THE CURRENT STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Created: 2/25/1971

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Intelligence Memorandum

THE CURRENT STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence1

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Current State of Sino-Soviet Relations

Political Re 1anions

here has boon no firm evidence thatintroduced any new proposal at the Pekingtalks, 1

the talks got underway, iii

a soviet cniTsa-specialist-sarcr at the Poking discussions wereCana-still" and that the Soviets were awaiting "newfrom the Chinesehe negative tone of those comments, which is consistent with the

indicates tnat no significant progress is being made on the border issue.

Note: Tkie memorandum, thederies ofweekly reporte on Sino-Soviet relations, was prepared jointly by the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Research and was coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.

1

SHhppr

/

2. Moscow has invited the Chinese Communist Party to send representatives to theh CPSU congress, accordingrench press service report attributed to "reliable sources" in Moscow. If such an invitation has been extended, Moscow probably has put it on the record to show itsattitude toward Peking and has littlethat the Chinese will accept.

Soviet Comments on Chinese UN Representation

to id

>assaaor Beam on February that it wasChina was definitely interested in UN ossible effort to indicate thata unique insight into China's UN policy,that Peking had "discussed" lastassembly session with Moscow.

he was "absolutely convinced" that Peking will not abandon its demand that Taiwan be ejected from all UN organsondition of membership, other lower ranking Soviet officials have recently predicted Q

sion in eitherhis week went further

that Peking will gain UN admis-

One Soviet UN diplomat heS

official that Peking would reject UN membership if Taiwan were not expelled from all UN-relatedas well as UN organs.

4. Comments such as these suggest that Moscow is resigned to Peking's eventual UN membership but may be hoping that Western resistance to Taiwan's

-2-

7

expulsion vill forestall Chinese admission this year. The diplomats made clear that Moscow will not drop itsfor Peking's entry and will not join in any Western effort to keep Taiwan in the UN. Moscow remains unhappy with the prospect of China's presence in the UN, however, and may continue to engage inlow-key efforts to keep it out.

Soviets Seek to Score* Points Over Laos

7. The Soviet central media have noted without comment many of the Chinese warnings concerning US and South Vietnamese operations in Laos. Moscow

-3-

has reprinted, for example, Peking's assertions that the operations areerious threat to China" and that the Chinese people will not permit theirto other areas of Indochina.

In reprinting the veiled Chinese threats, Moscow appears in part to be trying to fan USover the possibility of Peking'sin the fighting. In addition, Moscow may be trying toreater coincidence of interest with Peking than actually exists. At the same time, however, Soviet propaganda broadcasts to China and Southeast Asia indicato that Moscow is also bent on utilizing the Laotian developments to reiterate its long-standing condemnation of Peking for failing to take "united socialist action" and to discredit the reliability of Chinese support in the eyes of Asian revolutionaries. Soviet broadcasts, for example, have belittled Chinese statements of concern over Laos as "clamorous anti-imperialist rhetoric" that will not be backed by "real action." Moscow has also charged that Chinese failure to cooperate with other socialist countries in aiding Vietnam hasUS "aggressiveness."

Moscow, although concerned over thesituation in Indochina, probably is not displeased with China's current preoccupation with events on its southern border. Indeed, I

| states thatainy good reading of what is on the Sovietthink the USSR now believes that China must mobilize considerable energy and material resources to protect her Southeast Asian flank. The Finns say Moscowthis will help divert Chinese attention from the USSR. Although some Soviets may hold this view, Moscow would probably not bo happyhinese decision to send combat forces to North Vietnam.

_4_

ove would, in Soviet eyes, place the Kremlin in the difficult position of having to react to the Chinese ante or see Peking's influence in Hanoiat its own expense.

Sino-Soviet Valentine's Day Passes Unacknowledged

10. Both Moscow and Peking once again failed to acknowledge theebruary anniversary of the signing of0 Sino-Soviet Treaty ofAlliance and Mutual Assistance. The treaty, which has nine more years to run, committed each party to provide military aid in the event of attack on the other by "Japan or other states allied with it" he US), Both sides undoubtedlytheead letter under present

loft-Secret

Original document.

---

---