Nfl fAagn dissm
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Tbe Latin American Guerrilla Today
HELEASE llf PART EXEMPTIONS [Mill
SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements lo the Current [nielli-aence Weeklies issued hy the Office of" Current Intelligence. The Special reports are published scpjiaicly lo permit more comprehensive treatmentubjecl. They arc prepared by llic Office o( Current Inlcltigvixv. Ihe Office of EconomicIhe Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science j'h! leehnoSogy. Spt-ciil Report ire coordinated as appropriate among the Directorate* of CIA hot. cxccpl (or the normal substantive exchange with other agendo! ut Ihe woiking level, have nol been coordinated oulsidc CIA unless specifically indicated.
The SPECIAL REPORT contains cfaarifioJ informationthe national defense ol die United States, within the mean-mj ol. of the US Code, as jinended. Its liansmission or revelation of ils contents Io orby an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
THE SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within ihe framework of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID.
THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA TODAY
For more than ten years Fidel Castro has been encouraging and aiding Latin American revolutionaries to take to tho backlandsand mountains of their own countries to imitate his guerrilla campaign and victory. Today, however, there arc fewerural guerrillas holding oui inew countries. They are weak, of declining imporiance, and do not pose serious Threats to the governments. Guerrilla insurgency in the hinterlands became increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant in many Latincountries in the decade ofs societies urbanized and modernized at accelerated rates.
As rural guerrilla fortunes have faded,ow breed of revoluiionary has appeared in the cities, in Uruguay, Argentina. Brazil, and Guatemala urban guerrillas have engaged in spectacular acts of terrorism and violence. Six foreign ambassadors have been kidnaped during the last three years, of whom two wore murdered.ozen other diplomatsarge number of government officials also have been kidnaped. Robberies of banks and arms depots, airline hijackings, arson, sabotage, and killings of polrce and security officials have reached unprecedented proportions in severalTerrorism is likely to increase in aialf-dozen Latin American countries this year and could challenge the governments of Uruguay and Guatemala.
Prominent students of the Cuban revolution believe that Castro never intended toural guerrilla war when he landed in Cuba from Mexicout that he hoped to joinuick urban putsch. His experience during the preceding ten yearstudent radical,and violent revolutionary was acquired in the cities. Even after Castro was forced into the sierra after his expedition foundered, heto rely heavily on urban support groups. His radio appeals were beamed mainly to middle-class, nationalist audiences, and in8 he helped organize an abortive national strike in the towns and cities.
Castro's small guerrilla band won some skirmishes with regular military forces, butthe Batista regime collapsed because
Castro captured the imagination of an oppressed, disenchanted middle class through highlypublic relations. Once in power, however. Castro quickly alienated urban groups through his radical appeals to peasants and workers. The regime exaggerated and glorified theof Castro and his guerrilla colleagues, andural, agrarian mystique for the
In the months following Castro's victory, exiles and revolutionariesumber of Lajin American countries unsuccessfully attempted to initiate guerrilla struggles in their own countries.0 Castro and Che Guevara were giving support to such revolutionariesarge scale. Misinterpreting their own experiences, they recommended that rural guerrilla methods be employed and gave little consideration to urban tactics. Large numbers of Latin American youths
to Cuba for training in rural guerrilla techniques, and Guevara's guerrilla handbook was widely distributed and used throughout tho hemisphere. In lact, the Cuban leaders and their revolutionary disciples were so confident of these methods that95 almost every country in Latin America skirmished with revolutionaries inspired or supported byew of these efforts endured, but by mid-decade most of the remaining guerrilla bands were of declining importance.
These efforts failed principally because the Cuban leaders themselves refused to understand the true dynamics of how they came to power and because they imposed an unworkable strategy on their followers. As rapidly as new guerrilla efforts were conceived, however, security and counterinsurgent forces in many Latin American countries were expanded and became moreThe rural guerrillas also failed because of ineptness and disputes over leadership, tactics, and ideology. Generally, they were poorly trained and equipped despite Cuban efforts, and, desiring quick results, were unprepared psychologically for protracted conflict. Rural guerrillas have been unable in virtually every instance to attractmiddle-class support, mainly because their programs and campaigns have been directed at rural groups.
67 Cuba attempted towaning guerrilla fortunes in thethrough an intensified, recklessto continental rural guerrilla war. The Latin American Solidarity Organization was foundedemispheric revolutionary front. It held its first conclave the summern the meantime, Che Guevara withther Cubans wasa new guerrilla effort in Bolivia. Cuban advisers were also operating with guerrillas in Guatemala and Venezuela, and possibly in Colombia. Castro insisted more stridently than ever that meaningful change could result only from violent struggle in the countryside. The French Marxist, Regis Debray, earlier hada treatise expanding the point, asserting that guerrilla action must be an exclusively rural phenomenon without significant aid from the cities. His Revolution Within the Revolutionthe new Cuban manifesto on guerrilla war.
Cuba's efforts to "export" the revolution reached their zenith during this period. Guevara's summary defeat in Bolivia in7 and the concurrent failures of guerrillas elsewhere demonstrated more clearly than before theof Havana's approach. Youngthroughout Latin America began to reappraise Cuba's strategy. Castro unintentionally contributed to an acceleration of thisby publishing Guevara's field diary. Che's poignant memoire of ineptitude, hopeless meanderings in dense jungles, and flight from encircling Bolivian troops has undoubtedlymany young revolutionaries that other tactics can lead more quickly to dramatic results. It is ironic that Che's detailed account of his own defeat is likely to endureore permanent legacy than his guerrilla handbook or speeches.
Carlos MarigheMa, the Brazilian author of the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla has replaced both Guevara and Debray as the primaryof violent revolution in the hemisphere. Debray. who was recently released from aprison after serving more than three yearsyear term for his part in the Guevara fiasco, admitted onecember that he hadthe importance of urban terrorism. He now claims to be rethinking his entire treatise on guerrilla tactics, and has endorsed urban
Guevara's precipitate failure also ledeappraisal of tactics in Cuba.8 and the first halfavana appeared to be withdrawing from revolutionary liaisons in Latin America. Cuban support to revolutionaries in Venezuela and Colombia terminated, andin other countries were told to acquire their own funds and arms. Castro, however, wasto amend his rural guerrilla strategy and was loath to share the spotlight as foremost
revolutionary in the hemispheie with Marighella. Nevertheless, during Ihe second half9 there were signsradualHfacceptance of urban methods as urban terrorists accelerated their activitiesumber of Latin American cities. In9 Marighella wjs killed, and two monthi later Castro came out in support of hrs line by publishing the Mini-manual
Since then. Havana has been more flexible and cautious about endorsing revolutionary groups. Both urban and rural tactics now are supported, and in view of events in Chile, the nonviolent path to power is also publiclyleast there. Underlying the pragmatism of this approach, however, is the same enduring commitment to rural guerrilla methods that has characterized the Cuban revolution since the. Cuban leaders continue to predict that in most countries rural insurgency will be decisive in the long run and that urban tactics should be employed to create favorable conditions for rural conflict. Marighella himself was making plans to initiate rural guerrilla warfare in Goias State prior to his death.
Today. Guatemala may be the only country receiving material support from Cuba for guerrillaew Cuban advisers are in the Guatemalan countryside, aid Cuban funds have been provided. In other countries. Havana appears to be giving little more than training andsupport to revolutionaries Cubanagents have been active in Chile since Al-lende's inauguration, and it is possible that Cuba could increase its contacts with South American terrorists under Chiloan cover. In the long run. however, rural guerrilla methods increasingly will be replaced with activities in the cities.
The Dawn of ihe Urban Guerrilla
The urban guerrilla groups that have sprung up since Che Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia aremoreof the rural guerrillas of the. They have learned from Havana's mistakes of the last decade, but because most of them operate in highly urbanized societies, thoy realize that rural methods are not applicable anyway. They areof them are believed to be in their earlymiddle-class backgrounds, and are frequently either university or former university students. Except in Argentina tht urban guerrillas generally profess to be Marxists. In the few instances where they have discussed or publicized their political programs these are vague but ultranationalistic. Today's urbandesires quick remedies 'or social andills and has chosen the tactics of terrorism in the cities to achieve rapidat least to make dramatic headlines.
In general, the urban guerrilla endorses Havana's theoretical line by ascribing long-term importance to the rural struggle and to thebut in practice he concentrates or confines his activities in urban zones. In an interviewm0 in the Cuban Communist Party daily, forupamaro admitted that plans called for extending the struggle into tho countryside, but "not with the characteristics of typical rural-guerrillae emphasized instead that, at least in Uruguay, futurein the countryside would consist of brief, commando-type raids launched from the cities.
Thus, although urban revolutionaries look to Havana as the spiritual center of revolution in Latin America, they are zealously nationalistic and prefer to maintain tactical and financialCuba has provided training for some urban guerrillas, backs them with propagandaand grants haven to revolutionaries and political prisoners, but there Is no evidence, of more extensive contacts. There are indications that Havana wouldarger share of the action, but it is probably known among young revolutionaries that Cub* has been heavy-handed and arrogant in dispensing aid in the past
While Cuba has persisted in emphasizing the rural nature of its revolution and has
concentrated on rural tactics for revolutionaries, the rest of Latin America has been urbanizing at accelerating rates,0 there were five Latin American cities with more0 there were nine. It is estimated that today therend that in ten years there willexico City. Saond Buenos Aires already have more than five million residents, and four other cities have moreillion. By the end of this decade five more cities will surpass the five-million level, and another five will have moreillion people. The accelerating rato of urbanization is also reflected in tho giowth of citiesuarter million inhabitants or more.9 Latin American cities hadnd one million inhabitants, and anotheradesidents.
The new revolutionary in Latin America comes from these cities. in his Mtnlmanual, Marighella said that it is "ideal" when the urban guerrilla "ope-ates in hn ownn Uruguay and Brazil, and possibly in other countries,follow Marighella's advice, organizinginto four-or five-man "firingach groupargely autonomous tactical squad that initiates its own operations and has little contact with other groups. Marighella also emphasizesaction, suggesting, for example, thatshould be performed by one guerrilla "in absolute secrecy and in colduch rigid compartment*iization accounts in large part for the ability of urban terrorists to resist police raids.
Urban terrorists havo been responsible for the kidnapings of six foreign ambassadors sincetwo were murdered. Three USofficers havo been killed by terrorists during the last three years, and at least eight otherdiplomats or officials were kidnaped for ransomocal officials are also targets of terroristin Guatemala.hijackings have become common, and in0 the first combined hijacking-kidnaping occurredosta Rican airliner was hijacked to Cuba. Frve US citizens aboard were threatened with death unless severala top Nicaraguan terroristreleased from Costa Rican jails. Urban revolutionaries also struck in theRepublic last April when the US Air Attache was kidnaped and later released in exchange for prisoners. Terrorists have stolen millions ofransacked arms depots, engaged in various kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and foreign officials. They contributed directly to theof the Ongama government in Aigentina, and have undermined stability in several other countries.
As urban terrorism has increased, contacts and collaboration among urban-based activists have also been on the rise. Bolivia is the principal focus of insurgent interest in South America,umber of foreigners have participated in ELN activities since last summer. Individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers in urban terrorist techniques were in Bolivia last September Three Chilean revolutionaries, rumored to be members of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MlRj were killed in Bolivia last summer, and three others were allowed to return to Chile after being captured. MIR members reportedly also hadwith the Uruguayan Tupameros and areto have participated late last year in aof insurgents from several South American countries that was supposed to establish anarmy."
Argentine terrorists reportedly have contacts with terrorists from neighboring countries, and there is some collaboration between Brazilian and Uruguayan urban guerrillas. Contacts are nothowever, and ithat terrorists in most countries are primarily concerned withtheir own activities. Tht Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR are the two groups most likely to engage in proselytizing. If the MIR or the Altamirano faction of the Chilean Socialist Party is permitted to aid terrorists in other countries, in fact. Santiago could become the primarycapital in Latin America. Although
Havana has provided some training and backs urban guerrillas with propaganda, the Cubanshave lew contacts with South American terrorists.
The new breed of urban revolutionary has been most active in Uruguay, Brazil, andThese countries had almost no difficulties with rural guerrillas duringnd tew manifestations of urban violence until the last few years. Guatemala, however, hasong history of rural and urban violence, which intensified during much of the decade of the sixties. Urban terror recently has become more important there than has Castro-line guerrilla struggle,ignificant capability for both kinds of action. In Bolivia there have been two abortive guerrilla episodesndappear increasingly interested innew urban methods. In Colombia and Venezuela rural guerrillas continue to operate in the countryside, but they areakened and disheartened remnants of large and important guerrilla groups that were threats in the. The current status of the revolutionaries in each of these countries is described in theparagraphs.
The National Liberation Movementknown as theevolutionary Marxist organization that haspectacular and rapid rise to prominence during the last few years. Since9 it has been the most active and successful insurgent group in South America. It hasotal of seven Uruguayan and foreign officials during this period, and three of them-the Britisha US agronomist, and the Brazilianstill in captivity.
The Tupamaros are highly organized and disciplined, and through audacious and ingenious offensives haveisruptive force far out of proportion to their numbers. They initiallyconsiderable public sympathy, but lost much of this support after theyS AID official last August. Nevertheless, they are likely toignificant disruptive force for some time to Come, especially in the tenseatmosphere that probably will precede the presidential election in November.
Named after Tupaceruvian Indian who organized an important uprising against Spainhe movement was founded in northern Uruguay2 by Raul Sendic. It was not active6 when it began to conduct sporadic robberies for money, arms, and supplies such as police uniforms andpapers.he movementits activities in areas outside ofMontevideo, but later turned more and more to urban violence.
7he Tupamaros succeeded in portraying themselves as romantic, quixotic revolutionaries. They attempted to minimize personal violence and excesses, and gained considerable popularity and publicity as selfless Robin Hoods. In elaborate public relations efforts, the Tupamaros redistributed to the poor some of the money they had stolen, as well as food. milk, and other provisions. They alsoalleged financial frauds through theof compromising stolen documents, which did cause considerable alarm in government and financial circles. By daring daylight robberies, they accumulated large sums of money, often robbing banks by recruiting employees or bythemselves as policemen or guards.
boutupamaros raided the small town of Pando. robbing three banks, taking over the police and fire stations, and severing communications. There wereon both sides, and the Tupamaros claim that members captured by police were tortured and killed. The Pando raidajor turning point for the guerrillas, who thereafter turned increasingly to murder and other extreme forms of urban violence.
activities-especial ly Ihe murder of police and securityin late
n latejudge was kidnaped but laterOnuly, US AID officialand the Brazilian consul were7 August. US agronomist Claude Fly.Mitrione was killed onugustPacheco government refused to negotiateterror-sts. Tupamaro demands for thtall imprisoned guerrillas in exchange forthe Brazilian gradually laded in the faceintransigence. By mid-Septemberretioated furthoi and agreed tocaptives if major news media publicizedmanifesto. Althoughagazine subsequently printedviolation of government censorship
stages have nol btff retailed.
Tht government's deltrmination not to negotiate with the guerrillas hasonsideiable show of force.counterinsurgtneyan unprecedented crackdown following the August kidnapings-have resulted in significant guerrilla losses. In August, Congressday. limited state-of-sioge as thousands of soldiers and policemen scoured the Montevideo area in search of theumber of important guerrilla leaders, including Raul Sendic. were apprehended.esult, anupamaros are currently imprisoned.to some estimates, onlyupamaros remain active.
A hard core of the Tupamaro organization weathered the government's counterterroristhowever. During tho last few months of
remained very active. Theycinemas to make politicalimportant communicationsbanks, and in early November theyone of the largest robberies in theIn conjunction with thesethey have also conducted aof low-level harassment designedconstant publicity and to keep security lorces off balance. Finally,1 thty added another hostage to the list ofbeing held, whon UK ambassador Jackson was kidnaped. Uruguayan police estimate that aboutupamaros participated in thiscoordinated kidnaping in the streets of Montevideo.
The Tupamarosairly extensive base of support among students and youths, whootentially large reservoir of new recruits.and faculty federations at universities and secondary schools are dominated by extremeand Communists who sympathize with or overfly support guerrilla demands. In late August, (or example, secondary school studentsviolently in Montevideo in favor of the Tupamaros. This resultedovernment decree Closing tht schools until the beginning of the newear this March Students have been relatively quiescent in recent months, during tht Uruguayan spring and summer, but studenttor the Support of the Tupamaros have appealed.
The Tupamaros also havo been supported by fairly large numbers of middle-class professionals who increasingly are disenchanted with the quality of life and economic stagnation in Uruguay. Middle-Class support probably hasto diminish, however, sinct the Pando raid, mainly because of the terrorists' increased emphasis on murder and othtr extreme forms of violence. One Tupamaro leader has statedthat the chivalrous tactics employed before the end9 have been replaced by greater revolutionary milltance. There have been reports of division within Tupamaro ranks over this.de-cision. and it is clear that if it is followed, much middle-class support will be lost.
Tht Tupamaros have demonstratedresiliency, determination, and skill since last summer, and it is likely that, because they enjoy exttnsive support from students and youths, thty willormidable force in Uruguay tor
some time. The boldly executed Jacksonshows that the terrorists retain theto carry out complex and importantand that the government's refusal toand police dragnets have had only limited results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their full capabilities are not known, but it is likely that the terrorists will remain active in the coming months, perhaps buildingoncerted, large-seal^ campaign of urban terrorism towith Ihe period preceding the presidential elections.
Sincerazilian security forces have moved aggressively and effectively against suspected leftistubstantial number of terrorists have been rounded up. and
Carles lamina Engaging in Guerrilla Training
two of the most important Brazilian guerrilla leaders and theoreticians have been killed and others exiled. In early0assive counterttrrorist operation in several major cities in an attempt toerrorist campaign they had learned about from captured documents. Estimates of the number of persons arrested in tho operation varyo more, which haswidespread criticism of the police and the military.
Terrorists are still able to carry out major operations, however. This was demonstrated dramaticallyecember when SwissBucher was kidnaped in Rio de Janeiro and he'd nearly six weeks for ransom. Afternegotiations the governmenteleasedolitical prisoners, who wee flown toxchange for the ambassador. For the first time, however, the government forced the terrorists to reduce their originalsignificantly by adheringirmposture. The guerrillas dropped their demands 'or the publication of communiques and for free railroad transportation and yiolded when the government refused tootal ofther prisoners. The terrorists, in tact, were the nethe Bucher affair, inasmuch as their credibility and their image of invincibility incases were undermined seriously.
The National Liberating Actionne of the two most important terrorist groups in Brazil, has been active for about three years. Former officials of the Soviet-line BrazilianParty (PCB) who split off in opposition to the party's nonviolent policies form the core of the ALN's leadership as well as that of most of the other major terrorist groups. Carlos Mari-ghella. the author of the Stimmanual of the Urban Guerrilla and the foremost Brazilian revolutionary of recent years, was the ALN's leader until he was killed by police inis deputy, Joaquim Camara Ferreira, took over, but died in0 resisting arrest. In9 ALN members, working jointlytudent group closely affiliated with the ALN, kidnaped US Ambassador Elbrick. He was roltasedwhenerrorists were flown to Mexico. Most of them went on to Cuba, where they were greeted by Fidel Castro.
The Popular Revolutionary Vanguardecond important terrorist group, is headed by Carlosormer army captain and counttnnsurgency specialist who deserted inhe VPR was responsible for the first significant terrorist actionoreign
in Brazil when, inhey killed US Army Captain Charles Chandler in Sao Paulo. In0 VPR militants kidnaped the Japanese consul-general in Sao Paulo. He was later released in exchange for five imprisonedIn0 the US consul in Rio Grande do Sul foiled an abduction attempt by the VPR when he ran down one of the terrorists in his car. In0 VPR terrorists working with the ALN kidnaped the West German ambassador. Forty prisoners were llown to Algeria to secure his release. The Bucher kidnaping In December was the most recent example of VPR capabilities.
The number ol militants taking part inoperations is probably not more. Most are former university students, but many are cashiered military and police personnel, extreme leftist labor figures, and professional criminals. Thereood deal of sympathy for some of the terrorists' goals among intellectuals and the radical clergy. Several priests have been accused of assisting the ALN's support sector, and military and security officials are convinced that terrorists have important contacts among the Brazilian clergy. Marightllaaragraph in the Minimanual to the clergy, saying that "the priest who is an urban guerrilla is an activein the struggle.
Some terrorists-particularly in thehave received training in Cuba, and Uruguayan terrorists have assisted Brazilians in illegal border crossings and in obtaining passage to otherBrazilian revolutionaries are probably largely self-suf tic lentesult of robberies ol financial institutions. It is possible that Havana also has provided some financial backing, but there is no 'irm evidence of this. Marighella was long one of Castro's favorite revolutionaries. He attended the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization innd he may have returned to Brazil with definiteof Cuban supportime when Havana was still relatively generous In dispensing aid.
Urban terrorism appears to beess serious problem in Brazil, even though kid-napings, robberies, and sabotage are likely toTerrorist capabilities appear lo0 as police became morein apprehending and killing Importantleaders os wellignificant number of militants. Tha government's performance in the recent Bucher kidnaping enhanced its prestige, just as the terrorists' capitulation on manypoints during the negotiations probably strengthened the hand of those military and security officials whotronger line in dealing with terrorists. It is possible, therefore, that urban terrorism has already reached its peak in Brazil and may now be declining In importance and intensity. Terrorists retain the capability to carry out many types of assaults and acts of sabotage, nevertheless, and undoubtedly willestabilizing factor in Brazil for some time.
Although Argentinariefof Cuban-supported rural guerrilla action in3 andrban terrorism did notroblemome Peronists and other extremists in the labor and student sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of urban violence and strikes, but the phenomena of bank robbenos. kidnapings. and other spectacular acts of urban terrorism are relatively new. Unlike terrorists in neighboring countries, most of
whom identify with Castroite or Maoist doctrines, the bulk of Argentine urban revolutionaries claim to be left-wing Peronists. Very little is known about their structure and membership. There may be as manyozen small groups, some of which reportedly are attempting to formor to merge forces. The Peronist Armed Forces group appears to be the most active.
During the early monthserrorists concentrated on raiding small police and military posts and on robbing banks. In March, members of the Argentine Liberationroup formed in9 orrom the union of three earlier revolutionary groups,araguayan consul in Buenos Aires and demanded the release of two imprisoned leftists. Therejected the demand. Paraguayan President Stroessner, who was vacationing in Argentina at the time, endorsed the Ongania government's decision and thB terrorists later released their captive. This was the first case in Latin America Inovernment successfully defied the demands of kidnapersoreign diplomat.
An almost immediate reaction to thiswas the attempted abductionoviet diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led by an official of the Argentine Federal Police. The effort was foiled by the police. One of the most spectacular events of the year was theand murder of former president Pedro Aramburu. He was abducted onay. and the kidnapers, who later identified themselves as Montoneros. saidune that he had been tried and executed for crimes allegedlywhen herovisional government. The military government ofOngania, seriously embarrassed, was ousted by the armedeek later.
Terrorism has continued during theof General Levingston.man commando group, whose membersthemselves as Montoneros.mall town near Cordoba. Theyank,the police station, and severedFour weeksimilar raid was madeown near the capital. In October, tho home of the US Defense Attache was fire-bombed, and other explosive devices were found at the homes of two other US officials. Later in the month terrorists forcibly entered the homes of three US military officers and made off with arms,and identity documents.
Terrorism in Argentina is less spectacular than in Uruguay or Brazil, but the Aramburu murder and its aftermath demonstratemall and fanatical group can achieve. It is likely that terrorist bands will increase their activities this year, aiming especially at US officials.they have not demonstrated many of the capabilities of the Tupamaros or of one or two Brazilian terrorist groups, Argentine urban bands are slowly increasing their potential both by experience and probably through their contacts with the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR.security and police forces have not yet had much success in halting them, and relatively few guerrillas have been imprisoned.
Little is known about the extent of support and sympathy for the-terrorists, but as in Brazil and Uruguay, youths and studentsubstantial portion. Elements of Argentine's highly politicized labor federations probably sympathize generally with terrorist objectives, and it is also known that some radical priests, membersroup known in Argentina as the Third World Movement, have contacts in terrorist circles. LastThird World" priest waswo-year suspended prisonfor his alleged contacts with terroristsin the Aramburu murder. Measuresby the government late last year were designed to move Argentina gradually toward constitutional government during the next four or five years, but they are not expected toajor impact in reducing terrorists' activities. It is likely, in fact, that terrorist activity will continue to increase during the next few years and mayore serious problem to the government.
Because of its geographic location in the center o' South America and the weakness of its political Institutions, Bolivia has longarget of cross-border subversion.rom Bolivia and other South American countries, with Cuban support, attempted to avongo and vindicate Che Guevara by reviving his National Liberation Armyven though ELN rural guerrilla effortsecond time, revolutionaries have continued their attempts to give the impressionontinental guerrilla movement is being forged in Bolivia. There were reports last NovemberSouth American Liberation Army" was trying to begin operations in Bolivia, and Cuban propaganda continues to place heavy emphasis on the internationaland support of revolutionary activity In Bolivia. Despite this outside interest and rhetoric, efforts to revive rural guerrilla action have been completely frustrated. In recent months,the ELN appears to be taking an increased interest in urban guerrilla methods, and it is likely that rural efforts will be abandoned, at least temporarily.
The present ELN is the offspring of the movement founded and led by Guevara until it was all but obliteratednti Peredo, one of the survivors of that effort, began to reorganize revolutionary cadres8bout SO Cuban-trained guerrillas infiltrated Boliviaemonstrating Havana's continued interest in guerrilla warfare. Inowever, inti was killedolice raid, and leadership passed to hit brother Chato.
Onhe resuscitated ELNanother phase of guerrilla activity bya mining camp at Teoponte. north of La Paz. Aboutuerrillas, many of them students from La Paz, dynamited the installation and seized two German employees as hostages. Tho Bolivian Government later released ten political prisoners in order to free the hostages. The ELN was forced to take the defensive almostand counter insurgency forces picked off the guerrillas systematically in skiimishas during the next few months. By early September, when eight guerrillas were killedrre-'ight, the ELN probably had been reduced to hall its original size. By Ihe end of October, Chato Peredo had been captured and aboutuerrillasow remained in the countryside and eight,Peredo and three Chileans, woro granted safe conducts to Chile. Rural guerrilla activity ceased.
The ELN is unusual in the recent history of insurgency in the hemisphere because of thelevel of cooperation and support itfrom revolutionaries in nearby countries. The original pronouncement of the ELN, left at the site of the Teoponte raid, indicated that six Chileans, four Argentines, two Brazilians, and two Peruvians were ELN members. Subsequentand body counts show that at least the majority of these were with the guerrillas. The present ELN. unlike the original, however, has Bolivians In command, and there are noreports that Cuban personnel are currently in Bolivia.
In0 the Uruguayan press published the textetter allegedly written by Chato Peredo and addressed to the Uruguayan Tupamaro terrorist group. It announced theol "lormal" relations between the Tupamaros and the ELN. Chato said that "in the near future we must give more and more proof of integration, not only in the sense of help, buthe interchange ofnommittee for the support of the ELN was formed in Chile. Socialist Senator Carlos Alta-mirano was named director and tho thencandidate, Salvador Allende.ember. This committee was publicized heavily by Cuba's official media, but thus tar Havana appears to have done no more thanpsychological support.
Following the collapse of its rural guerrilla operation, the ELN appears to bo shifting
ished statements now warn will "fight to the final victory in the mountains and thearlier statements did not refer to urban activities. So far. however, the ELN hasimited capacity for urbanItayroll truck in La Pazut lost several trained guerrillas in the process. It has carried out well-publicized murders of several o' Its political opponents in the lastonths, including two in the capital recently. It is probably also responsible for some of thethat occur sporadically in La Paz, and the dynamiting of the USlS office in Santa Cruz
Like the FAR in Guatemala, the Cuban* oriented ELN is not the only violentgroup in Bolivia. The pro-Chinese Communist Party began its own militant operations inwhen party membersattle ranch and handed it over to peasant groups. The action was designed to gain sympathy from the peasants and toase for future guerrilla operations. The government's subsequent seizure of the property practically annulled the party's gains, however.
One faction of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party is also committed to guerrillabut some of its better trained members have joined the ELN. The pro-Soviet Communist Party is opposed to guerrilla activities and.esult, many of its more activist members have joined the ELN.
Because of the continued interest of Bolivian and foreign revolutionaries in maintaining aninsurgency in Bolivia, the ELN probably will continue to be active. Significant numbers of university students are ELN members orand the labor unions, whichong tradition of radicalism, may also contributeThe ELN has made it clear in repeated announcements that it intends to persevere in the struggle, and propaganda support from Cuba has continued. It is likely that individual Chilean and Uruguayan revolutionaries will continue to donate their services. Havana provides propaganda support and is in close contact with ELN cadres, but it is not known if materia! backing has been provided.
During the last two or three years there has been more violence and terrorism incountry of only five million people-than In any other country in the hemisphere. It is estimated that terrorist activities7 have resulted in an average of abouthird of whom have been policemen. It is also believed that aboutrominent businessmen have been abducted for ransoms averaging
The major perpetrator of the violence is the Rebel Armed Forcesro-Cubangroup with both urban and rural wings. Inwo high-ranking members of the US military group in Guatemala were murdered by the FAR. and in August US Ambassador Meln was killedidnap attempt. The FAR was the first Latin American terrorist group to resort to kjdnapings, assassinations, and otherforms of urban violence.
9 the FAR has escalated itsIn the autumn, guerrillas overran ancamp near the Mexican border,ural town, temporarily seized farms in outlying areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas. In December, the FARarticularly violent but unsuccessful campaign to disrupt the0 presidential election. FAR cadres killed moreozen security officials, the right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala
ighly regarded editor of theleading newspaper. Fire bombings inGuatemala City caused damage estimated in the millions of dollars.
rban terrorism largely supplanted rural offensives. On the eve of the election the FAR secured the releaseaptured colleague by kidnaping the Guatemalan foreign minister,eek later it obtained the release of two other guerrillas in exchange for the abducted US Labor Attache. After the election in March, West German Ambassador Von Spreti was kidnaped. He was killedpril when the government reversed its earlier policy and refused to negotiate with the terrorists.
guerrilla operations apparently have been minimized temporarily, but guerrilla safe zones have been established in the hinterlands, perhaps as havens for urban terrorists on the run. Inwo-month lull in urban activities ended with dozens of bombings,kidnapings. and various scattered acts of sabotage.
Havana's expectations from the FAR are commensurate with its investment.'
Guatemala has been one of the top countries on Havana's list of targets since the, and today it is probably Ihe only country in the hemisphere where Cuban guerrilla advisers are in the field. It is believed that atrained in Cuba were infiltrated into Guatemala latenhe FAR reportedlyrom Havana, and in0 it received. In early October two more Cuban guerrilla advisers arrived in Guatemala Cit
periodic contacts with the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua and the Honduran Francisco Morazon Movement. FAR instructors reportedly were dispatched to train members of the Salvadoran Revolutionary Action group innly in Nicaragua, however, where the small and harried FSLN is active sporadically, have revolutionaries dared to bring their embryonic units out into the open.
In0 the hijackersosta Rican airliner identified themselves as members of the United Revolutionary Front of Central America. This was the first public mention of this sobriquet, but fragmentary clandestine reports in9roup called the UnitedForces of Central America. It is not likelynited or coordinated Centralrevolutionary group exists at this time in moreropaganda context.
The FAR has engagod in some cross-border operations, mainly Into neighboring Mexico and Honduras in search of safohavens. It was inexican hideout, however, where Marcos Antonio Yoneteran of Guatemalanstruggles0 and leader of the nowh of November Revolutionary Movement, was killedexican Army patrol in
Terrorism is not the work of the FAR alone. The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) is also committed to armed revolution even though its long-term strategy calls for preparing the masses prior to violent operations.2 the party has tried to gam control over its own guerrilla factions, and it hasistory of rivalry with the FAR. interspersed with occasional abortive periods of unification. Party leaders reportedly are afraid that the political gains they have made might be lost by an all-out terrorist campaign, but this has not provented them from applauding and masterminding acts of assassination and other
The upsurge of terrorist activity inresulted in one of the harshest crackdowns in memory. Onovember Presidentday state of siege that was extended in December for another month. Stringent counter-insurgency measures were adopted that resulted in the death of at least one guerrilla leader and the capture of another. The government's actions were so exaggerated that the Airleet of Salvadoran shrimp boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in illicit activity. Four boats were sunk, two Salvadorans were kilted, andounded.
Right-wing counterterrorists have also been activearge scale. Their operations were responsible for many deaths during the recent state of siege. President Arana has admittedthat the government is unable fully to control counterterror. for most of which police and security officials are responsible. Government and right-wing sources are believed responsible for the recent murders of two prominent politicians. Onanuary congressman Adolfowell-known intellectual who had been confined to akilled. Onanuary one of Guatemala's leading labor officials was machine gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent political figures on the government's clandestine assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of retributory violence in motion.
Neither the government nor the left-wing terrorists are likely toecisive victory in the near future. US citizens and other foreigners will continue to be majorSwas beaten andby right-wingearly December, and US officials have escaped kidnaping in recent months largely because of heightened security precautions. FAR terrorists spent almost two days in earlyfollowing and attempting toS diplomat. They were deterred because of thesecurity measures he used, but the FAR can be expected to peisevere in such efforts.
Since the peak of activity2nsurgency has fallen to suchin Venezuela that there are nowlessuerrillas divided into several rival guerrilla factions, and only isolated acts of urban violence occur. Rural guerrillas continue to decline in importance and pose no direct threat to the government. They haveew small raids and ambushes during the last few years, but are not capable of sustained operations and are expected gradually to abandon the struggle or resort to banditry. Low-level violence and crime could increase in the cities this year, but this will noterious problem.
The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) was one of the primary recipients of Cuban support for many years, as well as one of the most active and formidable guerrilla groups in the hemisphere.24 ita high level of urban terrorism with rural operations.he Betancourtprobably was more beleaguered andby terrorists and guerrillas than any Latin American government since Batista's in Cuba.24 urban terrorists burned factories, murdered police and security personnel,opular Spanish athlete, and engaged In various acts of sabotage. In2 the US Embassy was bombed. US businesses were raided, and two US military advisers were kidnaped. Rural operations were carried on simultaneously, and spectacular acts such as the seizureenezuelan merchant ship on the high seas were carried out.
No Foreign Dissem
fortunes declined steadily under the Leom. however, and6 the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) formally abandoned violent tactics Under the leadership of Douglas Bravo, some FALN cadres split with the PCV over this decision,with Cuban aid to revive rural guerrilla insurgency.owever, the FALN had fallen into such lassitude and incompetence, that Castro publicly denounced Biavouban guerrilla advisers, including at least two members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party who had been attached to the FALN. were withdrawn byther forms of Cuban support also dried up. The Pro-Castro Movemont of theLeft (MIR) has been activen9 it split into three rival factions, two of which competeotal of aboutuerrillas in the field. The MIR has received Cuban aid in the past, but today it is inactive and unpromising from Havana's point of view.
Guerrilla fortunes were so dimn fad, that President Caideraide-ranging pacification program in March aimed at absorbing Communists and guerrillas into the legal political framework. He offered an amnesty to guerrillas who would lay down their arms, legalized the Communist Party, establishedwith the USSR, reorganized the security forces and restrained aggressive armed forces operations against the guerrillas. The pacification plan has been successful In attracting someaway from their mountain redoubts and probably has undermined moral* and added to the divisions among those who remain in the field.
Some Venezuelan officials appear to bethat small bands of revolutionaries may seek to emulate the successes of terrorists in other South American countries. The defense minister said publicly onanuary that the government is concernedossible increase in terrorism. He cited as evidence the murderormer guerrilla by FALNombing in
Caracas, and an attempted bombing. The US Embassy in Caracas has speculated that the recent split of the PCV into two factions could result in sharper competition among extremist groups and an increase in violence and crime. PCV dissidents, includinghird o' the party's leaders, areew party less subservient to Moscow. This faction could resort to robberies in order to fund its activities, even though the use of violent methods wouldepa'tui* from the peaceful approach that all factions of the PCVhus, despite the current low level of violence and crime and the possibility that it will increase somewhat this year, there is virtually no chance that terrorism or guerrilla activity will be renewed on levels comparable to those of the.
Rural violence has boon an integral part of Colombian life8 when rampantand guerrilla strlfo thatecade were
An ELN Guerrilla Tnuniag Camp
unleashed. Duringhree rival guerrilla forces looking to Moscow, Havana, and Peking for support emerged from the remnants of earlier rural struggle. None prospered for long, however, and all have declined appreciably during the last
No Fo/eign Disscm
years. They no longer attract young recruits or receive much publicity in the cities or on the campuses. In all, there are probably onlyuerrillas incountryeople.
The guerrillas have generally confined their activities to marginal mountain areas, and they now engage more in banditry than in guerrilla warfare. Because of these activities, they still cause trouble in the countryside and to the security forces, who have great difficulty
The Army of National Liberat.on (ELN) is the most active guerrilla group in Colombia, it has enjoyed considerable prominence there and in the rest of Latin Americahen it began guerrilla operations and lost in battle its most famousguerrilla priest Camllo Torres. In early0 the ELN ambushed an army patrol, killing seven soldiers and wounding eight. It was the most serious guerrilla action of any kind in Colombia in moreear.
The ELN suffers from internal fissures and frequent defections, however, and its urbanapparatus in Bogota is reported to be in disarray. Cuban advisers may have been in the field with the ELN6ut Havana apparently had cut off all aidhe ELN is reported toen under arms, but they are divided into four groups and operate Inareas.
The Revolutionary Armed Forceshe action arm of the pro-Soviet Colombian Communist Party, is larger than the ELN but less active. Operating in four main groups, the FARC's policy since8 has been to avoid provoking the government, because Moscow is reluctant to have the FAR jeopardize newly established Colombian-Soviet relations or the legal role of the Communist Party. Some small clashes with military forces take place from
The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) is the action arm of the pro-Peking Communist Party of Colombia/Marxist-Leninist. It reportedly consists o'en in five groups. The EPL avoids clashes with superior forces, but hassmalt, isolated towns, ranches, and police posts. Such raids apparently are the product of the EPL's weakness and its need to acquireand publicity. There is no evidence that the EPL receives regular financial support from Peking.
These guerrilla groups have not engaged in significant urban violence and appear to havecapacity for such action. They do not pose serious challenges to the government, and are likely to continue to fade in importance.
Rural guerrilla insurgency probably will be eschewediable method by Latin American revolutionaries in most countries in thefuture. Although the Cubans are likely to continue emphasizing this approach and some urban revolutionaries will express the belief that urban and rural tactics should be employed simultaneously, fewer and fewer volunteers are likely to be enlisted for rural action. Guatemala, where all forms of violence and terrorism remain at unprecedented levels, may be the only countryesurgence of rural guerrilla activity is possible. The Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Cubans will probably continue to encourage and perhaps materially supportfrom other Central American countries. The potential for revolution in those countries is not very great, however, and it is unlikely that new rural guerrilla groups will emerge in the next year or so.
Urban revolutionaries in South America have been far more successful than their rural counter-parts in embarrassing governments and instability. They have won Importantfrom the govern meny in forcing the release of political prisoners. Inthey were able to exploit the weaknesses of
No Fonfign Dlssem
Ongania regime and they contributedhange ol government after they kidnaped andormer president. This year, terrorist activities may increase in Argentina and Bolivia, continue at relatively high levels in Brazil and Uruguay, and they could be initiated by small, fanatical bands at any time in several otherProspects are, therefore, that terroristwill increase in as many asozen South American countries.
In the entire South American continent, however, there are probably no morective urban revolutionaries. Police and counter-terrorist techniques became more sophisticated and effectivend terrorists have been dealt hard blows in several countries. Important guerrilla leaders in Uruguay, Brazil, andhave been killed or captured, and largeol terrorists are in jail. Thus, althoughsecurity forces probably will not be able to extirpate terrorist groups, they may continue to Increase their capabilities in neutralizing andthem. Terrorists succeeded at first largely because governments were surprised, confused, and unprepared to deal with them.owever, as terrorist methods became better known the Guatemalan Governmentirm policy of refusing to negotiate withand the Uruguayan Government persisted in the same policy despite important ktdnapings. Kidnaped foreign officials were murdered in each countryesult, but guerrillas sufferedlosses of popularity for their brutality.the Brazilian Government in the pastquickly to terrorist demands, itougher line in the recent Bucher kidnaping and undoubtedly will uphold this firm position in future dealings with guerrillas.
Small bands of violent urban revolutionaries may be able to harass and embarrass Latingovernments lor some time to come, but they are not likely lo pose serious challenges to any with the possible exceptions of the regimes of Guatemala and Uruguay. In Guatemala, FAR-ini-tlated violence and right-wing counterterroramountmall-scale, bloody civil war that could increase in proportion depending on what actions the government takes. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros continue to demonstrate aability to carry out spectacularThey probably can add other hostages to the three foreigners they already hold, and they will undoubtedly sustain and seek to increase terrorist activities of all kinds in the months pre-cedinq the1 elections.|