PAKISTAN, INDIA, AND COMMUNIST CHINA: A CHANGE IN RELATIONS?

Created: 1/19/1971

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Intelligence Memorandum

Pakistan, India, and Communisthange In Relations?

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Pakistan, India, and Communisthange in Relations?

introduction

For at least the past five years, Pakistan's need for Chinese support against India has dominated its foreign policy. Some time nextainly East Pakistani civilian government may well replace the present predominantly West Pakistani military government. The foreign policy views of such awould differ from those of its predecessor. This memorandum explores some of the factors that will work both for and against change in Islamabad's policy towards New Delhi and Peking.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.

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The Present Policy

Indian efforts in the field of foreign policy were all directed tcwarde one aim, the isolation of Pakistan and its dis integration. President Ayub Khan in Friends not)

hen British India was divided into Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India, West Pakistanis usually have controlled the central government of Pakistan and dominated the influential military and civil service there. They have operated under the assumption that India planned either to absorb or to dominate its smaller neighbors. Among the many Indo-Pakistani issues, the one they most often have cited as evidence of Hindu expansionism is the continued occupation of predominantly Muslim Kashmir, aninymbol of deeperhas led to two wars with India. New Delhi's insistence that Kashmir's accession to India is final and not further negotiable, combined with Pakistan's refusal tothe status quo resulting fromas effectively blocked the building of good relations.

Because Pakistani leaders believed therelear military threat from India, they sought outside help against their larger neighbor. During thendn alliance with the US resultedassive US military aid program that largely satisfied Pakistan's perceived needs. owever, in the midst of one of the Indo-Pak-istani wars over Kashmir, the US halted armsto both belligerents. Pakistan with less diverse sources of armsmaller indigenous arms production capability than India, was forced

to turn to other countries for assistance.

the brief war, Pakistanmilitary and political help from anations, but its only effective ally Pakistani leadersChinese threats and ultimataIndian divisions tied down, therebyinvasion of East Pakistan and the collapseforces in the west.

Since the war, Pakistan has sought armsumber of sources, but with limited success. Only China (the Pakistanis believe that Peking is aiding them within the limits of Chinesehas been forthcoming, supplying tanks, jet fighters, and other equipment Pakistan felt it needed to replace combat losses and to try touildup of the Soviet-supplied Indian military.

The Sino-Pakistani relationship has not been free of problems, but Pakistani leaders have soon few alternatives to its continuation. the West Pakistan establishment--based on landowners andhad almost nothing in common with China's Communist rulers, and this has led them to suspect Chinese motives and to be concerned over possible Chinese interference in Pakistan's domestic affairs. Chinese arms, although welcome, have been of inferior quality, and Peking has not always been able to supply necessary spare parts or meet agreed delivery schedules.

Of most concern to the Pakistanis, however, has been the fear, especially after Yahya came to power inhat Peking was losingin Pakistan. Indian attempts over the past

two years toapprochement with China have worried Islamabad, and the continued postponements of Chou En-lai's visit tohas been talked about for severaladded to this concern. The warm reception given President Yahya Khan in Peking inoupled with an extensive grant of economicthat time the second largest ever given bynot completely dispel Pakistani worries.

The Awarai League Foreign Policy

We believe that loriaZteat ion of reli'iont with our neighbours would be to the beet advantage of our peoples. Mujibur Rahmanationwide political broadcast)

7akistanis electedassembly that will begin toew

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constitution in February. If the delegates are able toumber of difficult constitutional problems and if their solutions are accepted by President Yahyaivilian government will come to power early next summer- The national assembly will become the national iegislature--or the lower house if the constitution calls icameralits leaders willignificant role in determining the country'spolicy,

8* The Awami League s (AL) sweep of elections in East Pakistan meansit won no seats in thewillajority in the assembly. Its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, would be the logical choice for prime minister should Pakistan decidearliamentaryand. conceivably, the Awami League, acting alone, could form the first government.

has devoted himself toautonomy for East Pakistan and hasa comprehensive foreign policy. however, good indications of the directionthinking.

Mujib and most East Pakistanis would not view India in the same light as have Pakistan's previous rulers. Because of their struggle for provincial autonomy the Bengalis of East Pakistan see domination from West Pakistanorethreat to their independence than India, and considerations such as Islamabad's competition with New Delhi for international prestige have beento the Bengali cause. With the army seen as an agent of West Pakistan and with too few troops in the East Pakistan army to defend it from Indian attack, Bengalis have concluded that negotiation rather than military confrontation is the only feasible means of protecting their interests.

Opposing interests of the two areas of the country have carried over into differences over the relative importance of Indo-Pakistani problems. For the Bengalis, Kashmir is neither an

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emotional nor an especially important issue. the election campaign, Mujib gave lip service to the self-determination for Kashmir but hasurged that the issue be set aside so that more important problems could be solved. In the past, Pakistan has insisted that allbe resolved, and New Delhi has refused to discuss the disputed state.

Mujib is primarily interested intrade with India and in allocating waterbetween East Pakistan and eastern India. When Indo-Pakistani trade was haltedroblems were created for both East Pakistan and eastern India. Pakistani jute is now shipped to Calcutta via Singapore, the agricultural products of Assam can no longer be exported by river through East Pakistan, and East Pakistan must import coal thousands of miles from China instead of from Indian fieldsew hundred miles away. In West Pakistan--where Indian and Pakistani economies were not closelyrestoration of trade has been unimportant- In fact, West Pakistanis have tried to take advantage of the Indian desire for commercial relations to force concossions on other issues.

ajorest Pakistani problem was solved when an agreement was reached on thc distribution of the waters of the Indus and its tributaries. But-ong series of meetings over the past several years, there has been noto the parallel problem of the Ganges andwhich flow from India through East Pakistan. India will soonarrage at Farakka on

thc Ganges that will divert water from Eastto the Calcutta area. The Pakistanis claim that the loss of water will prevent developmentin some parts of East Pakistan and have even speculated on harmful effects to thecology. Although the Bengalis have not viewed this problem with anything approaching the emotion Kashmirin the west, the Awami Leagueressed its concern and at one point demanded that the issue be taken to the UN. Negotiations will be difficult,

but Mujib apparently believes the problem can be solved, especially if West Pakistani demands do not complicate the discussions.

Pj|hag called for Pakistan's withdrawn ron cento and seato, but despite his neutralist statements and his leftist tendencies in domestic programs, he is still basically pro-Western. In East Pakistan, potentially the strongestto Mujib both within and outside the AL comes from the far left and includes groups that advocate Maoist policies. For all these reasons, Mujib's predilections are to minimize Chinese influence in Pakistan.

success ofndia policy,will probably decide his China policy. succeed in normalizing relations with Newneedhinese ally will diminish. Attime, the lessening of tensions on thewould make it somewhat easier for both

the us and USSR to supply arms the Pakistanis maywant.

the other hand, should Mujib failrelations with India, he might wellthe established Pakistani policy of closewith Peking. Should there be difficultywith India, this alone couldto him the value ofhineseplay. Moreover, as West PakistaniIndia may well emerge as the greaterin the eyes of Mujib and his followers.

Limitations on Mujib

_ The roote of confrontation between India andan go deep into our hietory and will have to continue until the cause of juetioe triumpr.e, no matter how heavye odde. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in The Myth of Independence

17. Domestic politics may limit Mu]ib'sof action in dealing with India, despite the

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AL sweep in the National Assembly election in In those elections, the Pakistan People's Party, led by Z, A. Bhutto,ajority of the seats in West Pakistan, and Bhutto now isto make himself the spokesman for the country's western wing.

Bhutto served as foreign minister under Ayub Khan* and his writings and speechesetailed picture of his foreign policy views. Bhutto is somewhat more extreme in his dislike of India than most Pakistanis, and he has fewer reservations about close relations with China, Although he disagrees with the military and the former West Pakistani establishment on most domestic issues, he differs only slightly on foreign policy, in any contest for power with Mujib, Bhutto might try for military backing by emphasizing foreign policy and the few other areas, such as limitations on provincial autonomy, on which he and the generals are in substantial agreement.

Should Mujib try to ignore the Kashmir issue, sacrifice West Pakistani interests to obtain Indian agreement on the Farakka Barrage, or move far enough from China to weaken West Pakistan's ability to withstand an Indian invasion, he mightnited West Pakistani opposition and the threat of military intervention. To avoidituation, Mujib might modify his foreign policy views, especially if by doing so he will enhance his ability to implement his domestic program and to gain greater autonomy for East Pakistan.

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