THIS ESTIMATE IS SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND CONCURRED IN BY THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA.
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHINA'S REACTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS
Chinese Beepcmae Thua Far
1. Peking trailed both Hanoi and Moscow in reacting to recent developments in southern Laos. The Chinese did not speculate publicly on the possibility of cross-border operations into Laosebruary when they began to cite press coirmentary fron Hanoi, which had begun sone days earlier. Since then Peking hasumber ofcomwntaries as well as several Foreign Ministry statements. At first, these pronouncements dwelt on the same themes: the US isthe war in Indochina; the people of Indochina will certainly surmount the new challenge; and China will continue to provide "powerful backing and support." More recently, Peking has strengthened Its rhetoric, claiming that the allied rove Into Laos Isenace to China" and that
definitelyrave threat tohe latter statements are an escalation of the rhetoric that followed Cambodia last spring, and suggest that Peking nowore serious view of thein Indochina.
Large rallies have been heldeking and Shanghai to condemn allied actions Inattern that will no doubt be repeated throughout the country. Nevertheless, all authoritative connent on the situation in Indochina since the beginning of the month has placed Chinese assurances of assistance in terms of rear base support.
It is reasonable to assume that Peking and Hanoi have been consulting on the present situation, but there is no evidenceigh-level conference. Rumors of Important Chinesehou En-lai and Chief of Staff Huang Yung-shengattending coinmunlst strategy sessions in Hanoiate January and early February appear to be unfounded. ietnanese negotiator, however, has been in Peking recently toupplemental agreement on nilitary and economic aid to North Vietnam.
4. No unusual military movementseither on the ground or in
presage an expansion of the Chinese roadbuilding act"vityIhr
recent discovery of heavier anti-aircraft gunswith associated fire control radarn the area of the roadbuilding can not be related to developments In southern Laos,
ptions and Probable Courae* of Aotion
5. Peking has viewed the war in Indochinaest of Mao's theory of "people's war" and has consistently advised the communistsndochina to prepareong and costly struggle and to persistelf-reliant and protracted warfare. Peking doubtless believes victoryuch an effort would enhance its claims for Ideological
Thie judgment io baaed primarily on information derived no photography i* available to confirm thip. -* Thie roadbuilding activity ie diecuaeed in the Annex.
pre-eminence over the Soviet Union and would strengthen China's political influence in Asia. On the other hand, Peking has had to consider the possibility that an adverse turn in the war could leadecurity threat on China's southern border.
6. While Peking has advocated "people's war" for the IndocMnese it has given no indication of intent to use Chinese troops or to risk an accidental confrontation with the US. The involvement of Chinese forces in the struggle thus far has been limited to construction and anti-aircraft detachments in northern Horth Vietnam during the bombing and currently in northwestern Laos. China has built roads from Its own territory into northwestern Laos, and now has00 troops there in engineering, anti-aircraft artillery, and security. This activity can servo several purposes. Roadbullding to the east facilitates North Vietnamese access to northwestern Laos for support of Pathet Lao operations. The extension of the road south and west in the direction of Pak Beng also poses the threatreater communist presence in the Thai border region and this threat might be exploited toreater Thai roleaos. And, of course, the road system provides China itself with direct access to northwestern Laos.
Peking would naturally be concerned about theuccessful interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh trail could have on the capability of the NVA/VC to carry on the struggle in the South. At this early point, Peking's most sanguine estimate is probably that Hanoi can counter the South Vietnamese move and through pressure in Laos and South Vietnam, can force an early withdrawal. In their worst case estimate of the consequences of operations generally limited to the Tchepone area, the Chinese will have considered the possibility that Hanoi's supply lines could be disrupted so severely that the overall corrrnunist positionouth Vietnam would suffer serious deterioration.
In an effort to forestall this latter situation, thereumber of things that Peking might do short of direct involvement of Its own combat forces. It would, of course, seek to persuade Hanoi to persevere In the struggle, and it would promise additional materiel support to encourage Hanoi in this course. Peking could also offer to re-introduce logistic personnel into North Vietnam.
Beyond these measures the Chinese may see small risks and considerable advantage in certain stepsaccompanied by shrill propaganda closely coordinated with Hanoi's military efforts and threatshat convey menace but which do not cortrnlt them to serious action. The purpose would be to raise the threat of Chinese
Intervention and thus to encourage an abortive end to current Allied operationsouthern Laos and, fn any event, to create such apprehension particularly In the US, as to Inhibit any future initiativesimilar nature.
Among the measures that the Chinese might take to give credence to their threats would be to move troops about in South China or tohow of stepping up construction of the new road to the Mekongroject they probably intend to move ahead with anyway. They might also send reconnaissance patrols beyond the present area of road construction toward the Thai border. This latter move would have the particular objective of causing Bangkok to pull back from its involvement in Laos.
Another move open to the Chinese would be to Introduce advisory personnel into combat areas and to let their presence become known. They might feel that the advertised presence of such advisors could raise the spectre of Chinese intervention as In Korea, without In fact involving much real risk. (Chinese observers have visited COSVH in the past but so far reports of Chinese advisors In combat situations in Cambodia and Laos have not been confirmed.)
Finally, ifere prepared to go still further Peking could send troops into the Plain of Jars area or even into southern Laos. But
this would be unlikely unless US troops or ARVN forces backed by US air power, having destroyed coirmunist forces around Tchepone, should move northward with the apparent intent of carrying the war into North Vietnam or northern Laos. In this event the Chinese would feel that their own security interests were directly threatened.
of these circumstances,adical shiftpolicy seems most unlikely. In northern Laos there isno real threat to Chinese or North Vietnamese interests.Vang Pao and US air power inflict heavy blows on thearound the Plain of Jars in the next few months, Laotiannot beosition to threaten vital Chinese or North Thus, we doubt that the Chinese would choose at this pointthe risks involved by moving toarger role in northern Laos.
for southern Laos, there are practical difficultiesan effective Chinese military presence there. would suffer the same relative disadvantages in firemobility as the more readily available North Vietnamese. also have the same logistical problems that confront theconsiderations of this sort, however, He the larger risksof direct involvement with the US.
r 'i mm j.
Itossfble, of course, that the South Vietnamese incursion Into southern Laos would arouseense of desperation in Hanoi as toequest for participation of Chinese combat forces. All the evidence we have, however, extendingood many years,that the North Vietnamese would be exceedingly reluctant to call for such assistance, unless they saw that the security of their own country and regime were in grave peril. Shortirect threat of this kind we do not believe that the North Vietnamese would invite the Chinese in.
In sum, China's most likely course of action in response to recent events In Laoso publicly and privately encourage Hanoi to persist in Its protracted struggle; to raise the level of threat in Its propaganda; and to Increase its flow of arms and equipment to allayreluctance Hanoi may have about continuing the conflict. At this stage of the Allied incursion into Laos, Peking probably sees the US
and its allies still bogged downar that offers no graceful exit. If Hanoi maintains its will to resist, the Chinese will probably see no need to change their basic approach. And even if North Vietnam feltto shiftess aggressive posture or toegotiated settlement, Peking would have little leverage to preventove.
CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES IN LAOS
The Chinese Comnunist Pi-eeenae
Chinese military presence in northwestern Laosslowlyingle engineer regiment in8 toforce ofroops. As theadditional construction and anti-aircraftbrought in to maintain and defend the road system.
the end of the last dry season inthere was estimatedroops. Sincemilitary forces have increased slowly as Pekingroad construction once the rainy season ended. Moreartillery (AAA) troops were deployed along the roadan additional engineer regiment was identified. that the Chinese
engineer regiments in Laos have five subordinate battalions instead of the normal three. esult, the estimated military strength has been Increasedroops.
The Chinese anti-aircraft and security forces have been active in their defensive role, however. AAA units have not hesitated to fire on the occasional Lao aircraft that have attacked the road or on any aircraft that happened to fly over the road.
Chinese AAA inventory now includesm andm andewmndsame number of smaller caliber automatic weapons. The weaponsalong much of the Chinese-built road network in northwestmajor concentrations at Huonguong La, and Muong Houn. pieces generally protect strategic bridges, large barracksstorage installations. The smaller pieces are more widelydefend the road construction units. Moreover, the use oftracking procedures, seen sinceanuary, enablesaos to function more effectivelyn area defenseforces were assumed previously to be functioning in arole protecting individual construction elements.
The Road Construction Pre/grow
the Chinese began the major road constructionnorthwestern Laos inhey have builtilesgraveled roads with permanent bridges at large watersystem runs south from the Yunnan border to the village of Muong Sal,
where it splits into two routes: one turns northeast toward Routend the North Vietnamese border, and the other leads southwest toward the Mekong River and Thailand.
road toward North Vietnam was completed at the end ofbridge still is needed across the Nam Ou River at Muong Khoua,is no evidence that the Chinese intend soon to build thenecessary to span this waterway, but on the basis of theirconstruction activity, it is likely that one will be An engineer regiment recently moved into the Muong Khoua area.
are signs that Chinese engineers in northern Laos mayto resume construction of Routeoward theof early January indicates an increased buildup just northHoun, the present terminus of the road. Construction camps arenew AAA sites are being constructed, and some radar-directedare in place. So far this dry season, Chinese roadbuilderson finishinghich runs northeast from Muong Sai
to Muong Khoua, and improving the surface to Routeetween Muong Sai and Muong Houn. Both projects are almost completed.
1 'llul ill ll i
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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