Created: 9/19/1970

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


Time andHoubq Situation


enry A.

U. Alexis

Defense avid Packard


Admiral Thomao Moorcr

NSC Staff - Vlron P. Vaky*


hold another ecosion at the ond of the . "morning, September0 a.

Moorcr to prepare material on posolblc

b. Mr. Vaky to prepare material on possible outcomes cf action and possible U. S. postures.

Declassified and

* Minuces written by Mx.for Release



A cable from the CIA Station la Santiago waa distributed to the principals to road. (Dr. Kissinger has copy. J It was made clear that no one doe other than the principalseen this report.

Dr, Kissinger pointed out that the operation apparently/underway apontaneously, and th.it he does not sec anythingan or should do. The question was what happens when and if It starts. ill have to ermine whether Chore io anything for us to do In those circumstances'.

Mr. Johnson pointed out that it might create widespread violence, perhaps leading to civil war.

Mr, Packard said that he wasn't sure of that because Allcnde juct might watt

next round. It is difficult to know how to access the situation,


Vaky commented that first it should bo understood that the Popular Unity (UP)eterogeneous group. Not all of the elements would rccort to violence; some, such as the Radicals, might even welcome this turn of events,

it was not clear that Allcnde himself would stay to fight; he might well leave the country. Thirdly, the Communist hard-core and the Socialistprobably would resort to violence. Theyabor unionocal peasant core and might well cause widespread and serious internal security situations. Another element to consider was thefl

that the non-commissioned officers were xnziTursTccnjyLcIu ere in sufficient number Allcnde sympathizers. The question as to whether the troops would respond to orders needed further assessment.

It was agreed that the movement reported In the cable was self-gcnoratod,

- Mr, Helms confirmed that we were not in specific contact with the military on this point.

Mr, Johnson said that then we really had only two Choices: either tell them to turn it off, or encourarjo them.

Dr, Klscim.cr said the President would certainly not approve the courso of action telling them to turn it off, We do have the choice of merelyack or egging them on. He saw little point in the latter.

Admiral Moorcr and Mr. Helms commented that other Latin American military would stand clear. *

J-Mr. Packard said we had to dccido how wo would Ilka all this to come out.In his view what we wanteduccossfui military action but without ua

Dr. Klsolnr^er oaid that If it happens, howover, wo need to be ready for For example, what do we do if there are civil disorders; what! _do wo do if.thero lo civil war; what do we do If asked for equipment.

Mr. Helms pointed out that tho Chilean Army might very well need munitions, or crowd-control weapons.

Mr. Vaky added that if we were asked to supply them we might consider clandestine channels rather than through MAP.

Dr. Kisslnccr paid thatSAG meeting on Monday should tack this item on at the end.

It was agreed that the WAS AG meeting would bo held0 AM Monday,

Dr. Kissinger asked Admiral Moorer toaper on how military ssistance might bo provided. Mr. Vaky was aofced to prepare material on various poooiblc outcomcc and. posture.

Original document.

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