THE CHANGING SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA

Created: 12/2/1970

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The Changing Scene in South Korea

OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred In by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Ac bvdieoted over loaf

2w;

Thf following intelligenceparticipated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency ond tbe intelligence, orgonttotlom of theof Stole ond Defense, and the NSA.

Concurring,

It. Gen. R. E. Cuthmon,SMC, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Dr. Bay S. Cline. the Director ol Intelligence ond Research, Department of State It. Gen. Doooid V. Bennett, the Director, Defenie Inlellioervce Agency Vice AaW. Noel Gaybr, the Director,Nemonal Security Agency

Dr. Chevies H. Rekhardt. for the Assistant General Monoger, Atomic Energyond Mr.regar, for the Assistant to tho Director, Federal Bureau of Investtgotion, th. subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

Ii!r. I - f- h-d rjv>

svithin the meaning of tho espionage.lasvs. Title, the'.froissV' mission or revclcttion of vAidi In any manner to an unoTjrho^rcd person is prohibited.

contents

Paga

CONCLUSIONS

DISCUSSION

HE BALANCE

II. THE NORTHERNEW

SOUTHERN RESPONSE

n the United

Asian "Anticomimimsin"

to the Communist...

O. The Korean Question

OI'INSTABILITY 1)

MILITARY ANNEX

THE CHANGING SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA

CONCLUSIONS

Komi's position on tlie Korean pen insula, hasin recent years. It hasong period ut polilicalThe rcumimy is booniing. Its military strength poses adeterrent to any North Korean invasimi. Antl Southposition is notably stronger than tliat of the North.withdrawal of one liS Army division from Smith Koreaof itself significantly alter this balance.

Korea, probably in part responding lo ihese changesthe evident failure of its military confrontation tactics, hasline of allack. Terrorism and paramilitary action have beenNorth Korean efforts toase for politicalin South Korea, as well as diplomatic activity abroad,to be increasing.probably liopcsoreapproach to weaken support for the vigorouslyregime in world (especially American) opinion, and to playnatural desire of many South Koreans for closer

Korea is likely to respond to Pyongyang's moreby some very tentative approaches of its own towardand the USSH. But major direct moves to easeNorth Korea still seem far distant in view of Seoul'sto and fear of the Korean communists. For some time,will be most concerned to maintain finn I'S seciirityto retain sonic I'S troops on its territory, and to strengthenfellow non-coniiiiimists in East Asia, especially Japan.

Soulh Korea itself could give theignificantfor its political subversion efforts. Pyongyang will be alerl to

ploil suspicions or misimdens landings between Seoul andespecially Seoul's fear lhat die US might abandon it lo its enemies. Perhaps even more important, the strong Park regime has kept Korea's old political ills under control but has not really cured them. Economic troubles, Park's increasing authoritarianism, problems inuccessor to Park, or even an apparently diminished threat from the North which reduced incentives for national unity, all might make llie South Korean political situation less stable. In such circumstances, North Korean propaganda and subversiongin lo have more impact (linn lias been the case lo date, and the North might be tempted once again to reintensify paramilitary action aud armed subversion against the South.

DISCUSSION

most of tlie time since World War II. South Korea hasserious problem of one kind or another foi' US policy. Simplewasorry-recoverinn. from the rav,ii;cs of wars, establishing

'Au . it ,. iiiJ.ll U i,ull) itr.il .Old

resource-poor land, and much of the time Fighting the twin haudicaps of ruinous inflation and pc.rvusive official corruption. Political life has been no lev Iruubled. ihe sliortcomings of Syngiiuin BIht's regime duringed to. Under the brie) cjqicriinenf with free1 icitt activity svhith followed, the perennial factionalism of Korean political life degenerated into mounting public disorder. Major General Park Chuug-bce aud his military colleagues who seized powertop lo lhat. Bul Ibey sverc slow to win genuine popular support, even after they converted themselvesivilian government iund throughout these yeslis. South Korea bus lived under the shadow of the hostile North and its powerful GonuniinUI backers. In the last fesv years, however, changes taking place throughout Park's reign have culminateduite impressive pOSilion of strength.

I. THE BALANCE SHEET

Park, although lacking the more flamboyant qualities ofslowly achieved dominance of South Korean political life and thehis countrymen by virtue of solid accomplish: mo I. He has skillfullyamong rival power brokers to give Southrolonged periodstability -aulhuritarian, to be sure, but more subtle induring much of Koua's modem history, lie also Im> overseen auprogram, centered on labor-intensive export industries, whichmost .South Koreans belter off tlian ever before.. Southgross national product (GXP) has increased at the remarkablyeal, while industrial production has grownvnent .miiuafly. The Smith Korean economic scene has drawn the

high, if grudging, praise of one Japanese businessman that "they are where we wereears ago."

If ruler Park's supervision. South Korea has developed one of the most competent ami professional civil anil military government structures in Asia. Its army, the fourth largest in the world, is reasonably well ixuiippcd through US aiil programs, and its officer and non-commissioned officer corps has re-ceived leadership and combat experience in Vietnam. Moreover tho younger nffiecis now coming into leadership positions are better trained, and seem less rent by regional and personal factionalism and more imbued withthan were their predecessors. The civil bureaucracy also lias gained inarge infusion of fresh blood following the military coup1 has installed young men, well qualified by academic training amior by military service, in key positions.

Progress also has been made toward international acceptance. One of the most difficult problems was resolved on atormal level withreaty normalizing relations with japan. Since then. Japanese capital liasital role in South Korea's economic growth. Suspicion and outright dislike of Korea's sometime conqueror persist; but there noveitheless is arecoimitum within the leadership in both eouutries of common regional interests. An encouraging feature of the relationship has been quiet cooperation in lite exchange of intelligence. Other advances toward international status hase Iicen South Korea's acceptance iu regional groupings, such as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC; and the Asian Development Hank. Itsas an American ally in the Vietnamese war has givenense of pride and self-confidence which may prove as important as the more tangible military and economic benefits that participation bas brought.

These very successes have created potential problems. South Korea has relied heavily on foreign loan capital to finance its economic boom, and in the process bas accrued massive foreign debts. In normal circumstances South Korea should lie able to handle those debts. But it is highly vulnerable to international economicerious world-wide recession, or the loss of US markets, or anything which frightened off foreign investors, could undermine tlie whole delicate stmcture of rapidly grossing exports to cam tbc money to repay the loans which make possible in the fiist place the industrial growth tothe exports to cam the money.

fi. There also are inequities in the distribution of South Korea's Hew prosperity. The rural areas lag in educational opportunities, housing, and health and other government services, as well as in actual income levels. Even in the booming cities unskilled wages remain very low, and the pressmes of rapid urbanization could aggravate worker resentment at the prosperity of South Korea's growing middle class. The- "revolution of rising expect at ions" is noterious political problem in South Korea, but the ingredients are there.

inally, South Korea's political stability rests tno much on Park himself, andeeling of tin eat from the North which makes Park's strong rule seem

acceptable. Park's very success in dominating South Koran's political! life lias served to stunt the growth of democratic iiislilunom, or the development ol independent political leaders. There is no effective political opposition. The NewPartyliief candidate for that role, is weak and divided. Park's own Democratic Itepuldican Party is allowed Uttle role in pohcy making, and even tlieof policy is primarily in the hands of military men, with whom Pack still idmlihcs far rnore than with civilian politicians. Corruption still Is an Integral part of the governmental process, making the nossiUlity of new nation.il scandals ever-present Park's heavy-handed riggiag of clectioas Im surely would win, even if they woe free and fair, serves further to discredit tlie demo* raise ptocess. It, <um. while Park is carefulm of parliamentary process,unsidirablc degree of free qseechelatively independent press, there is little leol sluuing of power orelt public identification wiih Ihe icgimr.

Of itself, this ntuy not matter too much. Democracyoreign plant in South Knn'ii. with shallow roots in the cultural tradition* mid emotions of the people. Penuuial and family ties still rate higher than any concept of impersonal law or broadly Ihised political parties, and Confucian pitci ii.ill.sm nms directly contrary' I" ideas ol sliarrd or dilfused power. Stability, unlet, economic progress,ativc freedom fnan government harassment mean more to allcry few Koreans than parliamentary rsroccsscs. and on these counts Park delivers handsomely.

But Park (however ursdeistandalJy) has liven unsvilling to designate an heir apjiurent. and his skill in playing even his own >irnnortcrs off against one another lias kipt any individual or group from emergnjg as aa obvious potential successor. Ihe powerful South Korean Central Intelligencend the Army command are suspicious, even hostile, rivals. Kim Clmng p'il, the guiding political genius of Ihe regime's early years, is able and aggressive and has somethingersonal following, but diis alone makes him suspect by many, and he can nu longer count on Park's support for tho succession When Park chose to amend tlm Constitution last year, to enable himself to runhird term as Presidente forfeited an early opportunity In oversee the first orderly transfer of [xivscr in the Hepublie's history. Should that transfer take place; when Park Is unalde to supervise and controlafter his defeat or dcalh--cunfiuucd stability probably would depend on whether the chance of dmiinstanora tluew up another individual who could impose his will on the congeniUlly feuding Koreans,

Park's own dominance is based to an unhealthy eiient on thetense of thn-at Irotn Dal North, which the tosemraent has al least In*.igger*ti (I. If ibis threat shouldnational unity noquite sowide range of destabilizing- couldwith Northightontroversial issue.tegardedthemselves and many other* as the "ctmMcUme* of thebe less willing to tolerate government corruplion and limitsfreedoms. Trade unions might be more openly resit ve about government

coutrul Ambitious individuals in 'hi* political parties or Ilic military mightl' to chjllt ngr Park's sutualry total command of South Korean iM-Iitivs

IJ.wry tentative signs of such political stirring* already air evident. Kimk- young and aggressive NOP Pusldential candidate fur1s mounting ti surprisingly vigorous campaign hy criticizing Parkiitlu-ithis atmosphere ol tension ando ixoltaig tla- life of [bis] ricjme in the name of national security andim dors Dot nowrjr tovrioui danger to Pail, manyi;:h"hocrowds who apparently relish hrsraig him attack the President would not iu factlo substitute his untested uhilities for the security Park has demons!rated he can provide. Hut such criticism could intensify Park'sunder stress lo withdrawistant authoritarianism, at times paralyzed hy imieeisiveness and at times Impulsively over-reacting. If Park slanild take re-pnsslve measures against Kun or other critics which seemed out of rsreportion to the threat.MH farther fuel tla- uiopH-nt di*cont>nt with his authoritarUiusni.

On balance, bossevet, we think thai South Korea should lie able to cope svitli Its problems andelatively strung position for the next lew years at least, Smith Korea's strengths are especially impressive when measured against the appaient ladings ol the North, AH our evidence indicates that North Korea's economy is doing badly compared with the South, amiolitical and military apparatus has bovn diSTuptiddlcvs wuxesskai of high level purges.

Tla- plauiKsd witlidrawal of one US division Irom South.'if the presently authorized total ofill mil of Itselfalter the relative military balance between Nurth and South. The South Korean mililaiy has shewn increasing skill in coping with North Korean guerrilla iullltraliun efforts. Willi US air and logistic >up|iort. South Korea should la- able to successfully defend against an all-out North Koreanu Ihesituation where North Korean troops were lorried by Chinese, the Sooth {again with only US air and logistics capable of holdmg off tla*forces loronth, lu fact South Km. is military posilaiois the North should be lurther stiongi honed by the> billion equipment titoderni-zalion pro gram which the US intends to provide over ihe next five years.

Nor will South Korea'sarkedly damaged by ll* planned US troop withdrawals. L'S military sperxfaitg. which includes Vi.items as well asrought in bcceiise of troops actually in South Korea, lias coo-tributisl ou the average only aboutercent of Ihe real increase lu South Koiea's GNP duringeriod. 'Ibis shareen steadily declining with the expansion ol South Korea's eeenumy. The loss ol0 IIS troops will at most slow ilown South Korea'*stimatedereent annual growth dining tlie next -es.nl yearsiripressiv'ipercent .sin!

'Sec Aimndiutu-oon nf North andiy rapulalilka

will isist Srniil0tsir in dollar can lings. This loss is relatively sinill when compared wiih South Korea" esport earnings ofuUkiu. ami it. VIOO million annually in foreign capital inflows.ill not biive much I'. of ;iiyin-effect so long aslootinue to climh rapidly

II. THE NORTHERNEW DIRECTION?

IS.ilh Koreans serin to liave lead the lialante sheet in much this way. andised their ladies against the SoulhTie iinmidi.ilc cause nltieal adjustment seems fo have liecti the failure of their espciimcnl withuetics and terrorism fiom lttnfl thioughuch large scali' disaster* us the lllue House raid and the mass landings at Ulchin on the ertst iMiust, hir from encouraging the |xuplir of ihe Smith to rise in "people's;ulylie Smith'swhile Justifying tlie presence of I'S troops in tho eyes ot the world. Since, early hMQ, the rate of incident* along tin Demilitarizedias dropped by overeront. VIeanwhile, the- emphasisr Isulled to tbe iiddtr.il ion of agents for poUtkulto rivniil agents, tirganirc crib, ami to develop ihe political base lot revolutionho South. Kim ll-song Ims revet it ly signaled tbe contuinatum of this policy by warning thai tlie |scuple of lha- South must take the responsibility for Iheir. I. ilieahead, he said, will not be an easy one.

Hi. While shilling its irnphasis Irum unned to ihiliticul subversion against the South, Ninth Korea Ills also ichoiuml Its earlier campaign Im inleruatloual status anil iui Im ii" An extensive effort is under way, particularly in Africa, lo open trade anil diplomaticenunciations of tho UN's role in the Korean Question have again Isrcome somewhat more ambiguous Attempts also have liecu made al leastrn more flexible on relations with the South. North Korea has revived carliir suggsstxais ranging from mI limited steps at mail exchanges and'.i- ii menibars nf <bsided famiiMs.un-aggression pact, mutual troopndegeneration of tlx- two Koreas, each keeping its dIfft social and political system. Pyongyang's constant demands remain theol all foreign. American) troops from the peninsula and ih- ouster nf llx> Puik gnverumnit by the South Korean people.

ll iu all. North Korea seems lo he showing ils peaceful face at Ihr roo-inent, bulb to Ihe South and lo inlernalionnl opinion. Kim doubtless hopes to exploit the natural desire of many Southor better relations with the North. These shifts in mihtaiy and diplomatic activity are reflected Iu new iMnpaig.inda emphasis from the North. "Peaceful reunification" is once more theith ttition-wide clcdinus possible il only |again) ihe loreigii triiopa would have. Wink- jl rs granted that military means may eventually have to be used loi mil it at ion. IVonsryaiiK now claims to foresee this as ail will make only when the Soulh Kireans iheinsclvos lise up in revoltIn it lutcign nprrrcssor. and tlie native puppet govemmenl.

IS. We Imse very litdc evidence hshy this change in tactics has come about, und slill less about how long ll might obtain. Hut speculation about the

"why"giveIndli ation of "howere obviously not working. Far from weakeningi- evident threat was serving to solidify nipport for Parkof he. strongor was North Korean brinkmanshipprcounhe IS lo withdraw from

lie need fur continued US military presence ai tlie peninsula, while Imth Peking and Moscow west esVaily reluctaiit lo hack up North Korean adviiitiirivm. With Pyongyang's two potential botkcis (ending between theui-siJves, the Ninth Koreans could not count on receiving the level ol supporttn further pursuit of the high-risk policy.

Miii..nin'iii'. pid'-letns at hoiiir W. .Ii ady havn men tinned its ccOnoinie hillings, and the purge in late IWIM ol key militarye are not sure whether these men were eliminated because tlieir policies toward tho Smith lud tailed or whet tier Klin Il-song got lid of them for quite othirost likely because he feared they were or mighthreat to his total naitml nt the military/ and then useds scapegoats lor an umimcuful pohcy. Whatever ihe true reason for ihe purge, tt scene likelyeed to regroup and rebuild at home would lurtluT diminish Kim'* en tlmsiasm for an aggnnsite policy toward the South whuh was not working anyway.

im fur!heniii>ic (an reason that his newer "pencefur approach is having some success, His di]ilomatii' of tensive- has thus far won recognitionew more African andMem status. More Importaul, the Japanese have la-en encouraged to hope Ihat North Korea may be ripe lor their 'bridgend are likely to increase .conomie and even tiolitlcal contacts Most of

ill Kim's pis-sent course is In kevping with the current fashion of detente. He can hope that in the ahwiaelear military threat, uitrtniltiotul and even South

Korean support for Park's fiercely anlicomunimst gt-vimin-nt will weakenna> see ihr planned reduction of US troop strength in the South as eoiisistent wilh bis present pulky, if not an actual cutm-iiuence of it.

?1 What Wi taiinot estimate withKim's own volatile

rsonalily. Ilis desirelei national limelight and hi* appirent tendency lo act hastily and emotionally when he ieels his isositioii thiealened, togi-thereal need lo buck up the spirits of the Noilh Korean populace andthem to continued economic aud political hardships, all may make it difficult for him to hold steadypeaceful" Course, At any time he thought itand with wry little warning, Kun could revertaramilitary approach toward tla- South. Hut iirsofar .is evidence and logic are useful guides inituation, it msim to iu likely that for some time to come North Korea should calculate tlett it has little to gain from aggressive military tactics on anyseak- against South Kotnaii forces.

' Thuar9 mtndral thrw of Nerth Ktres's fhv Ait ay (enupJ IXfenM. ihr Amis t'Jari el Staff, anil thel it- Army'*tance

SECRET

yongyang probably will Indulge in' la. ulars from lime lolimn. These might Ii directed at US targets In .mil around tlx- peninsula if theUke the I'whlo oclian ut Soulh Korea itself Kim svuuld bone to erodeiidm/ Staitb Korea and to shake Soulh Kuicim euofkicocc ui our ssHllingni-s* to react sullniently vigorously, as well as to cliwnirstrate tliat his quarrel is not with Smith Korea a" such In it with tlie "foreign oppressors" whose presence prevents lustier Ninth-South relations. Their might also beat political assasslna-timi in the Soulh. These proliably would la- designed lo tpiicar to he the work of Southctdninatlirr tlnu North Korean military' actions.

III. THE SOUTHERN RESPONSE

Nnrlh Koreas more flexible Initioore complex and(hiving challenge lo the South. Itompetition Soulh Korea isil lo wan. providixl it has confidence in its considerable strengtlisNorth. We think it ra<-reasinsly has. South Koreun eaimates of thetlie proposed I'S tn-ip withdrawals on the actual military balanceI ourut llieir frequently es.pres.scd concernhe withdrawals, a<ign of diminished US mmniitnicnt.own fears that indeed this may be fust the beginningeneralpolicy. While gaining in self-confidence, the snutlierner* are not yetofIheir-nic miracleMoreover, tliey stillcotilnmtid by an implacably lustilc North Korea and siirrounrledbrer neighboring gianls- ilie Soviet Union, China, andareor at liest untrustworthy. And they worry nliout the Amei'ieimsI'im'I, once before withdrew tmups from Korea tou soon,

A. Continuing Reliance on the United States

onlmnrnK altisnpt to 'licit luilher Arm ricaii assurances of mihtarywriting ilremain Ibe cornerstone of South Koieasnliiy for the Inreseeable future. Tlie Soulh Koreans feel strongly that

they are and ought to he an exception to the Nixon Doctrine. Seoul will

Miring any opportunityilateral guarantee of "airtomatle"i-i- to an allack nr. faibnc that,egional security alhancr. In the past it has tried such approachesPATO" modeled on NATO (which some Soulh Kcaeiim seem to helii'sebe CS to automatic response In West Kurirjie'sn AllM system with the US providing the weaponry and the countries within lange of Chiiu'se missiles the milecurity system among tlie countries loutributing troops to the allied side in Vietnam, orol ASP ACilitary alliance. Most recently, the Niion-Sato emmu-iii'iin of Nost-iobcraised South Koreanecurity system with the I'S, Japan, and Taiwan. Tlie common theme iu all these regionalbchi-vr the central South Korean aim- -is mil so miuh Iu Improve cooperation willi Asian iicighltors us In get ihc US ever more securely hound tu Soulh Koiea's

il;se.

SfXSFT

SEv^ET

he same motive is present in South Korean thinking about Vietnam.

that some influential South Koreans have tried to Ihink ol

I" prolong or expand tlie war may not al all reflect Park's offieial policy. Hut he almost certainly takes eornlortituation in which US and South Korean soldier, are allied In cmwiion antiinnunuiiist eause. ml he hav real aiipre-lansana ahonl ins thing ihat ihininishesactlvi and hicratlvc coonrralinn.

oittkomrnvnism"

o lunjr. as they are rruxaiahly eonfident ol tla- American cotnnutinenl. like South Koreans ate likely to play their stronr. liaial quite vkilllulty in diplo-matie and ceononae ctanpetltlon with the North. They liave more money for investment and foi' purchasew male-rials, and South Korean diplomats are not fearedubversive clement in the countries with whieh iHith Koreas woukl like relations, Seoul riatu'ally will give first priority to strengthening ties with fellow uoii-euininunists in East Asia. Taiwan, and nt hast for the present Thailand. sec Asian security problems in mueli the same light .is noes South Korea. Some HOK nlfnials have even talked of offering South Korean troops to Thailand, especially if tt lirewme necessary to withdraw them from South Vietnani. Such an offer no douUouldS bases and pcisniincl remaining in lluiland: Seoul is not interested in taking on purely Asian entanglements.

iv withly to grow especially dose, if not warm and Ita ndly. Japan's economic stake in South Korea is high and growintf. and with il Inevitably ionic* some jmliliealhole network of politicalcconotnie. aial inilit.uy rsihaiigcs is developing lietwocli tla- two at various levels ol giivenimenl anil mini iterei-il lifelj

C. Approaches to the Communist World

outh Korea also Is edging cautiouslyill emit relationship with

uud even communist states. This is still vety much in ihe talking stuge

m Seoul, and is in largeefensive reaction Seoul clearly ishoul US efforts to improve relations with tlie Soviet Union, even alleging thattrtctvS from moving lo clack Neath Kteran agi^ssis-eriess. Now Ihe Watt Crsrrruuiv, wilfa whom Si-oul has laJieved It lad pryehokigieal altunties and similar interests, seem prepared to compnimise on their divided-nation pmb letti. Al tla1 same time, South Kurean officials talkeed lo bluek Norlh K'Hi-an diplonialic efforts throughout the world. Parkponsive to (he argument ol some of his advisors that South Korea will he "isolated'* In Inter

ET

national "pinion If it continues to seem so intiansigi nl loss.ml the

wot lo*.

ut South Korea's cvali mt ion ol its own .strengths anil minis also Jipnctirs to In; slowly changing Seoul's protests about Japan's cxjmomie anil other dealings with Ihc Noi'lh have an iiuieaviiigly (orniiilhough Southwhile still not liking Japanese-North Koreanlonger see them aserious (limit hi their nwn interests. Superficially at least. Korean develop-incuts might billow tlie Cennati modelecade or so Milnd) of both sides workingsumng of tensions and specific impnivcmciit* in relations while riiuiiiiinlHiu reniiiius impossible. But so long as Kim II song is in {lower in the North, and the Kiae-on War gt-neration in theundamentalto ami fear of North Korea willtwl.il diffiTrncc hum tin-Germanh.it the South Korea us base beenitter war with the North ami still feel physically threatened.

V-rf detente is therefore likely tnatte' of very small steps,ind tl*nc of most odier iwn-cornmimi'tlo-rnatic relatMKUi may Ih* cslahliihcd with cocailiics which also recognizeporting anil cultural delegations will he exchangedst Kurnpran stahss. And Soulh Koiiu's stiingciil antiisiinmuiiist law nuiy lie amendid to pcimil trade with sunn cninmimW countries.

Vogrcss In this direction will Ih: veryindeed. Seoul will have trouble finding sidlnble goods to trade with communist stales, ami iccniiciling thecommunist preference lor barter trade and long-term deferred payments with ils own idlor immediate foreign exchange pioflls. It certainly w'.I) not waul lo seem lohatever ubstacles oilier nations still hvl Iu dealing with North Korea. I'nitla-iinore, it will want to be wry careful alaiut undermining the solid antiiomniuiiist front of the South Korean [Mpnlace.

D. Tha Korean Question

Ihehip with North Koreaore Important ami much note ddffcult probhm tlian approadies to cither communistih auiiisissary of Korea's liberation from Japanese rule I'ark's turprise itinmi.ji-lit at Ir-.ot some propaganda advantage.partid from previous ufficial* dismissing umficnlionmhli fia- tbe distant future. Instead, he challenged Ihc North Koreans In help lay the gnmndwork by ceasing military provocations and publicly iciaiiinciiig ihe fonilnl overthrow of the South Korean (ajvcrninent Ihr proposal, however, was licdgid iihout with coii'litions clearly uiiacceptable lo Pyongyang, which promptly denouncd it. Thus, its main value probably lay In its impact on world anil dnnie.slle opinion, wllb an eye toward both tbe UN vole on tho Korean Question and the upcumiiii! Presidential election in South Korea

;tl Parks loiiiial ailing of the subject did have one unison lid tie side-elfit umlii-.iloii will In- discussed with increasing openness ui the South. Iu au

effort lo toulrol tin- pure of ihrdeltate, and to assert government control over M. spokesmen liave tlescnlad plans to allowinn of North-Southby stages; first among Viprrl*'. then scbolarx llati journalists, theneting with general public debateuch eontiol will not be entirely possible, particularly In the later stages. The government* own statements unci uellmis will make It mure difficult Id accuse others of having violntml ibe .uitieoininuuist law hy merely discussing relations Willi Ihe North.

f North Korean military activity remainsow level, there is likely to be some ineiea.se of public prcwure for more isutlativcs toward tla- North, rivenamily visils or mail ischjngi* wouldacit rceognttiiat of the North quite drantatie in South Korean vyrv but there wil be at least as many important South Korean* uneasy about the whole venture as tlierr arc pressing for greater flexibility. We expect Seouri detinte efforts to continue loatter of one step back for every two forward. And Hmj Issue of US troops on the peninsula will remain of crucial Importance to Irtitli North aud South, effectively limiting progress towardemong time to come.

k*sire to mako more friends among more Lira's ufbe seen In context oi tlse priority it gives to relations with the USKmiM would like as many nations us possible in Irs comer if thessite ever sveakened or leinosnl. Hut there reallyia"to tint protection. Hence any gisvtures Seoul makes towardwill la- as much an attempt toust rate to WoshlngliHi that it isSouthho an- responsible lot ismtinulng tension' on thelo prepareossible Anterkviu withdrawal.

IV. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

Kon-ans siLspect that while Washington may stiH cotwidi ra imv-vaiy burden, it is one lor which American cnthnsia.vni is

Iheir suspicious about US constancy, should ease as Seoul gains confidence in its own stieiigthsis the North.ery long time to come, however, there will be ample opportunity forompromise,fn South Vietnam, furthei US troop withdrawals from South Korea or japan, efforts to Improve US-Chinese relations (including what might lie seen as US weakness in opposing Peking') entry into Ihell would arouse South knrcunltensions thatedication lo the ant (communist cause in Ada was weaienmg.

Ii very little tbc South Koreans could do about any of theseWe cannot rale,outh Koreanovocation indesigned lo show Washington thai American troops still wereKoica. Moreover, some in Seoul may genuinely believeeymoie leverage with Washington than Is the ease If President Park,

who bus staked everything on ihc US lie. (celt 'ahahdotietl' andt might asjsfravali- liis leiUHiicy lo rseonrne more authoritarian in bis mic awlct'Malili' lo the, reasoned advice olimes of stress. Public: pronouncement* as In what the US "must* ordo cwn expose liim to embaliavMiont lai'tweown populace, and cxacribatc tciisiuns between Ihe two anvmumnts An) lireak in harrraxunus US-ROKiu-titatements by Park which alienated segments ul Anicriran publicaial North Korean efforts to sow distnut and

nure mtickm source of potential instability is the pobticwl dilution iu South Korea itself. Should tbe sense of threat from the North recede, the

(ustilieati

life iu Soulh Korea would no

appear acceptable to Important elements in tho population. We do not know what would luippcn inituation, bul it could lead lo confusion and struggle and some unraveling uf political stability. In sucb circumstances, Neath Korean propaganda and subversion might begin to have more impact than has been the ease to date, and the North might be templed once again Iu ie intensify paramilitary action and armed subversion igainsl the South

n scan, the dimetisiou of the threat to South Korea is ciruudiug beyond the mUitary inufroulalinri we are used to thinking of,ore complca political consTelitkoi al home and abroad. South Korea clearly has tho advantage on the iulisnaliiin.il (ronl llul diction lietweeu South Korea and (he IS. or lutwoen the Southoveiuineiit Mid its own people, could give North Korea an opening lor inure successful political or even pat.iuiililaiy action in the Soulh than has hurelnfore been the ease.

MILITARY ANNEX

SESTET

iS'cithri tlu' Ninlh nor tlu- South Korean military forces ciaild conduct mk-tiiiiiiil iniVpeii<lint oflcnsivc operations against tin other. Kach hasi[*ihil-ily to launch anut would roqiure considifablr outside assistance to con tiliue opcratiinn. both must unpnit POL. as well as replacements Tot iiiafor ileitis ol cirttipincnt such as aircraft. missiles aialb. artillery, most vehicles, and laasy aitiimjMtioii. Without advance assurances nf Soviet and/or Oiinesc logisticiNorth Kotiu could not count on sustainingrations in theonth<

T1h' South Korean Army is larger than th.it ofen as opposed to tlieMl. The Souths numcTical superiority may be ulfsetcstriH', howcviT, by tlsc North's greater iinmlar of maneuver battalions. In addition, individual North Korean soldiers are armed svilh the domestically produced AK I" assault rifle which is superior to individual weapons in general use by the South. The Northarger inventory ol auli-iilrcnilt artillery, large muititrS; Inult mounted rocket launchers, and tactical bee rocket over grnund (h'fUKi) missiles. TIk- Southreater number of tanks, Ihe North, however, lias increased Its armor assets over the last several years and Its tank inventory includes iIm-upa rior to any tank of the HOK Army. II- ah tides are alwut espial inf field artillery pieces with ihe South having aof thoseeavier calibre. Majorombat catuprnent in Imth. ii In-ii obtained from outside sources and much of it is dated. Their apfiear to Ik- tome changes under way ingant/al tonal structure of lla- North Korean Army, which seem to have tbe effect of reducing the amount of heavy equipment tn some individual rc-gimenls while ujrgroding former brigade-sire units. This mayhift in combat tatties to grralrr reliance on light infantry units, but it Is not clear how tins tnlghl alfrct ovrrall capabilities iu combat against Ihe South Korean Army.

The ntivul forces ni each aie small and primarily oriented toward coastal defense. North Korea docs have four Wclnss submarinesomar and Osa guided missile bnals which provide itotential offensive capability. South Korean navy ships and llseir equipment are of World War II vintage and theireriously erodes the navy's general combat effectiveness The South Korean Navy would Inactical disadvantageations against North Korean Mibrnwritie* and rnlssUe boats.

orth KiHTti stillreat advantage over the South in air (lower, although Ua' rapdecir.oing with the introduction ofDs tutu the South Korean Airn addstion. South Korea has in iuadispiate Aid<ornc Early Warning system and insufficient air facilities fur rflectlsr dispersal of mats andie HOK Air Force Is capable of providing tai-tn al support to ground ami naval fortes under visual flight eondititaii only. South Korea could out topeitbslantial Nutlh Korean air attack without significant US air augmentatlon.

'Whileiu<>i:f fen-raws within else Inldligtrii-i- CoaKiMiniry will. neurit t'iIs'tolli Kiveiin air nrtferuni.-nt n* li> the.iojwiiiion In this triitence.

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