CONTENTS
SCOPE NOTE CONCLUSIONSHE DOMESTIC SETTINC
IL THE CURRENT STATE OF IRAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
Pakistan, and Afghanistan
Arab Slates
Europe
D Iran and the
in. THE SHAH'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
IV. LMPLICATIONS
SECRET
ANNEX
IRAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION
SCOPE NOTE
This estimate deals primarily with Iranian foreign policy over the next several years, the place military forces have in that policy, the likelihood of hostilities between Iran and its neighbors, and some implications of these matters for the US, including the question of arms sales.
CONCLUSIONS
Shah is determined to ensure forosition ofleadership in the Persian Culf after the British withdrawaldeeply concerned that radical Arab regimes, supported by thein time threaten Iran's interests in the Culf. However, Araband dislike of external direction almost certainly willformation of an effective radical Arab military coalitionMoreover, an overly active Soviet policy of support formovements against Iranian interests could Jeopardize thesatisfactory relations with Iran.
Shahodern, well-equipped militaryas essential to maintain and further Iranian interests in thedeter hostile moves by Iraq, and to assure Iranian egress fromThe existencearge military force will help him to getof conservative Arab rulers in opposing the spreaddoctrines and forces in the Culf.
physical integrity of Iran is not threatened by any ofCulf neighbors. Iran is on good terms with all but Iraq.between the two are clearly possible, but the Shah'sare substantially larger and better-trained than those ofthe Shah fears most in the Gulf is the growth of Arabthe overthrow of traditional ruleconsequent harm
/
lo Iranian interests.adical movement succeed in establishing itself in one of the smaller stales, he would almost certainly try to contain or unseat it by clandestine means, but might use overt forceistnilateral use of force by the Shah would virtuallv compel even conservative Febal to support fellow Arabs, and this would upset both Culf stability and the Shah's designs for cooperation of conservative Culf States under his leadership.
D. The Shah considers US willingness to provide the arms he wants as evidence of this country's high regard for him and for his policies. He would probably settleubstantial part of the total number he wants, hoping to get approval for moreater date. If. however, he felt that US explanationsrolonged delay or an luiwiUingness to meet his needs, he would almost certainly turn to other WesternFrance in the first instance. If US rebuffs or deferrals of his arms requests should convince the Shah that the US was no longer responsive to his needs, he would conclude the US was downgrading its relations with Iran. Consequently, he would readjust Iranian policies in the direction of: closer ties with certain West Europeanore accommodating attitude toward the USSR, resistance to US advice on international issues, probably increased pressures on US oil interests, and possibly termination of US special facilities and military overflight rights.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DOMESTIC SETTING
L The successes of the Shah's program of social reform over the hut five"whiteIran's notable progress in economichave given the Shah great confidence that be is master of hii ownhas also given many Iranians more confidence in their country and Itsoff an earlier insecurity and hesitancy, (he Shah has become apurposeful leader. Novery fewarehis approval. Behind the facadearliament, he appoints andcabinet minister! as he pleases. rJornestically, his ambitious planseconomic and loculand reform,wide-scale education. Theovernedargeis, within limits imposed by inertia and inefficiency, responsive to
n addition to the civilian bureaucracy (one out of six Iranians employed outside agriculture works for theho Shnh has the support of armed forcesCCO-tnan gendarmerie, and an extensive police
RET
I
ar.il security apparatus. Tbe Shah lakes particular care to keep his officer corps content, mostly through tlie provision ol extensive perquisites in the way ofhoming, and the like. Supplying the armed forces with sophisticated weapons is on additional, but apparently not critical, element in keeping them loyal
here arc stillumber or Iranians who disagree with the Shah's policies Or whohare in power, but no org.ini*ed opposition of any consequence exists. The elements thai formed the bulk of Mossadeq'ihe, including the TviiJchave eillier been cowed ar drawn into the government's programs, which now incorporate almost all the social demands of the oldnot the politicalooce made. The conservative Muslim clergy resent the way the Shah dominates or ignores them, yet they appear to be able to do little more than grumble. However, there have been assassination Attempts on themost recenthould he die, through assassination or accident, there is no single person able to wield the power he docs, nor would tho system permit devolution of authority. The Shah would probably be succeeded, as provided by law. by the Queen as regent (or the minor son of the Shah. The regency would likely be supported by the military leaders, but would be notably less effective than the present regime.
of the principal factors in the success of the Shah's rule has beeneconomy, which has grown at an annual average rateercentOil has led this growth and has provided the money to slfmulatealmost all other parts of the economy. Construction has grown at anrate ofercent, industrial outpet al aboutercent,uarter of CNP) has grown atercent
This rapid economic expansion, however, has been achieved at the cost of serious balance of payments difficulties; the deficitas0 million. Foreign exchange earnings will probably rise at aboutercent annually for tho next several years; nevertheless the annual balance of payments deficit will reach0 million3 if import growth continues at the pace of recent years.
Aboutercent of Iran's annual foreign exchange expenditure1 billion is for military purposes. It cannot pay for both military procurement and civihan imports at levels specified in existing programs without significantly increasing its already heavy debt burden. The Shah thus alreadyhoice between military and civilian goals and will probably opt to cut non-military imports, including inputs to further industrial growth, therebyoderate slowing in economic growth fromevelindfall of several hundred million dollars from new oil agreements would reduce the difference between existing expenditure plans and currently anticipated income, but it would not close the gap.
ScCREi
SECRET
II. THE CURRENT STATE Of IRAN'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
or wellentury. Iran was an arena in which larger power*for influence. Up tohe UK and Ruuu were the principal contestants As British power declined after World War II. tbe t'S took over *omc of the UK's role in Iran. However, the UK's past reputation as kingmaker in tho axon, its ownership of the Anglo-Ii anion Oil Company andfiicetil of the Iran Oil Consortium, and its position as guardian of the smaller stales of the Persian Culf have continued to give Britain considerable influence. During the pastears, however. Iran has made considerable progress in emerging from the shadow of the great powers. This change has been node rxnuble by massive oil revenues, which relieved Iran of the need for foreign economic and military assistance, by the changing pattern of reUnoni between the US and the USSR, and by the Shah's emergenceonfident powerful autocrat.
Pakistan, and Afghanistan
S. Iranian relations with Turkey and Pakistan have long been very good; the threeeen members of the Western-sponsored CENTO allianceId recent years, the three states, wishing to be less dependent on Western guidance,egional cooperative organization (RCD; to deal with projects of mutual concern. For all practical purposes, there are no matters of contention between Iran and either of these two neighbors. Iranian relations withare less close than those with Turkey and Pakistan Most of what is now Afghanistan was once ruled by Persia, but the Sunni Muslim Afghans broke away wellentury* ago in protest at Iranian Shla Muslim rule. Although relations between the two states have from time to lime deteriorated,ver the location of borders and the division of the Helmand River waters, these disputes are not of great moment. For some years now Iranian-Afghan relations have been smooth if somewhat distant
Arab States
n the Shah's mind. Iran's foreign problems, aside from its relations with the larger powers, really center in the Arab region to the west especially the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq. The Shah has no use for the radical rcpubli. in socialistby Baathist Iraq and byhave appeared in the Arab world in recent years. Iran's problems with the Arabs are complicatedollision of Persian and Arab nationalisms. There are also ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities along Iran's western border. Thooil-producing areas of Iran lie in Khuzistan. an areaarge Arabic-speaking population which was ruled by an autooomous Arab-familv until thehe Baathists in particular claim this area as part of*the ArabAbout half of Iraq's population is Shia Muslim, and it has very close ties to the Shia community which is the majority of Iran's population; the Iraniansrotective feeling about their Iraqi co-religionists.
he Shah cares relatively little who runs the Arab states of the Culf. as Ion; as they do not challenge his pre-eminence, are not hospitable to radicals and revolutionaries, and arc responsive to Iranian security ob|ectives. Never-tbeleu, he docs view physical control of certain locations as the key to stability in the Culf. Thus, he wants control of the tiny islands of the Tunhs and Abu Musa on the grounds that forces hostile to him might physically seize these uln>ds and control entiynd exit from the Culf. Control of the islands also involves conflicting Iranian and Arab od claims. He recognizes that tooand could be counterproductive, and has indicated that he will not press the sovereignty issue so long aa Iran obtains effective control of these islands. If such an arrangement is nut workedfore the British withdrawal, the Shah will exert increasing pressure on the tiny Tmcial states which claim them, and in the last resort would probably occupy the islands by force.
II The Saudis and the Iranians have cooperated fairly well in tbe Culfalthough Iranian pretensions occasionally grate on the Saudis. The Iranians have also irritated Kuwait from time to time by assuming an attitude of superiority. The present Kuwaiti and Saudi .Arabian regimes, however, recognize Iranonservative government whose interest in the liability of the Culf generally coincides with their own. Neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia Is likely to challenge Iranian effortsre-eminent role in Culf security', for example, by naval patrols, so long as Iran respects territorial waters andon undersea od rights.
ranian rclsooDs with Iraq have been antagonistic in recent years. The Iranians have unilaterally denounced the treaty7 which extends Iraqi jurisdiction to the low water mark on tho Iranian side of the Shaat-al-Arab instead of placing tbe boundary essentially on the shipping channel. The treaty requires shippmg for Abadan and Khorramshahr to transit Iraqi waters. Tbe Shahthat the revoluntJonary regimes in Baghdad threaten liis interests, and he has actively opposed them. For instance, he has supported Kurdish rebels in Iraq extensively over tbe past seven or eight yean. This support has involved direct military aid. cash subventions, and some haven on the Iranian side of the border for Kurdish rebels. At the same time, the Shah prefers to keep potentially troublesome Kurdish leaders occupied outside Iran, which alsourdish minority. The Iranians were considerably annoyed when the Kurds accepted the Baghdad government's proposalsease-fire and settlement inut Tehran maintains contact with Kurdish leaden against tho day whenmay start again.
t seems likely that Iraqi-Iranian relations will remain poor, at least as long as the present Baath government is in power In Baghdad. The Ba.ithist regime will continue to use the party and the state apparatuses to further Iraq's aims of replacing of traditional rulers in the Culf with revolutionarysad. as far as possible, to exclude Iran from Culf affairs. The Baath groups in Bahrain, Kuwait. Abu Dhabiew other principalities arc likely from time to time to attract Iran's attention. The Iranians and the Iraqis continue
]
5ECJRET
to support the activity of political exile* from the other country. For example, an Iranian-supported group tried to ouit the Baath regime in0 The Iraqu. for their part, continue to call tor the "liberation" of Kb unit an. which they call Arabutan. Especially since Iraq became heavily involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute, however, these enoenvors have been largely rhetoncal Never-theless, the Shah is seriously concerned about Iraqi pretensions to Khunstan.
n the past, Nasser had ambitions to extend bis country's politicalinto the Persian Culf, and he may well entertain thoughts of making trouble for the local rulers there at some time in the future. Egypt now has neither the time nor the resources to devote toask in so distant an urea; the Israelis are Egypt's pressing problem. Nasser is also inhibited fromin the Culf area by the lact that Kuwait and Saudi Arabiaf0 million annual subsidy which is of great importance to the Egyptian economy. For the present, he is not likely to risk offending these donors by adventuring in the Culf. In any case, other persons and parties now present alternatives, which have some appeal to young would-be revolutionanes in eastern Arabia. The Shah deeply distrusts Nasser's aims, however, and fearsetente in the Arab-Israeli dispute might givehance topressures in tbe Persian Culf region.
ran has maintained good reUtWns with Israel for many years, but, out of regard tor the sensibilities of conservative Arab associates, the Shah has kept his Israeli association fairly discreet. Mis concern to maintain good relations with King Feisal and the Amir of Kuwait, for example, will continue to set limits to public displays of mtimacy with Israel. Yet. Iran is the major source of oil for the pipeline across Israel from the Culf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean, and the two governments get along quite well and cooperate in certain quiet ways.
Europe
Shah maintain) good relations with the principal countries ofEurope. The Iranians and the British successfully worked out anfor Bahrain, thus defusing aserious post-UK withdrawalThereood chance that the British, who wish interstate relations into be as cederly as possible ia snnapaoon of their withdraivaL willout an amicable arrangement allowing Iran control over the islandsand Abu Musa, which it claims. Thehe UK, alongand perhaps Germany, as potential sources of arms if he cannothe svants from the US.
and the Superpowers
and the USSR have brought their relationsairly normalthe past eight years. The situation today contrasts sharply with thebitter hostility which prevailed in thend much ofnd Iron have exchanged many high-level visits; the Soviets havemillion in economic credits, of which0 rrullion has been drawn. The
SECRET
major proiixls Involved areatural gas pipeline which is due to beginin0teel mill in Isfahan, (ran has also contracted5 million worth of military equipment from the USSR, mostly personnel carriers, trucks, and artillery.
IS. The Soviets have attempted to build good relations with Iran and other states along its border which are allied In ihe West. At the same dmc. it has courted the "progressive" Arab regimes and become the major arms supplier for Iraq. Syria, andAll. The USSR places considerable importance oniti presence in the Persian Culf. where it has limited diplomatic represents-tion and few political assets. Showing the flag by Soviet naval vessels is certain to increase in the years ahead. However, an overly active policy of support lor Arab radical movements In the Culf or undertaking independent conspicuous political or military efforts there could jeopardize the USSR's currently good, if not overly cordial, relations with Iran. The Soviets would therefore prefer not to be [Hitosition of having to choose between Iran on the one hand and Iraq and the radical Arabs on the other. This consideration will set limits on how aggressive the Soviets will be in pursuing their policy in the Culf in the next few years.
The Iranians continue to regard the USSR with concern, recalling Soviet efforts to create puppet regimes in Iran during and after World War II and. active support thereafter for the Communist Tudeh movement. The Shah takes' considerable pains to avoid Soviet military and economic aid in areasophisticated weapons and training. He is suspicious of historic Russian designs on Iran and dejires for direct access to the Persian Culf. He believes, however, that good Iranian-Soviet relations offer benefits to Iran and that he can control any Soviet presence and subversive activities in his country*.
Since the, the Shah has considered the US to be Iran'sforeign supporter.ran had outgrown its dependence on US economic and military assistance and. while it continued to look to the US for advice and weapons, it became substantially less ready to accept guidance. This has been particularly the case in the field of weapons procurement. In, Iranian military programs were designed with the confrontation of the told war In mind. More recently, the Shah has emphasized that he wants to buy arms to protect Iran and the Culf from radical Arab revolutionary forces.S. the US undertook, subject to annual Congressional approval, to provide Iran credit up toillion annually for five years for the purchase of arms. Purchases under these credit arrangements, together with earlier armsaim at modernizing and streamlining Iran's Armed Forces. This process is well along; Iran has0 tanks,s (andore onnds. (See Table at Annex forn0 the Shah was Informed that the US was ready to examine further military needs with him and possibly make new financing arrangements on the basis of this examination.
SEQSET
III. THE SHAH'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
Thecutely twnioous of Iran's great pastetermined to set lib country on the roadreat future. He is determined to ensure foretition of power and leadership to which he believes it is entitled on the basis of its history and standing in the region. The Shah sees the Britishfrom the Gulfevelopment which gives Iran an opportunity to restore its hbtoric position in the Culf. but which alto contains dangers of turmoil
Comiderartons of this sort underlie the Shah's mditary and foreign policy. He wants Iran to be on good terms with itsl possible. He ha* no mator territorial aaihitions. save as noted below, hedo almost allboundaries as they nere determined hy wars and treaties in the ISthh centuries. He has. for example, given up Iranian claims to Kuwait and Bahrain. However, there are possible points of friction with Iraq on such matters as the boundary in the Shaat-al-Arab. and with some Arab states on seabed petroleum rights in the Culf.
The Shah has long been concerned that Arab radiralshreat to Iran. He hasuccession of conservative and monarchal Arab governments replaced by military regimes espousing sociaUsm. anti-imperialism, andfor the USSR which has provided arms and other aid to them. These regimes have. In varying degrees, extended help to like-minded elements in "non-liberated" Arab states. The Shah appears to believe that, perhaps over antime, the USSR will be able toumber of these regimes and manipulate them against Iran's interests, especially in the Culf. and ultimately against Iran itself. He views any new radical regimeotential adherent to these "anti-Iranian" forces
The Shah's worries are not without kisOficahon. but they are exaggerated. The Soviets snd the Arab radicals are indeed working for "progressive" regimes in the Middle East Each addition to the radicalthere probably willew more in the course of theisolates the remaining traditional rulers. Yet. there arc several factors which militateoviet-radical Arab campaign against Iran. First, theontinuing to improve its politicalwith Iran by government to government dealings. Second, the Arab radicals are deeply split; there are the Nasserbts. two bitterly antagonistic Baath Parties, two Arab Nationalists Movements,ariety of local revolutionary groups. Cooperation among these radical Arab states and movements Is decreasing, even with regard to IsrscL CommunUt parties in several Arabraq and Syria, are divided. Third, except where their interests run parallel, the Arab radicals have shown little disposition to acceptevnon Fourth, most Arab radicals have so far shown lirde interest in Iran, even though they regard the Shah as an Imperialist agentriend of Israel.
In tho Persian Culf. Iraq and tbe USSR will, to some extent, be carrying out parallel activities. The Soviets are likely to make the "correct" diplomatic moves, naval visits, and the like, while the Iraqi Buatfilsts promote their revolu-
SECIET
tionary interests. The Baathisti will he willing to cooperate with other revo-uitiooary forces in the Cull, tnchidine thv Communists, as long as suchseems likely to further Baath interests. Iraq is not hkely to help in promoting the fortunes of other Arab radic.il movements or of the USSR at its own expense. Moreover. Baghdadresent Soviet efforts to direct Iraqi activities in the Cutf
he Shah wants modern sophisticated armed forces to establish military superiority over neighboring Arab countries, particularly Iraq, in urder to deter present or potential hostile forces from any notions of armed adventure in Iran, and to promote Iranian interests in the Culf. In recent years, he has emphasized improvement of his air forte, andoser extent his navy Iran's Armed Forces are ulrcady larger and better equipped than any the Iranians are at all likely tothat of Iraq. The additional aircraft which the Shah wishessramatic increase in certain of Iran's capabilities. If he getsran would have the capability to airliftombat loldiert at one Kmc to any likely trouble spot in the Culf region. Forces of this nature would permit Iran to conduct rnilitary operations in. say Saudi Arabia in responseequest for help against insurrection.
ran's neighbors are probably not yet aware of jus! how impressive Iran's forces may become by (hewithout these additional purchases. The conservative Arab rulers in the Culf have and arc likely to continue good relations with Iran; in any case, there is little they can do militarily about Iran's preponderant force. The Iraqis, who have built up their forces considerably in recent years but arc still militarily inferior to Iran, are likely to get quite con-cerned when they realize the levels of air power toward which the Iranians are building. Baghdad will probably believe that the Iranians are doing so with operations against Iraq in mind and will almost certainly seek to add to its own forces.
2S. Hostilities between Iraq and Iran, though not likely, are clearly possible9 and inraqi and Iranian forces mobilizedegree and faced each other across thehe south. This could happen again, and an incident rnigbt touch offborder skirmishes, exchanges of artillery fire, and occasionsi air raids. Iraq will, however, be particularly in-hibited from mioating provocative actions as long asifth of its army remains in Jordan and Syria.
hould large-scale hostilities between Iraq and Iran take place, the major scene of actionlong the southern half of the two countries' common border. The Iraqi Army has not reached the border in the mountainous north forears, thanks to the Kurdish rebellion. The Iranian Armed Forces are substantially larger than those of Iraq, although the two sides arc about evenly matched in numbers of such weapons as tanks, artillery, armoredcarriers, and aircraft. The Iraqis.their nearlyears of warfare
SECRET
against Kurdish guerrillas, do not seem to have developed much spirit and dash. Their senior officer corps has been decimated several tames by political purges.
Iraqi attempt to invade Iran would in all probability be anthe Abadan-Khorramshahr region in the south or possibly one onin the center of the border. The Iranians should be able to deployat least equal magnitude against those of Iraq. The Iranian Air Forceto Iraq's since it has about half again as many qualified puotsaircraft, although the Iraqis have had experience in ground supportin the Kurdish war Each side could do some damage to the other,bombing or shelling od installations; both Abadan and the Iraqi oil parrsto the border. Il seems likely that both sides would rapidly find thatof their equipment caused high breakdown rates and thatwas inadequate to support an ambitious advance. Hence, anyprobably not go on for an extended period.
Syria or Egypt would have virtually no capability to supportar as long as they actively confront the Israelis.ettlement be reached with Israel. Syria and Egypt could move some troops to Iraq. Syria and Egypt could also deploy aircraft to assist Iraq.ajor change in the relations among the three would haveko place before Syna and Egypt would contemplate such moves. The Syrian Baathists despise their Baghdad colleagues. The Iraqi Baathists despise the Syrians. Nasser distrusts both, and (he feeling is reciprocated. An effective coalition of radical Arab states against Iran is virtually impossible in the foreseeable future.
Hostibtics with other countries seem remote indeed. The very close ties that Iran enjoys with Turkey and Pakistan preclude hostilities involving these countries. We see no likelihood that Iran and Afghanistan would see any reason to go to war in the foreseeable future. The USSR could of course overwhelm Iran with ease.however. Soviet policy with non-Communist neighbors is to maintain good state to state relations and to promote Soviet influence through trade, aid, and other conventional instruments of statecraft. Hostilities beween the two are probable only in the context of general hostilities between the US and the USSR in this srea. Should either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia fall under the dominationadical regime, relations with Iran would almost certainly deteriorate. But neither country has sufficient military force to pose any threat to Iran, nor could either buildorce for many years. Evenadical government, neither is likely to receive external assistance sufficient to reverse this situation.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
existencetable governmentarge military forcethe Shah get the cooperation of conservative Arab rulers In opposingof radical doctrines and forces in the Culf. Yet, there arein the way of an enduring cooperation between Iran andasic, longstanding antagonism between Persians and Arabs, and
even the coiuervalhe Arabs in (he Cull arc likely torojection of Iranian power in this area with some suspicion. At present, the Shah and Feisal arc determined to cooperate, but thu disposition isersonal matter on tlie part of the two rulers ratherirmly grounded matter of national poiicy of thetates. In any case, cooperation between the two is abutuarantee of stability in the Culf. The means by which the Sluh seeks to make Iranian power felt in the Gulf could set Iranian andArabs at loggerheads. Feisal might help the Shah if the latter moved covertly, but should radical turmoil break out in one of the shakier mini states of the Culf. for example, and the Shah were to intervene openly, the need to show Arab solidarity would probably compel Feisal to denounce Iranianthough his sympathies probably would be against the radicals.
evelopments of this sort would cause some difficulties far the US, which might find itself caught between two friendly states, both armed with US weapons and both of major interest to US petroleum companies Even if matters do not reachtage, Iranian moves in the Culf could cause much Arab opinion to believe that the US is supporting Iranian efforts, including those clearly directed against Arab interests.elief would have some adverse effect on relations with the Arab world; the issue could become serious if Iran did use force on the Arab side of the Culf.
f more immediate concern is the issue of US-Iranian bilateral relahons, and particularly the Shah's desire for additional military aircraft He probably would settleubstantial part of the total number he wants, hoping to get approval for moreater date. If, however, he felt that US explanationsrolonged delay or an unwillingness to meet his needs, he would almost certainly turn to other WesternFrance in the first instance. He would be reluctant as lie says, to complicate his air force's logistics by doing so. and this consideration would cause him to delayime, while trying to convince the US to give him greater satisfaction. He is unlikely to turn to the USSR for rnili:ary awvraft he rtmami deeply suspicious that Russia has long term subversive designs on his country, and he would not want the Soviets to have access to his air force.
3D. The Shah considers US willingness to sell him the arms he wants asof US support for his policies and fur him personally. Since the Shall views Iran's relationship with the US as extremely Important, deferral or even refusalarticular request would not cause him to make major alterations in the overall relationship unless he considered this request essential Yet, his suspicions that the US docs not fully appreciate lilm would increase. He would probably become correspondingly resistant to US advice on future armsand on Iranian policies generally.
ut tf US rebuffs or deferrals of his arms requests should convince the Shah thai the US was no longer responsive to hu needs, he would conclude the US was downgrading its relations with Iran. Consequently, he would readjust Iranian policies in the direction of: closer ties with certain West European states,
comparative military forces
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vloiliun
76
4 2
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TOTAL
AFC
Air
iFichun
Or^twfllj)
TOTALoiiibtn
Trim port
IHjM Mlf-17
L-28
(of whiched
l
S4
it:
6
23 (of which
as
U-7
8 IL-28
37
t Piool Craft Laedjnc Craft
1 II s
batforddiBooalIran Imi.
secret
IRAN
DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIESONFLICT WITH IRAQ
At the outlet of hostilities with Iraq, Iran would be able tonfantrvrmored divisions,eparate brigades. If required the2 Infantry divisions could be deployedours. The Iranian Air Force would be able toactical fighter squadronsd) Logistics deficiencies, although existing, would notgnificant factor in the defense of Iran from Iraq. However, the Iranians would probably not be able toajor rffensrve movement into Iraq. Perhaps as much as an infantry division would be kept for duty along the Soviet border cast of the Caspian, bui, if required, most of this force could be deployed into action against Iraq.
Although an Imperial Cuard division is assigned security duty in Tehran,rigade would bo required for internal security during hostilities with Iraq.
SECFfET
IRAQ
DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIESONFLICT WITH IRAN
Iraq could bring elementsnfantryountain divisions, and
armored division0 personnel) into anion against Iran. The Iraqi Air Force couldactical fighter squadrons
Hawkerighter bomber squadronsndight and medium bombers
Internal security during any major mobilization would necessitate maintenanceeinforced brigade in Baghdad, and at least another reinforced brigade in defense of critical targets along principal lines of communication. Iraq's capability to deploy against Iran will be limited by the stationing of forces in Jordan and Syria, now numberingn case of major conflict with Iran, this force would almost certainly be rapidly reduced. Any major mobilization of Iraqi forces would rapidly deplete present logistical stodcages. and severely tax the entire logistical system.
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EGYPT
DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITIESONFLICT WITH IRAN
(Assuming that an Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement has not been achieved, and the Suez Canal remainsecause of the military and politicalof maintaining readiness for conflict with Israel, very few Egyptianifbe spared (or deployment against Iran. Of Egypt'sndighters, andndombers,quadron ofU-los might be deployed to Iraq or elsewhere in the Persian Culf area.
The Egyptian Navyajor combatantsestroyersubmarines) and one training ship south of Suez. At present one Skoryy class destroyer isundergoing repairs at Port Sudan, and one ex-British destroyerlass submarines are in India for major overhaul. Only surface combatants could operate in the Persian Culf. however, none of the ports in that area wouldepair facilities for Soviet type ships. In addition, the Egyptian vessels wouldervicing ship as escort, and it is doubtful that the training ship, theould be adequate for use in support of combat operations. If the Suez Canal were open, other vessels might be used, but the absence of support ships would severely hamper any naval operations in the Culf. Aden is the nearest friendly port where bunker fuel might be available.
*
syria
deployment capabilitiesonflict with iran
causehe necessity of maintaining readiness for conflict with Israel, few Syrian aircraft could be spared for deployment against Iran- Of Syria's operationalof., andU-7s, perhaps atquadron of) might (if the Arab-Israel situation were quiescent) be deployed to Iraq or elsewhere in the Persian Culf area.
Original document.
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