national intelligence estimate
Communist Chinas International Posture
DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ConcvntKf In b, It* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
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I. FOREICN POLICY: SOME PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
Constraints Affecting Foreign.
PROSPECTS AND CONTINGENCIES
Peking's Activist Foreign Pttlicy .
B. Sino-Soviet Relations . 8
The Triangular Relationship: US/USSR/China
Regicnrd Aims 11
and the World Conununity 14
communist china's international posture
China'$ return to active diplomacy raises new questions about the direction of its foreign policy. After four years tn which the internal preoccupations of the Cultural Revolution thoroughly overshadowed foreign relations, Peking is now mooing to repair its international image and to exploit new opportunities. In attempting to estimate how China will play this new role in international politics over the next year or so, this paper will examine Peking's options in terms of those policy factors which are most likely to remain constant and those winch are subject to greater variations in response to domestic or external events.
It must be acknowledged at the outset that we have remarkably little information on the decUion-making processes in Peking. Thus, estimates of short-run tactical moves are susceptible to considerable error. As in the past, sudden twists and turns in Chinese policies will probably continue to surprise us. But in the broader perspective of long-range goals and basic capabilities, this paper attempts to set useful guidelines on the course that China is likely to follow In adapting to the outside world.
A. With the waning of the radical and frenetic phase oi theRevolution, Peking has substantially recouped its earlier diplo-
Its successes toin large part lo the receptivity of other nationsore normal relationship with thebeen impressive, especially in areas of secondary importance to Peking. In areas of prime concoro,he Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia and Japan, progress has been marginal and Peking's policy less sure.
uomestic end foreign obstacles stand in the way ofPeking's basic goals, whether thews be Chinareat powerof the world revohitioii orore traditional but highlycountry ooncetned primarily with Asian interests.
the domestic side, stability and steady growth in basicofmilitary,far fromin the best of circumstantes. China's marginal economy willHmit its maneuverability in foreignreat deal ofto be dorse to restore effective tpvemmcetftoommunist nasty. So long ss Mao lives, thedisruptive campaigns oust and his death could usher in aleadership uncertainty and intense preoccupation with
China's aspirations remain blocked directly orby the realities of the international scene including: tbepower and hostility of the USSR, its most trranediatewell as rival for ideological leadership in the CommunistUS presence and US commitments around the periphery ofthe growth in economic strength and self-confidence ofrival, Japan.
should the Chinese regime wish to alter its basicapproach and use its growing military force aggressivelyareas, its options wouldi ted by the risk ofor another of the superpowers. From Peking's point of view,adventures in Southeast Asia, against Taiwan, bt Korea, or inFar East would be needlessly rtsky and tbe potential prizetbe game. Peking does, however, have room, even infor some maneuver directly between the twoas well as around their flanks or under their guard InAsia, the Near East, Africa, and even In Eastern Europe.
present, tbe Chinese see the USSR as their majorBy accepting negotiations with the Soviets, coolingand Improving their diplomatic Image, the Chinesethat they have reduced the risk of hostilities with theis little prospect, however,enoino rapprochementthe present Slno-Sovlet talks. But both sides arethat their dispute not endilitary test. Thus, asthey boA continue to exercise the present degree of military caution.
there il likely lo be some improvement in diplomatic: and tradebut little movement in border talks. As long as Mao lives there Is almost no chance of significant compromise on the ideological questions.
the US. Peking has moved from Its previousa more flexible approach better designed to exploit the Sino-USfor Chinese purposes. The Chinese hope to unsettleby playing on their fearslru> Americanwell as exploit the potential for changes in the balance ofEast Asia resulting from the drawdown of the US militarypursuing its new flexibility, however, Pekinc does not expectmajor improvement in Sfno-US relations and any smallare likely to be limited to marginal issues.
poses special problems tocause it too ispower. Is outstripping China in economic growth, and Isto Maoist subversion or Chinese threats. And theremember Japanese imperialism in China during World Warwhat threat the Japanese may become to their securitylong term and fear Tokyo will one day take on the role ofof Taiwan. Tbe Chinese answer so far has been toa rather rigid and vituperative propaganda attack ontheir policies, and their alleged ambitions in Asia. Whileimpress the North Koreans and some people in Southeastdoes little good for China's cause in Japan Itself. Nonetheless,the burgeoning growth In Sino-Japanese trade, any basicChina's approach to Japan seems unlikely in the presentIn Peking.
Southeast Asia, Peking's earlier fear that the Indochlnesespill over into China seems to have lessened. Indeed, thoto bebevs that the US is being forced gradually to withdrawpresence from the region and that this process willthe prospects for Chinese influence. Rather than useforce to exploit possible developments in this area,likely course will be to increase its support to subversiveactivity. The Chinese will seek to maic'. In their role asleaders without exposing themselves to undue cost oraddition they will rely on conventional diplomacy when thisneeds. There Is abundant evidence that Peking feels no need to
set deadlines and has no schedule to fulfill; it Is clearly prepared for the long haul.
J. In the longer run. if Mao's successorsore steady and pragmatic course, they are likely lo have greater success than Mao in expanding China's political influence and acceptance. We cannot be sure, of course, how future leaders will sec their situation, and it is possible that they will be prepared to employ China's developing powerore aggressive manner. We think It more likely, however, that they will continue to focus their foreign policy on diplomacy at the overt level and on subversion at the covert level. The open use of military force will probably be fudged needlessly risky.
X. While we do not doubt that China would fight tenaciously if invaded, we see no compelling factors moving Pekingolicy of expansionism, origher level of risk-taking. For all its verbal hostility and latent aggressiveness, ndther the present nor the probable future leadership is likely to see foreign adventuresolution to China's problems,
I. FOREIGN POIICY. SOME PRINCIPIES AND PRIORITIES
A The Ideological Bote
L Io part, Peking trill perceives the outside world in traditional ways. The Sino-centric view of the Middle Kingdom has survived the advent cf the com-muniits. The past century hasesidue of bitterness and frustration among (botethe vastsense ol nntionallim and pitriotinn has been outraged by what tbey see as unfair treatment of China by foreigners. This basic sense of injustice and frustration has facilitated tbe peoples acceptance of enormous sacrifices and has permitted the corormrakts to carry out revcJuUooary programs timed at reachingWhile popular espeetanons have beenisappointed, ibe basic dynamism of Chinese nationalism remains to be exploited again and again- Unlike the ideology of Maoism, which rruy not long survive its creator, the OadlOonal sense of China's privileged role io the world will probablyonitant theme in this and any fceesecabJc Chinese government
aoist Ideology, which emphasizes tbe inevitability of class conflict and world revolution, adds an ingredient of violence and militaries to tradiUonil ChiDcse drives. It aRcrnpts to project tho revolutionary experience of thecivil war onto the world *tage by advocating the defeat of the alHueot Weitern Powers through the mobtlizatWn of the poorhe world.
Poking tecogiiioB ihc limits ofrevolutionary line, however, andaccepted andolicy of peacefulot application where ihi? suit* iU nerds. Analogous to the dceaesUe united front policy which served the com-munlHs well in the Chinese civil war, tho peaceful coeaistewo line was originally intended toemporary accommodation to tbe norms of International conduct which would bo replaced as other countries followed China'sh. But as the prospects for world revolution have dimmed, peaceful coexistence hasarger role In Chinese foreign policy, even white propaganda stress on the more orthodur pulley of revolutionary struggle retnalnsigh pitch,
deology continues to play an exceptionally important ro-lo in the fonoula-tien of Chinese foreign policy. Althouph decisson-maken may hold varying degrees of faith in revolutionary dogma, all are required to justify their proposals in Its terms. Such justification has become particularly importantami* of the Cultural Revolution during which the purge and countcrpurgcivided leadership was rationatixed by linking interna! political deviations with uternal heresies. Many domestic figures deposed during the Cultural Revolution, for in. stance, were moused of following polioses that were pro SovitT ora the excesses of the Cultural Revolution have subsided, even the return to mote conventional diplomacy has been clothed In the rhetoric of Maoist ideology.
B. The Military Ingredlonl
Military strength hasajor preoccupalioneadership long at-tuned to Mao's dktuai that the "barrelun" was tbo source of all political power. Moreover, the Chinese have been as sensitise to tho needs of defense as they have been to the role of violence in advancing world revolution. Pobtical concepts and programs are conceived in strategic and tatties! military terms and transmitted to the Chinese masses and the rest of the world in martial rhetoric The traditionally strong position of tho military in Communist China has assumed new importanceesult of its vital role in underpinning Ihe regime during the Cultural Revolutiony-product, the military appears to hatve IncieBsed Its influence over tbe formJation and execution of policy.
Communist China's military power is impressive by Aston standards but remains markedly inferior to that of tbe superpowers. The People's Liberation Armyhose basic strength bes In the sire and fighting ability of its groutd forces, has the capability to putormidable defense of theagainst any invaders. However, while persistent efforts over the past HO years to strengthen and modem be the Chinese Armed Forces have yielded some creditable results, economic and political oUiruptiom have left the PLA vulnerable In certain areasodern opponent. Scene of its moreproblems are an apparent deficiency in motorized transport and heavy armament, an air defense system which probably lacks adequateaod data processing capabilities,avy which remains little moreoastal defense force.
ince Chirms intejventium I" tin- Korean War, which Pcling considereddefensive mora. Chinn'i military posture has remained basically cautions nnd prudent. Moreover.this espcrlenoc Poking appeared somewhat mora renrinmeO tn (ho use of military throats to further in foreign policy ob|ecti*a. The aljcative rnove against thedrnd the dcaeorrvehe Formosa Strilt2 both reflectedenacei. over anotherwith the US. Even ajainil the cterncmttrnbly weaker power of India, Peking vraa careful In IMS not to become embroiledengthy campaign. Peking waa probably mtidied to make ihe potnt that, in rpite of aavere mtrrnal difficulties, Chfara wai Hill ready and able to defend itself.
For alesatance ia tha tekvcJreSoal field, the deploy-sent of Caana'iforce* rrmatra baaioaDy defensive. Maoist sssaanry doctrine arrnahassrrs defense fe depth and tha erupurement of the entire civilian pc^iletvon to over-coma an attack. Tha fear'S ittack baa eased, in part becauseessen iag concern since IKS-IK* that the SoothoarJ. Aalan war might spuT over Into China, and is probably tower now than at any Other Unas In Ibe peatears. The Chinese now view the Soviet Union ai poatng the rnost immediate military threat and over tha past year have been conducting an ester.campaign to prepare (or tbe possibility of an eventual war. In acecedance with this altered throat, there arc indications that the Chinese are adjusting their militarylthough there has been no wholesale movement of troops to tho north em border.
Even ihoiigb the main approach to ihe defense of China still emphasize? defense inMao's "peoplesit rnore to itseadiness lorolongud. defensive war within Chins. The Peking leadership has clearlyigh priority to acquiring the military symbolsreat power, especially strategic weapons, bat also conventional forces as weO. Peking probably wants the strategic weapons primarily asoviet or US attaok sad to Increase Chinese bargaining strength on ffltcrarbonal issues. Thar* Is no evidence that the acteevernentapability will neccasarlly make iha Chinaae rnore agfpeaerve. Theyo be deterred by ovarwheomlnah/ soperlc* US and Soviet power both fxom east-light attacks aad from ceajastng In "nascseart East Asia. Qtinasts views to hava Impact on tha rrrtaraatjonal scane and it wflfiag to es-pand scarce rersourraa to achieve this goal,an he eapocted to centime to exercise caution tn employingonventional and rsucJear strength. Peking aspects lis pohbea! saftnenca in Asia to grew, net from the open use of military power, bed through active dipiomncy end the enccarrrsasssrsrut and support of subversive and revolutionary octlvitsm, all backed by the loean!ng presence and growing power of immemorial China on the Allan tceoe.
C. Domestic Constrain Is Affoctino Foreign lnitioii.es
addition to the Ideological and military praccaidlHous cited above,factors determine and often severely restrict the range of foreignand instrumentalities open to Peking. Those domestic constraints operate
to limit Ihe economic, ptycboIogicuL and bureaucratic resource! available for tho conduct of foreign relation).
The Chinese, economy duringid not oven approach ihn high sustained growth ratei ofombination of factors were responsible for thisdiUcoted planning and bizarre management of the Great Leap Forward at the end of; the cessation of Soviet aid; badconditions in lhe early years of the decade; and finally, the disruptions of Ihe Cultural Revolution. At the same time, the proportion of resourceslo the military sector increased, adding to China's technological capabilities, but further hobbling development of the civilian economy.
This failure toigh rate ol growth io the civilian economy limits China's capability to use economic leverage for foreign policy go all. China's image in thes the economic model for Asia has been largely destroyed. The fabled potential of the "China market" has lent rnuoh ol Us attraction to world traders, thereby reducing tbe political concessions Peking can exact in exchange for trading privileges.
olicy Ineptitude also tenders theeking's interne preoocupa-Oca with internal politics had paid off in terms of rapid economic, social, and political development, the Chineoe might nowounder doinraHc bate for the conduct of foreignn fact, the major experiment! designed to push China ahead, including both the Great Leap Forward and the Culturalhave beenlthough the economy has hugely recovered, party organiiaticn remains disrupted, ctvll administration has been hampered, and laKing tensions have been created within the lender shipesult of tbe Cultural Revolution.
The foreign policy apparatus proved at vulnerable as other bureaucratic orguit to the Impact of the Cultural Revolution. For nearly three yean, the formulation and execution of foreign policy were panxryxed by politicalBed Guard activities In etnboaiiei abroad and within lhe foreignitself brought conductive activityirtual standstill. All ambassadors but one were recallediag, embassy staffs ware substantially reduced, and rrdlitant posturing was c'iwedubstitute for tradiOonal cliplcenacy.
This Is not to say, of course, that China's presence was not felt in the outside world during the Cultural Revolution. Trade and aid programsas did support for subversion tn Southeast Asia and elsewhere. And China's potentialreat power was evident to the world as the development of nuclear weapons continued despite domestic turmoil. Nonotholtat, It was not9 that Chinese ambassadors began to trickle back to their peers, and the current campaign to retrieve China's international Hatus and influence started in earnest. Tho return to pro-Cultural Revolution diplomacy has been slow and uneven, and tho balance between radical and more pragmatic influences
and potentially unstable.
II. PROSPECTS AND CONTINGENCIES
A Parser's Activist Fcreign Policy
ith its foreign affairs apparatus largely restored. Peking it rnrrvrig quickly lo recoup ill pre-Culturul Revolution diplomatic position and to com-pets for influence in new areas. This drive has emphasized peaceful coexistence and has sought influence through conventional, diplomatic means. Its successes tob) huge part to the receptivity of cither nationsore normal relationship with thebeen impressive, especially whento the almost total isolation at ibe height of the Cultural Hcvohitioo. Most of the gains, however, have come in areas of lesser concern to Peking and under circumstances which have made improvement in relations easy andcheap.
areas of prime interest to the Chinese, Peking's policy has beenUncertainty and cautions experiment alicet haie been characteristic,with the Soviet Union, the US, Southeast Asia, and Japan. Inwhere policy decisions are more difficult, differences within thoapparently come to the fore and strain tbe entire decision makingwas especially marked in Ihe fluctuations of Chinese policy9 and the continuing holding operation pumiedeking's handling of the recent turmoil inon Sine-Americanbetrayed an initial hetitaneethe regime'sormulating policies on major
Though some of the in-mediate danger has been removed from thethe Sino-Soviet dispute remains the single most Important bilateralfor Peking At the same time, it conditions and determines many aspects of tbo Chinese posture In dealing with other Communist states, tbe Third World, and the West
Although relations between Moscow and Peking had been deteriorating markedly over lhe last decade, and tht Sov'et troop deployments along the Sino-Soviet border had been building since the. tho Chinese did not appear lo take the threat of Soviet military action seriously until after the invasion of Czechoslovakia- Even then. Poking sought to deter the Soviets by
harshly militant posture, combining provocative behavior on the
Soviet pressure conHnued lo growowever, nod after bloody clashes on the Ussurl In March and ia Stnkiang during August, Soviei diplomats began to drop broad hintsossible pro-esripdve itrtko against Chinese nuclear and strategic weapons facilities. Tho Chinese, swore now that they might be faced with the choice between bucking down and risking their nuclear installa-tions, finally agreed In September to tbo border negotiations which opened in Peking
Tho oipoiicocc of that tense summer moved the Chin sir toheir foreign policy tactics. Par from deterring the Soviets, their mtlltanl posture had not only raised tho possibility of broad conflict with the Soviets to on unaecept-ablo level, but aho deepened Chinese diplomatic isolation. After what wasa prolonged debate enrty In the fall, tho leadership decided thai border talks offered the mow viable means of defusing the darrgerously tense lihiation. At the same time, the decision was apparently taken toide-ranging diplomatic campaign to restore China's world status and influence, botheterrent to the Soviets and in support of Chinese objeclis-ea outside lhe bilateral Sino-Soviet framework.
Since the opening of the border talks, there has been no evidence of progress on any of the basic issues confronting the negotiators. In spite of tbo stalemate, however, there have been no specific reports of new border dailies, which argues that the mere existence of the talks has had soma stab) tiring effect For their part, the Chinese have demonstrated Iheir concern for maintaining Ihe talks at Ibe highest possible level by vigorously resisting any move which might lend to their downgrading. The Soviets seem to have conceded this point, possibly because of Iheir prcuccupation with events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East,omequent unwillingness for now, to trigger newsvitli China.
Despite lhe sooibing effect of the talks, the border situation remainsexplosive. The Soviets have continued their force build np along the border. Although lhe Chinese have not significantly beefed up force levels near the border, there Is some evidence that they have deployed troops north into areas close enough to bo readily available in an emergency. They are also trying lo Improve tbe effectiveness of their parumlhtary fores. Chinese civil defense campaigns to build air raid shelters, disperse population and stockpileall of which are useful for domestic political reasons asin effect
There have been signs of some slow, hailing normalisation of starealthough ibe ideological gulf remains as broad as ever and questions of principle and suiatance are no closer to solution than before. After protracted haggling an exchange of ambassadors is in the final ita gits of arrangement, and discussions for0 SirM-Soviet trade protocol have been completed.
ho prospectenuine rapprochement growing out of the Sino-Soviet talks now seems remote.g as Moo lives them is almost no chance of significant compromise on tbe ideological questions. Peking, seeing no prosprctilitary advantage over the Soviets, appears committed toog-term process of keeping tensions below the flash point while attempting to pile up pohtical points In tbe communist world by embarrassing the Soviets at every opportunity. Evenontinuation of the deep national antagonism and tho rdticJogical schism, both rides rue apparently concerned that tie dispute not endrtJh'tary test. Oct tbo lost year both sides have hadto estimate the costsrolonged military confrontation,rcspoct that neither finds partiwlarly advantageous.
C. The Triongular Relationship. US/USSR/China
The Chinese approach to tho US has been strongly affected by their poiit-knl coniUct with tho USSR. This was apparent oarlicr tht* year when Pelting moved front Its previous Intmnrigeacc against the USore flexible approach better designed to exploit tho Slno-US relationship for Chinese purposes. Tho primary aim was undoubtedly to unsettle the Soviets by playing on their fearslno-US rapprochement. By demonstrating their concern over this possibility, the Soviets have probably insured Unit the Chinese will continue to exploit the "triangular relationship" wherever and whenever it suits their needs, Even though events in Cambodia caused the Chinese tojder line against the US, they have clearly maintained tho option to returnooro flexible posture when it serves their Interest.
The potential for changes in the balance of forces in East Asia resorting from tho drawdown of US military presence is another factor encouraging more flexible Chinese tactics toward the US. The Chinese will hope to speedtroop withdrawals from the area, especially from Taiwan. At the same time, they we possibilities for improving their relations with states now forced to rely less on American guarantees. Peking may also hope that it can exert teato exacerbate frictions causededuction In the US posture. The Chinese probably see the US-CRC relationship as particularly vulnerable in this respect.
There arc no indications that Peking expects to bring about an early, major improvement In Slno-US relations. The Chinese probably expect no far-reaching US concessions on Taiwan, which remains the main test for Peking. Not are they likely to give up the US as tho prime targe* in their ideological offensives against the capitalirt-imperialist enemy. Nonetheless, Peking will wish to maintain sufficient flexibility Io exploit the triangular relationship and lo move promptly in whatever direction offers the maximum benefits.
For these reasons any early improvement in Sino-US relations is likely to be limited. For rumple, although recent US trade concessions have been studiously Ignored by the Chinese In public, Ihey base privately shown souse interest in bow far the US might move in this direction. While likely to reject any formal trading relationship, the Chinese seem ready to accept more subtle, Indirect trading through third parties. Similarly they are likely to show little interest in formal diplomatic recognition so long as the US remains committed to the GRC. At the same time, however, they will probably retain an interest in keeping lines of communication open through contacts such as those at Warsaw. The price of Chinese gestures will probably be slow and erratic, subject tofek in Peking from changes in Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US reUtiotis.
or some years to come, Sino-Soviet relations will be Peking's majorIn foreign affairs. Peking has already shown an acute sensitivity to thetint the US and the USSR might find considerable common ground in opposing ChlnE. In reaction, Peking will attempt to exacerbate the existing
suspicions betveecn Moscow and Washington, will tncieustogly penny iunlf be to re (ha world ai the Innocent victim of "coflusioo' between the iin^erpowon:wtO throw out Hues to other Western rowers end this Third World tn aa effort lo elicit new support Tho men direct roKitson would be lor Peking losnxyotrsresront with Moscow, but there seernrs hTOn ttitmioa that Mao could accept tbo shafts required to rnove his regfcne closer Inward tha Sovvets-Thus, over the neat few years, or und Sato's death, Pcatorg will protista ron keeping the SJsvo-US-USSR rebtleeahrp aa fluid as possible fat order to prevent any alliance against China.
D. Carvers Regional Aims
ostfknset Ana. Pefclng* carry fears that tbe Irvdcchirsraa war might spOI over into China seems to have lessened in recent years. Even uSough Peking has expressed apprehension lhat US frustration in Vietnam might lead to further escalation, the basic Judgment of the Chinese seems to bo thai tho US is bogged down in an indecisive effort that is rnore likely to leadithdrawal than h) further nieenston of tbe lighting. Their confidence In (his Judgment snnst have been shaken (cenporniily by the US move Into Contbcrdla, but theirof the ensuing political costs fee the US hassua>lol them that It Is itHI valid. Thru, what we believe to be thaw long-range antiglare probably rnrnoina sinchaaged; la.retracted struggle Hanoi's potieneo will cartlast that of the US.
s reapads rha luelhocd of the PLAt mto Soathiaat Asta for otienrrva action, rha evidence of the pantears suggests Peking wontd be reclined la thai Carectice catty If China's security it sean as thriwmeed, aa oa the Scno-torran berder lar ef China Is provoked, as on the Stno-Indian border In Iflol Thus, we eeestinue to bebeve that China would use Its rrrunary foroee to prop up htorth Vktaam If it appeared that (hareeal danger ol thai government collapsing. SLinlarly, China would no doubt raaot wttfa the PLAirect military threat elsewhere along its southern borders
likelyalmost certainly Its initialaggravation In this area would bo to increase its support to subversiveactivity. The fact that China continues ist long-term Improvementlogistic capabilities along this border, including the current readnorthern Laoa, illustrates Peking's desire to have nipport fadllOaa readycs*vttnannctes may develop. The character of tke leointica,and recent hislory all suggest that Chkneaa plana In thisin the defense of snath Chun and the assistance of nearbythenssesafva pash by the PLA into SomAeast Asia. Thabefore, would ba to bring into eaatfenrce friendly pnvirnmanO responsivepottnoal influence, and, ha Peking's view, thta could ba dronediplomatic prcaaure than open ikjjrasnwXL
aod Burma are already targetsebvenave afsortties with the US guarantee China's condnulng hostility. Thus far. Poking
hu hat) Utile orirsortiinHypply diplomatic pressure on Bangkok ami hu horn nl,mgong-term carnpnijtn to encourage lisntfgency agaleul tho gov-uriiiiwuii. Then ii no uiggraHon that Peking acein auy task oran be ocwunphihoJ qsat'kly irvoa Ifigh priority. On the contrary. Pelting Ii consistent In ndvrstetlag local ttX-nhaetx and hat Jven little male-rialhe active liunrgcrto. Shook! thereufastanUal reduction ta the UStn Scsrtheast Asia, he Chinese nay combine ton low-level activitymm eeajttva caplrruatlc bhevdJshrrrwbt
a nerava. OMneaenaxrraepng sevoarrocasety artMry. aup-pscmecled by amallof aid in arm and training to dasadrnt ethnic minorities. But diplomatic cooUctj with thti neuBallst government hue been damaged ruber than brown. Peking's return to modoancm in other oreai of its diploaacy may eventually be extended to include improved relation with Rangoon. Irrdeed. Bt now appears that both sides are prepared to resume more normal reiillona.uking It not likely to abandon Ui lupport of Burma's insurgents.
lsewhere in Southeast Ada. the Chinese are likely to persist inlocal revutotloiiauSsa, but In these relatively remote arras, signlfkant material assatance It unlikely to be provided. The Cranese will conttarre lo find it difis-cssk to refuse rnjiietti ior aid from any snares that creams aa insurgent or iswolu-bonary rapakUty. but they wffl ccemnee to urga arrX-iekarana rather than de-perdenoe aa outside aid. Then, the Chsaeae wiD rnaJUasa tha* role as revom-boaery readers hat wuheaat upcalsag ibernsclvta to traahse ceat or nekbundant rvldanre that Peking feels as need to art slrradkeea and has ran sctsedade a) folflll.early prepared tor tha long hauL
eulh Alia. China's Interest la Indiaelatively low rank on Peking's scab of priori Ora. China Is concerned wilh Sine-Indian bcedar liaises, withrivalries wilh the Soviets over influence In Soulh Asia, end withthat Indiaincapable of playing tho rolerodlng Asian power. Toward these ends Poking hu sought to embarrass and fctlosJdata New Delhi, but without becoming deeply involved In the effort. Foraking bas propagandised and provided limited arms and trailing to Nags and Mhroin eastern India without, however, artempting to tuna thaiialQr csatspqea
3ftarger scale, fUdnats naotary aad to PutViwaa the ararqor raao-ensn-inissslrt rvxSptarat of saach Cmnree aid aras born ool of eoaaaaaoa aaeUty to indra. In the prorasa tha Pakbtanls have become rraaier chants of the Clear ii and Peking will probably teak to preserve and nurture this ralatsoruhspinc-Lrdian relations ihoold improve lornewhit in the earning years. Tentative feelers between Peking aad New Delhi luggest both partbs may ba readyeturn todiplomacy. While formal ties may be itelortd, in Una wilh Peking's current effort to boulter Its diplomatic image, tlie rolalionshlp will undoubtedly remain caatiout and toot (nr aoene tame to ronac
The Anon Communttli. Poking now Mctm determined io consolidate the curronth/ Improved tlei with both Haiti' Vietnam and North Korea. If only become of tho primacy of the Si no-Soviet conflict, Peking ia Ukery lo go to tome lengths to improve its rotations with Pyongyang andrefcrabh- at Moscow's eipense. The error of pushing Pyongyang ind Hanoi, whether ideologically or politically, now seems to ba clear to Plsalng and is unlikely to bo repeated in the same gross terms as during the Cultural Revoajticaj.
China's present call for "indicant unity" ts probably designed, in the lint oaaranca, to aqueese out the Soviet Union, It tbo serves to gyve the impressionnore active rale In tht "sastHmpratakst" struggle, than China'sIocs tattoos warrant Indeed, it secant briery that China will ccrstjooe to tailor its rote toward propaganda and material rapport of thoaa on tho front lines rarher than expose itself to greater Hi. This apparent effort to write itself Utatorfly fate any potrible settlement hi Indochina, together with its iportsorship of Sihanouk, will require caueful diplomacy If it I* not to slieesate Hanoi Having bona* the burden of tbe "abtfaft the Vietnamese are likely to bo especially sensUive to any Chinese attempt to dioUlo Miategy or tactics. Csireastfy the Chinese are moving with finesse but their natural bent toward chauvinism is nearly al likely to erupt against the Vietnamese as against Wrolerners.
M. Japanpecial cast for frksng. Because of Japans rrsmarkable economic performance and US tucoMragernuiii for It toore active rote in Asia, Peking ts showing concern over Japan's pot end tl military power, and Its possible designs on anotlwr Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Thla concern was heightened last fall by the signing uf the Nixon-Sato corn-muaique on the reversion of Okinawa. Prolog has always been sppreheniivo over Japan's expanding influence tn Alia, par lieu kufy hi Taiwan, and has taken the view that the Nlxoo-Sato cornoiuntqiitore assertive and direct role forrf In tbo area. Peking's itectum has been marked by indigna-rJoa and by an unsettling conviction that at the US disengages from Asia, Japan will fill the vend both onreorntcadry and mUi tardy and wtl assunte the Lead role in countering China. Adding to Feting* dlicsnma ts the awareoess that its prjrbeal assets aad leverage lai Japan haws rtasthecDy dwtndkd aad ts image has suffered from the rxtonraes of tha Cultural jvavchitioe.
hi Despite itspart failures- Peking seems to have decided to cofUoueourse of llmlied mrddllafi lo Japans internal affairs. Peking has alto iaonched an intensive propaganda campaign which raises the specteremilitarized, impcrialiiticorrtgn policy ploy designed to fan traditional Asian fears and to undercut Japanese iiifluence. Moreover, the Cbiscse are attempting toase againet US-USSR-JapaneNhich Is abo intended to strengthen Peking's hand ia its ecenpetition for irtQiseoce in Asia. So far this approach has been successful In helping improve China's relations with North Karen, but hot notignificant impact on Peking's non-com-munidurthermore, tire campaign has not been allowed to affect
materially China's burgeoning trade with Japan, which is expected lo rnach record levels again this year.
rafctun. The continued eaaKMee^ndecdthe NetionalW Chinese Covemmcot In Taiwanentralhinese foreign policy. This symbol of the unfinished nrrohrtiotiighly cenotioriai issue even after two decades. Tho Peking leadership faces tho general frustration of knowing that they cannot tako Taiwan by force, that it will not fall to them by default, and that the (lowing strength af the independence-minded Taiwanese could weaken Peking's claim to the Island and perpetuate the issue indefinitely, iho continued recogsitton of the CBC by many countries In the world ond its presence In the UN and other international bodies blocks Peking front full international participation andajor irritant to the Chinese Communist leadership. Finally, the Taiwan issueomplex obstacle to improved relations with both the US and Japan, thus severely limiting Peking's freedom to maneuver on international Issue*.
Korea continues to attract Chinese Interest because of the strategic role of the peninsula, the quadrilateral competiboo for Influence there, and the volatile relationship between the north and the south. Peking has workedto regain Its influence In tryongyanaj and has succeeded In reviving warm displays of friendship While attempting to limit the solo ofS. USSR, and Japan, however, Peking will also seek to ilmll North Korean adventurism. The outlook Is for tough political support for Kim lUsong's propoguidjcombined with quiet restraint oa his military excesses to areid drawing China into another military conrramation on the peninsula.
E. China ond Ihe World Community
Where Peking'i security Interests are not directly engaged. Chineseactivity over the list year has Involved far rnore tactical flexibility than bos been shownis the US and the USSR. The face shown the world once again broadly resembles that displayed prior to the Cultural Revolution, anurtured Image ofigness, but entailing little or no change in long-term goals. Sino-Soviet cooitderations are part of theost of this cllplomatlc activity, and tn some cases, notably In Eastern Europe, tend lo dominate the Chinese approach.
Eastern Europe has become on attractive target for Peking because Soviet problems there seem to draw Soviet attention away from China. In addltliai to its close liesAlbania. Peking has been uctivefy cultivating the Rumanians, and more recently has shown real fleribtlity In shelving Idee logy and Improving long-frigid relations with Yugoslavia. AmbastiOOri have returned io Hungary, Poland, and Easteking is clearly preparing for long-term competition with ihe Soviet Union and lor this reason alone is likely to give greater attention to the East Europeans. Much will of course depend on the subtlety and finesse of Peking's approach, but al this point the Chinese have apparently asv^ied the
oppcrtumtJeiworth pursuing la tho effort ai la Other diplomatic cadeavan now underway, Puling wi! Likely recover ground rati during thean Iraki lo Us new pragmatic dipfcrriocy, actUavD letnc rdrwird mctcincct.
drewhare to tha world, Pckstacshowing rovtved IMcrart in fostering better rotation* where the cent is cheap and the opnortrasltlcs tsrarrptfof; That does not rule out support lor icvcjutjorasry actlvfty.vtdrrrt to the Near East In contrast to lhe heavy arms aid from the Soviets to lha Arab world, the Chinese apparently hope lo sway the Arabs by cencentrvting iheir aid on the fedaycao- ThU will probably be mainlyon "proptct war" with some [mining and tmallarms okl. This abo serves to keep the pot boiling and the Soviets distracted- Bul while denouncing tlie ceasefire at an American-Instigated "Munich" and declaring strong support for iho Irdsyoen In thetrills, the Chinese have earcfoliy refrained from attacks on the Arab governmenti irtvolw-d, apptrenlly urnviuing to cornpromiic future stale relations la the area.
4fttoa, tha Chhsate will be ceoctrned to rostra, dipsornntlc leases to tbe GRC tn recent yean. Thai will require more nrearcsttooalnd less preaefyui't- Indeed, Chine's Forrtgn Mtrostry akrady teesnt to have accepted rhtt retreat fron Maottt mbaiooary work. For thr roost pari, aid prefects are likely to remain inodcal but with special efforts to snake thran practical and highly visible. The oontlruction of0 mllUcci Tetuania Zambia nil line appears to be Chant'i prctUge rsrc4tet for Africa; the Chinese, apparently abo hope, ihrough tha pcnltion ot military aid, lo coovert Tansanaaajor beachhead In Africa.
n an effort which may be inlessded mainly to apodlghleturn ID Iho world scene, the Chinese have aho been dtanttyfng unprecedentedin UN irstenbenhtp, lo earlier yean, Peking pul preeondiboas on itswhich were inanity unaercrstable to the international body. Mora recexstfy, Haw hi effkesabj have dropped their eatrrme demands and have rentumber of caottout lerbn for support fa the UN. Whrerai Chit* est caplonwa formerly spumed turh support, now ihey go out of their way to express appre-dstion for :t.f this activity. Peking hot not tcttttoed tit opposition to any "two-China" tomtaktson, and has rsvitinued to rathe it clear that the GRC roust either withdraw or be drsoshsed before Poking would accept UN membership. Widened diptornalie recognition of Peking, laoh us by Canada and Italy, Is steadily improving the chances for its ndmhiion lo the UN; such an outcome teems likely within the noil few yean.
n general, and hairing the contingency of militoi/ attack by the USSR, Chinas future international posture Is likely to depend more on Chinese internal developmentsn external factors. If domestic polilical and econon'ic problems accumulate, so will tbe pressure to give them even higher priority,
oncomitant lessening in foreign interests. Mao Tsc-tung remains the key variable So long as he retains his dominance within tbo leadership, Mao could attempt to reverie tho present relatively moderate treads. In the past, hit impatience has grown at his goals for China have been frustrated by economic reality and recalcitrant human nature. His ability to retreat and consolidate is still evident, but it is questionable whether hit ago nnd health will permit another major push toward his visionary aims. In any event, despite his deep concern over tho ideologlenl conflict with the Soviets, Mao's attention is likely to remain primarily on development* within China. Nor Is be likely to abandon his caution and risk the destruction of China by provocative moves against either the US or the USSR.
ao's death during this period could create succession problems that could give Peking reason loow posture on the international scene for some time. Almost any foreseeable combination ofpresumably hard-core Maoists like Lid Pino, tho designatedprobably piny for time to consolidate thcs> positions and to strengthen China to meet possible challenges. In the longer run, as those who follow Moo face up to Ihe needs of China, the trend it likely to be away horn the ideological excesses of Maoismorn realistic adjustment to thewell as theChina Indeed, if the successors persist io lhe present movement toward greater flexibility and pragmatism. Ihey are likely to have greaterthan Mao in expanding China's political influence abroad. And for lhe longer run, China's trrditionn] ethnocentrism will continue to fuel an assertive and potentially aggressive nationalism.
resumably they will continue to focus Iheir foreign policy on diplomacy at the overt lovol and on subversion and Insurrection at Use covert level This could include "war by proxy* as well as efforts to rntneerbate US relations with Its Asian allies and to exploit Interns] tension within jiese countries. We can-not be sore, of conrte, how future leaders will sec their situation, and it Isthat they will be prepared to employ China's developing powerore aggressive manner. It now seems bkety, however, that tlw open anduse of military power will continue lo be judged needlessly risky and Even the development of on operational
reckless policy. While we do not doubt that China would fighl tenaciously il invaded, or if threatened directly with invasion, we see no compelling factors moving Pekingolicy of expansionism, origher level of risk-taking For all Its verbal hostility and latent aggresnvencst, neither the present nor the rnotKiblc future leadership is likely to see foreign adventures as ato China's problems.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I. Thi* Ooo/mwii woi oiiumlnoNd by Iho ControlAgency. Ihil copy Ii (or A* Information ond ma ol too rtelpwat and ot panoni under an iVadictloneadto-tnowontlolmay ba ovthoriied by Idafficial, wtthn tnoirtpotlnnh:
o. Dlroctor ol InlBlliotncr ond Raworch, lor lha Deparlmant ol Start
DelectAganey, for lha Offieo of tho Sacrrioty ot
Daforna ond lha orgoniutfon of tha JoW Chttti ol Staff
Oiltt of Staff for ImnUlganot, Daparlrntel af lha Army, for
Dopnttmaol of tho Army
Chttf ofOprroren. (Intelor thr Deportment ol tha
Aitittorrl Chltf of Staff, In Ml HornUSAF, for lha Department of tha Air Forea
f. Owaetor afK, for lha Atomic Energyen B> Aulnorrt Director, Par, for lha rachvol loraaD of InvoillgoKori h. Daoeior of NSA, for lha rtoKanal Security Agency
I. ttraeror ol Control Bcforanco StrAct, OA, for anyarttrwt or Agoney
arotnl rnoy bo rtWlnad, or deureytd byccordrtaco wUh opplieoblt tt^trrkVingwfeHom. o. returned lo It* Control htofliganca Agoeey by ormnotmtnl wi* IrVCnWrolSorrier, OA.
han IN. doeuin.nl^Slaje^radtha tnntti mciplonh noyariod not In awraToiHona ytor. Al lha and of 1M1 period, lha foumart .hould tilher ba dtrtroytd, rtlgSitrUlo lha forwarding ogancy, or par-mlitlon dioncd ba itquralsd o( lha forwarding ogtneVsln.n2
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DISTBBUTlONi Whit Noma
rtollonal Security Council Drponmrnt of 5loroof Oofomo Ammk Eiway CeraratttlanBureau of Invauigatlo*Original document.