UNCLASSIFIED
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE4
PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELIGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)
This directive supersedes Director of Central Intelligence4 , as amendedugust
A complete copy of4 now consists of the basic DCID andhrough E, as follows:
nvestigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information.
uality Control Guidelines for the Single Scope Background Investigation.
djudication Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information.
ppeals Procedures: Denial or Revocation of Access.
tandards for SCI Security Awareness Programs in the US Intelligence Community.
The President approved the Adjudicative Guidelines, Temporary Eligibility Standards and Investigative Standards required by Executiven This revised DCID incorporates the President's policy documents verbatim, atnd C, to promote the use of these common and consistent standards for government-wide security background investigations. These two annexes should be read in the context of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) special authorities governing access eligibility to SCI, although the actual wordingroader application to clearance actions.
The DCI exercises authority derived from statute and executive order over access eligibility to SCI and delegates this authority to Determination Authorities through Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. (See Definitions.) Nothing in this directive or its annexes shall be deemed to preclude the DCI or
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Che DDCI under the authority of the Notional Security Acta amended, from taking any actions regarding an individual's SCI access.
Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Acts amended, and Executive, the following' personnel security guidelines, procedures, standards, and continuing security programs are hereby established for all US Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, and other individuals who require access to SCI. Individual departments and agencies may establish such additional security steps as may be deemed necessary and appropriate to resolve issues and/or address employment standards unique to them to ensure that effective security is maintained.
1. Definitions.
person living in awith the individual requiring SCI information.
igned determination by aof the Intelligence Community (SOIC) or his/herthe services of an individual are deemed essentialor mission accomplishment.
ritten evaluation supportingprocess, especiallyignificant exceptionPersonnel Security Standard is being considered. should consist of an evaluation fromand other technical or management expertsand should contrast the compelling nationalof an individual accessed to SCI wich the risk.
esigneeOICfor decisions rendered with respect to SCIor ineligibility.
Family--The spouse, parents, and cohabitant of the individual requiring SCI access.
Community--Thoau USand activities identified in thes amended, , oras making upommunity.
Officials of Che Intelligenceheads of organizations or activities withinCommunity, as defined by Che Naclonals amended,nd.
Cooipartmentedconcerning or derived from intelligence sources.
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methods, orrocesses requiring handling exclusively within formal access control systems established by the DCI.
The purpose of this directive is to enhance the security protection of SCI through the application of personnel security standards, procedures, and continuing security programs.
The provisions of this directive will apply to all persons (other than elected officials of the US Government, to include elected State Governors as may be required or. an individual basis. Federal judges, and those individuals for whom the DCIpecific exception) without regardivilian or military status, form of employment, official rank or position, or length of service. This directive does not apply to situations involving the duly authorized disclosure of SCI to representatives of foreign governments and international organizations.
granting of access to SCI will be controlledstrictest application of the "need-to-know" principle andwith the personnel security standards andforth in this directive.
accordance with "Security PolicyCompartmentednd its supplement, Security Policyhose approved for access torequired toCI-authorizedrovision for prepublication review asof access to SCI.
Security Standards.
Criteria for security approval of an individualeed-to-know basis for access to SCI are as follows:
The individual requiring access to SCI mustS citizen.
individual's immediate family must also be
of the individual's immediate family andpersons to whom he or she is bound by affectionshould neither be subject to physical, mental,forms of duressoreign power or by persons who mayhave been engaged in criminal activity, nor advocate theforce or violence to overthrow the Government of the United
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States or the alteration of the form of Government cf the United States by unconstitutional means.
d. The individual must be stable; eliable; of excellent character, judgment, and discretion; and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
to Personnel Security Standards.
Any exception to the Personnel Security Standards willommon sense determination based on the fact that the available informationinding that the specific risk to national security is manageable in the specific case for which the exception is granted. The organization determining that an exception is warranted will document their finding in the individual's security record. Asisk assessment, normally directed by the Determination Authority, may be required to aid in the determination of the appropriateness of granting an exception to one of the Personnel Security Standards. If accomplished, this assessment shouldart of the individual's security record.
DCI is the exclusive authority for grantingto the requirement that the SubjectS citizen.
affected SOIC or specified designee mayto the standard requiring US citizenship for theof an individual proposed for SCI access, as well asrequiring individuals to which Subject is boundor obligation be free of any form of duress.
to the US citizenship requirementto be accessed to SCI and their immediateshall require certificationompelling need. should be basedpecificertification of compelling need.
Requirements and standard?.
investigation conducted on an individualfor access to SCI will conform to thea Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) as definedA, "Investigative Standards for BackgroundAccess to Classified Information." Qualityrelevant to investigations are defined in AnnexControl Guidelines for the Single Scope
conditions indicate, investigation ofmembers will be conducted to the extent necessarya determination by the adjudicating agency thatoff this directive are met.
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a previous ir.vestigation has beenthe past five years that meets the standards of Annexwill serveasis for granting access approvalthere is substantial information indicating thatnay not satisfy the adjudicative guidelines in Annexa previous investigation does not meet tho Annex Ait is more than five years old, or if therereak inof two years orurrent investigation willbut may be limited to that necessary to bringfile up-to-date in accordance with theset forth inf this directive, paragraphs10. The up-dating process may be limited to reviewrecords, starting with an updatedndonly when it appears the person may nostandards for access under this directive. Shouldbe developed during the current investigationunfavorably on the individual's activities covered byinvestigation, the current inquiries will be expandedto develop full details of this information.
will be instituted requiring the(PR) of personnel provided access to SCI. will be conducted in accordance with the procedurescontained in the section ofefining theSSBI-PR may be expanded as necessary to resolve
the status of aninvestigation, departments and agencies withthe use of the polygraph for personnelmay require polygraph examinations when deemedthe department or agency head to be in the nationalof the United States, where they exist, suchshall be characterized by unified trainingas well as by coordination of scope,fairness issues to promote consistency, reciprocity and
those cases in which the individual hasof the United Statesubstantial period, aof the adequacy of the investigation in termsof the investigative requirements andof the information therein must be made beforeis considered.
8. Temporary Eligibility for Access to SCI.
a. In exceptional cases, including national emergency situations and hostilities involving US personnel, the SOIC or his designee may determine that it is necessary or advisable in the national interest to authorize temporary access to SCI before completion of the SSBI. In this situation, the procedures contained in theection entitled "Investigative
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Standards for Temporary Eligibility for Access" will be complied with before temporary access is permitted. ersonal interview of the individual by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel will be conducted wherever possible and practicable.
SSBI and final evaluation will be completed atpracticable moment unless an exception is granted by Temporary eligibility for access is valid only atgranting it and other agencies which expressly agreeit and acknowledge understanding of its Therefore, certification to other organizationsauthorized temporary access will includeof the fact.
eligibility for access may be granted onlynecessary for the individual to perform authorized indoctrination briefings will be modified to thenecessary to ensure protection of the SCI toindividual will be exposed, and appropriatesigned.
Requirements.
Individuals who hold SCI access have special responsibilities and obligations to report to their cognizant security officer, in writing and when feasible in advance, activities, conduct or employment that could conflict with their ability to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or counterintelligence threats. ore detailed explanationisting of an individual's responsibilities and reporting requirements are contained in Annex E. In addition, initial and updated security documents . Statement of Personal History, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, Security Clearance Application) and security records shall include details of such employment, activities, associations and/or conduct to facilitate appropriate investigation and evaluation to determine whether the circumstances create an unacceptable risk to the security of SCI or of unauthorized disclosure. Annex C, Guideline L, "Outsideummarizes the concern.
of Access Eligibility.
The evaluation of the information developed by investigation of an individual's loyalty and suitability will be accomplished by trained professional adjudicators under the cognizance of the SOIC concerned. When all other information developed on an individual isinor investigative requirement that has not been met should notavorable access determination by an authorized adjudicative authority. In all evaluations, the protection of the national security is paramount. Any doubt concerning personnel having access to SCI should be resolved in favor of the national security, and the
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access should be denied or revoked. The ultimate determination of whether the granting of access is clearly consistent with the interest of national security will be an overall common sense determination based on all available information. The adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to SCI are contained in Annex C.
Procedures.
rescribes commor. appeals procedures to be followed when an individual's SCI access has been denied or revoked.
Security Programs.
a. To facilitate attainment of appropriate standards of personnel security and to augment both the access approval criteria and the investigative requirements established by this directive, member departments and agencies shall institute continuing security programs based or. risk management principles for all individuals having access to SCI. In addition to security indoctrinations (see Annex E, "Standards for SCI Security Awareness Programs in the US Intelligencehese programs will be tailored to create mutually supporting procedures to identify and resolve issues which bring into question an individual's loyalty and integrity or suggest the possibility of his or her being subject to undue influence or duress through foreign relationships or exploitable personal conduct. These programs should include the capacity for member departments and agencies to monitor the individual's performanceailored program against the eligibility criteria and adjudicative standards when unresolved concerns are present, when an individual is assigned to perform sensitive work requiring access to SCI, the SOIC for the department, agency, or government program to which the individual is assigned will assume security supervision of that individual throughout the period of his or her assignment.
b- The continuing security programs will include the following:
(1) Individuals are required to inform the department or agency that grants their SCI access about any personal problem or situation that mayossible bearing on their eligibility for continued access to SCI and to seek appropriate guidance and assistance. Security guidance should be provided by an official who understands both the eligibility issues involved, and the unique sensitivities of the specific SCI program being supported. As appropriate, tailored monitoring programs should be established to ensure that individuals actively resolve problems which have led to concern about their continued eligibility for access. An individual participating in a
monitoring programarticular department or agency does not meet the criteria for automatic reciprocal acceptance of SCI
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eligibility as established by Executive. rn these situations, each organization should make their own determination of eligibility.
SCI security education programs of the member departments and agencies will be established and maintained pursuant to the requirements off this directive.
Security awareness programs for supervisory personnel will be established and maintained to ensure that supervisory personnel recognize and discharge their special responsibility to safeguard SCI, including the need to assess continued eligibility for SCI access. These orograms will provide practical guidance on indicators that" may signal mattera of security concern. Specific instructions concerning reporting procedures will be disseminated to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to safeguard the security of the United States as well as to provide all necessary help to the individual concerned to neutralize his or her vulnerability.
14) Security review programs will ensure that appropriate security authorities always receive and exchange, imely manner, all information, including lead information, bearing on the security posture of persons having access to SCI. Personal history information will be kept current. Security and related files will be kept under continuing review.
here permitted by agency policy, security review programs may include the use of polygraph examinations conductedualified polygraph examiner.
c. Whenever adverse or derogatory information is discovered or inconsistencies arise that could impact on an individual's security status, appropriate investigation will be conductedimely basis. The investigation will be of sufficient scope necessary to resolve the specific adverse or derogatory information or inconsistency in question soetermination can be made as to whether the individual's continued utilization in activities requiring SCI is clearly consistent with the interest of national security.
13. Implementation.
Existing directives, regulations, agreements, and other guidance governing access to SCI as defined herein will be revised accordingly.
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Director of Central
4
ANNEX A'
Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access
to Classified Information
The following investigative standards are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programs nd are to be used by government departments and agencies as the investigative basis for final clearance determinations. However, nothing in these standards prohibits an agency from using any lawful investigative procedures in addition to these requirements in order to resolve any issue identified in the courseackground investigation or reinvestigation.
Throe Standards.
There are three standards n the Appendix summarizes when to use each one):
investigation and reinvestigation standards forauthorizations and for access to CONFIDENTIAL andall SECRET-level SAPs not specifically approvedinvestigative requirements by an official authorizedSAPs byf Executive
investigation standard fornd for access to TOP SECRET (including TOPand SCI; and
reinvestigation standard for continued accesslevels listed in
to Periods of Coverage.
Some elements of standardseriod of coverage even years). where appropriate, such coverage may be shortened to the period from the Subject's eighteenth birthday to the present or to two years, whichever is longer.
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The content of this Annex is takenrom the Preaidentially approved Investigative Standards and Temporary Eligibility Standards and should be read in the context of access eligibility to SCI, although the actual wordingroader application to clearance actions.
Investigations.
Investigations and reinvestigations may be expanded under the provisions of Executivend other applicable statutes and Executive Orders.
Investigations that satisfy the requirementsiven standard and are current meet the investigative requirements of all levels specified for the standard. They shall be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all agencies.
in Service.
erson who requires access has been retired or separated from US Government employment for less than two years and is the Subject of an investigation that is otherwise current, the agency regranting the access will,inimum, review an updated Standard Formnd applicable records. einvestigation is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive (see
National Agency Check.
The National Agency Check is part of all investigations and reinvestigations. It consistseview of:
and criminal history files of thea technical fingerprint search;
Security/Suitability Investigations Index;
Defense Clearance and Investigations Index; and
other national agenciesIA, INS)to the individual's background.
STANDARD A
National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit Check
(NACLC)
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pplies to investigations and reinvestigations for:
to CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET (includingSAPs not specifically approved forrequirements by an official authorized tobyf Executivend
access authorizations.
Reinvestigations: When to Reinvestigate.
The reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion of, but not later than ten years (fifteen years for CONFIDENTIAL) from the date of, the previous investigation or reinvestigation. eflects the specific requirements for when toeinvestigation, including when there hasreak in service.)
Requirements.
Investigative requirements are as follows:
of forms: completior. of standard Formapplicable releases and supporting documentation.
Agency Check: completionational
Review: verification of thestatus, including credit bureau checks coveringwhere the Subject has resided, been employed,school for six months or more for the past seven years.
and Place of Birth: corroboration of dateof birthheck of appropriate documentation,completed in any previousheck of BureauStatistics records when any discrepancy is found to exist.
Agency Checks: inimum, allinclude checks of law enforcement agencieswhere the Subject has lived, worked, and/orwithin the last five years, and if applicable, ofagency for any identified arrests.
the Investigation.
The investigation may be expanded if necessary to determine if access is clearly consistent with the national security.
STANDARD B
Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)
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pplies to initial investigations for:
to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET SAPs) and
access authorizations.
Requirements.
Investigative requirements are as follows:
a. Completion of Forms: completion of Standardncluding applicable releases and supporting documentation.
National Agency Check: completionational
Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant completionational Agency Check,cards, for the spouse or cohabitant.
andBirth: corroboration of datethroughof appropriate documentation;ofrecords when anyexist.
for individuals born outside theverification of US citizenship directly fromregistration authority; verification ofor legal status of foreign-born immediate(spouse, cohabitant, father, mother, sons,sisters).
corroboration of most recent orclaimed attendance, degree, or diploma. appropriate educational sources if education is aof the Subject during the most recent three years.
verification of all employments forseven years; personal interviews of sourcesor both) for each employment of six months orthrough records or sources of all periodsexceeding sixty days; verification of alland military service, including discharge type. members, all service within one branch of thewill be considered as one employment, regardless
four references, of whom at least twoto the extent practicable, all should have social
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knowledge of vhecollectively span at least the years.
i. Former Spouse: an interview of any former spouse
divorced within the years.
j. Neighborhoods: confirmation of all residences for the last three years through appropriate interviews with neighbors and through records reviews.
k. Financial Review: verification of the Subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where Subject has resided, beer, employed, and/or attended school for six months or more for the last seven years-
1. Local Agency Checks: heck of appropriate criminal history records covering all locations where, for the last ten years, the Subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more, including current residence regardless of duration. (NOTE: If no residence, employment or education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed appropriate.)
m. Public Records: verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the Subject.
n. Subject Interview: ubject Interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the investigation, additional Subject Interviews may be conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations may be taken whenever appropriate.
o. Polygraph (only agencies with approved personnel security polygraph programs): in departments or agencies with policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security purposes, the investigation mayolygraph examination, conductedualified polygraph examiner.
14. Expanding the Investigation.
The investigation may be expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professional, and law enforcement professionals may be conducted.
standard C
Single-Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation
(SSBI-PR)
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pplies to reinvestigations for:
to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET SAPs! and
access authorizations.
to Reinvestigate.
The reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion of, but not later than five years from date of, the previous investigation (see
Requirements.
Reir.vestigative requirements are as follows:
of Forms: completion of Standard Formapplicable releases and supporting documentation.
Agency Check: completionational(fingerprint cards are required only if there has notprevious valid technical check of the FBI).
Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant completionational Agency Check,cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. TheCheck for the spouse or cohabitant is not required if
already completed in conjunctionrevious investigation or reinvest igat ion.
verification of all employments sinceinvestigation. Attempts toufficient number(supervisors, coworkers, or both) at all employmentsmonths or more. For military members, all service withinof the armed forces will bo considered as oneof assignments.
interviews with two characterare knowledgeable of the Subject; at least one will bereference. To the extent practical, both shouldknowledge of the Subject and collectively span theof the investigation. As appropriate,may be conducted, including with cohabitants
f.. Neighborhoods: interviews of two neighbors in the vicinity of tha Subject's most recent residence of six months or more. Confirmation of current residence regardless of length.
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Review:
Financial Status: verification of the Subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where Subjecz has reoided. been employed, and/or attended school for six months or more for the period covered by the reinvestigation;
Check of Treasury's Financial Database: Agencies may request the Departnent of the Treasury, under terms and conditions prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to search automated databases consisting of reports of currency transactions by financial institutions, international transportation of currency or monetary instruments, foreign bank and financial accounts, and transactionshat are reported as possible money laundering violations.
Agency checks: heck of appropriaterecords covering all locations where, during theby the reinvestigation, the Subject has resided,and/or attended school for six months orcurrent residence regardless of duration. (NOTE: residence, employment, or education exceeds six months, checks should be performed as deemed appropriate.)
Spouse: an interview with any formerthe divorce took place before the date of theor reinvestigation.
j. Public Records: verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the Subject since the date of the last investigation.
k. Subject Interviews: ubject Interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the reinvestigation, additional Subject Interviews may be conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations may be taken whenever appropriate.
18. Expanding the Reinvestigation.
The reinvestigation may be expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may be conducted.
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Appendix Decision Tables
TABLE li WHICH INVESTIGATION TO REQUEST
If the requirement is for
the parson has this access
on this
investigation
Che investigation required is
standard
SECRET; "L"
CONF.SEC.'L*
out. of dare NACLCX
SECRET,
COKP, SEC; HL"
or out ot
dare NACLC
our. of date SSBI
SCI; "Q-
TABLE 2: REINVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS
If che
requirement Is for
the age of cheis
required if there hasreak in service of
months
Tenths or more
tors.os.
(NOTE 11
yrs. Or no re
"L"
rs.os.
EMOTE 1}
yrs. Or more
SECRET,
SCI;
-0"
rs.os.
(NOTE 1)
yrs. Or more
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NOTE 1: inimum, review an updated Std. Fm.nd applicableeinvestigation (NACLC or SSBI-PR) not required unless the review indicates the person may longer satisfy the standards of Executive,
4
Investigative Standards for Temporary Eligibility for Access
The following minimum investigative standards, implementingf Executive, "Access to Classifiedre established for all United States Government and military personnel, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, employeescontractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information before the appropriate investigation can be completedinal determination made.
Eligibility for Access.
Basedustified need meeting the requirements off Executive, temporary eligibility for access may be granted before investigations are complete and favorably adjudicated, where official functions must be performed prior to completion of the investigation and adjudication process. The temporary eligibility will be valid until completion of the investigation and adjudication; however, the agency granting it may revoke it at any time based on unfavorable information identified in the course of the investigation.
Eligibility for Access at the CONFIDENTIALLevels and Temporary Eligibility for "L"
inimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the Standardncluding any applicable supporting documentation, favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, and submissionequest for an expedited National Agency Check with Local Agency Checks and Credit (NACLC).
Eligibility for Access at the TOP SECRET andand Temporary Eligibility for "Q" Access Authorization:
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UNC-Assini:^
For Someone who is Che Subjectavorable Investigation not Meeting the Investigative Standards for Access at those Levels.
inimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the Standard including any applicable supporting documentation, favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, and expedited submissionequestingle Scope Background Investigation
Eligibility for Access at the TOP SECRET andand Temporary Eligibility for "Q" AccessSomeone who is not the Subjecturrent,or Personnel Security Investigation of any kind.
inimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the Standard including any applicable supporting documentation, favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority, immediate submissionequest for an expedited SSBI, and completion and favorable review by the appropriate adjudicating authority of relevant criminal history and investigative records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of information in the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) and the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCID .
Requirements by Agencies.
Temporary eligibility for access must satisfy these minimum investigations standards, but agency heads may establish additional requirements based on the sensitivity of the particular, identified categories of classified information necessary to perform the lawful and authorized functions that are the basis for granting temporary eligibility for access. However, no additional requirements shall exceed the common standards for background investigations developed under) of Executive. Temporary eligibility for access is valid only at the agency granting it and at other agencies who expressly agree to accept it and acknowledge understanding of its investigative basis. It is further subject to limitations specified in)f Executive, "Access to Classified Information."
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ELEASE
ANNEX 3
Quality Control Guidelines for the Single Scope Background Investigation
In accordance with the requirements ofhis document sets out guidelines to maintain quality standards for the Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI). These guidelines assume the adjudicator's perspective because the adjudicator is the ultimate customer for the SSBI. The guidelines are divided into:
Definition of Quality
Conduct of the Interview
Collection Requirements (Coverage)
Quality Control Activities.
SOICs will ensure that investigative personnel employed by or assigned or detailed to their agencies/departments receive adequate initial and ongoing training in investigation and interrogation techniques, as well as familiarization with counterintelligence issues that may arise during investigation. Training should also incorporate findings of contemporary research in personnel security and medical disciplines and, in addition, evolving legal issues that may impact investigation collection requirements- As much as possible, training should be conductedoint effort with other investigative entities supporting the Intelligence Community, to facilitate information sharing and to enhance reciprocity.
Quality.
A quality investigationhorough and comprehensive collection of favorable and unfavorable informationariety of sources, past and present, that may includeeighborhoodredit, police, and the Subject.
The determination of eligibility for access to sensitive compartmented informationiscretionary determination using the whole person concept that such access is clearly in the interests of the national security. Accordingly, the investigation will be comprehensive and in such detail so as to affirmatively address unquestioned loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability.
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discretion,ound judgment, as well as freedom from
conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and
willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling and protection of sensitive compartmented information.
of the Interview
The quality of the Investigation depends on the investigator's ability to elicit informationource knowledgeable about the Subject. This is basic to the conduct of any interview. The investigator should plan and execute each interview so as to obtain the maximum amount of informationource. Available sources should be selected from each area of coverage to ensure that pertinent information about ths Subject's entire background is developed.
The investigator should conduct the interview in person anduitable location that protects privacy. Telephonic interviews are strongly discouraged; however, occasionally exigent circumstances may dictate that the interviews be conducted by telephone. elephonic interview is nscessary, the report should always state why the interview was not conducted in person.
The investigator should initially advise the source of the reason/purpose for the investigation and should attempt toegree of confidence in the source(s) that willigh level of rapport and cooperation.
The investigator should also advise the source about ths Privacy Actefore completing the interview, since the source needs to understand that the Subject of the investigation has the right to review information providedource and has the right toource's identity, unless the source requests confidentiality.
Requirement {Coverage)
a. For all Sources.
Investigators should establish the duration and nature of association between the source and the Subject to assess the source's extent of knowledge. The investigator should always secure the source's full name and any other appropriate identifying data, particularly in the caseourceommon name. All derogatory or noteworthy information concerning the Subject of the investigation that is providedource should be fully explored in the interview, including elicitation of the names of any corroborating sources or record information that will substantiate any derogatory testimony provided by the source. For all sources, the report should indicate what issue
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areas were covered and whether the Information provided was favorable or unfavorable.
b. For References and Neighbors.
Depending or. the source's degree of association, investigators should ask each reference or neighbor relevant information regarding the Subject's:
fl) Family, citizenship, education, employment, residence history, and military service.
Reputation, character, honesty, trustworthiness, integrity, discretion, reliability, and temperament.
Financial stability, organizational affiliations, and whether thereistory of mental, emotional, or physical health problems.
Whether the Subjectattern of excessive use of alcohol or has ever used illegal drugs or abused prescription drugs.
Activities whichack of discretion or demonstrate poorharacter flaw,erHonalitv
Participation in criminal activity or an altercation with law enforcement agencies.
Travels abroad for business or pleasure and degree of contact with foreign nationals.
loyalty to the United States.
ubject has had access to classified informationource isosition to know, the investigator should ask whether the Subject properly handles classified informations everecurity violation. Finally, the investigator should ask if the source can recommend the Subjectosition of trust and responsibility with the US Government or, in the caseontractor, can the Subject be trusted with classified information. The investigator should conclude the interview by asking the source to provide names of additional references.
c. Follow-up Questions.
ource provides noteworthy or derogatory information to
questions in any of the above areas of consideration, the
investigator should ask follow-up questions as necessary to
elicit all available information. The investigator shouldfully as
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(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the
conduct.
{2) The motivation for and the circumstances surrounding the conduct.
The frequency and recency of the conduct.
The Subject's age and maturity at the time of the
conduct.
Whether the conduct was voluntary or whether there was pressure, coercion, or exploitation leading to the conduct.
Whether the Subject has been rehabilitated or has exhibited other pertinent behavioral changes since the conduct.
If the Subject has ended the questionable conduct, the investigator should attempt to determine the motivation for positive change. The investigator should also attempt to establish whether there may be personal animosity or bias towards the Subject on the part of the The investigator should upply any available documentary evidence relating to the conduct in addition to the report of the source.
d. For Employment References.
The investigator should identify and interview the best source(s) available. These employment references should include, but are not limited to, the Subject's immediate supervisor,nd other persons with frequent professional contact. Where appropriate, the investigator should pursue the same line of inquiry as with references and neighbors. In particular, the investigator should inquire regarding:
Whether the Subject is willing to abide by company policies and regulations.
Whether the Subject appropriately safeguards the employer's proprietary/sensitive information.
the Subject is financially stable.
the Subjectistory ofto include alcohol, and/or prescription drugs.
IS) Whether the Subject has been involved in any criminal activity.
(6) Whether the Subject is reliable and eliqible
The investigator should obtain any available documentary evidence
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Co support the report of the. For Subject Interviews.
The Subject is the best source of information about himself/herself- Hence, the investigator should explore with the Subject the same line of inquiry she/he pursueseference, neighborhood, and employment The investigator should obtain the Subject's version of the deCails surrounding all issues arising either in the course of the interview or in other parts of the investigation that have been completed by the time of the Subject Interview and report them completely. The investigator should inquire regarding:
What happened and why.
Where, when, how, and how often it happened.
Who else was involved.
Was Che conduct voluntary.
Of particular value to Che adjudicator is evidence that the Subject is being contradictory or dissembling. If the Subjecc claims ta have ended Che conduce, Che investigator should actempt to determine the motivation for positive change. The investigator should report only the facts.
5. Quality Control Activities.
Quality control activities are designed Co ensureigh quality invescigacion and report have been provided. The following management tools can be used by investigative agencies to ensure qualicy investigacions, and ocher Cechniques may be appropriate:
Review.
Case review consistsupervisory review of the investigative requirements and the investigation to ensure thac all coverage has been met using the best available sources. Depending on the agency, the investigative review may be conducted by the investigator's supervisor oruality assurance or assessment team.
Program.
In ride-along programs, supervisors and/or senior agents accompany the investigator, observing the investigator's performance, focusing on whether the invesCigaCor:
(l) Uses proper/accepcable invescigacive cechniques.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCIASSIFIED
U) Explores all relevant issuas.
exear.or chat reflects positively on
the investigative
c. Source Recor.tact.
The supervisory element may selectample of an investigator's cases and contact some or all of the sources. The
? -yarding the investigator's professionalism, line of questioning, adherence to established policies and procedures, and thoroughness. Both written and telephonic re-contact are acceptable.
These recommended monitoring activities ensure adequate training
oversight, and proper professionalism while conducting the investigation They a'so
ensure that the standards of investigative coverage are satisfactorily met.
UNCLASSIFIED
AFFAOVIDFOIIIIEIEASE MTE9
ANNEX C"
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information
The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Special Access Programs (SAPs) and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.
Adjudicative Process.
a. The adjudicative process is an examinationufficient perioderson's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligibleecurity clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighingumber of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered inetermination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
nature, extent, and seriousness of the
conduct;
circumstances surrounding the conduct,knowledgeable participation;
frequency and recency of the conduct;
individual's age and maturity at the timeconduct;
voluntariness of participation;
tfce content of this annex is taken verbatim from the presidtjntially approved adjudicative guidelineshould be read in the context of access eligibility to sci, although the actual wordingroader
UNCLASSIFIED
approved for release date:9
application to clearance actions.
!6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;
motivation for the conduct;
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
case must be judged on its own merits, andremains the responsibility of theor agency. Any doubt as to whether accessinformation is clearly consistent withwill be resolved in favor of the national security.
ultimate determination of whether the grantingof eligibilityecurity clearance iswith the interests of national security must becommon sense determination based uponof the following, each of which is to bethe context of the whole person, as explained further below:
A
GUIDELINE 3
GUIDELINE C
GUIDELINE D
GUIDELINE E
GUIDELINE ?
GUIDELINE G
GUIDELINE K
GUIDELINE I
to the United States, Foreign influence; Foreign preference; Sexual behavior; Personal conduct; Financial considerations; Alcohol consumpt ion; Drug involvement;
Emotional, mental, and personality disorders;
J: Criminal conduct;
GUIDELINE Ki Security violations;
GUIDELINE L: Outside activities;
GUIDELINE M: Misuse of Information Technology
Systems.
unclassified
adverse informationingle
22 unfavorable determination,
the individual may be disqualified if availablea recent or recurring pattern or questionableor emotionally unstablethe whole person concept, pursuit ofmay be terminated by an appropriatein the face of reliable, significant,
information of security concern becomesan individual who is currently eligible for accessinformation, the adjudicator should considerperson:
Voluntarily reported the information,-
Was truthful and complete in responding to
questions;
assistance and followedwhere appropriate;
(41 Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
after evaluating information of securityadjudicator decides that the information is nottoecommendation of disapproval orthe security clearance, it may be appropriatearning that the future incidents of amay result in revocation of access.
llegiance to the United States
Concern.
An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance co theto safeguard classified information is
in aouDt if there is any reason to susoect an individual's allegiance to the United States.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
UNCLASSIFIED
fllASE DATEiAPBIflgfl
in any act of sabotage, espionage, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrowof the United States or alter the form ofunconstitutional means;
Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who arc committing, any of the above acts;
or sympathy with persons oradvocate the overthrow of the United States Government,sLote or subdivision, by force or violence or bymeans;
in activities which unlawfully advocatethe commission of acts of force or violence tofrom exercising their rights under the Constitutionof the United States or of any state.
5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
,! Th* in<iividual was unaware of the unlawful aims ofor organization and severed ties upon learnina
individual's involvement was only with thehumanitarian aspects of such an organization;
in the above activities occurred for onlyperiod of time and was attributable to curiosityinterest;
person has had no recent involvement orsuch activities.
oreign Influence
6. The Concern.
A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if theyn individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
7. Conditions that couldecurity concern and may be
UNCLASSIFIED
APPIOWI HI Ifil
diequalifying include:
immediate family member,erson to whomhas close ties of affection or obligation, isof, or resident or presentoreign country;
living quarterserson orof their citizenship status, if the potentialforeign influence or duress exists;
cohabitants, or associates who areany foreign government;
to report, where required, associationsnationals;
associationuspected oror employeeoreign intelligence service;
which may make the individual vulnerableexploitation, or pressureoreign government,-
that representatives or nationals fromcountry are acting to increase the vulnerability ofto possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure,-
substantial financial interestountry, orforeign owned or operated business that could makevulnerable to foreign influence.
8. Conditiona that could mitigate security concerns include:
determination that the immediate family memberfather, mother, sons, daughters, brothers,or associated) in question are not agents ofpower orosition to be exploitedoreigna way chat could force the individual to chooseCo the person(s) involved and the United Staces;
with foreign citizens are the resultUnited States Government business;
and correspondence with foreign citizensand infrequent;
individual has promptly complied wichrequirements regarding the reporting ofor threats from persons or" organizations from a
financial interests are minimal andto affect the individual's security responsibilities.
UNCLASSIFIED
HIEASE DATE:
oreign Preference
Concern.
When an individual acta inay as toreferenceoreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
exercise of dual citizenship;
and/or useoreign passport;
serviceillingness to bear arms forcountry;
educational, medical, or other benefits, retirement and social welfare, oreign country;
Residenceoreign country to meet citizenshipements;
foreign citizenship to protect financialinterests in another country;
or holding political office in the
in foreign elections; and
or attempting to perform duties,acting, so as to serve the interests ofin preference to the interests of the United States.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
citizenship is based solely onor birthoreign country;
of possible foreign preference
foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
is sanctioned by the United States;
hasillingness to renounce
UNCLASSIFIED
U'IDWl FOIIEUASI
exual Behavior
Concern.
Sexual behaviorecurity concern if ir.riminal offense, ersonality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion.' Sexual orientation or preference may net be usedasis forisqualifying factor inerson's eligibilityecurity clearance.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
behaviorriminal nature, whether orindividual has been prosecuted;
or addictive sexual behavior when theunable toattern of self-destruction oror that which is symptomaticersonality disorder.-
behavior that causes an individual toto coercion, exploitation, or duress;
behaviorublic nature and/or thatlack of discretion or judgment.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
behavior occurred during or prior tothere is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a
behavior was not recent and there is no evidenceconductimilar nature;
is no other evidence of questionableor emotional instability;
behavior no longer servesasis foror duress.
The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct {Guideline J) and emotional, mental, and personality disorders (Guideline ii in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised by
UNCLASSIFIED
hiease que:
sexual behavior.
ersonal Conduct
15. The Concern.
udgment, untrustworthir.ess, comnlv wtii^ Sfdl"nonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person
information. The
J-Y SUl?*nclearance action or eUg?bflity!Ve CermlnaCion ofprocessing for clearance
Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing; or
rv-^wplete required security forms, releases, or Provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful question!securitvor other official
ersonnel security or
trustworthiness determination.
16. Conditions that couldecurity concern and may be disqualifying also include:
a. Reliable, unfavorable information provided by nd other
ofconcealment, orIt: ^ a"erialfrom any personnelPeraonal history statement, or similar formfflCSscaCus' determine securityor trustworthiness, or award
providing false or misleading information
investigator.
medical authority, or other of:
trSs-wttr-^iH l2ersonnel security or trus-worthmess determination.-
Personal conduct or concealment of information thatdurestong1in activities which, ifrofessional, or community standing
or render the person susceptible to
UNCLASSIFIED
pattern of dishonesty or rule violations,of any written or recorded agreement made betweenand the agency;
with persons involved in criminal Conditions that could mitigate security concerns Include:
information was unsubstantiated or not pertinentdetermination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
falsification was an isolated incident, wasand the individual has subsequently providedvoluntarily;
individual made prompt, good-faith effortsthe falsification before being confronted with the facts;
of material facts was caused orto by improper or inadequate advice ofand the previously omitted information wasfully provided;
individual has taken positive stepsreduce or eliminate vulnerability toor duress;
A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, uoon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
g.^ Association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.
inancial Considerations
Concern.
An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
a. istory of not meeting financial obligations;
UNCLASSIFIED
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
or illegal financial practices suchemployee theft, check fraud, income taxaccount fraud, filing deceptive loan statements,intentional financial breaches of trust;
or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
affluence;
problems that are linked to gambling,alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
behavior was not recent;
was an isolated incident;
C- The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control loss ofusiness downturn, unexpected medical emergency,eath, divorce or separation);
person has received or is receiving counselingproblem and there are clear indications that the problemresolved or is under control;
affluence resultedegal source; and
individualood-faith effort tocreditors or otherwise resolve debts.
lcohol Consumption
Concern.
Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
incidents away from work, suchwhile under the influence, fighting, child oror other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
incidents at work, such as reporting
UNCLASSIFIED
tlEASI BITE:
jnclassifled
for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;
redentialed medical professional clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) ofor alcohol dependence ,-
of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence byclinical social worker whotaff member ofalcohol treatment program;
or binge consumption of alcohol to theimpaired judgment;
of alcohol, subsequentredentialed medical professional andof an alcohol rehabilitation program.
23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
incidents do not indicate
umber of years ago and therea recent problem;
changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
diagnosis of alcohol abuse orthe individual has successfully completedoutpatient rehabilitation along with aftercarefrequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous ororganization, has abstained from alcohol for at leastandavorable prognosis by aprofessionalicensed clinical social worker whostaff memberecognized alcohol treatment program.
rug Involvement
24. The Concern.
or illegal involvement with drugsregarding an individual's willingness or abilityclassified information. Drug abuse or dependencesocial or occupational functioning, increasing the riskunauthorized disclosure of classified information.
are defined as mood and behaviorand include:
unclassified
11. Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Acts amendedarijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants,nd
12} Inhalants and other similar substances.
c. Drug abuse is the illegal userug or useegal druganner that deviates from approved medical direction.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
drug abuse (see above def inition) ,-
drug possession, includingmanufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution,-
redentialed medical professional clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drugdrug dependence;
of drug abuse or drug dependence byclinical social worker whotaff member ofdrug treatment program;
to successfullyrugprescribedredentialed medicaldrug involvement, especially following the granting ofclearance, or an expressed intent not towill almost invariably result in an
that could mitigate security concerns include:
drug involvement was not recent;
drug involvement was an isolated or
demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in,-
completionrescribed drug including rehabilitation and aftercarerecurrence of abuse,avorable prognosis bymedical professional.
GUIDELINE :
Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders
UNCI ASSIFIEIU
APPBOVID FCB RELEASE BITE.9
Concern.
Emotional, mental, and personalicy disorders canignificant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they nayefect in judgment, reliability, or stability. redentialed mental health professionallinical psychologist ormployed by, acceptable to or approved by. Government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.
that couldecurity concern and mayincludei
opinionredentialed mental healththe individualondition or treatment thata defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
that suggests that an individual hasfollow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment failure to take prescribed medication;
pattern of high-risk, irresponsible,or emotionally unstable behavior;
that suggests that theefect in his or her judgment
that could mitigate security concerns include:
is no indicationurrent problem;
opinionredentialed mentalthat an individual's previous emotional, mental,disorder is cured, under control or in remissiona low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
past emotional instabilityne causedeath, illness, or the situation has been resolved, and the individuallonger emotionally unstable.
riminal Conduct
30. The Concern.
A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a
UNCLASSIFIED
person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
or admissions of criminalor whether the person was formally charged;
single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
that could mitigate security concerns include:
criminal behavior was not recent;
crime was an isolated incident;
person was pressured or coerced into committingpressures are no longer present in that
person did not voluntarily commit the actfactors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.
ecurity Violations
Concern.
Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
that couldecurity concern and maytying include:
disclosure of classified information;
that are deliberate or multiple or due
that could mitigate security concerns that:
inadvertent;
isolated or infrequent;
UNCLASSIFIED
iwioveifoi release baie.miu9s
due to improper or inadequate training;
a positive attitude towards thesecurity responsibilities.
utside Activities
Concern.
Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if itonflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude any service, whetheror employment with:
foreign country;
foreign national;
representative of any foreign interest;
foreign, domestic, or international organizationengaged in analysis, discussion, or publicationon intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or
that could mitigate security concerns include:
of the outside employment orthat it does notonflict with anresponsibilities;
individual terminates the employmentthe activity upon being notified that it iswith his or her security responsibilities.
isuse of Information Technology Systems
39. The Concern.
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security
UNCLASSIFIED
concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
that couldecurity concern and mayinclude:
or unauthorized entry into anysystem;
or unauthorized modification,or denial of access to information residing ontechnology systera;
(or use) of hardware, software, or mediainformation technology system without authorization,prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines
of hardware, software, or media intotechnology system without authorization,prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines
that could mitigate security concerns include:
misuse was not recent or significant;
conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
introduction or removal of media was authorized;
misuse was an isolated event;
misuse was followedrompt, good faithcorrect the situation.
UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX D
Appeals Procedures: Denial or Revocation of Access
This annex establishes common appeals procedures for the denial or revocation of access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) by entities of the Intelligence Community after adjudication pursuant to the provisions of This annex is promulgated pursuant to Executive. Executive, and the National Security Acts amended. For the purposes of this annex, all references to4 include the basic document and all of its annexes. Any individual who has been considered for initial or continued access to SCI pursuant to the provisions of4 shall, to the extent provided below, be afforded an opportunity to appeal the denial or revocation of such access. This annex supersedes any and all other practices and procedures for the appeal of the denial or revocation of SCI access. This annex will not be construed to require the disclosure of classified information or information concerning intelligence sources and methods, nor will it be construed to afford an opportunity to appeal before the actual denial or revocation of SCI access. In addition, the provisions ofr any other document or provision of law, will not be construed toiberty or property interest of any kind in the access of any individual to SCI.
This annex applies to all US Government civilian and military personnel, as well as any other individuals, including contractors and employees of contractors, who are considered for initial or continued access to SCI. This annex does not apply to decisions regarding employment and will not be construed to affect or impair public0 or the authority of any entity to effect applicant or personnel actions pursuant to Public Public, or other applicable law.
Access Determination Authority.
Adjudications for access to SCI will be made in accordance with4etermination Authority designated by the Senior Official of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) of each entity. Access to SCI shall be denied or revoked whenever it is determinederson does not meet the security standards provided for in Any doubt about an individual's eligibility for access or continued access to SCI shall be resolved in favor of the national security and access will be denied or revoked.
UNCLASSIFIED
4
unc1assif-ED
4. Procedures.
a. Individuals will be:
K- omprehensive andritten explanation of tne basis for that determination as the national
security interests of the United States and other applicable law permi
in this written explanation ofto be represented by counsel or other representativeown expense; to request any documents, recordsenial or revocation is based; and, to request the
Permitted by the national security
and other applicable
withinays, upon request and tothe documents would be provided if requested underof Information Act ) or the Privacy Act as applicable, any documents, recordsenial or revocation is based.
M) Provided an opportunity to reply in writing withinays of receipt of relevant documentation toeview of the determination.
clSl Provided written notice of and reasons for the results of the review, the identity of the deciding authority in accordance with operational requirements, and written notice of the right to appeal.
i ^ an opportunity to appeal in writingigh level panel, appointed by the SOIC, which shall be comprised of at least three members, two of whom shall be selected from outside the security field. Decisions of the panel shall be in writing, and final, except when the SOIC chooses to exercise the appeal authority personally, basedecommendation from the panel, and provided to the individual.
an opportunity to appear personally and
to present relevant documents, materials and information at some point in the process before an adjudicative or other authority, other .nan the investigating entity, as determined by the SOIC.
Ummafyrecordin9 of such appearance shall be made part of the applicant's or employee's security record, unless such appearance occurs in the presence of the aoDeals oanel descrlbed inf this section, in which case the written decision of the panel shall be made part of the applicant's or employee's security record.
- heir Principal deputy nersonally certifiesrocedure set forth in this section cannot be
unclassified
apprflvid fllr release bite9
made availablearticular case without damaging the national security interests of the United States by revealing classified information, the particular procedure shall noc be made available. This certification shall be conclusive.
in this annex shallOICexercising the appeal authority in paragraphbased upon recommendations from an aDpeals panel. Inthe decision of the SOIC shall be final.
SOIC may determine that tho appealin this annex cannot be invoicedanner thatwith the national security. In suchOICan individual an appeal pursuant to this annex anddelegated to the SOIC by the DCI under theActs amended. The SOIC's determinationregard shall be conclusive.
DCI or DDCI may take any actions regardingSCI access without regard tc any of thethis or any other regulation or directive. The DCI orconsult with the agency head pertaining to any action toregarding an individual's SCI access.
t. This annex does not create nor confer on any person or entity any right to administrative or judicial review of these procedures, their implementation, or decisions or actions rendered thereunder. It also does not create or confer any right, benefit, or privilege, whether substantive or procedural, for access to classified information. Finally, this annex does not create or confer any substantive or procedural right, benefit, or privilege enforceable by any party against the United States or any agency, department, or instrumentality of the executive branch, its officers or employees, for any other person.
unclassified
approwidfoufleleasf hie9
ANNEX E
Standards for SCI Security Awareness Programs in the US Intelligence Community
Consistent with controls and procedures set forth inSecurity Policy for Sensitive Compartmentednd its supplement, 9 Security Policytandards are hereby established for the SCI security education programs designed to enhance the security awareness of the US Government civilian and military personnel and private contractors working in the US Intelligence Community. Compliance with these standards is required for all departments/agencies within the Intelligence Community. Existing security awareness programs will be modified to conform with these standards. Departments/agencies willocumented program to ensure that training has been presented to all personnel.
All individuals nominated for or holding SCI access approval will be notified initially and annually thereafter of their responsibility to report to their cognizant security officers any activities or conduct such as described inhat could conflict with their ability to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. Any outside employment, activities or conduct that could create real or apparent conflicts with their responsibility to protect classified Information must be reported.
The security awareness requirements set forth herein are divided into three phases.oncerns the initial indoctrination of individuals, which is normally administered before access to SCI.oncerns the continuing security awareness program required to maintain an increased security awareness throughout the period of access.ets forth the final guidelines and instructions when access to SCI is terminated.
1. Initial Indoctrination.
As soon as practicable after being approved for access to SCI, personnel will receive an initial security indoctrination that will include:
need for and purpose of SCI, and the adversethe national security that could result from
intelligence mission of the department/agencythe reasons why intelligence information is sensitive.
administrative, personnel, physical, and other
UNCLASSIFIED
APPROVED FOR9
procedural security requirements of the department/agency and those requirements peculiar to specific duty assignments, including information on who to consult to determine if particular outside employment or activity might be of concern.
classification managementset forth in appropriate directives and regulations toguidelines and
definitions and criminal penalties forharboring or concealing persons;or losing defense information; gatheringdefense information to aid foreignand sketching defense installations;of classified information, , the Internal Security Acthe IntelligenceAct of2 and, when appropriate, the Atomic Energy Act
administrative sanctions for violation orsecurity procedures.
review of the techniques employed byorganizations in attempting to obtaininformat ion.
security responsibilities including:
The prohibition against discussing SCIon-secure area, on-secure telephone, or in any other manner that permits access by unauthorized persons.
The need to determine, before disseminating SCI, that the prospective recipient has the proper security access approval, that the SCI is needed in order to perform official duties, and that the recipient can properly protect the information.
The need to exercise security in activities as members of professional, commercial, scholarly or advocacy organizations that publish or discuss information on intelligence, defense or foreign affairs.
The continuing obligation to submit for review any planned articles, books, speeches or public statements that contain or purport to contain SCI or information relating to or derived from SCI, as specified by the nondisclosure agreements thatrerequisite for access to SCI.
Obligation to report travel to or connections with countries with aggressive proactive intelligence capabilities, or
UNCLASSIFIED
contacts with foreign nationals under certain circumstances, or attempts (including blackmail, coercion and harassment) by unauthorized persons to obtain national security information physical security deficiencies, and loss or possible compromise of SCI material-
Obligation to report to proper authorities all activities or conduct of an individual who has access to SCI which relates to guidelines described in Annex C, such as:
Involvement in activities or sympathetic association with persons which/who unlawfully practice or advocate the overthrow or alteration of the United States Government by unconstitutional means.
Foreign influence concerns/close personal association with foreign nationals.
Foreign citizenship or foreign monetary
Id) Sexual behavior that is criminal orack of judgment or discretion.
(e) Unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations or to cooperate with security processing.
. affluence or
abuse.
or improper drug use/involvement.
(k)
mental or emotionalconduct.
Noncompliance with security requirements-
(1) Engagement in outside activities which couldonflict of interest.
(m) Misuse of information technology systems.
(7) Identification of the elements in theWhiChr* ofinterest are to be
2. Periodic Awaraness Enhancement.
Each department/agency willontinuing security awareness program that will provide frequent exposure of
UNCI ASSIFIfcl)
A'MOKEfOIFELEASE BITE9
personnel Co security awareness material. Implementacionontinuing program may include live briefings, audiovisual preaentacionsideo tapes, films, and slide/taperinted material osters, memorandums, pamphlets, ombination thereof, it isac current information and materials be utilized. Programs snould be designed to meet the particular needs of the department/agency.
basic elements for this program will include,not limited to, the following:
foreign intelligence threat (includingassociated with foreign travel and foreign associations).
technical threat.
Administrative, personnel, physical, and procedural security.
Individual classification management responsibility.
Criminal penalties and administrative sanctions.
Individual security responsibilities.
review of other appropriate '
security briefings/debriefingsthe existing security awareness programs insituations:
(1) When an individual is designatedourier.
ltl When hish risk aquations are present, specifically:
<a> an individual travels, officially or unofficially, to or through countries with aggressive/proactive ntelligence capabilities or with conr.eccion(s) to terrorism or criminal activity, or:
(b) When an individual has, or anticipates above" " epresentative(s) of the countries identified
(3) When any other situation arises for which the SOIC or designee determines that an increased level of protection is necessary.
3. Debriefing.
UNCLASSIFIED
WlMIFHIELEASE UrE:APRT9S9
prov:
requirement that the individual readof Titles IB andnd that the intentsanctions of these laws relative to espionagedisclosure be clarified.
continuing obligation, under the orepublicationprovisions of the nondisclosure agreement for SCI, neverpublish; or reveal by writing, word, conduct,to any unauthorized persons any SCI, withoutconsent of appropriate department/agency officials.
acknowledgment that the individual willdelay to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, orany attempt by an unauthorized personnational security information.
declaration that the individual no longerdocuments or material containing SCI.
reminder of the risks associated with foreignforeign association.
UNCLASSIFIED
Original document.
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