DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
The Changing Shape of the Soviet Peripheral Ballistic Missile Force
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence0
The Changing Shape of the Soviet Peripheral Ballistic Missile Force
The Soviet peripheral ballistic missile force ia directed against targets in areas adjacent to the USSR, filling the gap between the coverage provided by tactical missiles and that of the intercontinental ballistic missile force. The peripheral missile forceajor nuclear delivery component of the Sovietstrategic attack force, which also contains jet medium bombers and diesel powered submarines carryinq ballistic missiles.
Initial deployment of the peripheral missile force began8 and was completedotal ofedium range and intermediate range ballistic missile launchers deployed in hard and soft modes.
Change has been characteristic of the force since itsprograms have been under way in every year ajor
Note: This report was produced eolelu bu CIA. It was prepared by the Office cf Strategic Research andOffices cf Current Intelligence <ZiJLatAvonal Estimate* and the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center.
transformation in force composition began in the mid-Sixties with the completion of the phaseout of the oldest component, thend the addition of two newScaleboard short range mobile missile deployed at bases near China inand theCBM being deployed in the western USSR since Some sites for thendystems have been deactivated recently and these systems may bo phasing out of the force. Two other missiles which may form part of tho future force are nowcamp and the PL-1 (now designated therobably the Scrooge.
This report describes the evolution of themissile force, its probable mission, and the factors which may have influenced the Soviettoarge force. It discusses changes under way and their implications for the future size, composition, and capabilities of theummary begins on
Evolution of the
PatternChanges in the Early Force
The Force in
Deactivation of Sites
The Addition of
Mission of the
The Initial Target
The Changing Target
Rationale for the
Rclationahip to Other Strike Forces
Force of the
Phaseout and Replacement
Improved Capabilities and Survivability .
Size and Distribution of the Future Force
Expenditure Outlook 43
Soviet Peripheral0 32
- 4 -
USSR: Deployment of the Peripheral(map)
ite at MukachevoRBM Sites |
SS-5 IRBM Sites
Initial Soviet Peripheral(photos)
New Soviet Peripheral Missile
Future Soviet Peripheral(photos) .
Growth of Soviet Stratogic Missile (chart) . . . ,
Soviet Expenditures for (chart)
also be under way or planus
The initial Soviet peripheral missile force was deployed mostly in the west, within the Far East and central portions of the USSR.ajor changeoverunder way in the composition ofas been phased out and somendave been deactivated. The Scaleboard mobile missile has been deployedbases near China, and theCBM is being deployederipheral role atin the westernII deployment may
Evolution of the
Soviets bcoan testing thot the Kapustin Yar missile test rahge Development wasinfter about! flight tests, and therobably be< sites in
The Soviet peripheral strategic missile force came into being in8 with the deployment of theRBM, nicknamed the Shyster, at soft sites. TheRBM (Sandal) andRBM (Skean) were subsequently added to the force in both soft sites and hard silos. Deployment of the initial force was completedaunchers were operational.
I'aplaka and Muknchovo (seumap,
facing) participated inest range firings90 andnit in tho Far East--possibly atfiring anommand post exercise in
nits were probably"deployed at
GyaraeysK and Simferopol'ew additional sites, principally in the military district along the Baltic
yj1*available evidence indicates that the Soviets deployed aboutaunchers jjtlS soft sites, each with four launch pads (see
e5 wVratn6 wWemJ
borders of the USSR and the remainder in the Soviet Far East. Other early MRBM sites which may have been originally intended foreployment were equipped instead with the SS-4.
The Soviets probablyheystem in the early Sixtiesemainingeach at Paplaka, Gvardeysk Mukachevo, andto be equipped with thentil at5 and possibly as latehen they were deactivated.
Development tests of theegan at Kapustin Yar innd were successfully completed in8 afterirings.
The first sites became operational early inthe The system was deployedsoft sites consisting of four launch pads andsites consisting offour siios
? LU AU nautical miles apart, form
IofT?ieX*K 4t!orceoft launchers andilos atomplexes.
orce is deployed in thee belt extending from the Gulf ploveSea* er is de-
CaScatiw Turkesta"'the North
Caucasus (see map on
the amount-has shown that
at sSft SltSf ^uipmuiiL ana the storage facilities bilUv ih!fl sufficient to provide this capa-
sitesndications thatard sicesefire capability.
ite.is mannedattalion and a
rbm sites sofl site at lonava
logistic and communications support. Three to five regiments makeivision and up to nine divisions an army. Orders normally pass down this chain command, but can be sent from Strategic Rocket Forces headquarters in Moscow directlyegiment.
addition to the permanent sites, there are
sites areo sites and are connected with Each field site usually con-and graded launch positions storage, or housing.
ield sites nearomplexes it
nm from the permanent the complex by roads, sists of four cleared without support facilities,
in the past several years some have apparently been abandoned and others have been constructed. Aboutield sites appear to be suitable for present time.
characterize field sites as alternate launch points which would be occupied under certain circumstances bynits from the permanent sites. Training exercises have been detected regularly at the field sites |
cient ground support utilize all the pads at the same time.
suggesting that this conceptomplex probably lacks suffi-equipment and manpower to at the permanent and field sites
Development of theegan innd was completed in1 after nearlyirings
Like thehes deployed in both hard and soft launchers. The first soft launchers became operational2 and the first silos The deployment program ended in
At its peak, theorce consistedsoft pads andilos. Alloft sites have four launchers, except for one site which has two launchers. Hardeneditesthree silos arrangedluster. t I
Field sites fornits have not beenprobably because theystem, which is more complex than theequires more elaborate launch positions.
Aboutercent of theaunchers areat widely dispersed complexes in the western USSR. The remainder are deployed in the Far East, the North Caucasus, and Turkestan. One soft site, now inactive, is at Ugol'nyy across the Bering Strait from Alaska <see map on
The Soviets at one time evidently planned more extensive deployment of the SS-5. Construction was begun on additional hard sites in three complexes but was abandoned at an early stage in the mid-Sixties. The reason for abandoning these sites is unknown.
Alloft launchers are believed to havecapability primarily because of' 1
evidence on the capacity of storage facilitiessites, the amount of equipment present, andsimilarity ofnd SS-5 The hardaunchers may havecapability because storage buildings
equipment at the sites also appear excessiveingle launch mission. Such possible indicationsefire capability are not evident atard sites.
The organizational structure for thes the sane as for the SS-4. Launch sites normally are manned
by battalions, and groupings of two or three sitesomplex are regiments. In the two cases where there is only one siteomplex the manning units have been classified as independent regiments. In all, the Soviets deployedegiments,f which are still operational.
Pattern of Changes in the Early Force
During the initial deployment of the peripheral ballistic missile force the Soviets strove to upgrade its capabilities (see illustration on pageor estimated technical characteristics of the three initial systems). Theas limited in0 nm) and in reaction time. It took an5ours toeady-to-fire status, which could be sustained for only about an hour, primarily because the missile used nonstorable cryogenic propellants.
Thearked improvement over then0 nm) and reaction time. The use of storable propellants facilitated silo deployment, thus increasing force survivability. Silo deployment also improved the readiness posture because theould be held in an alert condition for upew days.
Therovided greater0 nm),accuracy,ore powerful warhead to the force. With thehe Soviets could deploy launch sites farther from their borders and still strike targets theould not reach. Like thehead storable propellants and could readily be deployed in hardened silos.
The Force in
Since the basic deployment program was completed in5 the Soviets have continued to improve the capabilities of the force. They have completely phased out thend begun the phaseout of the vulnerablendoft sites. At the same
time they have upgraded support facilities at many operational sites.
Initial Soviet Peripheral Missile Systems
t* oorab* IiquhJ
RV weight Propellent Gu id oner
5bi ilorjtilu liquid inert ial
They have also added newScaleboard short range mobile missile and thextend the lower and upper range capability of the force and increase its survivability through mobile and dispersed deployment. The Soviets' desire to further increase force survivability is evident in the current development of at least one and probably two follow-on mobile systems.
Deactivation of Sites
The first major change in the MRBM and IRBM force came with the phaseout of the SS-3. ites which remained equipped with thefter the earlyeach at the Gvardeysk, Simferopol', Paplaka, and Mukachevodeactivated5 and The exact date of deactivation is unknown
sites at Mukacnevo were still operational ins evidenced by the presence of missilebut all the sites were inactivef
Deactivations have also been evident in theorce. Since7 atoft sites in the western USSR have been deactivated. Inoft sites have been deactivated in the Soviet Far East but these units have apparently been relocated to another complex (see map on
Theaunchin the Far East were at Barano-Orenburgskoye,om from the border with Communist China. Their deactivation7 may have been prompted by the Sino-Soviet dispute. The additionaunch pads7 to an existing.site in the Kremovo complex somem from the border was probably related to this deactivation.
unit was transrerrea to the' Kremovo area about the time of the deactivation and the new pad construction. Atore pads are under construction near Kremovo, and may be for the rest of the equipment removed from Barano-Orenburgskoye.
The deactivations in the western USSR occurred90 and probably were related to the addition of theo the peripheral missile force (see the section beginning on. quipment was removed from atoft2 each at Uman', Derazhnya, and Balta and one atin the general area where neweployment began in The timing of the deactivations and the proximity of the sites to the neweploymentirect relationship. The status of theard sites at Derazhnya and Uman' is unknown I-
eployment has undergone few changes since the last site became operational Thesoft site at Ugol'nyy was deactivated during the summer It was the only site in the original peripheral missile force from which missiles could be launched against the US. The deactivation of Ugol'nyy probably was due to the availability of ICBMs to cover the targets originally assigned to this aite. The severe weather and logisticalin this remote area probably were additional factors in the decision to deactivate the site.
Events in the last half9 suggestdeployment may bo further reduced in tho The neweployment nearwill result in phaseout of the SS-5complex. To date, however, no change hasin the operational status of tho sitescomplements ofround have boon detected
Therelight decline inirings during the past two years, which mayutback in crew training. Crew training launches are believed to be an indicator of the number of deployed launcherseduction in firings mayutback in
deployment. 0aunches were detected, as compared with8 and There were no launches from July to latene of the longest standdowns since the SS-Sprogram was completed
aunches have remainedelativelydespite the deactivations. There9nd Many ofwere part of the ABM test program athowever,
The Soviets have continued to upgrade facilities at most sites despite the age of the systems and the deactivation of some sites. These changes have been primarily of two types: housekeeping improvements and force-wide modification programs. Thechanges include minor additions such as small support buildings, firing ranges, and athletic fields. The force-wide projects, largely completedave included the construction of major facilities at most complexes. Two such projects have been the addition of new vehicle maintenance facilities atf thendomplexes and the construction of hardened communications facilities atomplexes.
In addition, major construction projects have been undertaken at certain complexes. For example, work continued on the nuclear warhead handlingat eightites for several years after the sites became operational and buildings probably are still under construction at one of these sites. Similarly, large fueling facilities have been built8 at isolatedomplexes at Taybola and Aktyubinsk. Missile fuel apparently was trucked to both complexes when needed, and these newprobably are intended to relieve this logistic problem.
The Soviets haveew program during the past two years to safeguard their peripheral
missile sites from ground attack. Defensive trenches with firing points for individual and crew-served weapons have been dug at many sites throughout the force, including all but one of the sites near China. At several of these sites personnel bunkers have been added and protective walls constructed around fuel and oxidizer storage tanks.
The Addition of Scaloboard
Thecaloboard mobile missile system was added to the peripheral missile force7 when it was deployed to new installations near existing Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) facilities at Saryozck, Drovyanaya, and Kremovor|(soe map on The Scaleboard installationsare permanent bases consistingircular nine-pad launch area, support andfacilities, and barracks. Althoughis continuing at each base, all the units are considered operational.
The pads at tlie permanent bases probably are no longer primary launch areas. Changes during the pastregular parking of support vehicles on some pads and the construction of facilities immediately adjacent tothat they are not intended for operational use, except under emergency conditions.
xneseion nave apparently never been occupied by
Scaleboardan unsurfaced launch area and contain no permanent facilities. They are apparently
New Soviet Peripheral Missile Systems
RV weight XOUUlitlOlbs PropeiUnt storaWe liquid Guidance inettiaf
Tha SSeached IOC inperipheral9 The Soviets haw beenodified version ot the SSI1 whichange ofm (nonrotal)ng earth) The CEP estimatedfor the SSeripheral role to raneesm
'DevFloptnenT <omplolo anili(My toi (litploymrni.
Soviet intentions at Simferopol' are less clear. The level of activity at this site during the oast three years has boon low compared with that
at the Scaleboard bases on the China
binglo Scaleboard TEL atApril iybyf however, and
TELs in0 along with tw6 Scaleboard missile dollies suggest that the Soviets will base aunit at this installation.
TheCBM apparently is being added to the peripheral missile force. eployment was begun8 at an IRBM complex at Pervomaysk and an MRBM complex at Derazhnya (see map on Previously.eployment had occurred only at ICBM complexes.[
A peripheral attack role for thet Derazhnya and Pervomaysk i
ew silos are tarther south
Uuin any previous ss-ii deployment and are notlocated for launchos against the United States. Standard SS-lls at Porvomayak and Derazhnya can atill reach the US, but they are within range of fewer targets than SS-lls deployed at ICBM complexes.
The Soviets have beenodified version of thehich mayange ofm (nonrotating earth). Booauee the modified mioeila ia still undergoing testa, it is unlikely that it has been deployed at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya. Siloe still under construction there may be equipped with the modified version or presently operational groups may eventually be retrofitted. If so, SS-lls at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya could cover virtually the entire US.
- 24 -
Another indicationeripheral role for the SS-lls is the deactivation of sevenoftat Derazhnya itself, two each at Uman1 and Balta, and one at Zhitomir. These sites are all near the new deployment and were all deactivated after the start of the neweployment at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya, many about the time the firstilos became operational.
The status of other sites in the sameis unknown
It is not yet cxear wnether the new SS-lls
assuming the role previously assigned toaunchers and if theeactivations detected so far are parteneral phaseout of that system.
The new silos at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya, likeilos at ICBM complexes, are deployed in groups of ten, otal ofroups have been-undert Pervomaysk and
nrc ueraz mya Atf theoperational and the remainder will become operational within the next twelve months. The full extent of theplanned at these locations is unknown, but the spacing between groups and past Soviet deployment practice indicate that there will be several more groups at each complex.
H deployment may be taking place atand IRBM complexes (see map on page
Future Soviet Peripheral Missile Systems
TOP SFSKJ ]
Theill significantly upgrade theof the peripheral missile force. Thean cover more peripheral targets than either ther the SS-5. It will also increase theof the force. ndilos are in closely spaced clusters of three and fourilosm apart. One incoming warhead could attack only oneilo, but the same warhead could attack an entire cluster ofraunchers.
Two possible additions to the peripheral missile force are nownicknamed Scamp) and therobably the missile for the system nicknamed Scrooge (see photographs on
Theobile missile probably composed of the second and third stages of the solid propellantCBM, has been under development at Kapustin Yar since To date,est firings have been identified. Two firings9 and one in0 may have been for troopindication that research and development of the system is nearing
If^ould be deployed in
Theill probably be deployedobile mode. Fixed deployment of this system probably is not intended, at least initially. Prototype silos were started for thet Kapustin Yar7 but have not been completed. In addition, no new silos which might be for this system have beenin the field.
The other possible addition torobably thenot as advanced in development as the There haveirings
?5iosince the program began
f which were successful. No firinqs have been identified since At least one more year of testing probably would be required before theould be ready for deployment.
* fJov designated the
Little is known of the PL-l's characteristics, but it appears towo-stage vehicle with at least the second stage utilizing liquid propellants. Theould bo cither an IRBM or possibly an ICBM. The maximum range of the missile appears to bem. If this estimate is correct, the missile probably would be deployed only as anICBM with this range would have to be deployed in the far northern area of the USSR to strike many US targets, creating difficult problems of maintenance, support, and operations.
factors suggest that initial deployment of theill probably beobile mode. First,
where the Sc been
Second, construction has been
halted on possible prototype silos adjacent to the soft pad. Finally, no silo construction which might be intended for theas been evident in the field.
Mission of the Force
The primary mission of the peripheral ballistic missile force as stated
is to destroy nuclear and other Strategic targets of the enemy in areas near the borders of the USSR. Its secondary mission probably is support of theater forces.
The Initial Target Mix
Rationale for the Force
In relation to the number of probable primary targets, the size of the soviet peripheral missile force has always seemed excessive. The initial force containedaunchers plusefire missiles. The Soviets have maintained about the same
fore* level despite the deactivation of manywhich probably were targets.
One explanation for the size of the force is
that the Soviets plan to use more than one missile
for some targets. This explanation is consistent
laim made by Premier Khrushchev0 that
as many as three missiles were assigned to some targets.
It is also consistent with Soviet MRBM exercises
conducted in the Far East during the late Fifties,
in which initial strikes were to be followed by
second launches against some targets. The abundance
of Soviet peripheral missile launchers probably also
made allowance for the loss of some sites to enemy action.
The size of the initial force may also have been affectedhift in Soviet military strategy evident at the beginning of the Sixties. Premier Khrushchev announced plans in0 to reduce Sovietforces by one-third, while increasing the size of the missile forces.
Until then, the ground forces had boon tho dominant element in Soviet military planning. Under Khrushchev's "new militaryhich was strongly debated in the Kremlin, strategic missiles would havemany of these forces. Khrushchev justified this shift on the grounds that nuclear weapons would deliver the decisive blow in any future war and consequently the requirement for ground forces was greatly reduced. Although these ground forcewere never fully implemented, this strategy may have influenced the extent of peripheral missile force deployment.
Relationship to Other Strike Forces Peripheral Forces
Strategic missiles are only one component of the Soviet peripheral attack force, which alaomedium bombers and diesel powered ballistic missile submarines (see table on. The Soviets probably developed this tri-sorvice peripheral
Soviet Peripheral Attackune0
Diesel powered ballistic missile submarines
submarines with total ofaunchers**
strike force to take advantage of the uniqueof each component, including the relative survivability of submarines on patrol, the short reaction time of missiles and their relativeto existing defensive measures, and the accuracy and multipurpose munitions deliveryof the bombers.
The relationship among the missions of each of the components of the peripheral strike force is not clear. Soviet command exercises9 indicated that one mission of the medium bombers is to make follow-up nuclear strikes on targets previously attacked by land-based missiles. It is also likely that medium bombers are assigned missions against targets which do not need to be destroyed at the very onset of hostilities. The bombers can also deliver nonnuclear munitions againstonventional or limited nuclear war.
The principal mission the Soviets have assigned the diesel powered ballistic missile submarines probably is attacking US island bases and strategic coastal targets in Eurasia.
The initial peripheral missile force wascomplete before significant numbers of ICBMwere operational, when deployment of thehe Soviet ICBM force numberedperational launchers4 SS-6s, S-7s, andsee chart on. The disparity in size between the peripheral missile and ICBM forces probably resulted from political and strategic considerations prevailing in the Fifties. At that time, the Soviets were faced with nuclear forces based both in the us and on the periphery of the USSR-all capable of striking the Soviet Union.
To counter the threat the Soviets probably would have preferred totrategic attack forceapability to strike targets in the us. Their heavy bomber force wasircraft
Growth of Soviet Strategic Missile
I I ! I ! II'*.
Deployment ol the initial peripheral missile lorcc began8 and was completed in5otal olRBM and IRHM launcher* deployed in hard and softhe lorceewRBMs.RBMi. andRBMs.
When the initial deployment ol the peripheral missile force endedive Soviet ICBM forceperationalince then, the ICBM lorce has grown to moreperational launchers and
deployment is still under way. When all currently identified launch
groups are complete, ICBM deployment willnchers.
present the peripheral missile lorce consists ofndaunchers; ataunchers operational or under construction; and threemobile missile unitsotal ofoaunchers. The futuremissile force is not expected toaunchers when replacement ol oMc systems with follow-on systems is complete.
Total Peripheral f*
..Missile Force../ .
nd they had not yet developed an effective ICBM which they could deploy soon enough or innumbers toredible deterrent. The Soviets could have expanded their long range bomber force but apparentlyalculated risk byreater intercontinental capability until an effective ICBM was ready for deployment.
The Soviets chose instead toargestrategic attack force, probably hoping to deter the US by holding Europe hostage. Their decision probably was influenced by the fact that theand capability to produce andarge number of MRBMs was already at hand.
The Soviets did not rely entirely on themissile forceeterrent. They also utilized tight security and propaganda about their ICBMto deter the US. After the first successful test firing of theCBM inhrushchev and other Soviet leaders made numerous publicabout their growing ICBM force. Thesecoupledack of hard intelligence about Soviet ICBM deployment, led to the missile qapof the lato Fifties.
The shootdowneconnaissance plane in0 provided the Soviets with photographicthat the myth of their ICBM force could be exposed, ubsequent statements. Premier Khrushchev attempted to minimize the significance of these flights by claiming that Soviet ICBMs were deployed in areas not coveredlights. By
however, rhq US was fully aware I
"that the Soviets had1ew Opera-
tional ICBMs This disclosure, coupled with the rapid buildup of the US ICBM force, almost certainlyactor in the Soviet decision to deployndissiles in Cuba The MRBM and IRBM launchers in Cuba probably were intended to give the Soviets an interim missile capability against the US until more ICBM launchers were operational.
Following the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets
?cderly buildup of their ICBM force-awhich has continued unabated. At present, the
Soviets have moreperational launchers at ICBM complexes,S-7s,S-lls, and. When allidentified launch groups are complete, Soviet ICBM deployment willaunchers. Because of this buildup, the relative importance of themissile forceoviet deterrent to US attack has greatly diminished.
Force of the Future*
Changes now under way in the peripheral missile force will resultollow-on force ofimproved capabilities. The remaining components of thend theprobably bo removed in favor of systems which will extend force range and increase survivability. The future force probably will eventually consist entirely of missiles in dispersed single silos andhe Scaleboard, thend possibly the PL-1. Although this force willreater mix of systems, its size probably will be on the orderaunchers.
Phaseout and Replacement
Phaseout of the current force ofndof theow appears to be under way. at several deployed sites during the past two years, however, coupled with the relatively constant number of troop training firings for both systems suggest that the phaseout will be spaced over several years.
The Soviets probably will first deactivate the more vulnerable soft sites, as they have thooft sites at complexes near Derazhnya and Pervomaysk. Although deactivations ofew SS-4the remoteoft site atbeenit is likely that additional sites not covered recently I
arc also no
* The discussion in this section considers what might develop in ike absencetrategic arms limitation agreement including the peripheral ballistic missile force.
operational. Thendard sites probably will be the last elements of the present force to be deactivated.
The rate ofndhaseout will depend on the introduction of new systems. Soviet practice in the presenteployment at Pervomaysk and Derazhnya suggests that follow-on missiles will be deployed before or concurrently with phaseout of the older systems. As more of the new SS-llsoperational, additional soft sites will probably be deactivated.
Moreeploymenteripheral role is expected but the extent cannot be determined on the basis of the evidence now available. If theillotal replacement for both thend theaunchers,eploymenteripheral role could be on the orderaunchers. In view of the greater capabilities and increased survivability of the SS-ll, however, it is more likely that its deploymenteripheral role will be limitedaunchers.
Part of the current force may be replaced by thehich probably will be introducedobile mode Part of the force might also be replaced by thef it is intended as asystem. The extent of mobile deployment will depend on whether the Soviets view mobile systemsajor component of the force orupplement to fixed deployment.
systems may be based at deactivated MRBM and IRBM sites where existing facilities could be utilized for support. Such basing .would be consistent with Scaleboard deployment, where some buildings at adjacent Strategic Rocket Forces installations have been utilized.
Thend theay also be deployed laterixed mode, but inasmuch as thes being deployederipheral role in fixed sites this likelihood is not great.
- top nirrtriiT
Mix of Systems
the transition between the phaseout of
old systems and new deployment there might be as many as six different missiles in the force. This interim force would include somends well as the Scaleboard,ndnd possibly the PL-l. onglomerate of systems would be costly to maintain and would posemore logistical and training problems for the Soviets than the present force.
Even after older systems have been phased out, the force of the future willreater mix of systems and types than the original force. By the mid-Seventies there apparently will be at least three and possibly four missile systems in thethe Scaleboard short range ballistic missile, theRBM, theCBM, and possibly theRBM. In contrast to the original force, it may contain only one fixed system, thendthree mobile systems.
The ratio of fixed to mobile launchers is dif-ficult to project. It will depend in part on whether retire is still an essential element in Sovietplanning for the peripheral missilerefire addeddditional missiles to the original peripheral force. If the Soviets still see the need toorce ofissiles--initial launch plusdeployment might number several hundred launchers becauseilos do notefire capability and the mobileprobably do.
Theay be the only silo-launchedsystem in the future because systems currently under development do not appear intended for fixed deployment. ew development program would take at leastonthsystem would be ready for deployment. Another six months or so would bebefore the first field launcher wouldoperational evenisonstruction is concurrent with the test program.
The Soviets also have the option of deploying other ICBMseripheral role. Of the current operational ICBMs, thes the only system for which new sites might be constructed for use in that role. Thendre probably no longer in production and thearries warheads with yields far in excess of most peripheral requirements. Any operational ICBM, however, could be used against peripheral areas from existing complexes.
Improved Capabilities and Survivability
The new systems will greatly improve theof the future force. The addition of Scale-board reduces the minimum range of the force to nm, and thextends the maximum range to atm. The force will be able to engage targets on the periphery of the Soviet Union and also cover all of Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and much of the United States. Mobile systems probably will be used against soft targets and will be able to relocate for survivability or move in support of ground forces.
Single silos and mobility will enhance theof the future forces. One incomingwarhead could destroy all three or fourraunchersard or soft site. The dispersion and hardness of follow-on fixed systems will make eacheparate aiming point. Onlyobile launcher is located in its base area will it bethe field it will be able to move frequently to avoid detection and
The reaction time of the new force should also be better than that of the current one. Reaction time for thendoft launchers varies frominutes to several hours depending on the state of readiness and silo-launchedndissiles can be firedinutes. In contrast,eaction time is estimated to be half atoinutes and mobile systems probably have
a launch capability on the order of one minute at peak readiness. If at less than peak, the reaction time for the mobile systems would vary considerably and could be as much as several hours.
Size and Distribution of the Future Force
The overlap between php.seout of older systems and the introduction of new ones may cause the number of operational peripheral launchers toduring the transition period. There is no firm basis for judging the future size of the follow-on peripheral missile force, but the fact that the Sovietsarge and costly force ofndaunchers despite significant changes in the target mix suggests that theyorce of ataunchers as essential.
Since almost all the launchers in the orig inal force probablyefire capability, the number of launchers in the future force could be larger. The ultimate size of the future force will depend in large measure on three factors: the Soviet view of the threat from the West, the state of Sino-Soviet relations, and the capabilities of follow-on systems (and, of course, on the timing and nature of any arms limitation agreement with the US).
The future peripheral missile force probably will be more evenly dispersed throughout the Soviet Union than the present one. Improvedore widely distributed target structure may cause some geographical shifts in deployment. More launchers probably will be deployed in the central and Far Eastern USSR to target Chinesedeployment and US facilities in Southeastarge number of launchers will remain deployed against Western Europe because of the number of targets in that area. Deployment of theeripheral role will permit, the Soviets to target both Asian and European targets from the same complex.
-I OF SKl.KH I
Estimated Soviet spending for the peripheral ballistic missile program from its inception in the middle Fifties0 amounts toillion rubles (the equivalent of aboutillion dollars).* This is nearly half the spending for the entire peripheral strikealso contains medium bombers and diesel powered ballistic missilethis period.
Spending for peripheral missiles exceeded that of the other elements of strategic attack forces during the late Fifties and early Sixties, but cumulative expenditures0 account for only aboutercent of total strategic attack spending. harp decrease in the spending for the peripheral missile force was reflected in theattack expenditures for the Sixties (see chart on. The most pronounced3 whon thend theeploy-ment programs began to taper off and ICBM programs were pursued with greater emphasis.
" The dollar figures (appearing in parentheses after the rubles) are approximations of what it would cost to purchase and operate the estimated Soviet program* in thepecific ratio of rubles to dollars ie used for each resource input to Soviet militaryAs the mix of these resources changesrogram, the overall ratios of spending change.
With the exoeption of expenditures for research, development, test, and evaluation, all costs of the peripheral missile force and the total strategic attack mission are reflected in the expenditurein thie section.
Soviet Expenditures for Strategic Attack Forces,
This chart shows estimated Soviet expenditures (operating and investment) forcomponents of the peripheral strike forces-peripheral missiles, mediumdiesel powered ballistic missile submarines--and for ICBMs. The total expendituresattack forces include heavy bombers and nuclear powered ballisticas well as the components shown. Expenditures for research,and evaluation arc not
Aftereak levelillion4 billion dollars) in1hen the peripheral missile forcerime element of the Soviet nuclear attack capability, annual spending for MRBMs and IRBMs steadily declinedowillion0 million dollars)his decline in spending reduced the peripheralforce share of total strategic attack spending from just over one-third2 to less thanercent These lower levels of spendingthe reduction in investment resulting from the completion of deployment of thendy the middle Sixties. The complete phaseout of theystem in the middle Sixties contributed to the reduction butesser extent.
The beginning of the phaseout of the initial force components and their replacement with new systems is reflected in the pattern of expenditures. Investment spending increased89esult of deployment of thet IRBM and MRBM complexes and of construction at Scaleboard bases near the Sino-Soviet border. Operation ofndites still accounted for most of thealthough the deactivation of some sites is gradually reducing the amount being spent.
0 further deployment of theeripheral role and the probable introduction of theobile configuration will cause investment to continue to rise and to exceed operating costs for the first time This upturn in spending for new systems0 probably will more than offset any savings that may result from cutbacks inndeployment.
The peripheral missile force of the future may require average annual outlays as low asillion1 billion dollars) or as highillion4 billion dollars), depending on the quantitative and qualitative improvements that are made. The lower level assumes that the Soviets will retain some of their older
ndaunchers, deployeripheral role, and supplement these with about
hundred mobile launchers. The higher level of ex-
penditures would pertain if tho older systems were phased out completely, the mobile element of the force were as largeaunchers, andeployment rangedaunchers.
These levels of spending are higher than the average annual expenditure ofillion0 billion dollars) for the force that was maintained duringeriod. They are, however,below the annual costs incurred during the early Sixties when deployment of the original force was at its highest level.
It is almost certain that the Soviets plan to continue to deploy new peripheral missile systems through the middle Seventies. The actual size and composition of the future force will be influenced largely by changes in the military situation on both the western and eastern frontiers of the USSR (and, of course, on the timing and nature of any strategic arms limitation agreement with the US).
The Soviet peripheral ballistic missile force fills the gap between the tactical and intercontinentalforces. It is directed principally against US and allied nuclear delivery systems and othertargets around the periphery of the Soviet Union. Itajor component of the Sovietattack force, which also includes medium bombers and some of the USSR's ballistic missile submarines.
The peripheral missile force was established in8 with limited deployment of the SS-3. Over the next seven years it greworce ofaunchers,ew SS-3s,RBMs, andRBMs. Deployment in hard silos consisted ofndaunchers. Aboutercent of the force was deployed in the western USSR, with the remaining launchers located near border areas in the rest of the country. From its inception, the Soviets continually upgraded force capabilities.
Major changes have been under way in theof the force since the mid-Sixties. Theas been completely removed from the operational inventory and oneoft site and several soft sites for theave been deactivated.
These reductions have been offset by the addition of the Scaleboard mobile missile and theCBM to the peripheral force. At present, Scaleboard deployment is limited to three units near Chinaotal estimated complement ofoaunchers. Currenteployment consists ofroups0 silos) at Pervomayskilos) at eachmore deployment likely at both locations and possibly in other areas.
Tests are currently under way on two systems which may be added to the force in the nearsolid propellantcamp and thorobably the missile used in the Scrooge system. Thes well advanced
and COuld be operationalobile mode Therobably will also be deployedobile mode, but could not enter service before
The follow-on force which is now being formed willreater mix of systems and havegreater range and survivability than the original force. The main components of this force probably will be thehehe Scaleboard, and possibly the PL-1. Deployment of these systems will take place over the next several years, and thend theill probably be removed from the operational inventory. Currently, there is no good basis for estimating the extent of deployment for each new system or the ratio of mobile to fixed launchers.
The overall size of the peripheral missile force probably will beaunchers, but the total will depend on factors such as the changing target structure in peripheral areas, the capabilities of follow-on systems, the state of Sino-Soviet relations, and the timing and nature of any strategic armswith the US. Whatever the size, the future force probably will be more evenly dispersed throughout the Soviet Union than the current one. The new systems will improve force reaction time and survivability, in addition to providing range coverageo atm.
To date, the Soviets have spendillion rubles (the equivalent ofillion dollars) on their peripheral missile force. The largest expenditures occurred in the early Sixties when deployment of the initial force was at its peak. Spending levelsin succeeding yearsowillion0 million dollars) Since then, investment spending has increasedesult of the deployment of Scaleboard and then arole. Investment probably will continue toin the early Seventies with the deployment of follow-on peripheral systems.
1UV !H'.UU4rf[Original document.