably contain some enlisted reservists in older age groups.

The Soviet reserve system calls for frequent mobilization exercises and periods of active duty for reservists. If the practice in oneivision is typical, however, it appears that such exercises are infrequent and reservist trainingconsists of lectures to reserve officers. There is some evidence that lessons learned from mobilization for the invasion of Czechoslovakia have prompted new emphasis on practice mobilization and reserve training.

The Soviet mobilization system can probably flesh out all divisions except Category IIIew daysobilization order and have them ready to move. In situations where speed of reinforcement is the overriding factor, mobilized divisions would be deployed regardless of their equipment status.

The Soviets relyell organized system for mobilizing civilian motor transport to offset the shortage of general purpose trucks in the ground forces. Portions of Soviet city motor pools arefor military use. Trucks and buses manned by reservists are formed into military transport columns which report to nearby divisions upon mobilization, where they are reassigned to various units. Most of these trucks probably serve as logistic support vehicles, but some are used in place of APCs. Army and front level truck transport units are probably mobilized similarly. The biggest drawback to this system is that, on the whole, the mobilized trucks are not well suited for military use, particularly with regard to off-road mobility.

The Soviets also plan to draw directly from the civilian economy other types of supportingngineer construction, railroad, signal, and medical units. They apparently do not count on quick mobilization of new unitsigh degree of specialized military training, such as Tacticaland missile units, although there isairly large pool of trained personnel to serve as fillers and replacements for standing units.

HI. Contingencies Leading toarsaw Pact Hostilities

This section discusses contingencies in whicharsaw Pact hostilities night arise, their relative likelihood, and various actions the Pact could undertake on its own initiative.

Factors Inhibiting Soviet Initiation of Hostilities

In the mind of the Communist leadership, the preservation of the Soviet stateriority far exceeding all other interests. During the post-Stalin period, the successive leaderships have given every indicationelief that, in the nuclear age, general war would pose the gravest risks to this objective.

This is not to say that Soviet policy has not been aggressive during this period, or that the USSR has not sought to use the weight of its military power to alter the status quo in its favor. But the USSR has periodically been aggressive, not in the military risks which it was willing to run, but rather in its probing to calculate exactly what military risks would be involved in any contemplated advance. In West Berlin, despite Khrushchev's repeatedof disbelief that the US would go to war over the city's fate, the USSR eventually backed off from its ultimatum without putting this proposition to the test. In the Cuban missile crisis, hewhen he discovered that he had miscalculated and that holding to his intended course would involve appreciable military risks. During the six-day Arab-Israeli warhe USSR was careful to avoid military risks.

Barring tho adventighly irrationalunless the USSR comes to underestimate the determination of the US to defend itsthis pattern of behavior will probably continue. Thisontinuation of an East-Westrelationship which denies Moscow the certainty that the USSR could escape unacceptable damage in

general war. It also presumes that situations will not develop which appear to the Soviet leaders to present grave external threats to their system.

The China Factor

Sino-Soviet hostility is an additional factor which tends to reduce the likelihood of Sovietattack or of Soviet escalation of conflicts which might arise by accident. Moscow is highly sensitive to the possibility of Chinese pressures in general and to Chinese exploitation of Soviet troubles in Europe or, particularly in relations with the US.

Reliable intelligence information indicates the Soviet leaders concluded inhat, in view of the Chinese problem, it would be best for them toautious approach in dealing with the US and to avoid an increase in tensions in Europe. While the degree of Sino-Soviet hostility may fluctuate over the comingubstantial and durable improvement is unlikely. Indeed, Soviet distrust of China will probably deepen as the Chinese acquire nuclear delivery capabilities against the USSR.

The USSR now has aboutivisions deployed in the military districts bordering China, and some of these could be moved westward to meet contingencies involving NATO. Given the distances involved,and the availability of low-strength divisions in the western USSR which could bewhat the USSR would probably see as an increase,eriod of European tension or combat, in the dangers from China against which these forces are intended toSoviets probably would not make such redeployments. Air units might be transferred at some stage, particularly if combat in the West turned out to be both intense and Similarly, unless the USSR faced prolonged ground combat with China, it would not reduce its forces earmarked for the Central Front for theof reinforcing against China.

Theiddle Bast Region

In recent years, the Soviets have expanded their influence in theiddle East region. However, the USSR's concerns there are less important than its vital interests in Eastern Europe, its dispute with China, and its basic relations with the West. The Soviet leaders wish toerious confrontation with the West and probably consider that preserving their position in the Mediterranean -Middle East region would not be worth the serious risk of nuclear war.

Possible Contingencies

The following contingencies are highly unlikely to arise primarily for the reasons discussed above. The ones which have the most plausibility are those arising in circumstances which are not under complete Soviet control.

Eastern Europe

Postwar Soviet behavior has made it clear that the USSR is willing to use military force against serious threats to its position in the communist states of Eastern Europe, as was reflected in the so-called "Brezhnev doctrine." One way, therefore, in which hostilities between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces could arise ispillover from large-scale revolts in Eastern Europe. Large-scale revolts are defined as uprisings which are sustained for ateek, an assumption which requires that the local East European armed forces either stand aside or actually participate against Soviet forces. The force of nationalism in the area, the vicissitudes to which Communist parties are subject, and theof the Soviet leaders for mismanagement are such that revolts of this kind in one or several East European countries must be considered among the possibilities of the Seventies.

At the outset the USSR would make every effort to confine the fighting within the country or countries involved, and NATO presumably would avoid intervention.

But if those East Europeans opposing the Soviets came to believe that their only chance of victory lay in involving the West in the fighting, they would try to provoke an expansion of thethough Western nonintervention in previous instances, for example East Germanyungarynd Czechoslovakiaould argue against this tactic. The chance of expansion would be greatest if the fighting were centered in East Germany, which would tempt West German intervention. Further analysis, therefore, is confined to this case.

This contingency might arise suddenly, catching the USSB unprepared. It is more likely, however, to be the culminationeriod of ferment and tension. This could give the USSR time, if it chose, tothe forces assigned to the Central Region in war planning.

In the contingency of large-scale revolt which, among other things, found the East German armyaside or opposing Sovietcontingency most likely to spill over into themembers of the Working Group believe that the other East European forces in the Central Region could probably become almost totally unreliable for use against NATO. Other members feel that in certain cases these forces would beexample, Polish forces in contingencies which raised the specter of East Germany's reunification with West Germany.

The size of theof the total ofoviet andast European divisions earmarked for the Centralwould be available for use against NATO in these circumstances would depend not only upon the reliability of the East Europeans, but also on such unpredictable factors as the scale of the revolt, the degree of real or threatenedbeing offered by the East European forces,

* This does not include the USSR's strategic reserve ofivisions and the forces in Hungaryungarianoviet divisions).

the usability of Polish and Czechoslovak territory for reinforcement from the western USSR, and the degree of prior Soviet mobilization.

Miscalculation of Effects of Tension in Berlin

Berlin has been frequently harassed during the entire post-blockade period without anyact which strongly argues that the USSR has devised elaborate proceduresto those of the West to maintain constant and close control over these matters. Theseare probably sufficient to check unintended escalation. Nevertheless, it remains possible that major combat could develop in an unintended fashion over Berlin (the caseeliberate Communistof West Berlin is considered on.

Althoughontingency might develop slowly, providing considerable time for mobilization, it is not certain that the USSR would mobilize. Byit would not be expecting hostilities, and it could count on its overwhelming local superiority in the Berlin area in case of miscalculation. might be forgone, therefore, on the grounds that it would needlessly raise tensions and provoke NATO mobilization. ar arising fromover Berlin might find the Central Region of the Warsaw Pact fully mobilized, partially mobilized, or not mobilized.*

At the outset, the Soviets would probably try to keep the conflict limited. So long as they did so, they probably would not employ any East European forces except those of East Germany. We expect that the East German forces would be reliable at thetheir ultimate reliability would depend on the course of the battle and, in particular, on whether they engaged West German forces.

* That is* anywhere between the present strength of about SO combat-ready divisions and the mobilized strength of about ivisions.


iddle East Region

The relationship of this area, and particularly the Middle East, to the defense of NATO is complex and not completely defined. If the Arab-Israeli conflict escalated and came to involve the US and the USSR, this would not be, strictlyATO matter (although the outcome could have significant implications for NATO). Butreat-powermight include naval hostilities in the Mediterranean, and this would tend to engage NATO, even though certain of the European members would resist this tendency.

Both the US and the USSR are deeply involved in the Middle East and specifically in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Each operates naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean where, unlike areas ashore, there is no demarcation line tending to maintain the separation of forces. Should large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities be renewed, and if they were more prolonged than on previous occasions, both the US and the USSR might find themselves drawnituationto that which could result from large-scale revolt in Eastern Europoiscalculation overwould not be under their full control. Thus military situations involving the US and the Soviets could arise out of existing conditions in the Mediterranean and represent plausible contingencies.

In the case of struggle or imminent hostilities between rival Arab groups, Moscow might try to move in troops, perhaps in an effort to preempt Western intervention. At present the Sovietsimited capability for rapid intervention. Theaval infantry troops with the Mediterranean Squadron couldoken landing against little or light opposition (but not against the defense the Israelis could muster). The Soviets could movearger force rapidly by air from the USSR, but this would entail problems of overflight and air cover.

The Soviet leaders would be reluctant to commit their armed forces for such operations in thearea. Coups in the Middle East normally



happen too fast for intervention by outside powers to be decisive. Further, the Soviets do not desire to entangle themselves in inter-Arab strife,if they might end up on the losing side. the presence of even an inferior Soviet force could inhibit Western freedom of action in such.

Although there may be intermittent acts of violence occurring in Cyprus, it is highly unlikely that such violence would cause the Soviets to intervene with military air or naval forces. The continuation of the communal talks, the desire of both communities for peace, the bilateral efforts of Greece and Turkey to improve their relations, plus the efforts of NATO and the UN seem to be mitigating factors to anythat might be exploited by the Soviets, especially through their use of airborne or naval forces.

If the talks for any reason are broken off, or if* they endlear failure leaving an unsettled situation, it is foreseeable that pressures could develop on both sides in favorew attempt toolution unilaterally. Such an attempt would revive the dangerreek-Turkish war. roblem might then be created for NATO and others and possibly set the stage for exploitation by the Soviets. In such circumstances, while the Soviets would attempt to influence the outcome of the event, they are not likely to push to the pointrobable or inevitable confrontation with the west.

All-Out Attack in the Central Region

Inf this report we describe how the Soviets plan to prepare for war in the Central Region and review Soviet expectationseriod ofduring which mobilization would occur. This plan calls for the assembly of three forward fronts and two reinforcing fronts which would containercent of them0onventional artilleryombat aircraft, anduclear-capable tactical missile and rocket launchers. Under this plan, options for conventional and nuclear fighting are available.


Soviets have never undertaken fullin peacetime, and they recognize that it would be costly, would raise tensions, and might set inrain of actions and reactions which could increase the risks of miscalculation. Nevertheless, it is possible that they might undertake it at some future time if they thought that, in this way, they could force political concessions from the Westactually going to war. If in these circumstances miscalculation did propel the two alliances into conflict, and if no way were found to terminatequickly, the Warsaw Pact plan for the conduct of the war probably would be that described above; any mobilization and reinforcement not completed by this time would be rushed to completion.

The Case of Nuclear Preemption

Because general nuclear war is highly unlikely to occur as the result of deliberate, preplanned Soviet initiative, Soviet nuclear preemption against Europe is not plausible unless it is part of an es-calatory situation in which survival of the Soviet Union is at stake. In the circumstances of mutual mobilization amid rising tensions, however, tho USSR might become uncertain about whether NATO was about to go to war. This could lead the Soviet leaders to consider the optionuclear preemptive attack designed to gain the advantagesirst strike.

Soviet "preemption" in this report is defined as an attack undertaken becauseelief that an enemy attack threatening the existence of the USSR has become imminent and certain. If the Soviets came to this belief, they would have to consider whether to strike at European NATO alone or at the US as well. Including the US in the attack would reduce the weight of retaliation, but the USSR could have no hope that it would escape retaliation It mightope that nuclear preemption against European NATO alone would not inevitably bring on full retaliation against the Soviet homeland.

If the Soviet leaders acted on this calculation, the forces availablereemptive nuclear attack


include, besides those describedtrategic missile launchers in the western USSR,edium bombers deployed at Long Range Air Force bases in this region, andiesel ballisticaunchers) in the Soviet Northern Fleet.

Surprise Attack With Limited Objectives

Using forces in being, and avoiding any preceding period of tension, the Warsaw Pact couldurprise conventional attack in the Central Region. This could be aimed atart or all of West Germany. mall amount of mobilization, limited to that which the Soviets felt confident would not be detected by NATO, might precede such an attack. By definition, there would be no warning.

Such attacks in the Central Region would be plausible only in special circumstances, quitefrom those which presently obtain. If the Soviet leaders were convinced that the US nuclear guarantee had been so deeply eroded that the risks of immediate or eventual nuclear war were negligible, and if they believed that NATO had become so demoralizedhock of this kind would complete theof the alliance, they might undertake this course of action. Even in these circumstances,they might equally well forbear on the grounds that political evolution in Western Europe wasproceeding rapidlyirection highlyto their interests.

If they undertook such an attack, the Soviets would probably not include East German forces among the invaders, out of concern that pre-attack secrecy might be compromised and that the East Germans might prove unreliable in an offensive role against West Germany.

If the attack were aimed at overrunning only the northern part of West Germany, the USSR would have to limit the size of the attacking force in order to avoid troop movements which might compromise secrecy and totrong posture against possible NATO reactions. Probably the Soviets would not commit


more than half of theivisions in GSFG to an attack limited in this fashion.

Capture of West Berlin

Drawing upon its forces already in Bast Germany, the USSR could overrun West Berlin. Moving with appropriate stealth, the Soviets could enjoy all of the advantages of surprise in such an action.

Moscow has long had this capability but has never chosen to exercise it. Indeed, occupation of West Berlin has notoal of Soviet Berlin policy. Rather than run the risks of war which taking West Berlin would entail, the Soviets have preferred to experiment from time to time with varying degrees of pressure in an effort to divide the Federalof Germany and the three Western Allies. The Soviets found in pressure andthe threateparate peace treaty which would turn control of access over to the East German regime-vehicles for playing upon Berlin's vulnerabilitiesanner which allowed for maximum control over the potential risks involved.

For the present, the Soviets evidently believe that refraining from pressure onparticular on Alliedthe kind of challenge' tonifying Western response would be likely. The Soviets might at some time in the future return to pressure tactics onthe incidents of delay of convoys3 illustrated how, eveneriod ofinor access crisis could develop rapidly. But it seems unlikely that, in the absence of wider hostilities, the calculus of the undesirability of direct military action to take West Berlin would change.

Invasion of Yugoslavia

A Warsaw Pact invasion of Yugoslavia wouldproduce early successes in the northern plains and prolonged guerrilla-type warfare in the mountainouj regions. NATO might become involved.

Such an invasion is highly unlikely at present but might become conceivable under the following circumstances: Yugoslav revisionism proves soas to cause serious strains in Eastern Europe; Tito's death produces deep internal divisions; the Soviets believe that significant Yugoslavian military and political elements would collaborate with them; or the Soviets are confident NATO will not intervene.

The chances of detecting at least some of the Soviet preparations appear good. The attack probably would be precedederiod of overt political tension. Mobilization of the necessary forces and their deployment to the Yugoslav border would probably extend over several weeks. Movement into theof the additional naval forces needed to impose an effective blockade of the Yugoslav coast would be detected. It would be in the Yugoslavto pass to the US indications of impending attack. While preparations would thus be evident, it is doubtful that precise Soviet intentions or timing would be known in advance.

For the initial phase, the Soviets, with Bulgarian and Hungarian participation, would probably employ some six or eight armies containingoivisionsen. To assemble this force, some Soviet forces normally earmarked for commitment to the Central Region would have to be shiftedin numbers which would weaken Sovietcapabilities opposite NATO.

The NATO Extremities

In northern Norway, Thrace, and eastern Turkey the borders are well defined, and large military units are not positioned directly on the borders. Serious incidentsotential for accidental war have not occurred in recent years, and in all three locales accidental war appears toighly unlikely contingency.


Opposite northern Norway, the Soviets maintain one combat-ready division and could mobilize two

more within about five days. Opposite eastern Turkey is the Transcaucasus Military District, which contains two combat-ready divisions and an additional seven divisions which could be brought up to strength within about five days. Against Thrace is the Bulgarian army, containing five motorized rifle divisions, five tank brigades, and three training units; the Odessa Military District, which would provide reinforcements, contains four divisions which could be brought up to strength in about ten days. Further substantial reinforcement of any of these potential theaters, without at the same time weakening Warsaw Pactin the Central Region, would require the mobilization of low-strength Category III divisions from interior military districts of the USSR. Some members of the Working Group believe that the forces in the Moscow and Kiyevndategory IIbe available for these contingencies, while otherbelieve that the USSR would judge it necessary, in these circumstances, to retain them for possible use in the Central Region.

For substantially the same reasons as apply to the case of limited surprise attack in the Central Region, deliberate Warsaw Pact attacks in these areas, in the absence of hostilities in the Central Region, appear to be highly unlikely contingencies. The USSR would recognize that such attacks could set inrain of events which would seriously increase the chances of nuclear war. The advantages of conquering eastern Turkey are, from the Soviet standpoint, obscure and probably not worth much, if any, increase in risks. Northern Norway and Thrace have strategic importance, but for this very reason the risks incurred by an invasion in these areas would be even higher.

IV. Warsaw Pact Reactions to Alternative NATO Postures and Strategies

This section discusses the possible reactions of Soviet military planners to various assumptions about US and NATO force structures and strategies and postulates the ways the USSR might alter its military forces in response to NATO changes.

Factors Bearing on Soviet Planning for Theater Forces'

A number of factors shape Soviet planning of Warsaw Pact theater forces, which are an integrated set of strategic and general purpose forces.

Pact forceshole are intended to be capable of defending the area against NATO forces.

They are also intended to bring to aconclusion, if possible, any military conflict which may occur.

Soviet forces in particular are also intended to maintain the Soviet political hold on the other states in the alliance.

By virtue of the military threat which they pose, these forces are intended to support the expansion of Soviet political influence in Western Europe.

Economic constraints limit the size of Soviet theater forces opposite NATO, which must compete for resources not only with civilian needs, but with other military requirements such as strategic forces and the buildup in the Far East.

'Because the USSR is dominant in the Warsaw Paot, overall Paot planning is discussed in terms of Soviet calculations and decisions.

Soviet policy toward these forces has long been marked by prudence, caution, and bureaucratic resistance to change.

The military factors are discussed at length innd II of this report. This section considers the other factors in Soviet military planning.

The Political Factor

The pressure exerted on Western Europe by the weight of Warsaw Pact forcesross pressure. Defense ministries in the NATO countries arewith particular aspects of Warsaw Pactand vulnerabilities, but these have no real effect on the overall political pressure which these forces exert in Western Europe by virtue, not only of their size, but of the reminders furnished by periodic exercises. With hundreds of strategic nuclear missiles deployed against them. Western Europeans are not likely to become more or less resistant to Soviet demands in response to changes in such matters as ground force equipment or of divisional structure on the enemy side.

On the other hand, the Soviets do have the option of making large-scale unilateral withdrawals in their forces in Eastern Europe as partigorous effort to promote detente. This tactic might commend itself to Moscow on the grounds that it would undermine the sense of threat which holds NATO together, encourage cuts in West European defense budgets, and promote large-scale US withdrawals in turn. The USSR would recognize that, in the eventrisis, it would enjoy an advantage in returning forces to the area.

Thereumber of disadvantages, however, to the USSR inove. Several of them, such as concern for stability in Eastern Europe and inertia and vested interests within the Soviet bureaucracy, are discussed below. In addition, it isof Soviet policy toajor concession which could not be reversed without some cost, in hopes ofreater concession from the

opponent. The Soviet tendency is to hold what one has and demand what the enemy has. For these reasons, the USSR is not likely to make unilateral withdrawals on any significant scale. If they did adopt this kind of tactic, it would most likely bemall scale, as4 when they made token reductions in the GSFG.

The Imperial Factor

What the Soviets might regard as their military requirement for preserving their position in Eastern Europe has never been determined, apart from theposed by the confrontation with NATO. Soviet rule in Eastern Europe in the Seventies is likely to become harder rather than easier as national self-confidence and national discontents both grow. If this does not happen, however, and if East-West relations developay which diminishes thefor forward deployments against NATO, the USSR might believe that it could maintain theintegrity of the Warsaw Pact in peacetime with forces significantly less than the current levels in Eastern Europe.*

The Bureaucratic Factor

The Soviet Unionighly bureaucratized structure, and those who wish to advance within it find it best to practice caution, prudence, and adherence to formalized procedures rather than initiative and imagination. The military is not exempt from this tradition, particularly in the field of theater forces, where the changeover of

*Some notion of what the Soviets might consider in thie vein can be gotten from historical data. The USSR in earlier years used to propose reductions of foreign forces in Germany by one-third. More recently, the Sovietsemporary drawdown from the GSFG during the Czechoslovak crisis. Eight divisions were dispatched to Czechoslovakia, but some four others were brought in as replacements.



generations since World War II has been slower than in other industrialized countries. This factor suggests that substantial changes in force planning are not easy to coordinate through the Sovietand that the Soviet defense establishment is not well suited to quick reactions to external changes.

The Economic Factor

It is clear that the Soviet economy has beenincreasing difficulties in recent years. It is also clear that the present leadership is even less willing than Khrushchev was to deny military requests for expenditures. In fact, this is among the factors contributing to the USSR's currentproblems.

Estimates of total Soviet spending on defense and space5 percent rise in the lastillion rubles5 to overillion* Expenditures for the general purpose forces, the largest major force element in money terms, have been rising more slowly,ercent in the same period toillion rubles Soviet general purpose forces opposite NATO now account for roughly two-thirds of total general purpose force spending. This share isslowly as the buildup in the Far East.

Increased resources for general purpose forces will be made available by the overall growth of the economy, and possibly by savings derivedtrategic arms control agreement as well. On the other hand, the civilian economy willajor claimant for higher allocations and, even within the general purpose forces, those facing China will continue to compete with those facing NATO.

*?hie includes all outlays for personnel and other operating costs; investment for all hardware and facilities; military research, development, testing, and evaluation; and all space programs.



Under present circumstances* the Soviets probably plan for no moreontinued gradual rise in spending for the forces facing NATO.

The foregoing discussion indicates that the size and structure of NATO forces are, for Soviet planners, only one elementather complex equation. By the same token, any changes on the NATO side will be only one factor in Sovietof possible changes in the size and structure of the Warsaw Pact. The followingdiscuss the ways and extent to which the USSR might alter these forces in response to NATO changes and how such NATO changes might affect Sovietabout the actual use of military force.

Reactions to Alternative US and NATO ForceStrategies

Continuation of Present Situation

There is little reliable evidence about Soviet policy decisions for the future of Warsaw Pact forces, and current problems concerning China and East European reliability add to thevuncertainties. There are nohowever, that major changes in doctrine or strength are impending. If they perceive substantially the same threat from NATO as before, the Soviets would be expected to continue the major trends of recentin the overall size of forces facing NATO, coupled with improvement of bothand nuclear capabilities. Given probable continued constraints on large expenditure increases in this area, equipment programs are likely to proceed at the deliberate pace of recent years. For example:

one-third of the Soviets' ground forces

and two-thirds of their tactical air forces were reequipped during the past ten years.

in the equipment levels have occurred

through organizational changes in recent years and havepercent increase inartillery pieces and multiple rocket launchersne-third increase in nuclear-capable tactical rockets in the Soviet divisions in East Germany andew divisions in the USSR.


Logistic capabilities have beenincreased to the extent that the previously established supply rate can be maintained for the expanded artillery force.

The Soviets will probably continue theirmodernization over the next decade. Thein artillery and multiple rocketprobably be extended to all first-linethe USSR, and the logistic needs generatedincreases can be expected to be metof transportation units. Althoughdivisions willew infantrythey probably will not completely meet their

requirements in APCs. Inighter with significantly improved ground attack capabilities will probably be added to the tactical air inventory. Soviet tactical aviation will decrease in numbers over the next ten years, although its capabilities will improve as new equipment is acquired.

A Small Cut in US Forces

the caseeduction of US forces in

Europe on the order ofercent, the Sovietswould not believe that the situation had changed sufficiently to require them to alter their own force planning. Out of prudence, they would be prone to credit Western statements about maintaining the efficiency of the force and about capabilities for rapid reinforcement from the US mainland.

A Larger Cut

A greater decrease in us deployments inon the order ofhave morefor Soviet planners. The Soviets wouldiminution in NATO capabilities, the more so if the reduction were not accompanied by substantial improvements in US capabilities for return to the theater. Their reaction would also be influenced, however, according to whether West Germany also reduced its forces.

The USSR would perceive in this situation two differentsubstantially enhance the relative military position of the Warsaw Pact, or to make some reduction in their own military effort.

Some analysts believe that they would choose the former course, maintaining or even increasing the pace of their modernization program with the intention ofilitary advantage which would be useful in peacetime as well as important in wartime.

Other analysts believe that, iniminished NATO threat, competing military and civilian priorities would lead the Soviets to level off or even reduce theiron Central Region forces.

All agree that, if the Soviets chose this latter course, they would be concerned that early or large withdrawals would arouse unhealthyand aspirations in Eastern Europe, and that Moscow would therefore proceedautious, step-by-step fashion. Ultimately, Warsaw Pact withdrawals accomplished in this manner wouldbe less than proportional to the US withdrawals

Nuclear Strategy

The Soviets would probably see in any of the deeper cuts an implicit reversal in NATO'seering away from conventional options and toward greater and earlier reliance on nuclear weapons. This would be true even in the caseelatively small0 men) US ground force which was explicitly designed to improvecapabilities. It would be most clearly perceived in the caseery small US grounden, for example) whose function would be largely custody of nuclear weapons.

Renuclearization of NATO strategy should not materially affect Soviet force structure. Soviet forces are now structured in accordance with a



stategic doctrine that assumes nuclear war in the theater. It would reduce the requirements Moscow now perceives for improving the capabilities of its forces for sustained nonnuclear combat.

NATO Time Norms

Adjustment inday norm for NATOfor conventional operations probably would not mean much to the Soviets. In conjunction with other changes, the Soviets might see it as additional evidence of renuclearization of NATO strategy. As such, it would carry the implication for Soviet force planning discussed in the preceding paragraph.

Soviet Attitude Toward Use of Force Under Alternative US and NATO Force Structures and Strategies"

The Soviet attitude toward the various military contingencies is discussed in Part III of this report in the light, not of present NATO deployments, but of the alternative US and NATO force structures and strategies hypothesized in the report of Working Group 1.

It is concluded that, considering the force structures and strategies alone, these alternatives would not substantially alter the Soviet belief that military adventures against or all-out attack upon NATOighly dangerous course of action. Even with doubts about the will of the US to use the strategic power which would be occasioned bydownevel of, foren in Europe, the Soviets would still be required to reckonubstantial chance of nuclear Thus deliberate initiation of war in Europe would remain an unattractive course of action.

An extremely important factor in the Soviets* calculations is their estimate of US willingness to meet the risks and costs of fulfilling USin extreme cases. In estimating thisthe Soviets will view US deployments in

Europe and stated NATO strategy as only oneand not thethe total equation. They will also draw inferences from the general US stance, the attitudes and moods which led to adoption of the alternative posture, and the degree to which US conduct lends substance to its formal commitments. If the US and NATO force structure and strategies remain unchanged, but US behavior convinces the Soviets that the US has in fact become unwilling to stand by its commitments when put to the test, they would conclude that the risks associated with any given course of aggressive action had declined.S and NATO posture which hadreduced military capability would not producehange in Soviet policy if Moscow believed that the US remained willing to meet the risks and costs of fulfilling its commitments.

In conclusion, Soviet military response to alternative US and NATO force structures and strategies isunction of these structures and strategies than of broader Soviet judgments derived from overall US behavior, in which USin Europe is but one factor.


V. Statistical Annex

This section contains the following tables on Warsaw Pact force strengths:


of Soviet Ground

Divisions, by Location and 79

Numbers of Soviet Tactical

Aircraft in Operational Units, by

Location and Type, and Projections

0 and 80

Estimated Numbers of Soviet Tactical

Aircraft in Operational units,and 81

4. Estimated Numbers of Soviet Shipsin Western Fleets,and 82

Estimated Strength and Readiness of

East European Ground Divisions 83

Numbers of Operational East

European Combat Aircraft, byType, and Projections for 64

Number of East European

Naval Vessels, by Type and 85

Pact Naval Aircraft, by Type

and 86



arsaw Pact General Purposefor Early CommitmentEurope 87

10. Estimated Mobilization andof Warsaw Pact 88

11. Soviet Strategic Attack Forces









SECRET Table 4

Baltic Black Sea

Cruise missile submarines


Diesel (mostaunchers)

Ballistic missile submarines

Attack submarines



Short-range diesel



Operational surface ships

SAM/SSM light

SAM light





Reserve surface ships

a. Includes three in the Caspian Sea.


Table 5

Estimated Strength and Readiness of East European Ground Divisions

These totals oount five Bulgarian tank brigades and three training units ae divisions. The tank brigades are about one-third the sineoviet tank division.

Table 7

Estimated Number of East European Naval Vessels, by Type and Location



Germany Poland Bulgaria Romania

missile patrol

torpedo boats .

chasers . .

4 t



* *


* *

figures in parentheses are augmenting coast guard units, which now operate in close coordination with the Polish Navy.



Table 8

Warsaw Pact Naval Aircraft, by Type and Location


Northern Baltic Black Sea

and bomber force


Reconnaissance and miscellaneous aircraft

tu-95 26


tu-16 24


Ml-4 6

ASW aircraft












7 40


Tabid 10

Estimated Mobilization and Reinforcement Capability Of Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO

Reg ion and





































Tabulation Mattes to Table 10

Note; There are five Soviet airborne divisions in the regionsTO. These divisions are directly subordinate to the Defense Ministry and are not counted in this tabulation

end of first phaee oforces are in area of operations and deployable.

end of next eignifiaant reinforcementwhen one or more additional ground or airmobilized and generally in operations area.

end of main Warsaw Pact reinforcementwhen additional fronts in. their entiretyin the intended area of operations andand strategic reserves are in place.

forces include units of the Leningrad Military

District in and near northern Norway.

forces include Bulgarian forces and troopsOdessa Military District.

totals count five Bulgarian tank brigadestraining units as divisions. The tankabout one-third the sizeoviet tank division.

forces in this region are all presently the Transcaucasus Military District.

totalsorps headquarters. Corpsrepresent an intermediate echelon betweenand army headquarters; in most cases theyas small army headquarters.

forces include Soviet forces in East Poland, and the Carpathian, Ba'tic military districts. Also included areand Polish national forces (exceptand assault landing divisions). Totalsinclude the contingency and strategicHungarian national forces and theGroup of Forces in Hungary and the armiesKiyev and Moscow MDs. Soviet forces in HungaryHungarians could also be used to reinforceSouthern Region. The aircraft totals excludeaircraft assigned to national air defense. interceptors in the Hungarian Airalso excluded.





Table 11

Soviet Strategic Attack Forces Oppositeissile Force

Number of

Land-based ballistic missiles range ballistic


Medium range ballistic


Variable range ballistic


land-based launchers

Ballistic missile submarines lass

Total sea-based launchers Bomber Force

Medium bombers of Long Range Aviationlinderadger

Total bomber force





Includes all elements of the Soviet Strategic at-took forces which are coneidered to be intendedfor peripheral operatione, and which arebased within striking distance of Western Burop. Some of these forces also are capable of strikes against North America, but this is not believed to be their primary mission. All data are approximate.

b Recently, the Sovietsariable range balletic missile, which is believed to be basically theCBM. Theas been fired at ranges as shortautical miles and is capable of ranges upautical miles.

c. Two oflass submarines are undergoing modification and are not active.



Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: