THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION AND TANK DIVISION: ORGANIZATION, SIZE, AND

Created: 11/1/1970

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Division and lank Division: Organization, Size, and Logistic Capability

WARNING

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence0

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Division and Tank Division: Organization, Size, and Logistic Capability

Introduction

In the early Sixties Warsaw Pact ground forces were structured to optimize their effectiveness for operations in conjunction with theater nuclear war. In particular, artillery was 3harplypart because it was assumed that nuclear weapons wouldthe breakthrough role formerly assigned to those weapons. Logistic support was also reduced to improve mobility and reduce vulnerability.

Since the mid-Sixties, articles in the Soviet military press and tho aconarios of military exorcises have indicated that Soviet military doctrine now accepts the possibility of nonnuclear hostilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This same evidence suggests, however, that the Soviets expect that NATO wouldtactical nuclear strikesact nonnuclearachieved initial success.

This report evaluates those changes in theand strength of two representative first-lino Soviet divisions in tho Group of Soviet Porces in Germany since they wore last analyzed in deptht assesses in detail their logistic capabilities, measures to what extent Soviet divisional organization has been affected byshift in tactical doctrine, and projects likely future developments.

The conclusions drawn from this analysis arebeginning on Sources and methodology, together with detailed data, are presented at Annex beginning on

Note: fhTig report was produced solely by CTA. It vas prepared by the Office of Strategic Research anduith the Office of Rational Estimates.

SI-ARKT

Contents

Page

Organization and Equipment

19th Motorized Rifle Division

10th Guards Tank

Personnel Strengths

Logistic Capabilities

The

Division POL Capacities

Assessment of POL Capabilities

Division Ammunition Capacities

Assessment of Anununition Capabilities .

Division Capacities for Other

Supply Categories

Future

Summary

Contents

Pago

Annex: Sources and Methodology 28

Table 1. Vehicle Storage andMajor Equipment Items of theRifle Division 32

Table 2. Vehicle Storage andMajor Equipment Items of theTank Division . 34

Table 3. Estimated Holdings ofItems ofhDivision andh GuardsBy 36

4. Estimated Holdings of Major Equipment Items ofh Motorized Rifle Division andh Guards Tank Division, By Type of Equipment .

Illustrations

Motorized Rifle Division andTank Division, GSPG (map) 4

Soviet Tank and Motorized Riflecharts)

Organization and Equipment

Two divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany19th Motorized Rifle Division andh Guards Tankbelieved to be representative of first-line Soviet divisions and servetandard against which all other Soviet linecan be measured, (See the map, facing.) The field artillery strengths in both of the divisions have been substantially augmented during the pastyears. Aside from this change, however, and gradual improvements due to modernization, the general organizational structures of both remain essentially what they have been since the early Sixties (see the charts on

The overall equipment strength of each division has been increased byajor itemsostlyesult of the artillery augmentation. The current equipment totals areor the tank divisionor the motorized rifle division.

The results of the analysis of the organization and equipment of these two combat: ready divisions are summarized in this section and in the tables at Annex, beginning on

19th Motorized Rifle Division

h Motorized Rifle Divisionarrisoned in the Dallgow-Doeberitz area, has increased in size since ehicles and major items of equipment have been added, increasing the totalcount fromoseet Annex on. This growth is largelyto increases in organic divisional and regimental artillery and consequent increases in supporting vehicles.

The artillery regiment ofh MRD was increased from eight to nine batteries inithmm howitzer battery. This brings the regimentotalmm howitzers and 36mm howitzers.

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Before the introduction of the additional howitzeroviet artillery regiment had anehicles and pieces of equipment. Current analysis indicates that this regiment hasajoritems. This total includes the six additional howitzers and the newerargo trucks which replaced older model trucks as prime movers and general transport vehicles for their logistic support.

This new artillery organization incorporates what appears to be an important tactical and logistical trend. Formerly, the supporting elements ofargo vehicle whicharrying capacity of no moreetric tons (mt) . Many of these trucks have apparently been replacedne-for-one basis by the newerruckapacityt, increasing the load carryingof the regiment to provide for the additional howitzer battery without increasing the number of trucks.

The division's rocket units, the FROG (free-rocket-over-ground) battalion and the multiple rocket launcher battalion, have also been increased in size, adding to the division's nuclear and nonnuclear fire support.

One launcher has been added to the FROG battalion and there are now four launchers organized into two firing batteries of two launchers each. In addition, the new wheeledas replaced the older, tracked models (see lower photograph on Theystemew resupply vehicle, built on the same chassis as the launcher and carrying three rockets rather than one. The new resupply vehicle has not yet been observed in the FROG units ofh MRD but has been supplied to other Soviet units in Germany. One of these resupply units per launcher would increase the total number of rockets available in the division from theofour on tho launchers and three on each resupply vehicle).

A major increase in total division firepower has been achieved by the introductionaLtery of 6

SEQRET

mocket launchers (see top photograph on pagen the multiple rocket launcher battalion, augmenting themmocket launchers. Theround launcher which rapidly expends large amounts of ammunition, calling for extensive mobile stocks.

The antitank battalion hasreater transformation over the past several years than any other element of divisional artillery. 8 the antitank unitix-gun battery probably attached to divisional artillery headquarters forand logistic support. Since that time it has been increased to three six-gun batteries, probably organizedeparate battalionsubordinate to the division headquarters. This new organization was first observed in9 after the division returned from Czechoslovakia in (Previous estimates of the equipment holdings of the antitank battalion haveattery of antitank guided missile vehicles. There is no current evidence to indicate that the antitank battalion ofh Motorized Rifle Division does in fact have guided missiles. There is,attery of nine antitank guided missile vehicles in each motorized rifle regiment.)

The heavy mortar support was increasedotal ofubes for each motorized rifle regiment,ix-tube battery directly subordinate to each of the three rifle battalions. Formerly the mortar units were subordinate to the regiment, and each regiment hadubes. Inmm howitzer battery was added to each motorized rifle regiment, providing additional fire power.

Recentlyh MRD has begun receiving thermored personnel carriereplacing the obsolescent Some other Soviet divisions in Germany have been equipped with theince but it was not until late9 thath MRD, formerly fully equipped with theas observed with the newer Thesand has significantly better mobility andthan the It is not yet known how many

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ill be allocated to each regiment, but in any case the combat effectiveness of the division's infantry is being increased.

h MRD evidently has not been issued any of the newest model Soviettracked amphibious squad fighting vehicle called the infantry combat vehicle, whichm smoothbore cannon and an antitank missile launcher. This vehicle is beinginto motorized rifle units in the USSR but has not yet been identified with Soviet forces in Germany.

The currently estimated equipment holdings ofh MRD are shown at Annex by number in eachunit inn pagend by type ofin n

10th Guards Tank Division

h Guards Tank Divisionarrisoned at Krampnitz and Potsdam, has also been strengthened by the addition ofehicles and pieces of equipment since The total of major items of equipment in the tank division is nowseet Annex on. The increases, like those inh Motorized Rifle Division, consist largely of additional divisional and regimental artillery and supporting logistics vehicles.

The artillery regiment ofh GTD previously haduns,ewer than the artillery regiment of the rifle division. mm howitzers have been added to the tank division's artilleryraising its totalame number now found in the motorized rifle division's artillery This increase probablyreater need for conventional supporting fire for the tank division. The FROG and multiple rocket launcher battalions of the tank division were increased to the same levels as those now found in the motorized rifle division. The multiple rocket launcher battalion of the tank division has been fully equipped with IS of the newocket launchers, replacing themm. To meet the ammunition supply needs of the

-VI -

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the Soviets havo provided the battalion with at leastrucks andwo-axle cargo trailers, eachL capacity. Thes the largest of the general purpose transport vehicles now beinginto either the tank or motorized rifle division.

Two of the four line regiments of the tankbeen observed with theweapon which mountsm cannons and hasradar direction system (see photographto

he addition or theo the existing Aaa batteryattalion. The rifle regiment of the tank division now has its original six-gun battery oftowedm guns) and two four-gun batteries of. In the three tank

m Self-Pro pel led Ant km era It Gun

Vehkle speed Vchkle cruising range Crow

Maximum rote ol lirerange (slant)

ock tonsiles periles Four nven

ounds pe<eal

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regiments, two four-gun batteries ofere added to the four-gun battery of, self-propelledm AA guns.

At least two of the four line regiments of the tank division have also received somes part of their motor transport, probably replacing oldor and lighter cargo vehicles.

The currently estimated equipment holdings ofh GTD are shown at Annex, by number in eachunit inn pagend by type of equipment inn

Personnel Strengths

Although the equipment levels of these Soviet divisions can be determinedigh degree of accuracy, no comparable methodology has been developed to accurately determine the absolute levels ofstrengths of Soviet units. There is reliable recent evidence, however, that the authorized wartime strengthoviet motorized rifle division is0 men and thatank division. Small personnel increases which have resulted from the subsequent artillery reorganization have probably not affected these totals significantly.

Actual peacetime manning levels of Soviet divisions in East Germany are probably significancly lessercent of wartime strength at most times. There is good evidence that Warsaw Pact planners assume that first-line Soviet and East European divisions might enter combat at effective strengths ranging betweenndercent, suggesting both that some personnel shortages are normal in peacetime and that these are deliberate.

In the case of Soviet divisions, these shortages may result in part from personnel attrition in the intervals between conscript callup periods. But at

least somJv^ivisional units are probably regularly undermanned

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applied to other divisional support

otn Combat support and servicethe division could have been as low asercent of its authorized wartime strength.

It would be more consistent with known Soviet manning practices, however, if combat support units such as artillery were closer to full strength than service support units such as the maintenanceore likely manningonly minorin combat elements (the tank and notorized rifle regiments) and combat support elements with the bulk of the shortages in servicebetweenndercent.

Logistic Capabilities

Background

The service support organization at division level appears to have been reduced substantially in the early Sixties as parteneral streamliningto optimize the Soviet ground forces for high speed armored conbatuclear battlefield. This action was reflected in the classified debates of that period, with the advocates of theby then Minister of Defensethat the cuts enhanced the ground forces' capability to maintain high rates of advance in nuclear war and proposinq even further reductions.

Others such as Colonel General Malykhin, deputy chief of the Rear Services, complained that the cuts had already dangerously reduced mobile supplies and argued for keeping the stocks at least at the then current levels. These same writings indicated that the actual mobile stock levelivision was sufficient for some throe to five days of offensive combat.

Analysis confirms that the logistic capacity of the Soviet division has been maintained atthe same level as in the early Sixties, although the trend toward the replacement of light cargo trucks and trailers with new medium cargo carriersne-for-one basis may eventually result in increased overall logistic capacity if it continues beyond the point of compensating for the increased requirements of the artillery weapons added to the divisions.

The Evidence

The

eiidDiea tne laentix ication of POL rtiuiTjum, oix, and lubricants) and ammunitionunits for many of the combat regiments andof the divisions as well as the mobile stocks in division reserve.

In four of the eight line regiments of the two divisions studied, mobile stocks of ammunition are kept in vehicles in open sheds separately secured within regimental and battalion areas. The same is true for tho POL stocks in three of the line roqimonts.

All four tank regiments and the four motorized rifle

regiments in the two divisions are about the same size, however, and mobile stocks of ammunition and POL are probably present in the remaining regiments at the same level as they are in those regiments for which mobile stocks were identified and analyzed.

Division POL Capacities

The POL transport at division level and lower iu provided by tank trucks and trailers and cargo trucks and trailers carrying bulk containers. ank truck

can holdallons of fuel andankallons. The cargo trucks and trailers can also transportallons each.

As shown in the following tabulation, the tank division has anOL-carrying vehicles,otal capacity ofallons. otorized rifle division has anOL carriers,apacity ofallons.

POL vehicles in Sovietrifle

regiment Tank regiment Tank regiment Motorized rifle

regiment Motorized rifle

regiment Motorized rifle

regiment Artillery regiment FROG battalion Motor transport

battalion

0

25

5 2

236

25

26

26

vehicles

The amounts of fuel carried in the on-board fuel tanks of division vehicles were calculated from Soviet data on fuel tank capacities. These amounts plus the

* Mobile POL stocks were not identified in the FPOG battalion of the motorized rifle division and were assumed to be at the same level as in the tank

capacities of the POL supply vehicles equal the total POL supplyivision can carry as follows:

POL capacity in gallons Motorized

capacity

carriers

fuel tanks

of POL Copabilitiefi

When tho data on fuel-carrying capacities la used in conduction with vehicle inventories, vehicle fuel consumption rates, and Soviet planning factors for combat fuel consumption, the probable number of days of sustained intensive combat ofovietis capable without POL resupply can be calculated.

Soviet military writings of the early Sixtiesto an expected rate of advance in nuclear warfare ofilometers (km) per day. Recent Soviet writings, however, suggest that this planning factor has been reducedore realisticom per day in nuclear warfare andom per day in nonnuclear combat. The days of effective combat for four different rates of advance are:

Days of conbat

division

k Motorized

of advance per day

m

the supplies of POLivision advancing betweenndilometers per day would permit

SKCfXE'l

intensive combat for only about four days. At this point the mobile pol stocks would have been expended to keep the vehicle tanks full and only the fuel in the vehicle tanks would remain. Resupplyigher echelon would have to start by this time or the division would begin to lose effectiveness.

Division Ammunition Capacities

The approach to estimating mobile ammunition stocks is different from that for estimating pol.* Virtually all the types of vehicles used to carry pol have the same capacity. Ammunition carriers, however, are measured by weight capacity rather than by volumeso it is necessary to identify the type of carriers as well as enumerate them.

The major ammunition transporters in the tank division are currently thetndtnd Thettre replacing some of the older zil models and have been observed transporting ammunition. Mobile ammunition stocks in the rifle division are also transported in Ural and zil trucks, but theof thet vehicles is higher in the rifle division than in the tank division.

rBV tnese methods,

iF. uinaiun iias miehiclesmobile stocks of ammunition,otal capacity oft. Tho motorized rifle

Mobile ammunition in metric^ Motorized

Total

Tank

Tank

Tank

Motorized

Motorized

Motorized

Artillery

Antiaircraft

Multiple

Antitank

* The AAA regiment was the only ammunition consumer for which no ammunition area was identified in either The amount of ammunition for this regiment was assumed to beevel consistent with current Soviet planning factors.

Motor

division has anehiclesotal oft. The distribution of mobile ammunition stocks within these divisions is shown in the tabulation on

The total ammunition supply is derived by adding the amounts of ammunition estimated to be stored with each weapon or in the direct possession of the troops to tho ammunition in mobile stocks as follows:

Ammunition capacity Motorized

Total

Mobile

With weapons

Assessment of Ammunition Capabilities

The data on ammunition carrying capacity can be combined with estimated expenditure factors tothe total probable days of intensive combativision could sustain without resupply. The evidence on Soviot ammunition supply and consumption planning factors is incomplete and much of it is old. There is recent evidence, however, that planned allowances for artillery weapons and tanks have not been changed for some time. The allowances forare still about one-third of those used by US planners.

The division level mobile ammunition stocks are sufficiont, under nonnuclear attackending ammunition at the ratenit of fire perorays of effective

* The unit of fire is an arbitrary quantity ofestablished by the Soviets for eaoh type of weapon and usedlanning factor in calculating and allowances.

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combat. At this point the mobile ammunition stocks would have been exhausted in supplying the combatonly ammunition with tho weapons or troops would remain, and resupplyigher echelon would have to begin by this time. The days ofcombat at various expenditure rates are:

Days of combat

Motorized

Expenditures per day (unit of fire)

d,vision

division

Capacities for Other Supply Categories

Of the major military supply categories, ammunition and POL have the largest requirement for transport. These expendables require aboutercent of the total transport capacity available within the division. for rations and what the US Army categorizes as Class II, IV, VIII, and IX supplies amount to aboutercent of total divisional mobile stocks.* The actual amounts of these supplies inh MRDh GTD are subject to considerably more uncertainty than are ammunition and POLF"

i Tnese other supply categories, however,ess important than ammuni-

* The US categories include; replacements and parte for weapons, vehicles, and engineer and signal construction materials; and quartermaster and medical equipment and supplies. Soviet requirements are derived from current Defense Intelligence Agency

estimates of consumption of these expendables perday.

The standard organization and equipment structure of Soviet divisions isroduct of thetactical doctrine, but is also influenced strongly by technological developments and economic considerations. Tho Soviot tactical doctrine of the early Sixties had evolved from the German blitzkrieg, with important modifications resulting from thethat any major hostilities involving the Warsaw Pact and NATO would probably lead to theater nuclear war.

These factors have resultedivision which is characterized by high mobility and firepower but which is optimized for relatively short duration combat. These characteristics are achieved by heavy emphasis on tanks--which are expected to survive well in nucleara relatively light infantryand logistic tail.

The Soviets began in tho raid-Sixties to modify their doctrine of inevitable nuclear escalation by recognizing that conventional war bctwoen tha Warsaw Pact and NATO is possible. But they almost certainly believe they would have the advantage in any non-nuclear conflict, and they apparently have little expectation that NATO would refrain from using tactical nuclear weapons if the Pact succeeded in an initial conventional offensive. They probablyheater nuclear war would develop fromituation.

With this background, the recent artilleryin Soviet divisions can be viewed as an effort to improve their capabilities for conventionalin the initial breakthrough phase in which theater nuclear weapons were formerly relied on to penetrate NATO's defenses. But thealso enhance the divisions' capacity foroperations in the wake of theater nuclear strikes as do tho concurrent increases in PROG launchers. The divisions can be said, therefore, to have been made more capable for eitherof combat.

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The Soviets probably consider their divisions to be appropriately structured for short-termconflict, and they evidently do notonventional conflict to be protracted. There appears, therefore, to be little incentive for them to restructure their divisions radically for war with NATO. the new Soviet divisions being formed on the Chinese border are reportedly identical in structure to the divisions in Germany. The Chinese have no capability for tactical nuclear combat. If the Soviots considered their Warsaw Pact division organization unsuited for combatoe using conventional weapons they probably wouldifferentfor the new divisions on the Sino-Soviet

Given the absence of any identifiable incentive for the Soviets to radically change their divisionthe reported similar organization of tho newly formed divisions on the Chineseis not likely that tho size and structure of the current Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions will change significantly within the next three to five years.

battalions

in the motored ntle reqimenTs on thP rhin, k

Minor changes in organization and equipment will probably continue to occur as new equipment is in-troduced and small improvements are made. For example.

on the China border

have been increased fromedium tanks to aboutan overall increasen the division.

change wouldeinforcementP"diloction toward tank-heavydivisi.cm structure

Also, the Soviets may increase the logistic load-carrying capacity of the divisions by replacing old model cargo trucks with new trucks of larger capacity. If all the cargo trucks in current divisions were replacedne-for-one basis, the overall increase in ammunition logistical capability would amount to aboutercent in the tank divisionercent in the motorized rifle division. Even so, the Soviots

SI'XlkET

trong interest in keeping their divisions' logistic tail as small as possible. They may seize the opportunity to shorten the tail by keeping the same load-carrying capacity with fewer but larger trucks. This is what appears to have happened in tho division artillery regiment, where the increase resulting from replacing the older trucks was only about enough to make up for the increased requirement resulting from the additional guns.

Summary

Shifts in Soviot doctrine for theator warfare in Europe since the mid-Sixties suggest an acceptance of the possibility of athort period of non-nuclear war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. However, they evidently believe that NATO would resort to tactical nuclear warfarearsaw Pact conventional offensive achieved major initial successes.

Analysis t

LTjnmat reaav

in19th Motorized Rifle Division andh Guards Tank Division--haseans for measuring the influence of the prevailing tacticalon the organization, strength, and logisticof divisions.

The analysis T

yields an accurate accounting of the major 'iieua ui1 equipment contained within each installation, the level of mobile logistics stocks, and someof relative manning levels.

A combat ready motorized rifle division currently hasajor equipment items. These totals represent an increase oftems in each type of division sinceesulting mainly from increases in

Nonnuclear artillery in the divisions hasby aboutercent in the past three years. The motorized rifle division now hasrtilleryhowitzers andultiple rocket launchers. The tank division hasrtilleryhowitzers andultiple rocket launchers. Additionally, heavy mortars were increased fromon each motorized rifle regiment, antitank artillery in the motorized rifle division was increasedoubes, and the regimental air defense artillery in the tankwas increasedoeapon batteries.

Nuclear delivery capability is being increased by the additionourth FROG launcher to each Soviet division in East Germany and by replacing older models with the newerransporter-erector-launcher, an eight wheeled vehicle with good mobility.

"(indicatesombat readyilhjlui iicea ruie division in East Germany probably has someoercent of its authorized wartime personnel strength of0ank division hasoercent of an. The shortfalls probably occur primarily in support units, although minor shortages of combat personnel are also likely. The authorized strengths haveincreased slightlyesult of the artillery augmentation, but no other increases have been

The overall logistic capacity of the Soviethas remained essentially unchanged since the early Sixties. The divisions carry mobile stocks of ammunition sufficient for about two to three days of

intensive combat under nonnuclear conditions or three to five days under nuclear conditions. Under nuclear conditions the ammunition stocks would probably only permit artillery rates of fire in fluid situations at about one-third the level of planned US rates for similar situations. The mobile stocks of POL are sufficient for three to six days of intensive combat.

The logistic capacity of the divisions maymoderately in the next five years as the Soviets replace old model light cargo vehicles with newer model medium capacity vehicles. Such an increase would be particularly applicable to ammunitionand might raise the overall logisticof the division.

It is believed that with the increases inartillery and nuclear capable rockets, the Soviets consider their divisions to be appropriately structured for short-term conventional conflict and they evidently do notonventionalor the conventional phaseonflict escalating to theater nuclearbe protracted. There appears to be little incentive, therefore, for them torestructure their divisions for war with NATO. The Soviet divisions being formed on the Chinese border are reportedly identical in structure to the divisions in Germany. If the Soviets considered their division organization unsuited for combatoe withonventional capability, theywouldifferent organization for the Sino-Sovlet border.

Given the absence of any identifiable incentive for the Soviets to change their division structure, and the reported similar organization of the newly formed divisions on the Chinese border, it is not likely that the size and structure of tho current Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions will change significantly within the next three to five years.

Annex

Sources and Methodology

h Motorized Rifle Division andh Guards Tank Division of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) arc both garrisoned withinBerlin Air Control Zone.

Jis the primary basirT

for estimates of the equipment levels and organization of these divisions and of tho type and models of equipment they hold.*

These estimates have been usedtandard against which all other Soviet line divisions are compared. Analysis of the other Soviet divisions in Rast Germany supports the judgment that these two divisions exemplify the highest peacetime readiness level in the Soviet forces. There is good evidence that the Soviets consider these divisions combat ready.

- i.

This study presents the latest results of the continuing analysis of these two divisions toto what extent shifts in Soviet doctrine are boing manifested in the strength, organization,and logistic capabilities of first-line divisions.

r

Vehicle Storage and Holdings of Major Equipment Items ofh Motorized Rifle Division

Multiple rocket launcher

Chemical defense

Reconnaissancebattalion and

unidentified

Motor transport

Unidentified

6

Motorized rifle

Tankartillery

FROG

Dallgow-Doeberitz

Motorized rifle

Motorized rifle

Artillery

Engineer

Motor transport

Unidentified

Dallgow-Doeberitz

Antiaircraft artillery

Dallgow-Doeberitz

Motor transport

Division

-

Hotee to Table 1

The maximum capacity is derived mathematically ana does not reflect practical vehicle storagesuck as working areas, access aisles, and, in certain cases, unit integrity. The estimate of probable holdings is derivedombination of

actualcalculations of practiaal

storage capacity ana Utilisation. Major items of equipment include all self-propelled vehicles (except molorayales) and large towed items such as artillery and two-axle trailers.

order-of-battle holdings identify some

nondivisional units in this installation. The areas occupied by these units are excluded from the analysis.

not identified by type but believed to be

subordinate to the division. These unitsinclude

headquarters^

the artLltevit ihetVUhiental reconnaissance hntt

tne main the traf

reconnaissance battery, iance battalion, the medicalontrol company, mall part of the motor transport.

Vehicle Storage and Holdings of Major Equipment Items ofh Guards Tank Division

Maximum holdings

regiment

transport element

a

288

regiment

regiment

artillery

transport element

261

defense company

signal battalion

battalion

regiment

rocket launcher

instrumental

battery and

battalion

battalion

battalion

rifle regiment

transport element

transport element

total

14 -

SKCKI- I

Hotes to Table 2

The maximum capacity ie derived mathematically and does not reflect practical vehicle storagesuch as working areas, access aisles, and, in certain cases, unit integrity. The estimate of probable holdings is derivedombination of

actualf practical

storageunlization* Major iterns of equipment include all seIf-propelled vehicles (except motorcycles) and large toved iteme euch ae artillery and two-axle trailers -

2. Units not identified by type but believed to be

subordinote to the division. These unitsp"

medical battalion and

the traffic control company.

Table 3

Estimated Holdings of Major Equipment items ofh Motorized Rifle Division andh Guards Tank Division, By Unit

Unit

holdings lyth Motorized h Guards Rifle Division Tank Division

Motorized rifle regiment

Motorized rifle regiment

Motorized rifle regiment

Tank regiment

Tank regiment

Tank regiment

Reconnaissance battalion FROG battalion Artillery regiment

Multiple rocket launcher

battalion Antiaircraft artillery

regiment Antitank artillery battalion Artillery instrumental

reconnaissance battery

Engineer battalion Signal battalion Chemical dofense company Motor transport battalion Maintenance battalion Medical battalion Traffic control company Field bakery

Total major items

26

a

itTSinclude all self-propelled

, W'P motorcycles) and Urge loved Uele such as artillery and iuo-axle trailers.

information for the AAA regiment in theintlTV'J3t. that for ihe Sam,

Estimated Holdings of Major Equipment Items ofh Motorized Rifle Division andh Guards Tank Division, By Type of Equipment

Estimated holdings

205

7

8

8

Motorized h Guards Rifle Division Tank Division

Tanks Medium Light

Antitankmm field gun ATGM vehicle

Antiaircraftm AAMG m quad self-propelled

AA gunm AA gunm twin self-propelled

AA gun

Artillery, rockets, and mortars FROGmm mortar

m howitzermm howitzer

Multiple rocket launcher

Transport vehicles APC

Armed scout car Light command vehicleeneral purposepecial purposerailer (two-axle)

Total major items

flote: Major items of equipment include all self-propelled vehicles (except motorcycles) and large towed items such as artillery and two-axle trailers.

a. Van trucks, POL tankers, and cargo trucks, o. Decontamination vehicles, engineer equipment, and ambulances.

Sfecret

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